Tsushima anniversary

[Lawrence]

Yesterday was the 100th anniversary of the Battle of Tsushima, where the Japanese Navy under Admiral Togo destroyed the Russian Baltic fleet. Along with the descisive victory at Mukden in March 1905, Tsushima helped bring the Russians to the negotionating table and secure peace.

It's sort of strange that this battle is a century old; it used fairly modern technology and tactics. People often label the American Civil War as the first modern war; I think that's an incorrect title. The Russo-Japanese War signaled how wars in the 20th century would be fought. It was a dress rehearsal for World War I; similar tactics, similar weapons and similar results.

Anyone want to contribute their thoughts to the Battle of Tsushima or the Russo-Japanese War in general? Please feel free.

[Bart150]

Well, if nobody else wants to try, I’ll see what I can do . . .

Recently I took a photo of the Tsushima memorial in the grounds of Karosta Cathedral in Latvia. I’ll give you some notes I’ve made about it, and I’m certainly open to comments from anybody who knows better on any point.

Tsarist Russia had three main naval bases in the Baltic: Kronshtadt, Reval (now called Tallinn) and Karosta, which was developed in one great project in the 1890s. The Karosta base was part of the town that today is called by its Latvian name of Liepaja, is Libau in German (and in many English texts such as ships’ logbooks) and, when transliterated, Libava in Russian. Karosta was and still is a very self-contained district in the north of Liepaja, so the relation between Karosta and Liepaja is analogous to that between Devonport and Plymouth. Unlike Devonport Karosta had its own cathedral - financed by the Russian Navy as part of the project to develop the base!

When Rozhestvensky’s force set out on its epic voyage in 1904 Karosta was the Russian port from which they departed. It is true that most of the preparation was done first at Kronshtadt and then Reval, where the squadron stayed for a month, and that the ships were only at Karosta for a couple of days. Still, Karosta was their last Russian port, and the senior officers attended a service in the cathedral there immediately before joining their ships.

Karosta Cathedral became a cinema in the Soviet era, but since independence it has been restored and there is a substantial congregation of ethnic Russians. In the grounds of the cathedral there are no graves and only one memorial. It is inscribed in Russian and Latvian. Somebody whom I trust has translated the Russian for me:

In lasting memory of the sailors of the Second Pacific Squadron who gave up their lives for their faith and fatherland in the sea battle of Tsushima on 14-15 May 1905. The service in the cathedral and the departure of the squadron from Liepaja took place on 2 December 1904.

There is no doubt that this inscription contains a blunder. From the date given for the battle the old-style calendar is being used: 13 days behind the new-style. In fact the warships left Liepaja-Karosta on 2 October 1904 (old-style)! The ‘December’ of the inscription should be ‘October’.

This memorial has obviously been set up since the departure of the last Soviet forces in 1994. The Soviet withdrawal left many ethnic Russians behind in Latvia, some of whom felt truculent at their reduced status in the newly independent country. Possibly this memorial was financed by the ethnic Russian community as a mark of assertiveness; or it may be that the ethnic Latvian authorities wanted to offer a token of conciliation. I’d be interested to know. In any case, factors of this sort make it all the more regrettable that the inscription contains such a blunder.

After reading Pleshakov’s book on ‘the epic voyage to the battle of Tsushima’ I realised that the memorial inscription warranted more textual analysis. The inscription implies that all the Russian sailors who died at Tsushma left Liepaja-Karosta on that same October day. Not so. The main force under Rozhestvensky left on 2 October 1904. A smaller detachment of ships that had not been ready in time left Liepaja-Karosta under Dobrotvorsky on 3 November 1904. A quite substantial force of mainly older ships under Nebogatov left Liepaja-Karosta at the beginning of February 1905.

Before the War there had been the Pacific Squadron of ships. When Rozhestvensky’s ships were sent out, the remnants of that old squadron were renamed as the First Pacific Squadron and the new force coming from the Baltic was called the Second Pacific Squadron (although it would be many months before the Pacific was reached). Dobrotvorsky’s detachment was considered part of the Second Pacific Squadron. However, the group of ships under Nebogatov that left in February 1905 was given the name of Third Pacific Squadron. Thus the reference on the memorial to the Second Pacific Squadron alone seems rather clumsy.

Most of the ships of Rozhestvensky’s October force went via the Cape of Good Hope and ended up travelling over 18,000 nautical miles (33,000 km) to meet the enemy. Some of his ships and all those of Dobrotvorsky and Nebogatov used the Suez Canal and saved several thousand miles. It was on 26 April 1905 off the coast of French Indo-China that all these units joined together under the direct command of Rozhestvensky: nearly seven months after the first departure from Liepaja-Karosta. 18 days later came the catastrophe of Tsushima!

Well over 4000 Russian sailors died in the battle. It seems likely from the analysis of departures above that some, perhaps many of them, were in the ships that left in November 1904 or the following February. If so, they are not commemorated, or at least not as explicitly as they might be. I did a small study to examine this point.

The fleet which set out in October 1904 contained 7 battleships; 6 were sunk by the enemy and 1 surrendered. There were 6 cruisers; 3 were sunk by the enemy, 2 were eventually interned in the Philippines and 1 escaped to Vladivostok.

The detachment which set out in November 1904 contained 2 cruisers; one was interned in the Philippines, and the other escaped from the battle but was then wrecked.

The squadron which set out in February 1905 contained 4 battleships; 1 was sunk by the enemy and 3 surrendered. There was 1 cruiser and she was sunk by the enemy.

The above excludes smaller vessels such as destroyers and torpedo boats and some lightweight cruisers. (The November 1904 detachment included some of these, so it was not as trivial as it may seem.)

Thus, making the assumption that most of the deaths were on ships that were sunk, it seems true that the great majority – but certainly not all - of the 4000 deaths were of men who set sail immediately after the service in Karosta Cathedral on that October day.

x

[hisashi]

The Social History of the Machine Gun
John Ellis

is a must to evaluate the importance of Russo-Japanese War for trench-warfare WWI. In Boer War and Russo-Japanese War machinegun was well tested. For example, Japan HAD some machineguns even when the war started. They could not use them (though too little in number to affect the macro situation) because they were intended for a use in fortifications. They had mo means to set up field fire point with them. Later they prepared more mobile machineguns in the latter half of war; in other words in this war machinegun revealed itself as a field weapon. Ellis explains how this weapon was thought little by Britain though Germany used it relatively heavily.

It is a controversial topic whether Nogi was a bad general against Port Arthur Fort. Eventually IJA used most modern way to fight with a fort, say digging a tunnel to blow them up from below, attack by heavy gun, engineers with explosives etc. The experience was summarized to a part of IJA Field Service Regulations (Sakusen Yomurei) volume 4, which was strictly secret volume. The vast scale of WWI stunned IJA observers but eventually IJA could not raise enough budgets to modernize them with more firepower and equipments in standard troops, beyond small experiment force.

On naval aspect I'll come back later.

[hisashi]

In Japan the most referred effect of Russo-Japanese War in navy men-of-war was the effectiveness of armored cruiser/battle cruiser. In a sense, these types made an epoch after Sino-Japanese War.

The main naval battle in Sino-Japanese War was Battle of the Yalu River (1894).

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_ ... iver_(1894)

In this battle both side prepared the largest gun they can afford but at large they were ineffective (in accuracy and recharge time). On the other hand high velocity guns, including those from poorly protected cruisers, made a fire on wooden Sino ships and deprived armored ships of combat readiness by damaging anything on board.

Armored cruisers ordered after this war were in general thinly but wholly armored to prevent fatal damage from smaller calibre guns. Japan deployed 4 BB and 8 CA into the Battle of Tsushima. Japan had lost 2 BB (Yashima and Hatsuse) by then.

Both side already prepared the coordination of fire on each ship; that is, unified the aim of guns (distance, direction etc.) on each ship. Japan used the Barr and Stroud transmitter and Japan-made copies along with voice tube, blackboard, and of cource messengers for communication between the brdge - gun group leaders - each gun. Eventually poor training and heavy damage prevented Russians to coordinate fire and they must let each gun to fire at will. Coordination of fire in each ship was a prerequisite for Dreadnaught - the dealer of accurate outrange fire. So we can say a part of Dreadnaught concept was tested in this battle.

In Russo-Japanese War, however, they made cross-range battle. In catalog data, BB Mikasa's main gun had about 10km range and the latest CA Asama had guns with 18km range. But they did not have effective aiming system in such a long range. In the Battle of Tsushima Russians opened fire at the distance of 7km and Japan waited until 6.4km. So at least CA was not outranged by BB in that situation.

Japan divided 12 men-of-war into two fleet. Once Togo's own fleet, 4 BB and 2 CA, misunderstood the maneuver of Rozhestvensky because his flagship's ladder was damaged and looked as if he ordered the fleet to change the course. Second fleet, 6 CA, noticed Togo was misled and chased Russian fleet in original course at faster speed. Togo again returned to Russians and Russians confronted a pincer attack. CA contributed to the victory of Japan and various navies ordered their battle cruisers after this war.

In Battle of the Yalu River (1894) BB Dingyuan did not sink in spite of fierce crossfire from Japanese fleet.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_tu ... p_Dingyuan

It was thought difficult to sink well armored ship by gun. To sink them, something must be done under the waterline. Mine, torpedo and even ramming. Especially Japan used various way to destroy Russian ships except ramming. Eventually Japan itself added the long list how a battleship can be sunk 'by gun' in the Battle of Tsushima making underwater damage by shells. I don't know how the balance between firepower and defense gear changed in this period, but the situation 'well armored ship cannot be sunk by gun' looks rather singular and temporal.