US/UK lend-lease to Stalin

[Gwynn Compton]

Oleg,

You have an interesting way of writting off our sources, yet you still are yet to supply a reliable source of our own. Indeed your source from Soviet Russia in itself is to be doubted. I'm interested to note you have not even tried to defend your source.

Keegan's sources come from John Erickson, John Erickson researched both in Russia, England and America from my knowledge to create his history of the Ostfront. Thus is it not so that he has a better overall picture of the war than perhaps anyone else ever?

The number Keegan gives is for the end of the war, and does not make any account of Lend Lease vehicles supplied, which would if we take into account likely losses, make the figure much higher, and thus increase the Soviet reliance on Lend Lease vehicles.

Unfortunately Keegan does not look at numbers for Lend Lease in 1941,42 and 43, however if someone can show me and reliable source for these numbers (and Soviet reports are generally not a reliable primary source on history)

Kulik was not in charge of Soviet automotive industry.
Kulik was not in charge of General Staff and therefore could not do anything about establishment of Soviet formations.

I never claimed he was either if you read my original post. He is in charge of Ordnance, thus being able to halt production of Anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. However, while not directly in charge of the Red Army motorized transport division, he was obviously able to convince Stalin to make the change. Hence why it is Stalin who makes the change and not Kulik directly, though Kulik was the advocator of this action.

-if you don't believe it or you want to make number that will suit your theory best-

No, that appears to be the specialty of more dubious historians. I draw my figures from Keegan and Erickson, both who are some of the most reliable sources on the Ostfront The theory which I am presenting to you, Oleg, is one that is supported by, I suspect, the majority of historians now days. The fact is the USSR was dependent on Lend Lease to win the war in the time that they did.

Yes the USSR could have won on its own, yes it could have built the said trucks on its own, but it would have taken even longer to do so.

the data on Soviet production has to come form the Soviet reports since there is no other source on the Soviet production

And the point I am making is that we must question the reliability of these figures. The entire idea of the "Great Patriotic War" comes from Stalin, and he wished it to appear a Russian engineered victory. Likewise both Britain and the United States wanted it to appear they had engineered victory, this is true, and one could argue that this would also make their figures unreliable. But the difference between Soviet Russia and the West is that ultimately, those who make these reports in the West are far more accountable than those in Soviet Russia. Accountability is perhaps the biggest honesty maker known to governments. And the only accountability in the Soviet Union is to the party, and the party for the obvious reason of wanting to appear infalliable, and to maintain the support of the people, does not want to look bad, and thus they can, and will cover up accountability. Such was the case in the Ukrainian Famine, and such was the case with the disasters in the Soviet Space programme, and equally this can be applied to the records of Soviet War production.

In the west however, accountability is open to the public, not closed to the party like Communist Russia. It is this aspect, the fact that if, in the West, you doubt the figures, you can perform an independent inquiry, that the accountability is there for you to see, it is tangable, this is what makes records in the West more accurate than those in the East. Mistakes are in the open in the West during this period, and thusly they are there to be critically analysed and to be corrected, but this is something the Soviet Union lacked. There is no unbiased critical analysis, the focus is on saving face for the party, especially in light of the disaster which befall the Red Army in 1941.

Oleg, you have proven yourself to be a valuable source to us in terms of supplying us with material from the Soviet Union. However, as a historian, it is your duty to critically analysise your sources and ask "Is what I'm reading true?" and "How might it be biased?" This is what I'm asking you to do here. I'm not convinced the sources your providing us with are reliable, and thats essentially the crux of the matter.

The reason why I rely so heavily on Erickson as a source for the Ostfront is that he is perhaps one of the model historians of our time. Erickson was known for throughly checking the information he collected in order to ensure that what he put into his books was as accurate as humanly possible. Keegan too follows this, however as Keegan's book focuses on the entire war, he was unable to give a blow by blow account of Erickson's work, due to limitations on space, however, a figure as reliable as Keegan has proven to be, it is hard to imagine him distorting figures.

In fact, while this thread has brought me much frustration, it has equally brought me joy in being able to engage people in an intellectual debate, which is ultimately why I return so often to this forum

[Oleg Grigoryev]

Oleg,

You have an interesting way of writting off our sources, yet you still are yet to supply a reliable source of our own. Indeed your source from Soviet Russia in itself is to be doubted. I'm interested to note you have not even tried to defend your source.

Keegan's sources come from John Erickson, John Erickson researched both in Russia, England and America from my knowledge to create his history of the Ostfront. Thus is it not so that he has a better overall picture of the war than perhaps anyone else ever?

The number Keegan gives is for the end of the war, and does not make any account of Lend Lease vehicles supplied, which would if we take into account likely losses, make the figure much higher, and thus increase the Soviet reliance on Lend Lease vehicles.

Unfortunately Keegan does not look at numbers for Lend Lease in 1941,42 and 43, however if someone can show me and reliable source for these numbers (and Soviet reports are generally not a reliable primary source on history)

Kulik was not in charge of Soviet automotive industry.
Kulik was not in charge of General Staff and therefore could not do anything about establishment of Soviet formations.

I never claimed he was either if you read my original post. He is in charge of Ordnance, thus being able to halt production of Anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. However, while not directly in charge of the Red Army motorized transport division, he was obviously able to convince Stalin to make the change. Hence why it is Stalin who makes the change and not Kulik directly, though Kulik was the advocator of this action.

-if you don't believe it or you want to make number that will suit your theory best-

No, that appears to be the specialty of more dubious historians. I draw my figures from Keegan and Erickson, both who are some of the most reliable sources on the Ostfront The theory which I am presenting to you, Oleg, is one that is supported by, I suspect, the majority of historians now days. The fact is the USSR was dependent on Lend Lease to win the war in the time that they did.

Yes the USSR could have won on its own, yes it could have built the said trucks on its own, but it would have taken even longer to do so.

the data on Soviet production has to come form the Soviet reports since there is no other source on the Soviet production

And the point I am making is that we must question the reliability of these figures. The entire idea of the "Great Patriotic War" comes from Stalin, and he wished it to appear a Russian engineered victory. Likewise both Britain and the United States wanted it to appear they had engineered victory, this is true, and one could argue that this would also make their figures unreliable. But the difference between Soviet Russia and the West is that ultimately, those who make these reports in the West are far more accountable than those in Soviet Russia. Accountability is perhaps the biggest honesty maker known to governments. And the only accountability in the Soviet Union is to the party, and the party for the obvious reason of wanting to appear infalliable, and to maintain the support of the people, does not want to look bad, and thus they can, and will cover up accountability. Such was the case in the Ukrainian Famine, and such was the case with the disasters in the Soviet Space programme, and equally this can be applied to the records of Soviet War production.

In the west however, accountability is open to the public, not closed to the party like Communist Russia. It is this aspect, the fact that if, in the West, you doubt the figures, you can perform an independent inquiry, that the accountability is there for you to see, it is tangable, this is what makes records in the West more accurate than those in the East. Mistakes are in the open in the West during this period, and thusly they are there to be critically analysed and to be corrected, but this is something the Soviet Union lacked. There is no unbiased critical analysis, the focus is on saving face for the party, especially in light of the disaster which befall the Red Army in 1941.

Oleg, you have proven yourself to be a valuable source to us in terms of supplying us with material from the Soviet Union. However, as a historian, it is your duty to critically analysise your sources and ask "Is what I'm reading true?" and "How might it be biased?" This is what I'm asking you to do here. I'm not convinced the sources your providing us with are reliable, and thats essentially the crux of the matter.

The reason why I rely so heavily on Erickson as a source for the Ostfront is that he is perhaps one of the model historians of our time. Erickson was known for throughly checking the information he collected in order to ensure that what he put into his books was as accurate as humanly possible. Keegan too follows this, however as Keegan's book focuses on the entire war, he was unable to give a blow by blow account of Erickson's work, due to limitations on space, however, a figure as reliable as Keegan has proven to be, it is hard to imagine him distorting figures.

In fact, while this thread has brought me much frustration, it has equally brought me joy in being able to engage people in an intellectual debate, which is ultimately why I return so often to this forum

Interesting I am using research which was done in the last 3 years (the one done through vehicles registration) - you are dismissing it on the basis that Kegan wrote differently

I am giving you numbers that were derived earlier than that - you dismiss them as a communist propaganda - very convenient.

I asking you again how in your (and Kegan) opinion all LL vehicles made it through the without loses so that there 400000 something of them by the 1945? Accidentally you will receive the same 30% for LL vehicles if you do little work with Krivoseev book..

In regards to Kulik -why don't you find establishment for Soviet motorized division of 1940 as well as for Soviet tank division o f 1940 - and see for yourself how many trucks and other vehicles they had.

On the other note did you find my post where I said LL did not help?

Copper:

Soviet production: 709,000 metric tones pure
LL deliveries: 308,726 metric tones base alloys (trick question: what is the conversion ratio between ore and pure copper?)
69,400 m.t. pure
LL proportion: less than 35% (I have a suspicion it would be less than 20% if you convert ore to pure copper and even less if you take into the account pre-war stocks.)

[Oleg Grigoryev]

I found a book called "Stalinist terror - New Perspective". Book is
published by Cambridge University Press in 1993 and edited by J. Arch
Getty and Roberta T.Manning . Chapter 9 is written by Roger R. Reese
and it is called "The Red Army and the Great Purge". I want to post
several quotes to give you an idea.

"To date the study of the purge of the Red Army officer corps from
1937-9 has focused exclusively on the terror of the Ezhovshchina,
that is, the arrest and execution of officers by the secret police of
the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) headed by
Nikolai Ezhov for whom the period is named. Several articles and
documents on the Red Army purge published in Voenno-istoricheskii
zhurnal and Izvestiia TsK KPSS in 1989 and 1990 have revealed that
the terror was only one of two extraordinary processes that
eliminated officers from the army in those years. The other,
heretofore unrecognized, was expelling officers from the army and
discharging them from the Communist party for associations with
enemies of the people and, in 1938, for associations with foreigners,
which did not necessarily result in death or imprisonment. Thousands
of officers were expelled from the party as the result of independent
actions by primary party organizations, and subsequently discharged
from the army in an orgy of denunciations at the local level out of
Moscow's control. As these two processes became interrelated,
confusion added to fear and magnified the effect of the terror.
Simultaneously, thousands of officers were reinstated and tens of
thousands new officers commissioned, more than making up for the
purged officers numerically, but not in experience, and making it
extremely difficult to assess the impact of the Ezhovshchina on
military cadres. This new information suggests a need to reexamine
our understanding of the purge of the Red Army, because before the
publishing of the aforementioned materials and documents, it was
assumed that all officers removed from the armed forces in the years
1937?9 had been arrested and either executed or imprisoned by the
NKVD. Table 9.1 from a report by E. A. Shchadenko, Chief of the
Commanding Personnel section of the People's Commissariat of Defense,
however, shows that a minority of army officers and political leaders
were removed from the army by arrest, and the majority were
discharged from the army through expulsion from the party.

All told, 34,301 army, air force, and Political Administration of the
Red Army (PUR) leaders were discharged from the army either through
arrest or expulsion from the party during the Ezhovshchina. Of these,
11,596 were reinstated by May 1940. This leaves the fate of 22,705
men unknown. These men could have faced a variety of ends after their
discharge. Those discharged because of arrest could have remained in
the Gulag under arrest, or later been freed but not reinstated to the
army, or even been shot; those expelled and not rehabilitated may
later have been arrested and sent to the Gulag or possibly executed.
The most extreme possibilities would be for all to have been shot or
for all to have been set free to go home. Neither extreme is likely.
If the NKVD was out to arrest someone, it does not seem plausible
that just because people had been discharged from the army and party
they would not be arrested; quite the opposite would seem to apply.
We know those discharged were not all killed because officers
continued to be released and rehabilitated after May 1940.
The numbers also show a more limited impact on the military than
previously thought. Before the publication of the figures in Table
9.1, it had been variously estimated that between 25% and 50% of the
Red Army officer corps was repressed in the Ezhovshchina,
Conveniently, Shchadenko's office gave the percentage of the
leadership permanently discharged in the purge, which allows a
calculation of the total strength of the nachal'sostav in the purge
years. In 1937, the nachal'sostav numbered 144,300, of whom 11,034
discharged for political reasons remained discharged as of May 1940,
equaling 7.7% of the nachal'sostav. In 1938 there were 179,000
leaders, of whom 6,742 political dischargees were still discharged in
May 1940, which equalled 3.7% of the nachal'sostav; and in 1939 the
army had 282,300 leaders, 205 or 0.08% of whom were dis charged for
political reasons and remained discharged in May 1940. Because the
army stepped up officer procurement during the Ezhovshchina, and at a
rate that outpaced discharges, it is extremely difficult to invent a
statistic to describe the cumulative impact of the purge on the
military, and Shchadenko's annual figures are probably the most
definitive we will ever have.
The reason for the earlier high estimates of the percentage of
repressed officers and PUR men by Western historians was not so much
the erroneous estimates of the number of repressed officers, but
tremendously low estimates of the size of the nachal'sostav. John
Erickson and Robert Conquest estimated the officer corps to number
80,000 and 70,000 respectively, so whereas Erickson's estimates of
between 20,000 and 30,000 men discharged is very near the mark, his
estimate of the impact is very far off, as is Conquest's estimate of
35,000 arrested officers out of a corps of 70,000. His estimate of a
minimum of 20,000 arrested PUR men is 300% off.2 Both of these
historians considered the majority of victims of the Ezhovshchina to
have been arrested, not expelled and discharged, and did not realize
how quickly and in what large numbers men were rehabilitated.
Chistki should not be viewed as antimilitary actions on the part of
the party, or as attempts to subvert the leadership of the army; in
fact, they reflected a genuine concern for the moral health of the
Red Army just as civilian chistki were to strengthen, not punish,
those party organs. In the military chistki men were expelled not
only for political reasons; failure in one's military duties could
also result in being booted out of the party. In the 1933 chistka,
for example, the particular stress was on discipline. Those who did
not maintain it in their units, or were personally undisciplined,
were subject to expulsion from the party."

so what Russian sources was Ericson using back here? Your foremost expert does not even know how much officers was in the army that he supposedly knows so much about. Forgive me if I am skeptical (accidentally Erickson is also somewhat frivolous when counting Soviet loses -it seems that statistics as it is not his strongest side) According to J. Erickson "Soviet War Loses" Calculations and Controversies" Red Suffered 6,885,100 kia are due to battle deaths, 8.8 to include all other's suicide etc. While in reality Soviet archives 6855100 men KIA, died from wounds, died in accidents, committed suicides, executed by the decision of military tribunals; one might wonder that he research methods are...

[Darrin]

[quote="oleg] I am giving you numbers that were derived earlier than that - you dismiss them as a communist propaganda - very convenient.

I asking you again how in your (and Kegan) opinion all LL vehicles made it through the without loses so that there 400000 something of them by the 1945? Accidentally you will receive the same 30% for LL vehicles if you do little work with Krivoseev book..

In regards to Kulik -why don't you find establishment for Soviet motorized division of 1940 as well as for Soviet tank division o f 1940 - and see for yourself how many trucks and other vehicles they had.

On the other note did you find my post where I said LL did not help?

Copper:

Soviet production: 709,000 metric tones pure
LL deliveries: 308,726 metric tones base alloys (trick question: what is the conversion ratio between ore and pure copper?)
69,400 m.t. pure
LL proportion: less than 35% (I have a suspicion it would be less than 20% if you convert ore to pure copper and even less if you take into the account pre-war stocks.)[/quote]


LL vehicles and rus vehiicle reg. What proof do we have the rus counted every imobile tractors all over rus or lada cars. Or that military vech esp from abroad would even be reg. Or that any reg happened regularly during the war. Every other account I read differs as to the use of LL trucks just because you mange to dig up one old stat that says dif I will ignore this until I read it with my own eyes. Although I don't distrust soviet sources per see this one seems almost imposible. Does it appear in english.

In mark harrisons accounting for war sov prod of pure copper is around your total but only if you include all production in 41 and 45. Most peole only include half those yearly total to discuss war production. Which is important to compare allied help during the war. Is this your source? Plus if you are talking about pure copper produced by rus they used the western ore to produce some of thier pure copper. In one source I examined rus only prod 10,000 tons of copper ore in 1937 4% of the world totals. From john ellis WWII a stats survey it doesn't give the impression of rus swimming in copper.

[Oleg Grigoryev]

LL vehicles and rus vehiicle reg. What proof do we have the rus counted every imobile tractors all over rus or lada cars. Or that military vech esp from abroad would even be reg. Or that any reg happened regularly during the war. Every other account I read differs as to the use of LL trucks just because you mange to dig up one old stat that says dif I will ignore this until I read it with my own eyes. Although I don't distrust soviet sources per see this one seems almost imposible. Does it appear in english.

In mark harrisons accounting for war sov prod of pure copper is around your total but only if you include all production in 41 and 45. Most peole only include half those yearly total to discuss war production. Which is important to compare allied help during the war. Is this your source? Plus if you are talking about pure copper produced by rus they used the western ore to produce some of thier pure copper. In one source I examined rus only prod 10,000 tons of copper ore in 1937 4% of the world totals. From john ellis WWII a stats survey it doesn't give the impression of rus swimming in copper.

What proof do you have that they did not counted or registred cars and trucks? (there were no LADA cars during WWII). Soviet army was very strict than it came to counting equpiment one had to prove that vechiles was lost actually due to enemy action and not internal sabotage - SMERSH made sure of that. I don't exactly see why would you exclude first half of 1941 out of the picture? Was not raw materials collected at that period used later on for the war production? Also I don't see why prewar stocks does not make their way into your estimation on general basis.

Darrin I will use an anology that sombode esle came up with but IMO is rather sucessful one

I go to war with 1000 bullets, during the war I produce 100 of them, and you give me another 200. After war you claim that your help was critical because you gave me 200% of my production. This is what the biggest morons around here claim. Slightly smarter people say that you gave me 67% of the total production. I simply point out that in reality you gave me only 15% of the total number of bullets I could spend, which is what counts.

[Darrin]

[quote="oleg]
What proof do you have that they did not counted or registred cars and trucks? (there were no LADA cars during WWII). Soviet army was very strict than it came to counting equpiment one had to prove that vechiles was lost actually due to enemy action and not internal sabotage - SMERSH made sure of that. I don't exactly see why would you exclude first half of 1941 out of the picture? Was not raw materials collected at that period used later on for the war production? Also I don't see why prewar stocks does not make their way into your estimation on general basis.

Darrin I will use an anology that sombode esle came up with but IMO is rather sucessful one

I go to war with 1000 bullets, during the war I produce 100 of them, and you give me another 200. After war you claim that your help was critical because you gave me 200% of my production. This is what the biggest morons around here claim. Slightly smarter people say that you gave me 67% of the total production. I simply point out that in reality you gave me only 15% of the total number of bullets I could spend, which is what counts.

Count yes but reg all trucks prduced and imprted to rus and only trucks...NO.

If you include 41 then you must exclude 45 at the least. We are talking about wartime production and how LL shipments during wartime did or didn't help. Peacetime production gets no medels.

No sources for any of this info preferable in english.

[Oleg Grigoryev]

[quote="oleg]
What proof do you have that they did not counted or registred cars and trucks? (there were no LADA cars during WWII). Soviet army was very strict than it came to counting equpiment one had to prove that vechiles was lost actually due to enemy action and not internal sabotage - SMERSH made sure of that. I don't exactly see why would you exclude first half of 1941 out of the picture? Was not raw materials collected at that period used later on for the war production? Also I don't see why prewar stocks does not make their way into your estimation on general basis.

Darrin I will use an anology that sombode esle came up with but IMO is rather sucessful one

I go to war with 1000 bullets, during the war I produce 100 of them, and you give me another 200. After war you claim that your help was critical because you gave me 200% of my production. This is what the biggest morons around here claim. Slightly smarter people say that you gave me 67% of the total production. I simply point out that in reality you gave me only 15% of the total number of bullets I could spend, which is what counts.

Count yes but reg all trucks prduced and imprted to rus and only trucks...NO.

If you include 41 then you must exclude 45 at the least. We are talking about wartime production and how LL shipments during wartime did or didn't help. Peacetime production gets no medels.

No sources for any of this info preferable in english.

You can use Krivosheev in regards to trucks - he is in English- you will get the same number through the differnt approach. It is probaly fare to exclude part of 1945, but then some of LL shipments also arrived after the end of hostilities - you will have to exclude them as well. And why NO? How in your oppinion trucks would go to the army without being registred? It kind of make general staff work difficult without being able to aacount for losses and the way to calcualte truck loses were inquire specific units using registration numbers as point of reference. So how about inclusion of pre-war stocks in the math?

[Pumpkin]

How was the LL distributed between the three routes: Murmansk, Persia, Vladivostok? I suppose Persia would provide the most attractive route, given closeness to Ural and the front and the distance to German bases. Did the Jap's do anything to block LL to Vladivostok? Did those ships only carry Soviet flag?

A later CEO at IBM (I think it was) wrote in his biography how he participated in an air bridge with LL across Siberia.

[Oleg Grigoryev]

How was the LL distributed between the three routes: Murmansk, Persia, Vladivostok? I suppose Persia would provide the most attractive route, given closeness to Ural and the front and the distance to German bases. Did the Jap's do anything to block LL to Vladivostok? Did those ships only carry Soviet flag?

A later CEO at IBM (I think it was) wrote in his biography how he participated in an air bridge with LL across Siberia.

Northern Russia -3964000 t
Persian Gulf - 4160000 t
Black Sea - 681000 t
Soviet Far East - 8244000 t
Soviet Arctic 452000 t

[Pumpkin]

Great, Oleg!
But I don't understand what Soviet Arctic refers to? Summer shippings north of Siberia??? Airplanes?

And I'm surprised to see that Northern Russia (Murmansk?) was such a significant route. Shouldn't German submarines and airplanes have been able to make that impossible from the Norwegian coast? And wasn't the wooden town of Murmansk simply, eh, gone, after German bombing?

[Oleg Grigoryev]

Great, Oleg!
But I don't understand what Soviet Arctic refers to? Summer shippings north of Siberia??? Airplanes?

And I'm surprised to see that Northern Russia (Murmansk?) was such a significant route. Shouldn't German submarines and airplanes have been able to make that impossible from the Norwegian coast? And wasn't the wooden town of Murmansk simply, eh, gone, after German bombing?

Arctic probaly refers to Archangelsk and sveral small Naval bases along the coast. You are right about town of Murmansk -it was decimated. The port and the railroad reamined intact however. You are also right about convoys.

"For the three months following PQ.18/QP.14 no convoys went to the Soviet Union as, once again, the Home Fleet headed south to the Mediterranean, this time to support the Anglo-American landings in North Africa. With such a commitment in
hand, there was no question of any further convoys to Russia until the end of the year. Moreover, supplies which were earmarked for the Soviet Union, namely 154 aircraft already crated and loaded awaiting the sailing of PQ.19, were now unloaded and reallocated for the North African landings. Stalin was not impressed”and rightly so, for this was the Soviet Union's time of crisis. In October the German offensive at Stalingrad entered its final phase as both armies battled among the ruins. The Red Army was desperately mobilizing reserves of men and equipment to launch a counter-offensive on both flanks of the German Sixth Army and this was no time
for the supply of Anglo-American aid to dry up."

from "CONVOY!" by Paul Kemp. Lend-Lease did kicked in the end of 1943. Before that it was too sporadic to relay on it. That however does not makes effort of allied sailors any less significant - it was nothing short of heroic.


Supplies Despatched to the USSR by Greate Britain between 1 October 1941 and 31 march 1946
Admiralty Supplies

Battleships -1
Destroyers-9
Submarines -4
Motor Minesweepers-5
Minesweeping Trawlesr -9
ASDIC -293 sets
Radar -329 sets
Submarine Batteries (complete) 41
6" guns complete -2
5.25" guns complete -35
4" guns complete with 16 spare barrels -36
12pdr guns complete with 12 spare barrels -22
20mm Oerlikons with 54 spare barrels -162
.5" Vickers machine guns with 52 spare barrels -384
.5" Browning complete with 120 spare barrels -240
.30" Martin -210
2" Rocket projectors -36 sets
AAD Type L projectors with ammunition -16 sets
Misc Gun mountings -530
Mines (various) 3206
Paravanes -318
Depth Charges -6800
Hedgehog Projectiels -2304
Torpedoes -361
Smoke generators, candles and Lachrymatory candles-5124 sets
Greande throwing eqpt -67 sets

Ammunition

15" -2000 rounds
6" - 2400 rounds
4.7 ", 4.5", 4", 3" -13600 rounds
12pdr -31000
2pdr -93000 rounds
20mm -882000 rounds
.5" Vickers 5792000 rounds
.5" Browining 1399000 rounds
.455" SA 26000 rounds
.303" SA 359000 rounds
.30" SA 899000
2" Rockets 4000
Flares & misc pyrotechnics 8273

War Office Supplies

Tanks (various) all
supplied with
ammunition - 5218
MT vehicles - 4343
Bren Carriers - 2550
Motor Cycle - 1721
AFV and MT spares 4090 tons

Weapons
PIAT projector - 1000
Thompson SMG - 103
2pdr AT Rifle - 636
6pdr AT gun - 96
Boys AT Rifles - 3200
Bren guns - 2487
7.92mm Besa guns - 581
Smoke Generators - 303000

Ammunition
PIAT - 100000
2pdr AT gun -2807000 rounds
.45" SMG -20807000 rounds
6pdr AT - 776000 rounds
Boys AT - 1761000 rounds
.303" SA - 89332000 rounds
7.92mm BESA - 53411000 rounds
2" Mortar (HE &Smoke) - 1163000 rounds
3" Mortar (HE&Smoke) - 162000
Signal Cartridges - 2204000
Clams - 159000

Electronic Equipment
Radar -1474 sets
Radio - 4338 sets
Valves- 42850
Misc Radio Test Eqpt -850 items
Charging & Generating Eqpt -160 sets

Telephone Equipment
Telephone Cable -30227 miles
Telephones-2000 sets
Switchboards 40 line -60
Switchboards 10 line -400

Miscellaneous Items
Exploder Cable 1070 miles
Camouflage Netting -3013000 meters
Camouflage Face Veils - 1199500
Surveying & Meteorological Eqpt -925 items
Specialloid Pistons -159000
Tyres -72000

Air Ministry Supplies

Aircraft (all types) -7411
Aircraft Engines - 976
MT Vehicles -724
Petrol, oil & other products -14146 tonns

Ammunition
.303" -162000000 rounds
.30 -66450000 rounds
.5" -24000000
20mm - 17500000

Aircraft Engines and MT Spares worth - 15981000 pounds
Misc aircraft eqpt worth - 1734000 pounds

Raw Materials, Foodstuffs, Machinery & Industrial Plant Supplied by the UK

Aluminium 32,000 tons £3,803,000
Copper 40,000 tons £2,204,000
Industrial Diamonds N/A £1,424,000
Jute 100,435 tons £4,975,000
Rubber 114,539 tons £239,000
Graphite 3,300 ton £160,000
Tin 28,050 tons £7,774,000
Wool 29,610 tons £5,521,000


Foodstuffs
These included tea, cocoa beans, palm oil, palm kernels, groundnuts, coconut oil, pepper and spices.

Total Value of Foodstuffs supplied:£8210000

Machine Tools, Plant and Associated Eqpt.

Machine Tools £13,081,000
Power Plant £12,264,000
Electrical Eqpt £9,091,000
Misc Eqpt (e.g.: communications, food processing,
textile plant, port and salvage eqpt.) £4,691,000
Misc industrial plant £5,201,000

[Gwynn Compton]

While in reality Soviet archives 6855100 men KIA, died from wounds, died in accidents, committed suicides, executed by the decision of military tribunals; one might wonder that he research methods are...

Indeed as one may wonder what yours are. And whether you have gone and viewed these archieves, or are working off another Historian's work, which is ultimately what we all do.

Given that Erickson's work is based on a comparison on both accounts of the war, Russian and German, and their archieves, I'm wondering where you historian is drawing his numbers from? Erickson was known as one of the most careful historians on the Eastern Front, examining and cross examining his information.

Infact one review I've read of your book had the following to say

great book for statisitcs, unfortunately, the writing style closely resembles Soviet-era propaganda in style and content ( the Soviet Union "fought the war for freedom loving people everywhere", "the Soviet Union liberated Eastern Europe", "fought off the fascist scourge" etc.).

Indeed I'd be quite interested to read this book and compare the differences.

I never implied you never said Lend Lease didn't help, just that you don't believe that it helped to the extent that most writings believe it did.

LL vehicles and rus vehiicle reg. What proof do we have the rus counted every imobile tractors all over rus or lada cars. Or that military vech esp from abroad would even be reg. Or that any reg happened regularly during the war. Every other account I read differs as to the use of LL trucks just because you mange to dig up one old stat that says dif I will ignore this until I read it with my own eyes. Although I don't distrust soviet sources per see this one seems almost imposible. Does it appear in english.

Agreed, however a vague argument follows

What proof do you have that they did not counted or registred cars and trucks? (there were no LADA cars during WWII). Soviet army was very strict than it came to counting equpiment one had to prove that vechiles was lost actually due to enemy action and not internal sabotage - SMERSH made sure of that. I don't exactly see why would you exclude first half of 1941 out of the picture? Was not raw materials collected at that period used later on for the war production? Also I don't see why prewar stocks does not make their way into your estimation on general basis.

As I mentioned before, Kulik disbanded the motorized transport division before the war, one imagines the trucks were placed into storage, dismantled for parts or sold off to the populace, or given to motorized divisions.

If you include 41 then you must exclude 45 at the least. We are talking about wartime production and how LL shipments during wartime did or didn't help. Peacetime production gets no medels.

Especially when peacetime production is being disrupted by "reforms" from people like Kulik.

However Oleg, I doubt either of us are going to budge here, we're both far too stubborn

[Oleg Grigoryev]

While in reality Soviet archives 6855100 men KIA, died from wounds, died in accidents, committed suicides, executed by the decision of military tribunals; one might wonder that he research methods are...

Indeed as one may wonder what yours are. And whether you have gone and viewed these archieves, or are working off another Historian's work, which is ultimately what we all do.

Given that Erickson's work is based on a comparison on both accounts of the war, Russian and German, and their archieves, I'm wondering where you historian is drawing his numbers from? Erickson was known as one of the most careful historians on the Eastern Front, examining and cross examining his information.

so how your crefull historian managed to screw up the number of officers in officer corp by magnitude of two?

Infact one review I've read of your book had the following to say

great book for statisitcs, unfortunately, the writing style closely resembles Soviet-era propaganda in style and content ( the Soviet Union "fought the war for freedom loving people everywhere", "the Soviet Union liberated Eastern Europe", "fought off the fascist scourge" etc.).

and yet the reader had no compalints about statsitcal apporach.

I never implied you never said Lend Lease didn't help, just that you don't believe that it helped to the extent that most writings believe it did.

- yes youd did -scorll up

LL vehicles and rus vehiicle reg. What proof do we have the rus counted every imobile tractors all over rus or lada cars. Or that military vech esp from abroad would even be reg. Or that any reg happened regularly during the war. Every other account I read differs as to the use of LL trucks just because you mange to dig up one old stat that says dif I will ignore this until I read it with my own eyes. Although I don't distrust soviet sources per see this one seems almost imposible. Does it appear in english.

Agreed, however a vague argument follows

What proof do you have that they did not counted or registred cars and trucks? (there were no LADA cars during WWII). Soviet army was very strict than it came to counting equpiment one had to prove that vechiles was lost actually due to enemy action and not internal sabotage - SMERSH made sure of that. I don't exactly see why would you exclude first half of 1941 out of the picture? Was not raw materials collected at that period used later on for the war production? Also I don't see why prewar stocks does not make their way into your estimation on general basis.

intersting you are constantly askiking me for proof while reptedly did not answer my quetsion how in your and Kegan oppinion all LL tarnsport made it through to 1945 without a loss.

As I mentioned before, Kulik disbanded the motorized transport division before the war, one imagines the trucks were placed into storage, dismantled for parts or sold off to the populace, or given to motorized divisions.

as I mentioned before Kuilik did not have power to do it. That would take resolution of the Soveit Government.

accidently I found this http://www.battlefield.ru/library/books ... stat4.html
note 558 cras and trucks per Soviet rifle divison.
also this http://www.battlefield.ru/library/books ... tat11.html
no what was it about Kulik?

If you include 41 then you must exclude 45 at the least. We are talking about wartime production and how LL shipments during wartime did or didn't help. Peacetime production gets no medels.

Especially when peacetime production is being disrupted by "reforms" from people like Kulik.

I think i just proved you wrong. So how is you favorite Ericson got the number of officers wrong, and how did all LL transport made it through the war without a single lose?

[Gwynn Compton]

note 558 cras and trucks per Soviet rifle divison.

Sigh... Kulik disbanded the motorized transport division of the Red Army, no bearing on individual units transport which moved them round the front, the motorized transport division was part of the organs of supply from memory. He did not tamper with individual divisions (as in formations) while the Motorized Transport Division was not a field divisions, but a department of the Army.

Both your links refer to field divisions, not a department of the Army. The motorized transport division which Kulik disbands is a logistical one.

my quetsion how in your and Kegan oppinion all LL tarnsport made it through to 1945 without a loss.

Unfortunately your question is made redundent by the fact that neither Keegan nor I have made that claim. Instead the figures I provided you are the numbers that the Red Army had at wars end, not the total delivered which would have to be higher to account for losses both to enemy action and to mechanical failure.

However I must admit that I have no answer for the difference in Erickson's figures to the figures you supplied. However I'd be interested if anyone else has different numbers for that, as I'm getting the impression that our debate is essentially boiling down to different intereptations of the same information by different historians.

In fact I'd love to get my hands on the original documents of how much the West claims to have sent and how much the Soviet Union received through Lend Lease, I imagine we'll find different numbers

[Darrin]

Oleg,

Maybe I should warn you about using website material esp something from a site with obvious sympaths. To start with this rus TOE still has tanks in it even though we know they were removed before june 41. Also it does not have enough mortars present to account for both 50mm and 88mm. It seems to be totally missing the 50mm weapons which I'm sure everyone knows were used. With this level of inaccarcy I wouldn't use this source to prove anything. Plus as we all know rus in 41 was short of so many thing in thier TOE. To supply 500 cars and trucks to 200 inf divs would require 100,000 cars and trucks without even considering the large number of huge mech corps. There were 20 mech corp on the western military district. Each one of these was supposed to have 2 tank div and one mot div. All togeather that would be 60 div some who were understrength but all would require trucks as well. Many more than the 500+ cars and trucks of an inf div. Not just for transport but also hauling supples.

Darrin