Yes.Urmel wrote:Yeahn but by that time production decisions had been taken and they were locked in.
They should have "changed the horse" about the same time USSR and Japan made their decision, or even earlier.
Regards, Juha
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Yes.Urmel wrote:Yeahn but by that time production decisions had been taken and they were locked in.


Juha Tompuri wrote:Yep.Ironmachine wrote:uhu wrote:bombing missions? I can't think of any DC3, however the last Ju 52 bombing mission was by the French in Viet Nam, September 1950 at Dong Khe.
This is telling much more about the lack of any decent air opposition or the deficiencies of the French air forces in Vietnam than about the Ju-52 qualities as a bomber.
The First Clashes
The Salvadoran attack began on the late afternoon of 14 July, with concerted movement of two columns, together more than 12.000 troops, against three border posts near the cities of Nueva Ocotepeque, Gracias a Dios, and Santa Rosa de Copan. These were swiftly captured and the Salvadoran troops then advanced along the main road connecting the two nations. Simultaneously, the FAS launched an “all-out” attack, deploying all available aircraft to attack Honduran airfields and troop concentrations along the border, as well as targets on the Honduran islands in the Fonseca Gulf. Around 18:10hrs, Salvadoran C-47 flown by Majors Jorge Domínguez and Fidel Fernandez, arrived over Tegucigalpa, their crew rolling 45kg bombs out of the cargo doors on Toncontin airfield. This attack was to be supported by two Cavalier Mustangs, but these never reached their target, while the other C-47 sent to attack Toncontin bombed Catacamas instead. Meanwhile, other FAS aircraft – including 14 planes taken from civilian operators – hit their targets, all except one returning safely to different dispersal airfields, instead to Ilopango. The missing plane was the TF-51D, flown by Capt. Benjamin Trabanino: this landed at La Aurora IAP, in Guatemala, apparently in emergency. It was interned and remained there until the end of the war.
The FAH was caught completely by surprise: almost 50% of its aircraft were parked in Tegucigalpa (the other half in La Mesa, which was not attacked by FAS), and pilots released to go home that evening. The Hondurans were more than lucky that none of their aircraft was damaged. Four Corsairs were scrambled in attempt to catch the C-47 that attacked Toncontin, but they could not make any contact due to nightfall. Salvadoran C-47-attacks were not very precise or effective, but had considerable effects on Honduran morale.
15 July: FAH in Counter-Air Offensive
Despite flying vintage, WWII-era-aircraft, the FAH still operated according to standard modern doctrine, seeing its first task in neutralisation of enemy air force and destruction of installations supporting the Salvadoran strategic ability to wage a war. Correspondingly, barely few hours after the midnight, the first FAH C-47s took off to attack targets deep inside El Salvador.
The first FAH counter air mission, a single C-47 launched around 01:40hrs on the morning of 15 July, was aborted when aircraft suffered technical malfunctions. The second, however, resulted in 18 bombs being dropped at what the Dakota-pilot – Capt. Rodolfo Figueroa – believed was Ilopango airport, at 04:18hrs. No damage was caused at all: in fact, no Salvadoran reports about any kind of explosions near that airfield are known
16 July: Salvadorans on Advance
On the morning of 16 July, the Salvadoran Army troops secured Nueva Ocotepeque and continued their advance along the highway to Santa Rosa de Copan, supported by a FAH C-47 and two Mustangs. Two additional Mustangs were to take off from Ilopango, when they collided due to mechanical failure on one of the aircraft. Both suffered heavy damage. With this, the FAS was left without four aircraft within barely two days of operations: with morale plummeting due to the losses and maintenance problems, the Salvadoran air force was effectively grounded for the rest of the day.
The FAH used the opportunity to air-lift a whole Guardia de Honor Battalion from Tegucigalpa to Santa Rosa de Copan. Four C-47s were deployed for this task, and they transported 1.000 soldiers together with their equipment over the day, all the time escorted by Corsairs and T-28s. Meanwhile, five Corsairs, two AT-6s, three T-28As and a single C-47 were used to attack Salvadoran units on the El Amatillo front. Flying 13 sorties during the day, they proved decisive in stopping the offensive
http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_156.shtml17 July: Major Soto vs. El Salvador
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The successful air battle fought by FAH Corsairs was crowned by air strikes of Honduran C-47s, AT-6s and T-28s against Salvadoran artillery positions.

Kilgore Trout wrote: Not to forget the Ju-87, which served until the end of the war.
The C model was developed to operate from the aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin and differed from the Berta mainly in its jettisonable landing gear, to allow it to ditch without over-turning
http://sturmvogel.orbat.com/stuka.htmlThe D-5 sub model began to delete the dive brakes as unnecessary since they weren't used much. By mid-'43 when the D-5 was introduced the Stukas were more often used in the close-support role than as dive-bombers. Presumably this was due to the loss of total air superiority by the Luftwaffe so that the Stukas couldn't climb to the altitudes needed to dive-bomb properly without fighter escort, but ground-level attack missions could go on regardless. The D-5 also replaced its wing-mounted 7.92mm machine guns with 20mm cannon, had extended wings to reduce the wing loading and re-introduced the jettisonable undercarriage of the Clara to make belly landings safer.

Juha Tompuri wrote:Yes.Urmel wrote:Yeahn but by that time production decisions had been taken and they were locked in.
They should have "changed the horse" about the same time USSR and Japan made their decision, or even earlier.
Regards, Juha

Juha Tompuri wrote:Kilgore Trout wrote: Not to forget the Ju-87, which served until the end of the war.The C model was developed to operate from the aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin and differed from the Berta mainly in its jettisonable landing gear, to allow it to ditch without over-turninghttp://sturmvogel.orbat.com/stuka.htmlThe D-5 sub model began to delete the dive brakes as unnecessary since they weren't used much. By mid-'43 when the D-5 was introduced the Stukas were more often used in the close-support role than as dive-bombers. Presumably this was due to the loss of total air superiority by the Luftwaffe so that the Stukas couldn't climb to the altitudes needed to dive-bomb properly without fighter escort, but ground-level attack missions could go on regardless. The D-5 also replaced its wing-mounted 7.92mm machine guns with 20mm cannon, had extended wings to reduce the wing loading and re-introduced the jettisonable undercarriage of the Clara to make belly landings safer.
Regards, Juha

Well, it was not the only thing that the German decision makers did not (fore)see when developing Luftwaffe.Urmel wrote:Juha Tompuri wrote:Yes.Urmel wrote:Yeahn but by that time production decisions had been taken and they were locked in.
They should have "changed the horse" about the same time USSR and Japan made their decision, or even earlier.
Regards, Juha
What I don't understand is why they did not order a few DC-3 for evaluation or buy them on the secondary market?



Not quite, as for instance the designes of Ju 52 rejected the original German origin engines, and choosed to go on with US based technology.Kilgore Trout wrote: Pay heed to the fact that Junkers was wholly owned by the Nazi government. Bureaucracies are self-serving, and stay with "the devil they know." Ju-52 substitutes proposed herein were designed by foreign companies - not good from a nationalistic or "racial" Nazi propaganda perspective. 100% of profit from selling a Ju-52 to the German military went to the government, making each one basically free.
This site has.Kilgore Trout wrote:To buy a license to build someone else's aircraft would cost $. How much? I have no idea
Kilgore Trout wrote:Probably, the German-built He-111 (another aircraft that was obsolescent but nevertheless served across the entire war) would have been more useful than the Ju-52. Why wasn't it tried? Who knows?
http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/axis-units ... 944-a.htmlhttp://www.luchtoorlog.be/he111.htmIn the beginning of 1942 flew the He 111's especially supply contracts for embedded German troops. During the summer fell Kampfgruppe 100 with success Sebastopol and used while 1,700 kg SV_C 1700 and 2,500 kg SC 2500 bombs. The encirclement of the German 6th Army at Stalingrad from November 1942 caused a massive German effort to maintain an air bridge. the 300 Heinkels the Luftwaffe in this area had available attacked the Russians ever again, evacuating as many wounded troops from the encirclement. German air bridge was severely hampered by bad weather and by the improved Russian air force and air defense. The losses increased when the Russians the encirclement around the 6th Army still further attracted. After the last airport in German hands on 22 January by the Russians under the trampled could He 111 "and other aircraft drop supplies only. When the troops at Stalingrad to early February 1943 gave the Luftwaffe had nearly 500 aircraft lost in their attempt to form an air bridge to maintain, were under 165 He 111's.
In 1943 continued the He 111's on the Eastern Front in the line of fire fighting. The bombers attacked troop concentrations and Russian factories within their reach. The increased number and improved Russian air defense fighters and demanded a heavy toll of the He 111's. Also during the Battle of Kursk was a large number of lost. The remaining He 111's were at the end of 1943 to Poland withdrawn for a rest and heruitrusting.
The now almost impossible to stop coming German retreat on the Eastern front meant that the bombers increasingly as supply and towing aircraft were deployed and obsolete Ju 52/3m started to be replaced. The Heinkels were meanwhile also continues to perform nightly raids, especially in the areas where the Germans had air superiority could keep in balance. A successful raid was conducted on the night of 22 June 1944, when He 111's successful attack on the airport Poltova in the Ukraine. During the night they could 40 U.S. bombers destroyed after an attack from England on Poltova had landed as between stadium before their flight to continue to North Africa.
In the autumn of 1944 as the Russian hordes Hungary invaded possessed the Luftwaffe units still He 111 over 440 operational programs. These aircraft carried mainly supply flights for the duration of the war. The Allied strategic bombing, the German refineries and virtually paralyzed the transport system so that the supply of fuel and spare almost no longer existed. In the beginning of 1945 introduced the Heinkels a number of supply and evacuation flights from the besieged Budapest. This was again repeated when the Russians were trapped Breslau in Silesia. The last nine operational He 111's were destroyed by their crews in Bavaria before on May 8, 1945 to the U.S. armed forces surrendered.




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