Significance of the Forming of the First Air Fleet

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rob0274
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Significance of the Forming of the First Air Fleet

#1

Post by rob0274 » 25 Aug 2015, 23:02

Evans & Peattie in Kaigun state that the First Air Fleet was the first permanent carrier force, whereas the USN only temporarily brought their carriers together for exercises. I am a little confused by this. Evans and Peattie themselves state earlier that the First Air Fleet was not an autonomous tactical formation like the later USN task forces but an administrative unit. How different was that in practice from the USN's Aircraft, Battle Force, containing the Battle Force's 2 carrier divisions?

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Re: Significance of the Forming of the First Air Fleet

#2

Post by cstunts » 26 Aug 2015, 03:23

Where exactly (on what page) do E & P state that First Air Fleet was "not an autonomous tactical formation like the later USN task forces but an administrative unit" ?


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Re: Significance of the Forming of the First Air Fleet

#3

Post by rob0274 » 26 Aug 2015, 13:30

cstunts wrote:Where exactly (on what page) do E & P state that First Air Fleet was "not an autonomous tactical formation like the later USN task forces but an administrative unit" ?
They state on page 349 that the First Air Fleet was "not an independent tactical formation that could undertake a naval operation on its own[.]" Later they call it "an effective administrative and operational unit" on page 351.

Kaigun does not explain the exact significance of the formation of the First Air Fleet as the first massing of carriers (as claimed), nor does it explain how it differed from the massing of carriers under Aircraft, Battle Force. It is unclear whether they believe the FAF was an administrative grouping from which carriers would be assigned to actual task forces based on operational needs, or 10 carriers sailing and fighting together. They say it was the former, but then they imply that it was the latter.

I've not been able to find much information about organization and administration in either the IJN or the USN. The couple of books about the WW2 carrier warfare and US naval aviation I've read do not go into any detail about the administrative aspects of naval aviation, although they are admittedly 'popular' histories. Parshall and Tully's website makes some exaggerated claims which directly contradict both what E&P wrote in Kaigun and common sense, namely calling the FAF a tactical formation that could travel long distances and bring decisive air power to bear.

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Re: Significance of the Forming of the First Air Fleet

#4

Post by hisashi » 26 Aug 2015, 19:04

In peacetime, one chain of command dealt with BOTH administrative and operational aspects of the navy. Here;
Administrative issues: personnel management (promotion, transfer, salary), supply, procurement...
Operative issues: combat, movement, training...

In wartime, multi-type vessels' team was formed. Nagumo's force in Pearl Harbor, 'kido butai' included far more units and ships than those attached to his 1st air fleet.

In general, IJN called ad-hoc teams for operation as 'guntai kubun 軍隊区分'. An operation plan included specifications of each guntai kubun and hierarchy among them.

Any administrative issues were processed by resources (men) in fleet-squadron-division chain, regardless of their temporal assignment to any guntai kubun. For example, a destroyer division (kuchikutai) had 2 - 4 DDs. kuchikutai HQ had some war accountant (shukei) officers and petty officers to help and direct war accountants on DDs. If a kuchikutai had heavy loss DD might be transferred to another kuchikutai, resulted in considerable paper work to merge/split their personnel records.

In that meaning, Nagumo's 1st air fleet was not autonomous in that they needed reinforcements to make any operation, and they retained administrative functions any fleets had.

Ozawa's 1st mobile fleet in 1944 was relatively autonomous in that they had carriers, battleships/cruisers and plenty of destroyers. But 2nd and 3rd fleets under Ozawa kept their administrative job, and anyway Ozawa's fleet was not completely (operationally) autonomous in that they did not have any fleet oiler in their formation. In the Battle of the Philippine Sea IJN attached oiler units to them as a guntai kubun.

As an antonym to guntai kubun, fleet-squadron-division chain or counterparts for other (aviation, garrison...) unit types was called as kensei 建制.

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Re: Significance of the Forming of the First Air Fleet

#5

Post by glenn239 » 26 Aug 2015, 19:29

1st Air Fleet was formed by breaking off the fleet carrier formations from, I believe, 2nd Fleet. Here's the fleets at the start of the war,

http://www.niehorster.org/014_japan/41- ... /_ijn.html

Zuiho is shown under the command of 1st Fleet, but was 1st Air Fleet responsible for it in any way? I'm not sure.

1st Air Fleet split off from 2nd Fleet I think because it was realised 2nd Fleet did not have the competency to command the carriers, which were recognised as becoming increasingly specialist and important. 1st Air Fleet was made responsible for its own training and battle doctrine. Whether it had further administrative function and if so how much, (such as equipment procurement) I'm not certain. For example, could Nagumo go to a factory and order special 700lbs bombs for his D3A1's if he wanted? I'm not sure, but I think he could. Could he order the development of new planes for his carriers? I don't think so. Kinda hazy.

On the tactics and training front, 1st Air Fleet was its own boss. Nagumo and his staff appear to have had full control over these, and in this sense 1st Air Fleet was a battle, not administrative, command. That's how Genda was able to unify the carrier air groups for combat operations, and that's also how Genda was able to skimp on recon until it killed 1st Air Fleet. I think Combined Fleet oversaw 1st Air Fleet training and doctrine, but in practice the carriers were so technical and specialised that Combined Fleet didn't often feel comfortable doing so, leaving 1st Air Fleet to its own devices. Since Genda and Kusaka had some pretty dangerous tactical ideas, the possibility for a Midway style defeat was present right from inception. It does not appear that 1st Air Fleet went out of its way to educate Combined Fleet on carrier tactics, instead using its specialist knowledge to incubate itself from Combined Fleet oversight and do what it wanted tactically. The situation was probably workable with a Yamaguchi or Ozawa, or maybe even a Hara, in command to snap the dynamic duo back into line whenever their thinking got too far out of line, but not with Nagumo, who was a dud air commander, out of his depth.

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Re: Significance of the Forming of the First Air Fleet

#6

Post by Wellgunde » 28 Aug 2015, 19:53

The Japanese fleet exercises of 1940 and 1941 pointed up problems with the IJN’s carrier employment doctrine. Dispersing them throughout the various components of the Combined Fleet made it virtually impossible to quickly bring them together so that their full offensive potential could be realized. The result was the formation in April 1941 of the First Carrier Fleet (Dai Ichi Kōkū Kantai). It was believed that consolidating all the carriers in one organization would significantly multiply their offensive power. Also, by making them directly subordinate to the commander of the Combined Fleet, carrier command and control would be enhanced making them more responsive to the tactical and strategic needs of the Combined Fleet commander. The concept probably came about through discussions between Genda and Yamamoto with Yamamoto providing the muscle to make it happen. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I believe Yamamoto stated that the Pearl Harbor Raid could not be successful without combining the carriers.

Commander, First Air Fleet was both an administrative command and an operational command. First Air Fleet was not a pure carrier organization Also attached were a number of destroyers to provide a screen for the carriers and to act as plane guards. At this stage of the war neither the U.S. nor the IJN forces were purely autonomous. Each relied on numerous fleet auxiliaries such as oilers to support them as operations dictated. IJN administrative organization was cumbersome with much duplication of effort. For example, each of the fleets had destroyers attached. And each fleet was responsible for the administrative, logistical, and materiel needs of those destroyers. The USN early on found this to be an unworkable system. The U.S. solution was to strip the administrative functions away from the operational forces and to turn those functions over to strictly administrative commands which were the forerunners of the Type Command system used today. For example, ComCruDesPac was responsible for the support of all cruisers and destroyers in the Pacific irrespective of which fleet or force to which they might be attached.

The U.S. administrative/task organization system was extremely flexible. Ships could be easily combined or transferred from command to command as operations required simply by sending a message. The TF designations made it very easy to identify the forces joined together for a particular operation and their chain of command without any reference to administrative organization. Nimitz had a free hand to move his ships around as needed. The IJN system was very rigid. Transferring a ship from one fleet or district to another required a directive or order from Navy Imperial General Headquarters. Within the fleet itself, the commander was authorized to form guntai kubun as needed.

The development, procurement and allocation of weapons, planes and ships was the sole prerogative of the Navy Ministry. The various fleet commanders had no direct say in the matter. It is probably safe to say though that the Naval Air Ministry was more attuned to the needs of the First Air Fleet than their counterparts in the surface portions of the Navy Ministry were to the commanders of the surface forces.
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Re: Significance of the Forming of the First Air Fleet

#7

Post by glenn239 » 28 Aug 2015, 21:29

Wellgunde wrote:The development, procurement and allocation of weapons, planes and ships was the sole prerogative of the Navy Ministry. The various fleet commanders had no direct say in the matter
With the procurement of shallow running torpedoes and special 16" penetrating bombs for Pearl Harbor, that meant that 1st Air Fleet would have to have put in a request for the special weapons to the Ministry, which then ordered the weapons on Nagumo's behalf from factory.
Correct me if I'm wrong, but I believe Yamamoto stated that the Pearl Harbor Raid could not be successful without combining the carriers.
That seems to have been a core concept in 1st Air Fleet, but Yamamoto also thought that the striking power of fewer carriers against Oahu was also valuable because of the potential for surprise. Hence, the contingency plan for bad weather preventing fuelling was an attack by the three carriers (Kaga, Zuikaku, Shokaku) that could make the roundtrip without refuelling rather than scrubbing the mission altogether.

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Re: Significance of the Forming of the First Air Fleet

#8

Post by cstunts » 28 Aug 2015, 22:15

It has been well-documented that Kaigunsho had enormous influence & control over the navy's armaments. However, it would not have represented any great feat or difficulty for Yamamoto to obtain what he wanted there...as there were certainly sympathetic hardliners in that bureaucracy, too.

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Re: Significance of the Forming of the First Air Fleet

#9

Post by Wellgunde » 28 Aug 2015, 22:29

glenn239 wrote:With the procurement of shallow running torpedoes and special 16" penetrating bombs for Pearl Harbor, that meant that 1st Air Fleet would have to have put in a request for the special weapons to the Ministry, which then ordered the weapons on Nagumo's behalf from factory.
Production of the Type 91, Revision Two Aerial Torpedo began in 1938. During its production life it was tweaked several times resulting in the addition of the anti-roller controller in August 1941. Since the Type 91 was the only aerial torpedo, I think the upgraded version would have been issued to the fleet by the Air Ministry as a matter of course without 1st Air Fleet having to specifically request it. What I don't know is if the early Type 91 Rev 2's had to be swapped out for the newer version or if it was simply a matter of installing a retrofit kit which could be performed by the individual carrier division maintenance crews. In any case, sufficient numbers were available to the 1st Air Fleet by December 1941 to ensure the success of the Pearl Harbor mission.

It is also interesting to note (to me at least) that the testing of the newer Type 91 Rev 2's was carried out by the Yokosuka Naval Air Group and not by the 1st Air Fleet. Did 1st Air Fleet have time to practice with the new torpedo between August and December or was it an accepted article of faith that it would operate as advertised?
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Re: Significance of the Forming of the First Air Fleet

#10

Post by Wellgunde » 28 Aug 2015, 22:50

cstunts wrote:It has been well-documented that Kaigunsho had enormous influence & control over the navy's armaments. However, it would not have represented any great feat or difficulty for Yamamoto to obtain what he wanted there...as there were certainly sympathetic hardliners in that bureaucracy, too.
Very true and perhaps only Yamamoto had that level of influence. However, it is also true that he had to choose his battles carefully. His opposition to the Tripartite Pact almost cost him his career and might have cost him his life. It is also fortunate that the engineers and planners in the lower levels of the Navy Ministry were intent on producing the best weapons possible in spite of any foot dragging and hindrance from officers higher up in the food chain.
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Re: Significance of the Forming of the First Air Fleet

#11

Post by cstunts » 29 Aug 2015, 00:37

It is a bit of a myth--probably concocted in Japan originally--that Yamamoto was in any real sense a 'moderate'...There are well-informed and significant Japanese scholars today (who have done immeasurably more, and better, research than their Western counterparts) who do not regard him as anything but a hardliner. And see Isoroku as by no means all that stable.

Similarly, one should understand that there were a number of strong-willed & formidable hardliners among the upper echelons of engineer officers.

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Re: Significance of the Forming of the First Air Fleet

#12

Post by hisashi » 29 Aug 2015, 06:12

In general, shallow water torpedo for anchorage attack was a theme for Japanese (or all in the world) engineers and torpedo-bomber crews of the day. The requirement became severer to avoid spin of torpedo when released in high speed. Murata, appointed as the torpedo-bomber leader of Akagi and eventually of the 1st air fleet, was an expert in joint study by Yokosuka NAG and Yokosuka Naval Air Technical Arsenal.

The prototype became available in the middle of Aug 1941 and Murata tried it. Only few leading figures in the fleet torpedo-bombers were lucky enough to try 'real' new type 91 rev 2 torpedo in early November. Until then, flight crew were simply told to release training torps at high speed and at lower altitude. In the final phase of training they had training torpedo with stabilizer fin.

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Re: Significance of the Forming of the First Air Fleet

#13

Post by Wellgunde » 29 Aug 2015, 10:07

cstunts wrote:There are well-informed and significant Japanese scholars today (who have done immeasurably more, and better, research than their Western counterparts) who do not regard him as anything but a hardliner. And see Isoroku as by no means all that stable.
Thank you. I would appreciate it if you could recommend some of these works.
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Re: Significance of the Forming of the First Air Fleet

#14

Post by Wellgunde » 29 Aug 2015, 10:20

Thank you, Hisashi. 戦史叢書 v.31 海軍軍戦備(1)昭和十六年十一月まで is on my research to do list.
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