Japan and oil

Discussions on all aspects of the Japanese Empire, from the capture of Taiwan until the end of the Second World War.
South
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#16

Post by South » 07 Feb 2008, 13:17

Good morning Jon,

The linked article re Sakalin was interesting.

The last paragraph supports my position: "and to threaten the Pacific possesions of the US".

After WWI, the US Pacific defense area was clear enough: from the Aleutian Islands, Alaska Territory through Hawaii Territory to Panama Canal Zone. This area defense triangle was a guaranteed shatterbelt against Japan to contend with re oil production and transport from Sakalin.

The risks were much less severe if the Dutch East Indies were acquired by Japan.

This is my reasoning.


Warm regards,

Bob

Jon G.
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#17

Post by Jon G. » 07 Feb 2008, 14:11

South wrote:...The last paragraph supports my position: "and to threaten the Pacific possesions of the US".
Yes, except that military build-up doesn't necessarily follow oil concessions. The Hitokappu Bay from whence Nagumo's fleet left to attack Pearl Harbor is in the Kuriles, not in Sakhalin.
After WWI, the US Pacific defense area was clear enough: from the Aleutian Islands, Alaska Territory through Hawaii Territory to Panama Canal Zone. This area defense triangle was a guaranteed shatterbelt against Japan to contend with re oil production and transport from Sakalin.
Note that the US wasn't allowed to build naval facilities in the Aleutians under the 1922 Washington Treaty.
The risks were much less severe if the Dutch East Indies were acquired by Japan...
Except that the Philippines are astride the route from Japan to the Dutch East Indies. That meant that war with the US was almost guaranteed once Japan decided to go south, rather than north.

On the other hand, rewards in terms of oil were much greater in the DEI.


South
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#18

Post by South » 07 Feb 2008, 16:52

Good morning Jon,

Oil operations have a corrolation with a military presence.

The Kuriles and Sakhalin were as alien to each other as Midway Island to the Hawaiian archepeligo.

Alaska Territory, to include its newly acquired Aleutians, was fortified after acquisition, 1867. Circa 1901 (?) Lt Billy Mitchell, later General, Army Air Corps, was an Officer In Charge, re the telegraph lines.

Re last 2 paragraphs; we're in complete agreement.


Warm regards,


Bob

cstunts
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#19

Post by cstunts » 07 Feb 2008, 18:20

Hello,

Yes, the Japanese wanted to find oil in Manchuria/China, but that did not become a viable option, and once this became evident they began to look south to the East Indies.

The Sakhalin issue is, in effect, moot. The difficulties of oil production there would have been utterly beyond the technical and industrial capacities of the Japanese in the Twenties, Thirties, or Forties. It has damned near buggered America's largest companies (ExxonMobil, Fluor) today as it is. Dwelling upon the Sakhalin fields as a realistic alternative source of oil for the Japanese in the first half of the century is disingenuous IMO.

Jon G.
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#20

Post by Jon G. » 08 Feb 2008, 00:44

South wrote:...Oil operations have a corrolation with a military presence.
True. But the 1925 Soviet-Japanese treaty stipulated that Japanese forces withdraw from the territory in return for mineral concessions. The Japanese may well have been in blatant disregard of that by 1941, but then they were also looking south rather than north by then.
The Kuriles and Sakhalin were as alien to each other as Midway Island to the Hawaiian archepeligo...
Yes. But the Sakhalin page doesn't distinguish very clearly between the two.
cstunts wrote:... The Sakhalin issue is, in effect, moot. The difficulties of oil production there would have been utterly beyond the technical and industrial capacities of the Japanese in the Twenties, Thirties, or Forties. It has damned near buggered America's largest companies (ExxonMobil, Fluor) today as it is. Dwelling upon the Sakhalin fields as a realistic alternative source of oil for the Japanese in the first half of the century is disingenuous IMO.
I agree, and you need not look any further than Sakhalin oil production figures and hold them against DEI oil production. It's more interesting that Japan kept trying to obtain what they could from Sakhalin, despite periodical friction with Soviet authorities and the great difficulty of even shipping oil from Sakhalin to Japan, than it is to note that Sakhalin alone could never satisfy Japan's oil needs.

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