Stiltzkin wrote:German tank losses are actually replaced, contrary to Soviet losses which sometimes exceed their production values
Dinardo,Germany;s Panzer Arm page 28
Stiltzkin wrote:German tank losses are actually replaced, contrary to Soviet losses which sometimes exceed their production values
Surely you would have to have the book to make that claim?Stiltzkin wrote:
This statistic wants to demonstrate extreme German irreplaceable losses.
Then, Why did you choose a graph that did not support your point?Michael Kenny wrote:Surely you would have to have the book to make that claim?Stiltzkin wrote:
This statistic wants to demonstrate extreme German irreplaceable losses.
There are 11 graphs in total by the way.
It did support my point German losses were sometimes greater than production. Granted if you make the time period long enough you can 'average out' the losses so that production catches up.John T wrote:
Then, Why did you choose a graph that did not support your point?
The book no.John T wrote: Do the book, or any other source, that have comparable graphs on Soviet inventory over time?
Well, I think that if the Germany increased tank production further from historical levels the costs of producing additional tanks would decrease because of economies of scale. Hence, if they increased the amount of expenditures on tanks by 5 fold, the amount produced would probably increase more than five fold like 6 fold.Stiltzkin wrote:I understand the allocation and flexibility issue, I know that. The weapon production is equivalent to the armoured forces size. The tank production is also linked to the allocated investment and has to cover the losses (German tank losses are actually replaced, contrary to Soviet losses which sometimes exceed their production values). I was just confused why Jentz was talking about "strains". Especially is they did not exceed their maximum capabilities. This makes no sense.If they reduced the manpower of the armed forces a little bit they could have increased the labor force for these industries by a huge margin. Why didnt they? Simple, because they needed men at the front and more equipment wouldn't have made any difference in 1943.
As Emile Despres noticed there was no general problem with equipment for the Wehrmacht. The problem was the lack of manpower to use additional equipment. I conjecture the the manpower problem was fundamentally caused by the racist ideology of the Nazis
However, under the circumstances that were present (as Rich stated), I doubt that the output could have been that large, or lets say switching from one to another wouldn't necessarily equate in the same productivity efficiency, I find that hard to believe (not to metion the difficulties that were present with the different tank types).
Lets assume the following: Germany has a higher labour/manpower pool and decides to make more tanks, surely the value would go up, but can they outproduce the US with the given (ardent) methods? Perhaps it might be too oversimplified to just look at the macroeconomical scale, other than the details at hand.
It basically sounds like the Nazis industrial productivity was solely limited by labour scarcity (and usually oil). Is that really the case? Why did prolific researchers like Harrison or Tooze perpetuate the old "outproduction" story, there must be something to it.
The cost of production of captured equipment was zero, however. Hence the gain in capturing equipment.There are certain problems attached to utilizing looted equipment, especially tanks, so in hindsight they are never totally "free" (tools, upkeep, maintenance, especially Soviet T-34s were difficult to implement into the forces).However, given that they had this ample supply of free equipment they saved billions of RM from producing the equipment.
Well, given their smaller and supposedly less efficient scale of production they produced tanks at a cost of around 100,000 RM per unit. If they increased the size of facilities to maximize economies of scale they could reduce costs to perhaps 80,000 RM per unit.True. They had to cover the losses and it was part of their doctrine that was developed in the 20s-30s.Because the USSR focused more of their vastly smaller resources into producing tanks
I do not think that this was his point (this isn't even about quantity vs quality), it was more about the ability to convert that potential aka did Germany have the facilities to make that happen, if they chose to invest more. The Soviets created gigantic tank facilities on Henry Fords example way before the war. The US created gigantic factories in a short amount of time. German factories could never exceed a certain size because of their vulnerability to bombardment (see Walter S. Dunn). Factory floor is a good key word. The Nibelungenwerke were the only ones close in dimensions and relatively safe but never fully utilized.Is that hard to understand? If you wish to prove they didn't produce many tanks because they lacked the basic resources to do so
Well, the negative remarks I remember were from veteran soldiers, the ones who actually used the American and British tanks and they said that the people who designed those pieces of garbage should be put in prison.Actually it was an overall good weapon system which improved substantially during the war, the negative remarks were usually politically motivated (tommy cookers, airpower saved them etc., actually it was leftist propaganda).The Sherman looked like a WW1 tank in terms of design
You might mean maintaining a small park of a few thousand tanks to replace losses in the short run? Well, when they invaded the Soviet Union they did not expect it to survive while after Barbarossa failed they didn't have the time to do that. Overall I don't see a general problem though as tank strength was maintained at about 180-200 tanks per armored division.Stiltzkin wrote:However, here is an interesting thought I would like to direct towards Guaporense, lets say they would improve the rate of production for AFVs, wouldn't a more fluent replacement system park make more sense (equivalent to its maintenance)? Allied supplementary driven production seemed to have a superior absorption advantage (I know the buildup is the more important fact, but lets just imagine this scenario, this would of course imply that veteran crews survive for the most part). My question is simply how far this "build up" could go and Richard Anderson might have a point here, as well (because Guaporenses views seem to be a bit utopic).
No he can't because he does not even accept the TsAMO numbers (which Miles Krogfus presented in this forum) or Krivosheevs (which are incomplete and rounded), he believes them to be way lower.Then, Why did you choose a graph that did not support your point?
Do the book, or any other source, that have comparable graphs on Soviet inventory over time?
You will find plenty of remarks and an obsessive habit in literature about German "inferior" equipment. Especially Soviet propagandistic sources and post war general reports like v.Mellethin or Guderian.Also, obsession with cool pieces of equipment is the mark of an amateur soldier, and neither Harrison nor Tooze are soldiers, German soldiers on the other hand, like Kesselring, did not complain about their equipment and supplies, Kesselring said his supplies or ammunition were good both in terms of quantity and quality. As Despres claims German officers did not say they had problem with weapons.
German AFVs were made under a scrutiny management, i.e. they tried to maximize quality for minimum resources, this in mind, the quality was not always high, especially late war Panther armour was horrible. T-34s for example although made in a 3rd world system, had the best materials selected. Quality is a relative term, this Quality vs Quantity issue presented in literature is also quiet misleading and an overall outdated view.while the equipment they used would be of inferior quality
Do you perhaps have Soviet, UK or US numbers to compare their allocations and resources?Overall it doesn't change the fact that with more resources diverted to tank production, production of tanks would be larger: historically in 3rd quarter of 1943, tank production, excluding the cost of guns, was valued at 78 million RM per month which was equivalent to 30,000 tons of panzers or about 1,200 units, at 67,000 RM per unit.
For effect of comparison, at the period German military expenditures were 10 billion RM per month, ammunition production was 220,000 tons a month valued at about 600 million RM, black coal production was 26.5 million tons a month (including coke), valued at 300 million RM, steel production was 2.6 million tons a month and German railways carried about 60-70 million tons of goods per month. Of the 2.6 million tons of steel only about 100,000 tons were allocated for Panzer production.
It is hard to judge that if you can not compare AFV prices (except under respective nations), which I tried to do for a long time. Developing a new potent AFV takes time, the Soviets started their programme in the 20s.oceans of cheap tanks
, oh man I should not laugh about this.So now the "benefits" of your wonderful Nazis include the first European free trade zone. Neat. Next we'll no doubt hear about the health benefits of Zyklon-B delousing efforts.
Sure you should, since this entire thread has descended into low comedy. Not that it was begun with much deep thought.Stiltzkin wrote:, oh man I should not laugh about this.So now the "benefits" of your wonderful Nazis include the first European free trade zone. Neat. Next we'll no doubt hear about the health benefits of Zyklon-B delousing efforts.
The thing is though, Guaporense is an economist, so I am interested in his insight, History is not an isolated Island, it goes hand in hand with Politics and Economy. This is usually neglected by many "experts".
That was the plan for "the new order":Stiltzkin wrote: , oh man I should not laugh about this.
The thing is though, Guaporense is an economist, so I am interested in his insight, History is not an isolated Island, it goes hand in hand with Politics and Economy. This is usually neglected by many "experts".
I would not call anything "free" under Nazi occupation though.
The EU is essentially one single country in economic terms now, given most of it uses the same currency
I have this data on steel allocation for 1944 (Germany is 3rd quarter and Soviet is the whole year):Stiltzkin wrote:Do you perhaps have Soviet, UK or US numbers to compare their allocations and resources?