The T-Buntai Radar Torpedo Bombers in the Formosa Air Battles

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Mil-tech Bard
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The T-Buntai Radar Torpedo Bombers in the Formosa Air Battles

#1

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 08 Apr 2016, 19:09

I am looking for assistance to run down the Japanese side of the Formosa Air Battles of October 1944, specifically anything involving the radar equipped night torpedo bomber force used during the engagements there.

Task Force 38 was attacked by an elite Japanese combined service force of 83 to 100 radar equipped twin engine torpedo bombers of the IJNAF and IJAAF off Formosa on the nights of 12/13 and 13/14 October 1944. The force suffered over 50% casualties and had only the heavy cruiser of TF38.1 USS Canberra and (possibly) the light cruiser of TF38.2 USS Houston torpedoed to show for it.

Neither ship was sunk, but both were out of the war for months.

From the American side I have the following --

1) Page 92 of History of United States Naval Operations in World War II: Leyte, June 1944 refers to this as the "T-Force." No mention is made of the radar capability of the torpedo bombers.

2) Alfred Price's The History of US Electronic Warfare. Volume 1 - "The Years of Innovation-Beginnings to 1946" at page 200 referred to this as the "T-Buntai" force. http://www.amazon.com/History-Electroni ... CG4HBZAHX4

This book was also his PHD paper at Loughborough University titled The Evolution of Electronic Warfare Equipment and Techniques in the USA, 1901 to 1945 and available for download here -- https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/dspace-jspui ... /2134/7410

Pages 224 - 226
The feint was entirely successful As well as drawing to their
destruction many of the aircraft based on Formosa, it forced the
Japanese high command to commit the 'T-Buntai': its elite force of
radar-fitted twin-engined torpedo bombers being held back on the
home islands for the decisive battle against the US fleet,. On the
evening of 12 October about a hundred aircraft of the ' T-Buntai'
took off from Kyushu and Okinawa to launch a large scale night
torpedo attack with radar assistance on the US Task Force - the
first of its kind ever attempted by the Japanese (5). Most of the
aircraft involved were Navy Mitsubishi G4M 'Betty' bombers fitted
with the 150 to 160 MHz Air Mark VI search radar.
But there were
also twenty-three of the new Army Mitsubishi Ki-67 'Peggy' bombers
carrying the 200 to 209 MHz Taki-1 search radar
- neither this
aircraft nor its radar had previously been encountered by US forces (6).
The Japanese raiders arrived in the area of the warships to find
heavy rain squalls which prevented effective torpedo attacks. However
these same weather conditions did not hinder the radar- fitted
Hellcats of night fighter squadron VFW-41 operating from USS
Independence. The US fighters fought a running battle with the torpedo
bombers and claimed five shot down (7); others fell to the guns
of the US warships. A similar Japanese air attack on the following
evening resulted in a hit on the cruiser Canberra and a very near
miss on the aircraft carrier Franklin; this, for the loss of 42 or
nearly half of the T-Buntai's aircraft (8)

Although the night torpedo attacks achieved little success they
caused a flurry of excitement in the US Pacific Fleet: the Japanese
airborne radars operated on frequencies well below the cover of the
high power TDY jammer; and the lower power jammers designed for
aircraft use could not be guaranteed to conceal warships on the
radars of bombers closing to short range to launch torpedoes. On this
occasion the US warships had been lucky - the weather had been bad
and the Hellcats had been able to spoil many of the attacks. Another
time the ships might not be so fortunate. It was essential that US
warships receive an effective high-powered jammer to counter the
enemy airborne radars operating on frequencies in the 150 to 210
MHz band, and quickly. A cry for help reached Division 15 and Dr
Guy Suits described what happened next:

Somebody pushed the panic button and Division 15 was tasked with producing a
modification of TDY to enable it to counter the radar, as rapidly as possible.

Under our sponsorship Albert Hull and his team at the General Electric laboratories
redesigned the TDY magnetron to cover the lower frequencies and
within a week they had hand-built fifty examples. These were rushed to the
Pacific by air and within two weeks of the initial request the first had been
installed in ships and were ready to go into action.(9)


In 1944 the official term for the procedure to deal with such high
parity orders was ' Crash Procurement Procedure'; the modern term
'Quick Reaction Capability' had yet to be coined, but there can be
no doubt that the capability itself existed in full measure.
3) I ran down the Dr Guy Suits quote down in Radio Countermeasures RCM - A Brief Look at NDRC Division 15's Impact on Radio Countermeasures (RCM) Activities During the Second World War (Alfred Price editor)

Full Dr. C. Guy Suits interview "T-Buntai" excerpt from pages 6-7
So far as I recall there was only one authentic flap in the Pacific theater
leading to demands for urgent countermeasures help and that, perhaps surprisingly,
came from the Navy. In October 1944 a U.S. task force operating off
Formosa came under attach at night from Japanese aircraft using a new type of
radar to aim their torpedoes. The new radar worked on frequencies lower than
those covered by the U.S. ships' TOY jammers and so posed a grave threat. **
Somebody pushed the panic button and Division 15 was tasked with producing a
modification of TDY to enable it to counter the radar, as rapidly as possible.

Under our sponsorship Albert Hull and his team at the General Electric laboratories
redesigned the TDY magnetron to cover the lower frequencies and
within a week they had hand-built fifty examples. These were rushed to the
Pacific by air and within two weeks of the initial request the first had been
installed in ships and were ready to go into action. I think one might find
it difficult to get inside that time scale even today!


**Note by Alfred Price. The new radar was a special version
of the Air Mark VI fitted to many Japanese aircraft and worked
on frequencies between 135 and 170 MHz. The prev1ous
lowest frequency encountered from the Japanese shipborne
radars had been the warning and fire control sets
working on 190 MHz.
I'm looking for the Development/organizational history of this "T-Buntai" force, the Japanese air units involved and any battle reports of their side of the engagement.

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Re: The T-Buntai Radar Torpedo Bombers in the Formosa Air Battles

#2

Post by AO69 » 09 Apr 2016, 12:03

Here's the composition of T Butai where T stood for Typhoon or Torpedo.

T Butai operated under the leadership of 762 Kokutai. It comprised the following Hikotai (according to renowned Japanese historian JINNO Masami)--K708, T1, K501, K703, S303, K262 as well as JAAF Sentai 98 & Sentai 7. Army units were also directly subordinated to 762 Kokutai. Kogeki (striking) Units used at that time two major types of bomber planes--older Mitsubishi G4M & new Yokosuka P1Y GINGA. I don't think that K262 still operated in October 1944 carrier-based bombers Nakajima B6N TENZAN. Army units detached to Navy used Mitsubishi Ki-67 HIRYU bomber planes that the Navy crews called YASUKUNI.

K708, K501, K703, K262 -- land-based bomber units (K262 unit designation still indicating carrier-based bomber unit)
T1 -- reconnaissance unit
S303 -- fighter unit

762 Kokutai CO was Capt KUNO Shuzo, veteran naval aviator. Capt KUNO was CO 762 Kokutai since Aug 1944 till the end of war.

Remark--apart from the air units from T-Butai there were more IJNAF air units involved in the Battle of Formosa in October 1944.

According to Admiral FUKUDOME Shigeru (C-in-C Second Air Fleet) T Butai was established in March 1944 to operate in total darkness or in a very bad weather. These conditions would make it easier to operate best IJNAF crews against USN crews unprepared to fight in such weather. IJN top brass still were not aware of advanced types of US radar and their capabilities at that time. Of course USN also operated in the air at night with specially trained crews. Famous naval flyer Cdr Butch O'HARE was already lost in 1943 in such ops.

AO69


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Re: The T-Buntai Radar Torpedo Bombers in the Formosa Air Battles

#3

Post by Wellgunde » 09 Apr 2016, 12:56

T攻撃部隊 Tkōgeki butai (variously translated as T-attack troops, T-attack unit or T-strike force) was established February 15, 1944 at Hsinchu Air Base in Formosa as a subordinate unit of the First Air Fleet. During its effective operational life, the strike force was plagued by a lack of trained pilots, radar operators, and ground communications personnel; lack of vacuum tubes; radar set manufacturing defects, and the lack of a clear operating doctrine. By December 1944 the unit was virtually destroyed at which time it withdrew to Kanoya Air Base in Kyushu where it was incorporated into the suicide attack strategy. Source: Senshi Sosho Vol 37
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Re: The T-Buntai Radar Torpedo Bombers in the Formosa Air Battles

#4

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 09 Apr 2016, 16:16

AO69,

With this --
IJN top brass still were not aware of advanced types of US radar and their capabilities at that time. Of course USN also operated in the air at night with specially trained crews. Famous naval flyer Cdr Butch O'HARE was already lost in 1943 in such ops.
You just increased by an order of magnitude my estimate of the damage that the grounding of USS Darter inflicted upon the US Navy at Iwo Jima and especially Okinawa.

No idea of US Navy radar capabilities to possibly owning a copy of the Aug 1944 edition of Radar Operator's manual #3 is utter disaster. At the very least examining the beat up radar gear in USS Darter -- especially the untouched radar aerials -- would have told the IJN that the non-directional nature of many of the US Navy's Type III identification friend or foe transponder/receivers.

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Re: The T-Buntai Radar Torpedo Bombers in the Formosa Air Battles

#5

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 09 Apr 2016, 16:23

Interesting, Google Translate thinks the term "Tkōgeki" is Turkish, of all things.

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Re: The T-Buntai Radar Torpedo Bombers in the Formosa Air Battles

#6

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 09 Apr 2016, 16:29

Also interesting, Pacific Wrecks web site has the following related to the 762 Kokutai. It's suicide raid on Ulithi that damaged Essex class CV USS Randolph.

See:
http://www.pacificwrecks.com/aircraft/p1y1/762-T22.html

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Re: The T-Buntai Radar Torpedo Bombers in the Formosa Air Battles

#7

Post by Wellgunde » 09 Apr 2016, 23:03

Mil Tech: Have you considered dropping by NARA and obtaining a copy of the Darter letter which shows exactly what was and wasn't destroyed?
Do we know for a fact that the Darter hulk was exploited by the Japanese? And if so, was it the Navy or the Army?
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Re: The T-Buntai Radar Torpedo Bombers in the Formosa Air Battles

#8

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 10 Apr 2016, 01:09

>>Do we know for a fact that the Darter hulk was exploited by the Japanese? And if so, was it the Navy or the Army?

Yes, and it was the IJN.

The Darter was stalking a damaged Japanese heavy cruiser Takao when she ran aground on the Bombay Shoals. The senior officer on the scene was the Captain of Takao. The CO of Takao was a former military attache' to the USA. Japanese patrol planes sent to cover Takao spotted Darter the morning after she grounded and informed Takao. Capt Onada had crewmen from the destroyers Hiyodori and Naganami board looking for documents the afternoon after the Darter grounded (24 Oct 1944).

The above is from page 638 of John Pardos' COMBINED FLEET DECODED. And Pardos confirmed the fact of captured radar documents from the captured post was records of Takao's Leyte cruise.

What i don't understand is why the Captain of Darter didn't simply arm all this torpedoes and have the Dace aim its deck gun at the torpedo magazines.

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Re: The T-Buntai Radar Torpedo Bombers in the Formosa Air Battles

#9

Post by AO69 » 10 Apr 2016, 01:57

John Prados Combined Fleet Decoded is a magnificent book. Although your statement is not true.

Capt ONODA Sutejiro [Etajima 48 Class] was heavily involved in naval diplomacy but he was never assigned to the USA. He never performed the duties of naval attaché. However he was sent to France 1928-29, visited Europe with Admiral OSUMI Mineo Mission in 1939 and again visited Germany in 1943 via Siberian Railway together with Major General OKAMOTO Kiyotomi delegation. He returned to Japan aboard I-29 in July 1944. He was lucky to reach Singapore and then travel by the air as the I-29 was shortly thereafter sunk by US sub. On 29 August 1944 he was placed in command of TAKAO.

There's also a big difference between T Butai ops in 1944 and AZUSA Unit during Operation TAN against Ulithi in 1945. T Butai suffered heavy losses but it was an elite conventional force prepared to attack in hazardous weather conditions. AZUSA Unit built around K262 aviators was a Kamikaze formation. The 24 GINGA planes were not expected to return home alive.

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Re: The T-Buntai Radar Torpedo Bombers in the Formosa Air Battles

#10

Post by Wellgunde » 10 Apr 2016, 14:49

What i don't understand is why the Captain of Darter didn't simply arm all this torpedoes and have the Dace aim its deck gun at the torpedo magazines.
Submarine torpedoes were not stored in a magazine, but that's a minor quibble. A round from the Dace would have to penetrate the Darter's outer hull, then the pressure hull, then various amounts of piping and equipment to finally hit a torpedo warhead which might or might not detonate. Keep in mind, the torpedoes were designed to only arm themselves once launched from the submarine. How would the Dace gunners know where to aim? They would be shooting at a target they couldn't see.
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Re: The T-Buntai Radar Torpedo Bombers in the Formosa Air Battles

#11

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 10 Apr 2016, 15:42

AO69,

>>Capt ONODA Sutejiro [Etajima 48 Class] was heavily involved in naval diplomacy but he was never assigned to the USA.

I was the one who said "to the USA," assuming that it what Prados meant when he said Capt ONODA was an attache'.

But yes, I see your point.
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Re: The T-Buntai Radar Torpedo Bombers in the Formosa Air Battles

#12

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 10 Apr 2016, 16:05

Wellgunde said --

>>How would the Dace gunners know where to aim? They would be shooting at a target they couldn't see.

You tie off a flash light over the parts of the Darter's hull the torpedoes are and engage with the 3-inch deck gun at less than 1,000 yards.

You are already in a situation where you are firing a much brighter deck gun at night and you lose nothing with the additional small light source.

I'll also note that on the 31st of October the US Navy brought a sub with a 6-inch deck gun to "colander-ize" Darter and this submarine didn't bother to try and set off the Darter's stored torpedo's either.

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Re: The T-Buntai Radar Torpedo Bombers in the Formosa Air Battles

#13

Post by AO69 » 10 Apr 2016, 17:36

I have found some details concerning HIRYU service in JNAF. 98 Sentai started conversion to HIRYU from Ki-21 on 1 Feb 1944. Aviators trained in Kanoya using G3M2 Navy bombers until May 44. In July 44 Sentai 98 had 34 HIRYU and was attached as 3 Hikotai to 762 Kokutai [1 Air Fleet -- the Philippines]. Its place in training was taken over by 7 Sentai that had just converted from Ki-100 DONRYU planes. 7 Sentai was attached to 2 Air Fleet [Formosa]. Both units were included into the T [Taifu] Butai [elite all-weather night & day combat units]. On 12 Oct 44 98 Sentai launched from Kanoya 21 HIRYU, fueled on Okinawa and then attacked [during bad weather] USN ships off Formosa. 98 sentai claimed two carriers sunk and lost 8 HIRYU. 98 Sentai remained under Navy control until 1 Jul 45 and 7 Sentai until Jun 45.

As the IJAAF crews were not expert in navigation over the seas some IJNAF skilled personnel were added to Army units to facilitate the air attacks on USN targets. Some of them were lost while some survived and were decorated with Bukosho.

Nothing special found on the radar the HIRYUs carried. The best source on IJN radar in English is LaCroix & Wells -- Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War [p. 773-777].

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Re: The T-Buntai Radar Torpedo Bombers in the Formosa Air Battles

#14

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 10 Apr 2016, 17:55

Ah-HAH!

"Taifu Butai" as my search term in lieu of "T-Force," "Typhoon force" or "T-Buntai" actually yielded a more recent article.

See:
Prelude to Iwo Jima: The Japanese Assault On B-29 Base On Marianas
James Hart • October 7, 2015
http://warfarehistorynetwork.com/daily/ ... -marianas/
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Re: The T-Buntai Radar Torpedo Bombers in the Formosa Air Battles

#15

Post by Wellgunde » 10 Apr 2016, 18:07

Mil-tech Bard wrote:You tie off a flash light over the parts of the Darter's hull the torpedoes are and engage with the 3-inch deck gun at less than 1,000 yards. You are already in a situation where you are firing a much brighter deck gun at night and you lose nothing with the additional small light source. I'll also note that on the 31st of October the US Navy brought a sub with a 6-inch deck gun to "colander-ize" Darter and this submarine didn't bother to try and set off the Darter's stored torpedo's either.
I think you may be underestimating the problem. It's just not aiming for a particular spot on the hull that's difficult, it's aiming for a spot that leads to the exact location of the torpedo warhead inside the hull. My experience from having served in two of Darter's sister ships is that that level of precision is just not doable. You would have to have a very, very luck shot.
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