Task Force 38 was attacked by an elite Japanese combined service force of 83 to 100 radar equipped twin engine torpedo bombers of the IJNAF and IJAAF off Formosa on the nights of 12/13 and 13/14 October 1944. The force suffered over 50% casualties and had only the heavy cruiser of TF38.1 USS Canberra and (possibly) the light cruiser of TF38.2 USS Houston torpedoed to show for it.
Neither ship was sunk, but both were out of the war for months.
From the American side I have the following --
1) Page 92 of History of United States Naval Operations in World War II: Leyte, June 1944 refers to this as the "T-Force." No mention is made of the radar capability of the torpedo bombers.
2) Alfred Price's The History of US Electronic Warfare. Volume 1 - "The Years of Innovation-Beginnings to 1946" at page 200 referred to this as the "T-Buntai" force. http://www.amazon.com/History-Electroni ... CG4HBZAHX4
This book was also his PHD paper at Loughborough University titled The Evolution of Electronic Warfare Equipment and Techniques in the USA, 1901 to 1945 and available for download here -- https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/dspace-jspui ... /2134/7410
Pages 224 - 226
3) I ran down the Dr Guy Suits quote down in Radio Countermeasures RCM - A Brief Look at NDRC Division 15's Impact on Radio Countermeasures (RCM) Activities During the Second World War (Alfred Price editor)The feint was entirely successful As well as drawing to their
destruction many of the aircraft based on Formosa, it forced the
Japanese high command to commit the 'T-Buntai': its elite force of
radar-fitted twin-engined torpedo bombers being held back on the
home islands for the decisive battle against the US fleet,. On the
evening of 12 October about a hundred aircraft of the ' T-Buntai'
took off from Kyushu and Okinawa to launch a large scale night
torpedo attack with radar assistance on the US Task Force - the
first of its kind ever attempted by the Japanese (5). Most of the
aircraft involved were Navy Mitsubishi G4M 'Betty' bombers fitted
with the 150 to 160 MHz Air Mark VI search radar. But there were
also twenty-three of the new Army Mitsubishi Ki-67 'Peggy' bombers
carrying the 200 to 209 MHz Taki-1 search radar - neither this
aircraft nor its radar had previously been encountered by US forces (6).
The Japanese raiders arrived in the area of the warships to find
heavy rain squalls which prevented effective torpedo attacks. However
these same weather conditions did not hinder the radar- fitted
Hellcats of night fighter squadron VFW-41 operating from USS
Independence. The US fighters fought a running battle with the torpedo
bombers and claimed five shot down (7); others fell to the guns
of the US warships. A similar Japanese air attack on the following
evening resulted in a hit on the cruiser Canberra and a very near
miss on the aircraft carrier Franklin; this, for the loss of 42 or
nearly half of the T-Buntai's aircraft (8)
Although the night torpedo attacks achieved little success they
caused a flurry of excitement in the US Pacific Fleet: the Japanese
airborne radars operated on frequencies well below the cover of the
high power TDY jammer; and the lower power jammers designed for
aircraft use could not be guaranteed to conceal warships on the
radars of bombers closing to short range to launch torpedoes. On this
occasion the US warships had been lucky - the weather had been bad
and the Hellcats had been able to spoil many of the attacks. Another
time the ships might not be so fortunate. It was essential that US
warships receive an effective high-powered jammer to counter the
enemy airborne radars operating on frequencies in the 150 to 210
MHz band, and quickly. A cry for help reached Division 15 and Dr
Guy Suits described what happened next:
Somebody pushed the panic button and Division 15 was tasked with producing a
modification of TDY to enable it to counter the radar, as rapidly as possible.
Under our sponsorship Albert Hull and his team at the General Electric laboratories
redesigned the TDY magnetron to cover the lower frequencies and
within a week they had hand-built fifty examples. These were rushed to the
Pacific by air and within two weeks of the initial request the first had been
installed in ships and were ready to go into action.(9)
In 1944 the official term for the procedure to deal with such high
parity orders was ' Crash Procurement Procedure'; the modern term
'Quick Reaction Capability' had yet to be coined, but there can be
no doubt that the capability itself existed in full measure.
Full Dr. C. Guy Suits interview "T-Buntai" excerpt from pages 6-7
I'm looking for the Development/organizational history of this "T-Buntai" force, the Japanese air units involved and any battle reports of their side of the engagement.So far as I recall there was only one authentic flap in the Pacific theater
leading to demands for urgent countermeasures help and that, perhaps surprisingly,
came from the Navy. In October 1944 a U.S. task force operating off
Formosa came under attach at night from Japanese aircraft using a new type of
radar to aim their torpedoes. The new radar worked on frequencies lower than
those covered by the U.S. ships' TOY jammers and so posed a grave threat. **
Somebody pushed the panic button and Division 15 was tasked with producing a
modification of TDY to enable it to counter the radar, as rapidly as possible.
Under our sponsorship Albert Hull and his team at the General Electric laboratories
redesigned the TDY magnetron to cover the lower frequencies and
within a week they had hand-built fifty examples. These were rushed to the
Pacific by air and within two weeks of the initial request the first had been
installed in ships and were ready to go into action. I think one might find
it difficult to get inside that time scale even today!
**Note by Alfred Price. The new radar was a special version
of the Air Mark VI fitted to many Japanese aircraft and worked
on frequencies between 135 and 170 MHz. The prev1ous
lowest frequency encountered from the Japanese shipborne
radars had been the warning and fire control sets
working on 190 MHz.