Military stocks and equipment in the Home Islands at the end of the war

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BobTheBarbarian
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Military stocks and equipment in the Home Islands at the end of the war

#1

Post by BobTheBarbarian » 18 Nov 2015, 04:40

Lately I've been doing some research on Operation Ketsu-Go, the Japanese counter to America's Operation Downfall. Based on reading and prior knowledge I know a decent amount about both of them, but what always seems to escape me are the figures of raw numbers, specifically the number of tanks, artillery pieces, and motor vehicles available (or planned to be available) by the start of the campaign.

Some specific requests:

- What was the number of tanks in all of Japan (and on Kyushu Island in particular) by August 1945, and what was the production schedule?
- What was the number of motor vehicles in all of Japan and on Kyushu by August 1945, and what was the future production schedule and fuel availability?
- What was the number and ammunition stock of all artillery pieces in Japan and on Kyushu and what was the future production schedule?

More on the subject of Ketsu-Go:

- What was the fighting power of the 200-series "assault divisions," especially those on Kyushu, relative to both a standard division and an elite formation such as those from the original Kwantung Army? How did they compare with American divisions?

- How was General Shizuichi Tanaka's ability as a commander? I understand that he was personally a well-rounded, even pro-Western, individual who had visited many foreign countries and almost single-handedly stopped the coup attempt on August 15th, though I know relatively little about his generalship. Had the campaign extended to the Kanto Plain, how in your opinion would he have lead the 12th Area Army?

I ask these questions because I'm trying to find out just how the IJA (and those IJN units that still existed either in the air, on the ground, or at sea) in the Home Islands stacked up against what the Allies were about to throw at them, and just what kind of chances did they have. So far I have found little to nothing in the available Western sources, so I turned to this site to see if any Japanese documentation could provide the answers. Thank you all in advance for your time.

Sincerely, Bob
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Re: Military stocks and equipment in the Home Islands at the end of the war

#2

Post by Eugen Pinak » 18 Nov 2015, 14:31

You can find some answers in the final chapters of the Vol.2 of "MacArthur Report".


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Re: Military stocks and equipment in the Home Islands at the end of the war

#3

Post by BobTheBarbarian » 18 Nov 2015, 14:46

Eugen Pinak wrote:You can find some answers in the final chapters of the Vol.2 of "MacArthur Report".
I have read both this and the Japanese Monographs that are readily available as well as Giangreco and Frank, yet there seems to be little information on the above. :(
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Re: Military stocks and equipment in the Home Islands at the end of the war

#4

Post by OpanaPointer » 18 Nov 2015, 15:46

Checked John Ray Skates' book yet? Lots of numbers there.
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Re: Military stocks and equipment in the Home Islands at the end of the war

#5

Post by Eugen Pinak » 18 Nov 2015, 16:05

Indeed. That's why I've written "some". Complete picture (at least in regard to holdings) is available in IJGHQ reports, furnished to MacArthur after surrender, but I don't know, in which US archive they can be found.

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Re: Military stocks and equipment in the Home Islands at the end of the war

#6

Post by hysteric » 18 Nov 2015, 17:16

Hello Bob,

Maybe this will help somewhat? Notes taken from the Japanese Monograph No.17 Homeland Defence. My understanding is the divisions you are asking about have been characterized as having a fighting strength no better than a weak brigade, but coming from me that information is at best anecdotal.

The last passage may be the closest to answering the Army's logistic situation in Japan at this time. This information relates the Ketsu-Go plan.

Mobilization Plan for Mainland Japan: January 1945
Imperial General Headquarters ordered the mobilization of 40 divisions and 20 independent mixed brigades (the number was estimated in October 1944) for the purpose of defending the Homeland.
--Lacking equipment and experienced leadership these organizations would be too weak to defend Japan, the plan was to draw further strength, especially officers, from Manchuria and China. It was recognized this would greatly weaken these areas but the trade-off was a better defense of the Homeland.
--Navy surplus matériel was commandeered to bolster dwindling stocks, and munitions and matériel stored in Manchuria were ordered shipped to Japan.

Civil Defence Plan: Under the plan the various District Army Headquarters in Japan were divided into the operational and administrative with the commander of each Area Army responsible.
1) The position of Divisional District commander was created to support organizing the Homeland civilian reserve force.
2) Under the Divisional District commander was the Guard District commander and under him, Local Defense Units.

The Guard District commands were of two types, according to the location of the command.
Type “A” assigned to suburban and rural prefectures
Type "B" assigned to such cities as Yokohama, Nagoya, Kyoto, Osaka and Kobe.
(Because the Imperial Palace was located in Tokyo and because it was the seat of government was excluded from this plan.)

The types of units organized included:
1) Regular Guard Units; those who served as full-time soldiers in training and actual duty.
2) Specially Established Guard Units; personnel who had combat experience and since returned to civilian life. These were authorized to continue work at their civilian jobs while being defense force members.
3) Local Defense Units; composed of personnel without any military training or experience whatsoever. They were to continue their civilian work while being responsible for military duty.
Personnel undergoing training in these units were subject to call for service with operational units.
(Note: I think these units were discussed elsewhere by fontessa and hisashi)

First Group; Army Mobilization Plan: Late February to April 8, 1945, using depot divisions as a nucleus, eighteen combat infantry divisions activated.
--13 in Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu: 140th Division, 142nd Division, 143rd Division, 144th Division, 145th Division, 146th Division, 151st Division, 152nd Division, 153rd Division, 154th Division, 155th Division, 156th Division and 157th Division
--3 in Hokkaido, Karafuto and the Kuriles: 88th Division, 89th Division and 147th Division
--2 in Korea: 150th Division and 160th Division
These were activated to guard strategic zones along the coastline and fight holding actions, buying time for rear echelon attack forces. Their first task was to construct the necessary fortifications.
Redeployment From Manchuria to Japan and Korea: March 1945, four picked divisions, the 11th, 25th and 57th divisions and 1st Tank Division were redeployed to Japan and the 111th, 120th and 121st divisions to Korea As well as one-third of the ammunition and some officers being transferred to Japan.

Second Group; Army Mobilization Plan: April to May 1945, plan published on April 2nd, executed in May.
--8 mobile infantry divisions: 201st Division, 202nd Division, 205th Division, 206th Division, 209th Division, 212th Division, 214th Division and 216th Division.
These were to be well equipped and with the best personnel available. Another plan published on April 6th called for the mobilization of 6 independent tank brigades and five tank regiments.

Third Group; Army Mobilization: May 23rd through June 1945;
--18 divisions (originally 16 were planned) mobilized for Homeland defense. Nine were to be coastal defense divisions and seven mobile divisions.
These were; 221st Division, 222nd Division, 224th Division, 225th Division, 229th Division, 230th Division, 231st Division, 303rd Division, 308th Division, 312th Division, 316th Division, 321st Division, 322nd Division, 344th Division, 351st Division and 354th Division. Later the 234th Division (coastal defense) and 355th Division (mobile division) were activated.

Also under this order: 14 mixed brigades, 3 mixed regiments, 3 independent field artillery regiments, 4 independent field artillery battalions, 9 independent mountain artillery regiments, 32 trench mortar battalions, 10 self-propelled gun battalions, 3 field heavy artillery battalions, 3 independent mortar battalions, 4 independent heavy artillery battalions and 30 independent engineer battalions.

Mobilization occurred in three phases because of the limited supply of manpower and matériel making simultaneous activation impossible, with priority given to vital areas that had to be fortified quickly and manned in strength for strategic reasons. These areas were also given priority for procurement of necessary war materials.

Line of Communications Units, Demand vs Availability:
Independent Motor Transport battalions or companies, Independent Animal Transport battalions or companies and other duty units, amounting to some 400,000 men were needed.
For equipment they needed approximately 12,000 motorized vehicles, 470,000 horses and 70,000 transport carts. The Army had no new motor vehicles to spare so it was planned to requisition them from among the 35,000 civilian cars, of which 24,000 were known to be in operating condition. One-seventh of all horses in the country were to be requisitioned. The Army had approximately 20,000 transport carts but the additional 50,000 would have to be built or requisitioned by troops in their deployment areas.

hysteric

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Re: Military stocks and equipment in the Home Islands at the end of the war

#7

Post by BobTheBarbarian » 18 Nov 2015, 17:56

Hello hysteric and thank you for the detailed reply. Most of this information I have encountered before, though I appreciate this last part, I must have missed it before:
hysteric wrote:Line of Communications Units, Demand vs Availability:
Independent Motor Transport battalions or companies, Independent Animal Transport battalions or companies and other duty units, amounting to some 400,000 men were needed.
For equipment they needed approximately 12,000 motorized vehicles, 470,000 horses and 70,000 transport carts. The Army had no new motor vehicles to spare so it was planned to requisition them from among the 35,000 civilian cars, of which 24,000 were known to be in operating condition. One-seventh of all horses in the country were to be requisitioned. The Army had approximately 20,000 transport carts but the additional 50,000 would have to be built or requisitioned by troops in their deployment areas.
A question on the quality of the divisions though, particularly those mentioned here:
hysteric wrote:
Second Group; Army Mobilization Plan: April to May 1945, plan published on April 2nd, executed in May.
--8 mobile infantry divisions: 201st Division, 202nd Division, 205th Division, 206th Division, 209th Division, 212th Division, 214th Division and 216th Division.
These were to be well equipped and with the best personnel available. Another plan published on April 6th called for the mobilization of 6 independent tank brigades and five tank regiments.
Third Group; Army Mobilization: May 23rd through June 1945;
--18 divisions (originally 16 were planned) mobilized for Homeland defense. Nine were to be coastal defense divisions and seven mobile divisions.
These were; 221st Division, 222nd Division, 224th Division, 225th Division, 229th Division, 230th Division, 231st Division, 303rd Division, 308th Division, 312th Division, 316th Division, 321st Division, 322nd Division, 344th Division, 351st Division and 354th Division. Later the 234th Division (coastal defense) and 355th Division (mobile division) were activated.
Giangreco describes these (particularly the first group) as "very high quality" with firepower augmented above the average division while at the same time possessing a high degree of mobility. He also states that the 100 and 300 series divisions, at least those in Kyushu, were strongly reinforced with artillery which made them even stronger in that regard than the assault formations. Captured Japanese officers after the war seemingly confirmed the emphasis on massed artillery and tanks. Do you know of any Japanese sources that go into detail on this?

Thanks.
Last edited by BobTheBarbarian on 18 Nov 2015, 17:59, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Military stocks and equipment in the Home Islands at the end of the war

#8

Post by BobTheBarbarian » 18 Nov 2015, 17:56

OpanaPointer wrote:Checked John Ray Skates' book yet? Lots of numbers there.
I haven't, though I plan on buying it soon as it is referenced heavily by Giangreco.
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Re: Military stocks and equipment in the Home Islands at the end of the war

#9

Post by OpanaPointer » 18 Nov 2015, 18:43

BobTheBarbarian wrote:
OpanaPointer wrote:Checked John Ray Skates' book yet? Lots of numbers there.
I haven't, though I plan on buying it soon as it is referenced heavily by Giangreco.
Frank's book is better for political and strategic, imho. Skates did a good job of establishing the situation that would face Olympic.
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Re: Military stocks and equipment in the Home Islands at the end of the war

#10

Post by Wellgunde » 02 Dec 2015, 23:03

Captured Materiel.pdf
(43.86 KiB) Downloaded 67 times
Weapon Stocks
Demobilization, demilitarization, and disarmament of the Japanese Armed Forces was carried out by the First Demobilization Bureau [Army] and the Second Demobilization Bureau [Navy]. These two organizations filed their progress reports and answers to specific occupation questions to SCAP through the Central Liaison Office. The attachment is a page from the SCAP document Final Report - Progress of Demobilization of the Japanese Armed Forces, 31 December 1946 and it summarizes the totals of captured materiel submitted by the Central Liaison Office. Unfortunately for your purpose, the list combines the four home islands and Korea. It also does not include material which the U.S. armed forces selected to be sent back to the United States for study and examination. It also does not reflect the probable large number of items which were "liberated" by U.S. servicemen or sold to them on the black market. How else do we account for the ease with which Japanese rifles, pistols, and bayonets can be found on the collector's market. I don't know if the Central Liaison memoranda go into deeper detail than what is given in the final report. For those wishing greater clarification, these documents are at NARA. This website http://www3.plala.or.jp/takihome/ provides total production figures for each type of Japanese armored vehicle, however, it does not break this down further by either year or theater distribution.
Fighting Power
The divisions from Manchuria were not elite and many had not seen combat. Their advantage was in their training; something that the recently formed divisions had very little of.
Mobilization
Many of the Ketsu Go mobilization plans had not been completed when the war ended. Given Japan's increasingly dire situation, some experts believe that these plans could not have been realized in time for U.S. invasion envisioned for late 1946.
Tanaka Shizuichi
Tanaka had never held an actual combat command higher than a division so his operational experience was limited. The Twelfth Area Army was basically an administrative headquarters and should not be confused with a similarly sized U.S. or German Army where the commander was personally involved with directing troops in the field. Ketsu Go recognized that in the face of overwhelming U.S. airpower any movement or reinforcement would be very difficult, if not impossible. With a few exceptions, each army was designed to operate largely independent of its neighbors and without interference from headquarters higher up the food chain. The goal was to defeat the invasion forces at or just behind the beaches.
Japanese Sources
The following volumes of Senshi Sosho, the official Japanese history are relevant to your questions and may answer many of them. Unfortunately, they have not been translated into English,
51 Preparations for the Decisive Battle of the Homeland (part 1): Defense of Kanto District. (1971)
57 Preparations for the Decisive Battle of the Homeland (part 2): Defense of Kyushu. (1972)
33 Industrial Mobilization of War Supply Production (part 2): Execution. (1970)
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Re: Military stocks and equipment in the Home Islands at the end of the war

#11

Post by OpanaPointer » 03 Dec 2015, 21:25

Thanks!
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Re: Military stocks and equipment in the Home Islands at the end of the war

#12

Post by Wellgunde » 04 Dec 2015, 02:24

Some additional material has come to my attention:
Japanese AFV Production in 1945
Type ----------------------------- total------comments
Production
Light Tank, Type 2-----------------5
Medium Tank, Type 3------------89-----contract to Misubishi for 291 vehicles Apr-Sep 45
Medium Tank, Type 4--------------2-----contract to Mitsubishi and Kobe-Seiko for production to start Aug 45
Gun Tank, Type 3-----------------16-----contract to Hitachi for 57 vehicles total
SP How, 105mm, Type 1---------20
Armored Personnel Carriers----126
Conversions
Type 97 Medium to Shinhoto----15
SP How, 105mm, Type 1----------8-----follow on order for 100 to have commenced Oct 45 (note 1)
SP How, 150mm, Type 5---------12
SP Mortar, 300mm Type----------4
Notes
1. Some sources state that a total of 10 were produced; total production was dispatched to the Philippines.
2. The Japanese produced a large number of AFV designs. If a particular design/model is not listed above it was not manufactured in 1945.
3. The small number of AFV's produced in 1945 is probably the result of several factors:
---a. Disruption of Japanese industry from bombing.
---b. Lack of steel
---c. The realization that it was pointless to spend time and scarce resources building vehicles which were markedly inferior to U.S. designs such as the M4 tank. It was much better to concentrate on artillery.
---d. The fact that, except for a few locations, Japan is geographically highly unsuited to armor operations. What you see on your war game map is not what you see in person.
4. The production figures are from Jane's World War II Tanks by Leland Ness
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Re: Military stocks and equipment in the Home Islands at the end of the war

#13

Post by BobTheBarbarian » 08 Dec 2015, 03:21

Thanks for the info Wellgunde! That was very helpful and went a long way to answering my questions. I appreciate your input. If I might ask, that PDF at the beginning, was it part of a larger set?
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Re: Military stocks and equipment in the Home Islands at the end of the war

#14

Post by Wellgunde » 08 Dec 2015, 04:28

BobTheBarbarian wrote:If I might ask, that PDF at the beginning, was it part of a larger set?
The PDF is simply one page from the reference I mentioned: Final Report - Progress of Demobilization of the Japanese Armed Forces, 31 December 1946 . The complete document can be found at: http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm/ref/collect ... ll8/id/351
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Re: Military stocks and equipment in the Home Islands at the end of the war

#15

Post by BobTheBarbarian » 08 Dec 2015, 05:24

Wellgunde wrote:
BobTheBarbarian wrote:If I might ask, that PDF at the beginning, was it part of a larger set?
The PDF is simply one page from the reference I mentioned: Final Report - Progress of Demobilization of the Japanese Armed Forces, 31 December 1946 . The complete document can be found at: http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm/ref/collect ... ll8/id/351
That's awesome. Thanks for the information. I never would have found that without your help, and how it looks like I've got some reading to do! :milwink: :thumbsup:
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