Japanese Tanks...
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Big Orange
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Japanese Tanks...
Why did the Japanese Imperial Army never posses real tanks throughout the 1930s and 1940s? What kind of armoured vehicles did the Japanese posses, why were they such poor quality?
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David C. Clarke
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One Japanese tank's half hour glory charge,Guam 1944.
Campaign in the MarianasUS Army in World war 2,pages 391-2.nearly 1400 hours...an enemy medium tank was forced to leave in a hurry,and,with three Japanese on top,drove west along the road toward the 307th Infantry's line.Raking the American position with cannon and machine gun fire,the tank moved up the road in the face of machine gun,BAR, and rifle fire.The three passengers were quickly knocked off,but the tank was still undamaged when it reached road junction 306 and turned north to confront the men of the 2nd Platoon,B Company.
Caught in the open,some of the Americans dashed forward to the house,while the others pressed themselves helplessly against the bottom of the ditch.The tank threw a burst of machine gun fire at the prostate men,killing one and wounding two,but then turned back to the road junction.Here it turned west again and moved along the Agana road towards Company A,307th Infantry.A machine gunner emplaced in the temple opened fire on the tank,which retaliated by plunging into the side of the building,shifting gears,andf forcing its way out the other side....the tank,meanwhile,undamaged but with a piece of thatched roof partially obscuring its vision slit,continued on and into the American lines.
Rifles,machine guns,BARs and grenades were powerless against the tank.The three bazookas in the A Company line--the only weapons that might have stopped it--were of no avail since two failed to go off and the gunner of the third was so excited that he failed to pull the safety until it was too late.For a moment the tank got hung up on a coconut log,but even then it remained impervious to American bullets and continued to fire widly.In another moment it was free again and swept on down the road through a battalion command post and aid station and...on through the command post of the 307th Infantry.
So far luck had been with the Japanese tank on its impromptu dash.It had succeeded in raising havoc on the 307th Infantry lines,forcing the men to fall back in search of better cover.Wounded men and scattered equipment marked its trail.What happened to it next is difficult to establish firmly.The tank left the 307th Infantry sector around 1430 hours and apparently moved west into the 3rd Marines sector,since a lone Japanese tank was destroyed there late in the afternoon by two American mediums.
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Big Orange
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Japanese tanks
They had real tanks for the 1930's, and they were used to fight China a country with very little armour or AT capability. So they did not have much of a motive to upgrade them. The tank vs tank clash with the USSR at Khalkhin Gol in 1939 one would think would have gotten their attention but they did not upgrade their tanks to something comparable to the Russian BT tanks they faced there until 1942. Also they did not get a tank comparable to the US Sherman till late 1944 and they didnt have many ready for use by the end of the war.
In a lot of ways the Axis powers who started the wars wound up lagging behind because their state of the art weapons at the begining were becoming obsolete as the wars progressed. Italy and Japan especially had this problem.
In a lot of ways the Axis powers who started the wars wound up lagging behind because their state of the art weapons at the begining were becoming obsolete as the wars progressed. Italy and Japan especially had this problem.
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David C. Clarke
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Nice story Peter. It also illustrates several points about Japanese armor.
The first point is that any tank in the right place at the right time can cause havoc among any unit of soldiers without proper anti-tank weapons. When the major types of Japanese tanks were first fielded in the mid-1930s, they entered a world where the light tank (under 15 tons) was pretty much "state of the art" for tanks of all nations. Also, the Japanese were at war with China, which had little armor and few anti-tank weapons.
The second point is that these tanks were still in service in 1944. By 1944, the major powers relied on tanks weighing in at 35 tons or more. The Japanese tanks could not compete with the U.S. medium Sherman tank, they were out-gunned and under-armored.
The reasons that this state of affairs existed are many. First, terrain conditions in Asia were vastly different than in Europe. Try to drive a 56 ton Tiger across a rice paddy. Even better, try to figure out how to transport by ship a 45 ton Panther across the Pacific in sufficient numbers to defend an island! And, of course, ultimately, the "key" to Japan's defense was its Navy, so ships received priority in the Japanese economy over tanks.
Tank development didn't receive much attention in Japan until after encounters with American Shermans convinced the Japanese that in any invasion of their homeland, they would need a better armed tank. In the meantime, the light Japanese tanks were still pretty adequate for the war in China, in which most of the Japanese Army was engaged.
Best,
~D, the EviL
The first point is that any tank in the right place at the right time can cause havoc among any unit of soldiers without proper anti-tank weapons. When the major types of Japanese tanks were first fielded in the mid-1930s, they entered a world where the light tank (under 15 tons) was pretty much "state of the art" for tanks of all nations. Also, the Japanese were at war with China, which had little armor and few anti-tank weapons.
The second point is that these tanks were still in service in 1944. By 1944, the major powers relied on tanks weighing in at 35 tons or more. The Japanese tanks could not compete with the U.S. medium Sherman tank, they were out-gunned and under-armored.
The reasons that this state of affairs existed are many. First, terrain conditions in Asia were vastly different than in Europe. Try to drive a 56 ton Tiger across a rice paddy. Even better, try to figure out how to transport by ship a 45 ton Panther across the Pacific in sufficient numbers to defend an island! And, of course, ultimately, the "key" to Japan's defense was its Navy, so ships received priority in the Japanese economy over tanks.
Tank development didn't receive much attention in Japan until after encounters with American Shermans convinced the Japanese that in any invasion of their homeland, they would need a better armed tank. In the meantime, the light Japanese tanks were still pretty adequate for the war in China, in which most of the Japanese Army was engaged.
Best,
~D, the EviL
Sometime luck played its part as well:
Tarawa,1943--Shermans versus Type 95:
Colonel Ed Bale(still alive) states that the lucky shot of the Type 95 ,straight down the barrel of his Sherman,set the follow up for the demise of the Chicago.It appears that in pairs was the best way to deal with the lighter Japanese tanks. The Japanese gunner must also have been well trained with the speed with which he could fire.
Tarawa,1943--Shermans versus Type 95:
Bloody Tarawa,Eric Hammel,page 125....After advancing nearly 400 yards from the seawall,China Gal struck up a duel with a smaller Japanese tank.Almost as soon as the first rounds were traded,the American medium's turret traverse mechanism was damaged.Its gun out of commission,China Gal raced forward and collided with the Japanese gun,snapping off the medium tank's precious 75mm main gun in the process.Lieutenant Ed Bale ordered his driver to make for the beach,leaving the fight to Chicago.To the sheer amazement of hundreds of onlookers,the plucky Japanese tank gunner set the second American tank afire with one round.
Colonel Ed Bale(still alive) states that the lucky shot of the Type 95 ,straight down the barrel of his Sherman,set the follow up for the demise of the Chicago.It appears that in pairs was the best way to deal with the lighter Japanese tanks. The Japanese gunner must also have been well trained with the speed with which he could fire.
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David C. Clarke
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Pitting a Type 95 against a Sherman was sort of like pitting an early Pz. III with a 37mm gun against a T-34. Without substantial luck, the Type 95, like the Pz. III was doomed. On the other hand, the Type 97 with its 45mm gun could pierce the side armor of the Sherman at 500 yards.
But the Type 95 was built as a light infantry support tank and not built for armor vs. armor engagements. When you consider the vehicle's lack of armor, it took a very brave crew to attack a Sherman head on. Sherman crews learned to use high explosive shells and not armor piercing shells against Japanese tanks simply because the armor on the Japnaese tanks was so light that an AP shell would go straight through tank and not necessarily kill the crew, while a high explosive shell would blow a Type 95 or 97 to bits.
I seem to remember that even the last designed and produced Japanese tank (which was hoarded for the anticipated invasin of Japan and never saw combat) didn't have spectacular increase in armor but did have a much, much better gun than the 45mm used on the Type 97. Even at the end, I guess the Japanese accepted that offensive power was more important than defensive armor protection.
Best,
~D, the EviL
But the Type 95 was built as a light infantry support tank and not built for armor vs. armor engagements. When you consider the vehicle's lack of armor, it took a very brave crew to attack a Sherman head on. Sherman crews learned to use high explosive shells and not armor piercing shells against Japanese tanks simply because the armor on the Japnaese tanks was so light that an AP shell would go straight through tank and not necessarily kill the crew, while a high explosive shell would blow a Type 95 or 97 to bits.
I seem to remember that even the last designed and produced Japanese tank (which was hoarded for the anticipated invasin of Japan and never saw combat) didn't have spectacular increase in armor but did have a much, much better gun than the 45mm used on the Type 97. Even at the end, I guess the Japanese accepted that offensive power was more important than defensive armor protection.
Best,
~D, the EviL
Japanese tanks where built for Japanese needs. In China the Chinese lack antitank guns in any number till 1945 so even the smallest Tankette could do the job of infantry support. While in Southeast Asian is not Tank country at all and getting a Tank from point A to point B could be a nightmare and a smaller lighter tanks has many advantages as it can go down narrow trails and across bridges that a medium tank could not. And if you compare the type 97 Chi ha medium tank to Early British cruisers, T26 and early markIII and its other contempories, its not all that bad. Thing was japanese industry was stretch to the limits by 1942 and they had no spare capacity to desighn or build new tanks
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Daniel Leahy
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"I seem to remember that even the last designed and produced Japanese tank (which was hoarded for the anticipated invasin of Japan and never saw combat) didn't have spectacular increase in armor but did have a much, much better gun than the 45mm used on the Type 97. Even at the end, I guess the Japanese accepted that offensive power was more important than defensive armor protection."
This idea of choosing offensive power vs defensive power seemed to pervade all of the japanese vehicles as is seen in the zero fighers and jdy bombers. I definately think this was one of the japanese cultural mentalities that led to their ultimate defeat. I've seen this also at work in my kendo training ( no protection in the back of kendo armor and emphasis on quick, accurate offensive attacks)....
This idea of choosing offensive power vs defensive power seemed to pervade all of the japanese vehicles as is seen in the zero fighers and jdy bombers. I definately think this was one of the japanese cultural mentalities that led to their ultimate defeat. I've seen this also at work in my kendo training ( no protection in the back of kendo armor and emphasis on quick, accurate offensive attacks)....
Outside the military research facilities, Japanese machinery and auto industry were weak. For mass-production they must rely on small companies for basic parts supply, but the small subcontractors could not meet the request of the war either in quality and quantity.
Japanese Gun industry remained relatively weak in comparison with aero- and shipbuilding industry which caught up with Western countries at least in planning (in production it often happened that the product did not yield the estimated specs). Japan had many guns to mimic. For example German FLAK 18, captured from Chinese army, for type 99 AA gun, and Boforce 75mm AA gun for type 4 AA gun, and later type 5 tank gun. But it took long until the mass-production of them progressed. Because of inferior basic technology such as bearings, making guns compact for tanks was difficult for Japan. These gun problem slowed down the replacing speed of Japanese medium tanks after IJA met the allied tanks.
The budget was always serious problem and staffs involved in accounting supported development plans which leaded to cheaper tanks. Railroad transport, shipmant (crane facility in ports and cargo ships), and road movement were also problems supporting the opinion to postpone larger tank plans.
Type 95 tank was originally planned as a medium tank replacing type 89. After prototype was finished, Tankers insisted that the armor was too thin even not enough against anti-tank rifle. So it was treated as 'mobile tanks' supporting medium tanks and in hurry type 97 medium tank was planned.
Type 3 medium tank had rather thin armor, partly because it was a gap-filling model using old body of type 1 medium tank.
Reference: Rikugun Kiko Butai (army tank troops), Gakken Henshu-bu (eds.), 2000, from Gakken, ISBN4-05-602065-5
Japanese Gun industry remained relatively weak in comparison with aero- and shipbuilding industry which caught up with Western countries at least in planning (in production it often happened that the product did not yield the estimated specs). Japan had many guns to mimic. For example German FLAK 18, captured from Chinese army, for type 99 AA gun, and Boforce 75mm AA gun for type 4 AA gun, and later type 5 tank gun. But it took long until the mass-production of them progressed. Because of inferior basic technology such as bearings, making guns compact for tanks was difficult for Japan. These gun problem slowed down the replacing speed of Japanese medium tanks after IJA met the allied tanks.
The budget was always serious problem and staffs involved in accounting supported development plans which leaded to cheaper tanks. Railroad transport, shipmant (crane facility in ports and cargo ships), and road movement were also problems supporting the opinion to postpone larger tank plans.
Type 95 tank was originally planned as a medium tank replacing type 89. After prototype was finished, Tankers insisted that the armor was too thin even not enough against anti-tank rifle. So it was treated as 'mobile tanks' supporting medium tanks and in hurry type 97 medium tank was planned.
Type 3 medium tank had rather thin armor, partly because it was a gap-filling model using old body of type 1 medium tank.
Reference: Rikugun Kiko Butai (army tank troops), Gakken Henshu-bu (eds.), 2000, from Gakken, ISBN4-05-602065-5
Hi.
Some remarks:
To my knowledge the type 4 gun was a side product of the development of the type 5 tank gun based on the type 88 aa-gun. Maybe you have better sources.
There were trials with a 57 mm at-/tank gun in 1942 which were stopped as the gun had almost the same characteristics as the type 1 47 mm at-/tank gun but much more weight. This was a mayor problem as a 75 mm gun wasn´t even thought of at this time. So the very good type 90 field gun was reworked as tank gun and used from 1942.
There were also two massive non-technology problems which slowed down the development of new tank tech:
- massive lack of raw materials
- no support for new developments by the High Command which always prefered the infantry until it was too late
Maybe I´m wrong but I´m always about to learn.
Yours
tom!
Some remarks:
The type 99 88 mm aa-gun was based on the german naval 8,8 cm Flak C32 not the Flak 18.maisov wrote: .......
Japanese Gun industry remained relatively weak in comparison with aero- and shipbuilding industry which caught up with Western countries at least in planning (in production it often happened that the product did not yield the estimated specs). Japan had many guns to mimic. For example German FLAK 18, captured from Chinese army, for type 99 AA gun, and Boforce 75mm AA gun for type 4 AA gun, and later type 5 tank gun. But it took long until the mass-production of them progressed. Because of inferior basic technology such as bearings, making guns compact for tanks was difficult for Japan. These gun problem slowed down the replacing speed of Japanese medium tanks after IJA met the allied tanks.
To my knowledge the type 4 gun was a side product of the development of the type 5 tank gun based on the type 88 aa-gun. Maybe you have better sources.
There were trials with a 57 mm at-/tank gun in 1942 which were stopped as the gun had almost the same characteristics as the type 1 47 mm at-/tank gun but much more weight. This was a mayor problem as a 75 mm gun wasn´t even thought of at this time. So the very good type 90 field gun was reworked as tank gun and used from 1942.
There were also two massive non-technology problems which slowed down the development of new tank tech:
- massive lack of raw materials
- no support for new developments by the High Command which always prefered the infantry until it was too late
My sources say that the type 95 was originally developed as a light fast tank for the highly mobile independent mixed brigades. The main problem was that the type 89 tanks were too slow (25 kph) to follow the trucks used by the mobile infantry units in 1933 which were able to drive at 60 kph or the new prime movers (40kph).maisov wrote: ........
Type 95 tank was originally planned as a medium tank replacing type 89. After prototype was finished, Tankers insisted that the armor was too thin even not enough against anti-tank rifle. So it was treated as 'mobile tanks' supporting medium tanks and in hurry type 97 medium tank was planned.
Maybe I´m wrong but I´m always about to learn.
Yours
tom!
Thank you for reply. My posting are often based on net resources, or at most secondary resources. My posting may contain many errors as it does this time.
http://www.warbirds.jp/kunimoto/type51/E-index.htm
shows an official explanation document when type 99 was formalized.
http://www.warbirds.jp/kunimoto/type51/99-8-1.htm
It simply states this type was based on captured 'Krupp 88mm gun'. Chinese army imported some FLAK 18 and other 88mm guns of unknown type for fixed use. Mr. Kunimoto states that SKL45 naval gun is most likely from similar specs and appearances, though barrel weight differs largely.
Other researcher insist that the original would be army FLAKs such as FLAK Kw or FLAK 16. Anyway, it is wrong that type 88 came from FLAK 18.
Most Japanese secondary sources on the web states type 5 tank gun was developed after type 4 AA gun.
The 1st independent mixed brigade was raised in March 1934. When in 1937 this brigade was deployed to China theater, its 4th tank batallion had four companies, equipped with respectively type 95 light tank, type 92 heavy tankette, type 89 medium tank, and type 94 tankette.
Kunimoto's Tank Worldtom! wrote:
The type 99 88 mm aa-gun was based on the german naval 8,8 cm Flak C32 not the Flak 18.
To my knowledge the type 4 gun was a side product of the development of the type 5 tank gun based on the type 88 aa-gun. Maybe you have better sources.
http://www.warbirds.jp/kunimoto/type51/E-index.htm
shows an official explanation document when type 99 was formalized.
http://www.warbirds.jp/kunimoto/type51/99-8-1.htm
It simply states this type was based on captured 'Krupp 88mm gun'. Chinese army imported some FLAK 18 and other 88mm guns of unknown type for fixed use. Mr. Kunimoto states that SKL45 naval gun is most likely from similar specs and appearances, though barrel weight differs largely.
Other researcher insist that the original would be army FLAKs such as FLAK Kw or FLAK 16. Anyway, it is wrong that type 88 came from FLAK 18.
Most Japanese secondary sources on the web states type 5 tank gun was developed after type 4 AA gun.
It is true that 40kph was required influenced by Christie tanks and the concept was a highly mobile tank. After the prototypes rolled out in 1934, tank school staffs and cavalry school staffs examined them. Tankers replied it as 'valueless as a tank' for its thin armor, while cavalrymen replied 'acceptable as an equipment of mobile troop'. This weapon was named as type 95 light tank in May 1935. Even in a congress in December 1941, tankers insisted that type 95 might be suitable for armored-car troops (mechanized cavalries), but for tank troops it was not suitable as a main weapon. After that new medium tank was planned in 1936.tom! wrote:
My sources say that the type 95 was originally developed as a light fast tank for the highly mobile independent mixed brigades. The main problem was that the type 89 tanks were too slow (25 kph) to follow the trucks used by the mobile infantry units in 1933 which were able to drive at 60 kph or the new prime movers (40kph).
The 1st independent mixed brigade was raised in March 1934. When in 1937 this brigade was deployed to China theater, its 4th tank batallion had four companies, equipped with respectively type 95 light tank, type 92 heavy tankette, type 89 medium tank, and type 94 tankette.