Impact of Lend-Lease on Soviet railways

[LWD]

.... We can safely assume that the Soviet rail system was expanding massively in the 1930s,

I thought that was pretty well documented, I don't see any need to assume it.

Yes. Keep in mind that the Soviet state railroads had to serve a much smaller geographic area in 1942 than they did prior to June 1941.

Well more important would be they had to serve a much smaller population (indeed given the total area of the Soviet Union what % was under German control?) on the other hand the army was about the same size was it not?

Likewise, the Soviets probably needed more rolling stock in 1945 than they did in 1942-1944 - basically dismantling all of Eastern Germany and railing it back home will create additional needs for your rail system, for example, and, again, in geographical terms alone the area under Soviet control was much larger in 1945 than it was during the war.

But a lot of that wasn't time critical.

That means that a 1947 CIA estimate of Soviet rolling stock will tell you very little about how that would have corresponded to needs in 1942.

It didn't really adress needs it was more a statement of capabilities and as stated for 47. A data point certainly but one that is of uncertain utility for the topic at hand.

[Jon G.]

.... We can safely assume that the Soviet rail system was expanding massively in the 1930s,

I thought that was pretty well documented, I don't see any need to assume it.

Maybe you don't, but my reply was in response to your observation that we apparently can't quite nail down the size of the Soviet locomotive park by June 1941.

The Soviet rail net expansion was sort of delayed - most European networks were past their periods of expansion (and were indeed shrinking in some places already in the 1930s) - not because the Soviet Union was behind everybody else per se, but because building rail lines in such an enormous country is a massive undertaking.

That expansion is also the backdrop against which you should estimate the impact of LL rolling stock and other railroad equipment.

Yes. Keep in mind that the Soviet state railroads had to serve a much smaller geographic area in 1942 than they did prior to June 1941.

Well more important would be they had to serve a much smaller population (indeed given the total area of the Soviet Union what % was under German control?) on the other hand the army was about the same size was it not?

AFAIK, 1942 was the low point for the Soviets on every count - including size of their army. That aside, I disagree with you. Size of geographical area which the rail services had to serve is more important than size of customers. As can be seen from Art and Paul Atreides' posts upthread, it seems fairly obvious that the Soviets lost far more rail lines (thanks to losing the territory over which they ran to the advancing Germans) than they lost rolling stock in proportional terms.

From my own inquiries the Germans reported a rather low number of captured locomotives - in part, no doubt because they didn't care all that much (the gauge thing, remember), but in part probably also because the Soviets managed to evacuate much of their rolling stock further east - something which is much easier to do than moving tracks and rail-beds.

Likewise, the Soviets probably needed more rolling stock in 1945 than they did in 1942-1944 - basically dismantling all of Eastern Germany and railing it back home will create additional needs for your rail system, for example, and, again, in geographical terms alone the area under Soviet control was much larger in 1945 than it was during the war.

But a lot of that wasn't time critical.

If you think the LL rolling stock was time critical, shouldn't you then try and find out when and to what sectors of the Soviet economy it was delivered?

That means that a 1947 CIA estimate of Soviet rolling stock will tell you very little about how that would have corresponded to needs in 1942.

It didn't really adress needs it was more a statement of capabilities and as stated for 47. A data point certainly but one that is of uncertain utility for the topic at hand.

Yeah well, in time critical terms, it seems (from Gottwaldt) that Soviet confiscations of ex-German rolling stock from Eastern Europe reached a high point in 1947.

[LWD]

But a lot of that wasn't time critical.

If you think the LL rolling stock was time critical, shouldn't you then try and find out when and to what sectors of the Soviet economy it was delivered?
...

Given that the Soviet had no intention of leaving occupied Eastern Europe for a good number of years if ever they had plenty of time to ship things back to the USSR. On the other hand delivery of supplies to units engaged in combat can be time critical and if the units are not well supplied you can remove the conditional. It matters little exactly what sectors the LL rolling stock was used for because it became part of the system as a whole.

[Jon G.]

But a lot of that wasn't time critical.

If you think the LL rolling stock was time critical, shouldn't you then try and find out when and to what sectors of the Soviet economy it was delivered?
...

Given that the Soviet had no intention of leaving occupied Eastern Europe for a good number of years if ever they had plenty of time to ship things back to the USSR.

Yes.

On the other hand delivery of supplies to units engaged in combat can be time critical and if the units are not well supplied you can remove the conditional.

Maybe I can, but I want more than your word for it. Can you demonstrate one or more instances where Soviet operations succeeded due to the time-critical delivery of LL railroad rolling stock? Or, for that matter, can you demonstrate one or more instances where Soviet operations failed solely for want of rolling stock?

As long as all we know is the amount of LL rolling stock delivered in the 1941-1945 time frame, we are not in a position to judge whether some, all, or indeed none of it was time critical or not; personally I think it is a clue of sorts that the Soviets themselves decided to cut down their own production of rolling stock to almost nothing as soon as the Germans attacked.

It matters little exactly what sectors the LL rolling stock was used for because it became part of the system as a whole.

That is wrong too. I gave the example, not long upthread, of the Alco diesels which were supplied for use on the Iranian rail network, which had a different gauge than the native Soviet railroad network.

[LWD]

On the other hand delivery of supplies to units engaged in combat can be time critical and if the units are not well supplied you can remove the conditional.

Maybe I can, but I want more than your word for it. Can you demonstrate one or more instances where Soviet operations succeeded due to the time-critical delivery of LL railroad rolling stock?

Of course not. There's no information that I know of on what rolling stock was used for what nor does it matter. It's the capacity of the system.

Or, for that matter, can you demonstrate one or more instances where Soviet operations failed solely for want of rolling stock?

Well given that they didn't launch offences for the most part, and especially later in the war, until they had adequate supplies there's not likely to be much here either. The abscence of LL would have meant that they simply wated longer to launch said operations. I'm not sure how to tell the impact there either though. If you are looking at the overall empact of LL on the Soviet railsystem it becomes even more problematic later in the war as it extends to the rail system itself and what it's carrying. Can you show that it didn't have any effect? It seems to me you are trying to reverse the role of proponency here. My position for the most part is that the position that the impact of LL on the Soviet railsystem being minimal has not been well proven. However said impact in a capacity limited system would likely be at least that of the capacity provided. Other factors are more likely to increase rather than decrease said impact.

As long as all we know is the amount of LL rolling stock delivered in the 1941-1945 time frame, we are not in a position to judge whether some, all, or indeed none of it was time critical or not; personally I think it is a clue of sorts that the Soviets themselves decided to cut down their own production of rolling stock to almost nothing as soon as the Germans attacked.

Replacing lost weapons after the heavy early losses was of course of primary importance. However the availablilty of imported rolling stock meant that they could continue to produce weapons at those plants rather than allocating part of it to rail system related production. This would have become of some considerable import as they reestablished their rail system in liberated areas.

It matters little exactly what sectors the LL rolling stock was used for because it became part of the system as a whole.

That is wrong too. I gave the example, not long upthread, of the Alco diesels which were supplied for use on the Iranian rail network, which had a different gauge than the native Soviet railroad network.

No it is not wrong. In the abscence of said locomotives and rolling stock some other means of moving the material would have been required or the Soviets would have had to do without. Now I guess that they could have moved it by truck but that would have been far less efficient and had it's own impact on the log system in general and the rail system in particular.

[Jon G.]

On the other hand delivery of supplies to units engaged in combat can be time critical and if the units are not well supplied you can remove the conditional.

Maybe I can, but I want more than your word for it. Can you demonstrate one or more instances where Soviet operations succeeded due to the time-critical delivery of LL railroad rolling stock?

Of course not. There's no information that I know of on what rolling stock was used for what nor does it matter. It's the capacity of the system.

You claimed that the apparent 1947 high in Soviet rolling stock wasn't 'time critical', thereby implying that LL supplies of rolling stock were time critical. I have not yet seen you able to underpin or in any way prove that claim.

Yes, we need to know the capacity of the system - specifically, we need to know the capacity of the system before we can decide how much, if any, impact LL had on it.

Or, for that matter, can you demonstrate one or more instances where Soviet operations failed solely for want of rolling stock?

Well given that they didn't launch offences for the most part, and especially later in the war, until they had adequate supplies there's not likely to be much here either.

So, what does that tell us about the impact of LL on the Soviet rail system?

The abscence of LL would have meant that they simply wated longer to launch said operations. I'm not sure how to tell the impact there either though.

If you aren't sure, how then can you make claims either way?

If you are looking at the overall empact of LL on the Soviet railsystem it becomes even more problematic later in the war as it extends to the rail system itself and what it's carrying. Can you show that it didn't have any effect? It seems to me you are trying to reverse the role of proponency here. My position for the most part is that the position that the impact of LL on the Soviet railsystem being minimal has not been well proven.

Excuse me, but if you want to maintain a position about LL's significant impact on the Soviet rail system, aren't these the things which you ought to examine and investigate first?

Personally, I don't have much of a position either way - originally (before I merged the two threads) I was inclined to believe that LL did have a significant impact on the Soviet rail system, but I am taking a more detached view now. I think we are still at the evidence-gathering stage.

My issue, quite frankly, is with the increasing lack of logic in your posts on this thread.

However said impact in a capacity limited system would likely be at least that of the capacity provided.

I think most people should be able to figure that out themselves :roll:

I again point you to the Soviet decision to stop, more or less, all production of rolling stock after the Germans invaded. Assuming that they would have been screaming for more rolling stock to transport stuff around their shrinking (although still-enormous) empire, would they?

Other factors are more likely to increase rather than decrease said impact.

One factor, mentioned above, actually seems to have been that the Soviets had more rolling stock for fewer miles of track post-June 1941 than they did pre-June 1941, which again in strictly logical terms would imply that LL rolling stock would had less of an impact than it otherwise would have.

But I am interested in hearing about which other factors you can think of - and if you can underpin them with concrete evidence, so much the better.

As long as all we know is the amount of LL rolling stock delivered in the 1941-1945 time frame, we are not in a position to judge whether some, all, or indeed none of it was time critical or not; personally I think it is a clue of sorts that the Soviets themselves decided to cut down their own production of rolling stock to almost nothing as soon as the Germans attacked.

Replacing lost weapons after the heavy early losses was of course of primary importance. However the availablilty of imported rolling stock meant that they could continue to produce weapons at those plants rather than allocating part of it to rail system related production. This would have become of some considerable import as they reestablished their rail system in liberated areas.

Yes, that point I will admit to - but it's already been made.

It matters little exactly what sectors the LL rolling stock was used for because it became part of the system as a whole.

That is wrong too. I gave the example, not long upthread, of the Alco diesels which were supplied for use on the Iranian rail network, which had a different gauge than the native Soviet railroad network.

No it is not wrong. In the abscence of said locomotives and rolling stock some other means of moving the material would have been required or the Soviets would have had to do without. Now I guess that they could have moved it by truck but that would have been far less efficient and had it's own impact on the log system in general and the rail system in particular.

Yes. So we can conclude that it indeed did matter what part of the system the locomotives mentioned in my example were delivered to: top-notch Alco diesels which were mighty fine in Iran, but useless in the USSR unless re-gauged. Which was my point, written in direct contradiction to your '...It matters little exactly what sectors the LL rolling stock was used for...' :roll:

[ljadw]

An additional information from "Engines of the Red Army":the Routes of Foreign Aid
US LL Shipments to the SU :16.350 .000 tons,of which "Railroad" :468.532 tons (not specified,but including loc's,freight cars,rails,etc)
And,now ,the interesting point :till 30 june 1943,NOTHING of these railroad things were delivered.
The first deliveries were :
1 july 1943-30 june 1944:70.466 ton
then:
1 july 1944-12 may 1945:355.739 ton
13 may 1945-20 september 1945:42.327 ton
This is proving that the LL loc' had no importance for the first 2 years of the war in the east ;and,that their influence in the third year was insignifiant .

[LWD]

You claimed that the apparent 1947 high in Soviet rolling stock wasn't 'time critical', thereby implying that LL supplies of rolling stock were time critical. I have not yet seen you able to underpin or in any way prove that claim.

NO I did not. What I claimed was that post war rail capacity was hardlly critical for looting of the occupied parts of Eastern Europe. Given that the Soviets planned on and had decades to do so I think that is pretty self supporting. On the otherhand it's also quite clear that deliveries of muntions, weapons, and men in war time is often critical. If the rail capacity is used at anywhere near capacity then it is a limiting factor. That also would be fairly obvious. If one looks at the build up time for Soviet assualts it was often several months. If they could have built up enough supplies in a month to launch repeated assaults would they not have done so? The implication is clear that the log system of which the rail system was a major component was either the problem or the supplies themselves were the problem. If one looks at the history of food distribution in the Soviet Union one sees that production often wasn't as much the problem as distribution which points at a saturated log network and by extension rail network.

Yes, we need to know the capacity of the system - specifically, we need to know the capacity of the system before we can decide how much, if any, impact LL had on it.

Just knowing whether or not it was saturated would be enough to make some estimates.

The abscence of LL would have meant that they simply wated longer to launch said operations. I'm not sure how to tell the impact there either though.

If you aren't sure, how then can you make claims either way?

??? It's a best guess but a reasonable one. The number of things about which we can be "sure" is very limited.

Excuse me, but if you want to maintain a position about LL's significant impact on the Soviet rail system, aren't these the things which you ought to examine and investigate first?

Excuse me but my position was that without them those denying any significant impact of LL on the Soviet rail system were making claims in excess of what was supported. I supplied some indicators that it was signficant but I'll admit they aren't conclusive. They weren't meant to be they were meant to point out how weak the position of no signifigance was.

My issue, quite frankly, is with the increasing lack of logic in your posts on this thread.

I have never claimed to be an expert in this field. I have pointed out logical problems with the posts of others and indicators that there positions were suspect. You seem to think I've claimed a lot more than I have.

I again point you to the Soviet decision to stop, more or less, all production of rolling stock after the Germans invaded. Assuming that they would have been screaming for more rolling stock to transport stuff around their shrinking (although still-enormous) empire, would they?

????

... One factor, mentioned above, actually seems to have been that the Soviets had more rolling stock for fewer miles of track post-June 1941 than they did pre-June 1941, which again in strictly logical terms would imply that LL rolling stock would had less of an impact than it otherwise would have.

Did they? Source please.

It matters little exactly what sectors the LL rolling stock was used for because it became part of the system as a whole.

That is wrong too. I gave the example, not long upthread, of the Alco diesels which were supplied for use on the Iranian rail network, which had a different gauge than the native Soviet railroad network.

No it is not wrong. In the abscence of said locomotives and rolling stock some other means of moving the material would have been required or the Soviets would have had to do without. Now I guess that they could have moved it by truck but that would have been far less efficient and had it's own impact on the log system in general and the rail system in particular.

Yes. So we can conclude that it indeed did matter what part of the system the locomotives mentioned in my example were delivered: top-notch Alco diesels which were mighty fine in Iran, but useless in the USSR unless re-gauged. Which was my point, written in direct contradiction to your '...It matters little exactly what sectors the LL rolling stock was used for...' :roll:[/quote]
If you need to move material you need to move material. If it's in Tehran then if LL locomotives don't supply the power Soviet locomotives or Soviet trucks will need to or someone else will have to do it.
http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/ ... pter17.htm
makes that pretty clear as well as pointing out that the transportation choke points were usually those under Soviet control. Which brings up a question were those Alco diesels LL at all? Or were they US operated?

[Jon G.]

You claimed that the apparent 1947 high in Soviet rolling stock wasn't 'time critical', thereby implying that LL supplies of rolling stock were time critical. I have not yet seen you able to underpin or in any way prove that claim.

NO I did not. What I claimed was that post war rail capacity was hardlly critical for looting of the occupied parts of Eastern Europe. Given that the Soviets planned on and had decades to do so I think that is pretty self supporting. On the otherhand it's also quite clear that deliveries of muntions, weapons, and men in war time is often critical. If the rail capacity is used at anywhere near capacity then it is a limiting factor. That also would be fairly obvious. If one looks at the build up time for Soviet assualts it was often several months. If they could have built up enough supplies in a month to launch repeated assaults would they not have done so? The implication is clear that the log system of which the rail system was a major component was either the problem or the supplies themselves were the problem.

Which might work fine as an exercise in supposition and common sense; it however does not tell us anything about the impact of LL on the Soviet rail system.

If one looks at the history of food distribution in the Soviet Union one sees that production often wasn't as much the problem as distribution which points at a saturated log network and by extension rail network.

Yes, clearly, communications and infrastructure are and always have been big problems in a country the size of the Soviet Union (or even just Russia) however, for purposes of answering the primary question raised by this thread, we are not much closer in finding out how much of an impact LL supplied rail equipment had.

Yes, we need to know the capacity of the system - specifically, we need to know the capacity of the system before we can decide how much, if any, impact LL had on it.

Just knowing whether or not it was saturated would be enough to make some estimates.

In all friendlyness, I think we should all refrain from making estimates until we have more and better data.

The abscence of LL would have meant that they simply wated longer to launch said operations. I'm not sure how to tell the impact there either though.

If you aren't sure, how then can you make claims either way?

??? It's a best guess but a reasonable one. The number of things about which we can be "sure" is very limited.

...meaning, that if you are 'not sure' how to measure the impact of LL supplied rolling stock, you, I, and everybody else are better served by no guesses, rather than ''reasonable, best guesses'. In fact, it would be better not to claim anything about the importance (or non-importance) of LL-supplied railroad equipment until we know more than we do now.

Excuse me, but if you want to maintain a position about LL's significant impact on the Soviet rail system, aren't these the things which you ought to examine and investigate first?

Excuse me but my position was that without them those denying any significant impact of LL on the Soviet rail system were making claims in excess of what was supported. I supplied some indicators that it was signficant but I'll admit they aren't conclusive. They weren't meant to be they were meant to point out how weak the position of no signifigance was.

Well, claiming no significance is just as fruitlessly extreme as claiming massive significance is. It is all well and fine to point out that more rolling stock (&c) means the ability to haul more men and more material around, but most participants on this thread know that already. Without concretely measurable evidence how LL contributed to the Soviets' ability to haul around men and material around at specific times, at specific places, all you are doing is poining out the obvious.

My issue, quite frankly, is with the increasing lack of logic in your posts on this thread.

I have never claimed to be an expert in this field. I have pointed out logical problems with the posts of others and indicators that there positions were suspect. You seem to think I've claimed a lot more than I have.

Maybe I have. That said, I don't think your latest few posts on this particular thread have been very logical.

I again point you to the Soviet decision to stop, more or less, all production of rolling stock after the Germans invaded. Assuming that they would have been screaming for more rolling stock to transport stuff around their shrinking (although still-enormous) empire, would they?

????

...meaning, if the Soviets were so desperately short of rolling stock as you seem wont to maintain, would they have stopped building it?

... One factor, mentioned above, actually seems to have been that the Soviets had more rolling stock for fewer miles of track post-June 1941 than they did pre-June 1941, which again in strictly logical terms would imply that LL rolling stock would had less of an impact than it otherwise would have.

Did they? Source please.

You want a source for an exercise in logic? Really? How about reading Paul Atreides' post upthread http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 0#p1660070 from which it is quite clear that the Soviets lost far more track than they lost rolling stock in proportional terms.

Maybe Paul Atreides' figures are wrong - coming as they do from official Soviet histories - but I am certainly not in any position to challenge them. Are you?

If you need to move material you need to move material. If it's in Tehran then if LL locomotives don't supply the power Soviet locomotives or Soviet trucks will need to or someone else will have to do it.
http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/ ... pter17.htm
makes that pretty clear as well as pointing out that the transportation choke points were usually those under Soviet control.

Note my point, made nearly ad nauseam by now, that this essentially is a need which was created by Lend-Lease itself. Yes, the Soviets (and other operators on the Persian railroads) needed the modern engines to haul supplies from the Gulf to the USSR, but only because there was LL shipped in the first place. Take away LL, as an extreme exercise, and you take away the need for the Alco locomotives, too.

Which brings up a question were those Alco diesels LL at all? Or were they US operated?

They were LL as I understand it. I don't think that US operated and LL rule out one another.

[LWD]

... Which might work fine as an exercise in supposition and common sense; it however does not tell us anything about the impact of LL on the Soviet rail system.

Of course it does. It doesn't give us a definite answer certainy but it helps extablish the bounds of the problem and focus attention on where the data is needed.

In all friendlyness, I think we should all refrain from making estimates until we have more and better data.

I didn't start it and if reasonable estimates suggest that propositions put forth previously are questionable then they are useful. Furthermore if one looks at the limitations of estimates given by anyone then again it suggest what data would help rfine them. As for more and better data that has been one of the things I've been saying we needed for some time. Indeed many of my postings were expressly designed to highlight this need.

...meaning, that if you are 'not sure' how to measure the impact of LL supplied rolling stock, you, I, and everybody else are better served by no guesses, rather than ''reasonable, best guesses'. In fact, it would be better not to claim anything about the importance (or non-importance) of LL-supplied railroad equipment until we know more than we do now.

That's debateable but it also ignores the history of this thread. Again I presented "reasonable, best guesses" to illustrate teh weakness of propositions others put fourth. IMO they did a decent job of this and so were worthwhile.

Well, claiming no significance is just as fruitlessly extreme as claiming massive significance is.

My point exactly, although I would have used a word other then "fruitless". In the original thread there were the first postings about LL vastly overclaimed it's importance. That was refuted quite well. However some went on to IMO understate its signfigance.

It is all well and fine to point out that more rolling stock (&c) means the ability to haul more men and more material around, but most participants on this thread know that already. Without concretely measurable evidence how LL contributed to the Soviets' ability to haul around men and material around at specific times, at specific places, all you are doing is poining out the obvious.

No. For one thing there's the questoin of need. For another you simply can't reduce it to specfic times and places as I've stated. If say a LL locomotive hauled a vital train load of supplies to the front at one point in time does that mean that without LL it wouldn't have gotten there? Of course it doesn't. The Soviets could have used one of their own engines that was used somewhere esle instead or they could have waited a bit longer. Furthermore how do you assess the significance of said vital supplies ariving a few hours or a few days later? You are arguing for a level of knowledge that there is no hope in the world of ever having.

Maybe I have. That said, I don't think your latest few posts on this particular thread have been very logical.

Then PLS point out just where you think my logic fails. I will admit that when I get deep into a discussion I sometimes loose track of the original point and am not as careful with how I craft my replies.

...meaning, if the Soviets were so desperately short of rolling stock as you seem wont to maintain, would they have stopped building it?

Then you are misreading me. I doubt that a deficiency of rolling stock was the most severe problem the Soviets faced in 41 and 42. When they would have needed it more would be in 43 through 45 with the need increasing with time. At that point since they could get it from LL it was more efficient to do so and not loose time and effort to changing production. In the absence of LL do you think the Soviets wouldn't have produced more rolling stock and rails in 44 and 45 than they did historiacally.

... One factor, mentioned above, actually seems to have been that the Soviets had more rolling stock for fewer miles of track post-June 1941 than they did pre-June 1941, which again in strictly logical terms would imply that LL rolling stock would had less of an impact than it otherwise would have.

Did they? Source please.

You want a source for an exercise in logic? Really? How about reading Paul Atreides' post upthread http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 0#p1660070 from which it is quite clear that the Soviets lost far more track than they lost rolling stock in proportional terms.[/quote]
It seems like an exercise in logic but is it? For instance the Soviets had considerable rail miles east of the Urals. However given the population there would it have had the same density of rolling stock as as was presenct West of the Urals? How much of the rolling stock west of the Urals was lost? Certainly the Soviets managed to get some of it out of the way of the advancing Germans but they also had to continue using it to support their armies in the field and that represented a continued exposure to combat damage and loss. Of course post June 41 is a rather large time frame. So was it true in July of 41? How about July of 42? or July of 45? Furthermore there are the usual questions with Soviet historical documents especially those publically available in the time frame of the one he quotes. Now I'm pretty sure you are correct for at least part of the period in question however it seems to me that you have just done exactly what you critize me for above.

Maybe Paul Atreides' figures are wrong - coming as they do from official Soviet histories - but I am certainly not in any position to challenge them. Are you?

Of course we are. A simple quote without reference or detail and given the Soviet histography of the time. If there's not sufficient information to at least let someone double check the numbers they can hardly be considered "certain".

... Note my point, made nearly ad nauseam by now, that this essentially is a need which was created by Lend-Lease itself.

I know you have repeatedly stated this. But lets apply your formula. How much of this need was created by LL? Given that the Soviets needed the material and would have had to produce at least some of it themselves. That's a demand of moving raw materials, perhaps sub assemblies, and finished goods. So what was the impact of LL in this regard?

... They were LL as I understand it. I don't think that US operated and LL rule out one another.

LL to the Soviets implies that they were under Soviet control. The ships that delivered the goods to Murmansk and Persia weren't considered LL? (I think the ones that delivered via Siberia may have been. They were Soviet crewed.) Why should the railroads that moved it from the ports under control of the western allies be considered such?

[Jon G.]

... Which might work fine as an exercise in supposition and common sense; it however does not tell us anything about the impact of LL on the Soviet rail system.

Of course it does. It doesn't give us a definite answer certainy but it helps extablish the bounds of the problem and focus attention on where the data is needed.

Ehm right, just remember, this all stems from your apparent claim that the big difference between wartime and 1947 Soviet rail inventories is that the latter 'was not time critical'. A claim which you should not have made if you can't back it up.

In all friendlyness, I think we should all refrain from making estimates until we have more and better data.

I didn't start it and if reasonable estimates suggest that propositions put forth previously are questionable then they are useful. Furthermore if one looks at the limitations of estimates given by anyone then again it suggest what data would help rfine them. As for more and better data that has been one of the things I've been saying we needed for some time. Indeed many of my postings were expressly designed to highlight this need.

You've just offered free-loading speculation.

...meaning, that if you are 'not sure' how to measure the impact of LL supplied rolling stock, you, I, and everybody else are better served by no guesses, rather than ''reasonable, best guesses'. In fact, it would be better not to claim anything about the importance (or non-importance) of LL-supplied railroad equipment until we know more than we do now.

That's debateable but it also ignores the history of this thread. Again I presented "reasonable, best guesses" to illustrate teh weakness of propositions others put fourth. IMO they did a decent job of this and so were worthwhile.

See above. It's all well and fine if you disagree with someone else's position, but you should be able to back up your disagreement with something more solid than 'reasonable, best guesses'

...

It is all well and fine to point out that more rolling stock (&c) means the ability to haul more men and more material around, but most participants on this thread know that already. Without concretely measurable evidence how LL contributed to the Soviets' ability to haul around men and material around at specific times, at specific places, all you are doing is poining out the obvious.

No. For one thing there's the questoin of need. For another you simply can't reduce it to specfic times and places as I've stated. If say a LL locomotive hauled a vital train load of supplies to the front at one point in time does that mean that without LL it wouldn't have gotten there? Of course it doesn't. The Soviets could have used one of their own engines that was used somewhere esle instead or they could have waited a bit longer. Furthermore how do you assess the significance of said vital supplies ariving a few hours or a few days later? You are arguing for a level of knowledge that there is no hope in the world of ever having.

If I am, then I will not take any blame for it Rather, I am arguing for the kind of knowledge you ought to acquire before making claims as those put forth by you in this thread.

Before you start making guesses about 'vital loads of supplies' should you not, at the very least, acquiant yourself with when in the 1941-1945 timeframe LL rolling stock was delivered, and what sections of the Soviet rail system it was put to use on?

Maybe I have. That said, I don't think your latest few posts on this particular thread have been very logical.

Then PLS point out just where you think my logic fails. I will admit that when I get deep into a discussion I sometimes loose track of the original point and am not as careful with how I craft my replies.

Like, if you want to make the point about LL's big importance to the Soviet rail sytem, come forth with solid data, rather than poorly-worded guesses about 'time critical', 'vital cargoes' &c

...meaning, if the Soviets were so desperately short of rolling stock as you seem wont to maintain, would they have stopped building it?

Then you are misreading me. I doubt that a deficiency of rolling stock was the most severe problem the Soviets faced in 41 and 42. When they would have needed it more would be in 43 through 45 with the need increasing with time. At that point since they could get it from LL it was more efficient to do so and not loose time and effort to changing production.

That point I will readily admit. Simply knowing that LL was in the pipeline could have affected Soviet choices about what to produce, and when.

However, as for rolling stock, I think the question is rather if there was any deficiency in it at all, at least for the 1941-1942 period.

LL only really caught steam ( ) from 1943 on - you could argue that this happened at about the same pace that the Soviets were clamoring more and more loudly for a second front against the Germans - and from THEN on there are identifiable, extra needs, namely railing all that LL from the Far East, Iran and Arkhangelsk to Soviet centers of consumption - but those needs were created by LL itself, and, it will appear, at least the Americans strove to provide LL on wheels, delivered to the Soviets' doorstep, rather than in crates on some godforsaken quay in the Far or Middle East.

In the absence of LL do you think the Soviets wouldn't have produced more rolling stock and rails in 44 and 45 than they did historiacally.

That is a good question. I guess it depends on the overall importance one assigns to LL; if you think it was very important, then the Soviet armies may not have been as far west as they were historically in 1944-1945 sans LL.

However, the Soviet propensity for robbing occupied Eastern Europe of ex-German rolling stock post-war, then gradually handing back the same rolling stock as their own production came online again might offer a clue about the relative importance of home-grown vs. acquired rolling stock.

... One factor, mentioned above, actually seems to have been that the Soviets had more rolling stock for fewer miles of track post-June 1941 than they did pre-June 1941, which again in strictly logical terms would imply that LL rolling stock would had less of an impact than it otherwise would have.

Did they? Source please.

You want a source for an exercise in logic? Really? How about reading Paul Atreides' post upthread http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 0#p1660070 from which it is quite clear that the Soviets lost far more track than they lost rolling stock in proportional terms.

It seems like an exercise in logic but is it? For instance the Soviets had considerable rail miles east of the Urals. However given the population there would it have had the same density of rolling stock as as was presenct West of the Urals? How much of the rolling stock west of the Urals was lost? Certainly the Soviets managed to get some of it out of the way of the advancing Germans but they also had to continue using it to support their armies in the field and that represented a continued exposure to combat damage and loss. Of course post June 41 is a rather large time frame. So was it true in July of 41? How about July of 42? or July of 45?

Sorry LWD, I don't care about your speculations. Give me figures, or give me nothing. The figures, as offered by forum member Paul Atreides, are there, and you are free to challenge them - with figures of your own

Furthermore there are the usual questions with Soviet historical documents especially those publically available in the time frame of the one he quotes. Now I'm pretty sure you are correct for at least part of the period in question however it seems to me that you have just done exactly what you critize me for above.

Free-form speculating, you mean? Where?

Maybe Paul Atreides' figures are wrong - coming as they do from official Soviet histories - but I am certainly not in any position to challenge them. Are you?

Of course we are. A simple quote without reference or detail and given the Soviet histography of the time. If there's not sufficient information to at least let someone double check the numbers they can hardly be considered "certain"...

Then you did not read his posts very carefully. He gives title and page references for his figures for Soviet rail stock on specific dates, even with a minor self-correcting post changing a page reference afterwards.

Of course the figures, like any figures, could be wrong - but it's your job to find alternative figures, or make plausible explanation as to why the figures on offer are wrong. 'Soviet historiography' alone is not gonna cut it - just as it's your problem if you don't have the titles to hand to verify the numbers provided.

[Politician01]

An additional information from "Engines of the Red Army":the Routes of Foreign Aid
US LL Shipments to the SU :16.350 .000 tons,of which "Railroad" :468.532 tons (not specified,but including loc's,freight cars,rails,etc)
And,now ,the interesting point :till 30 june 1943,NOTHING of these railroad things were delivered.
The first deliveries were :
1 july 1943-30 june 1944:70.466 ton
then:
1 july 1944-12 may 1945:355.739 ton
13 may 1945-20 september 1945:42.327 ton
This is proving that the LL loc' had no importance for the first 2 years of the war in the east ;and,that their influence in the third year was insignifiant .

Thouse numbers dont seem very reliable.

Its obvious when one does just some simple math.

Lets say one loco weights 60 tons
and one freight car 10 tons

2000 locs and 12 000 freight cars would be allready 240 000 tons.
And the allies delivered rails for some 30 000 km of rail system or even more.

and 8 tons or rail for one kilometer- thats just not possible.

And then there were a lot of rail engines and spare parts ect ect

[Alk]

The Russians virtually stopped producting locomotives during world war 2, producing only 92, relying on American Lend Lease to provide them with over 2000 these (according to Kotelnikov). These 2000 were actually Soviet 2-10-0 designs built in American factories (with some improvements) and then shipped to Russia. Russia lost about 16,000 locomotives during the war. American production did not totally replace all of these, but their efforts certainly helped.

Like with many other products, Lend Lease helped fill in the gaps in locomotive production, while the Soviets concentrated on producing huge quantities of a relatively small number of critical and war-winning items.

Meanwhile the Germans produced about 7000 series 52 locomotives alone (14,900 total during the war). Since the labor force and steel used in their production meant correspondingly fewer armored fighting vehicles could be built, it shows the drain on resources that the German requirment for locomotives was.

The more closely Lend Lease is looked at, the more critical to the Russian War effort it appears to be.

**...can anyone verify Soviet Locomotive production numbers? I got the above figure from wikipedia, and have read that Russia relied on Lend Lease for new locomotives. However, this figure seems impossibly low to me.

[Paul_Atreides]

Russia lost about 16,000 locomotives during the war.

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 0#p1660540

[LWD]

... Which might work fine as an exercise in supposition and common sense; it however does not tell us anything about the impact of LL on the Soviet rail system.

Of course it does. It doesn't give us a definite answer certainy but it helps extablish the bounds of the problem and focus attention on where the data is needed.

Ehm right, just remember, this all stems from your apparent claim that the big difference between wartime and 1947 Soviet rail inventories is that the latter 'was not time critical'. A claim which you should not have made if you can't back it up.

My claim was that the rail inventories were not time critical as far as looting Eastern Europe. Rather self evident as the Soviets didn't plan on leaving so they had years or decades even to do so. Furthermore if you have enough stock to move what food stock you have to prevent a famine what else related to rail capacity is "time critical" when you are not at war?