Hi Sid
I was not immediately aware that the moderator had actually moved your post to this (more appropriate) thread. Hence the late reply to your questions.
Sid Guttridge wrote: I was unaware the Hitler had forbidden SS intervention. Have you a source?
Regarding Berlin:
For what it is worth, there is David Irving's detailed account (with footnotes) of the blast at Rastenberg. Speaking of Hitler’s orders to Himmler: “Hitler had ordered him on no account to allow his Waffen SS to come into direct confrontation with the army ; that would be the first step toward the ultimate tragedy of civil war.”
http://www.fpp.co.uk/books/Hitler/1977/ ... er/37.html
In "History of the German Resistance, 1933-1945", By Peter Hoffmann
page 481. Goebles telephones Lichterfeld barracks and orders the troops to stay there for the present (around 6:00pm). It also shows that Goebebels was in contact with Hitler after the blast.
page 651. Himmler had set up a contingency plan where in an emergency all SS units were to be alerted but they were only to follow orders issued by him or SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Juttner. The plan was activated on 20 July 1944.
page 489 Joint protection of Broadcasting House in Berlin by Army and SS units. (Only move by SS troops before the failure of the putsch that I am aware of)
https://books.google.com.au/books?id=21 ... 44&f=false
"Kill Hitler - Operation Valkyrie 1944", by Neil Short, Peter Dennis
Page50 In Prague, Shaal the Minister of State for Behemia and Moravia was informed by Rastenberg not to act against the putsch unless directly ordered by Hitler.
https://books.google.com.au/books?id=72 ... 22&f=false
Himmler’s speeches Aug 3 1944 Speech to Gauleiters is interesting and
may support David Irving’s claim. In a reference to 20 July - “But is a prerequisite for the transformation that the army eliminates these people, the traitors, by itself. Thanks God, they took this opportunity, or Fortune has so ordained, that they took care of things in their own ranks, and we on our part – Dr. Goebbels and I – saw to it that no one from the Air Force or the Navy, no one from the SS and police, intervened. The Army had to do it itself. And it is important that it continues in this way.”
The only navy intervention I have read was a spur of the moment even in France. After the radio announcements by Dönitz and Goering at 1:00am 21 July, Admiral Krancke on his own initiative notified the Paris Army commander that he had armed marines ready to intervene in Paris if the SS and Gestapo arrested there were not released (they had been arrested late in the day/after dark when they were expected to be in barracks).
There were quite a few Waffen SS units around Berlin who stayed put, including various training schools and the barracks at Lichterfelde and Lankwitz. The Herman Goering Regiment had units near Berlin also – it did not seem to have intervened.
To me, this lack of organised re-action by the Waffen SS, Navy and Air Force is a bit much for a coincidence and confirms Irving's comment.
Sid Guttridge wrote: If he did, Skorzeny didn't obey, because he had finally made his way to the Bendlerstrasse HQ by the time the coup was suppressed by the Army.
Because Skorzeny and his SD men joined loyal troops at Bendlerstrasse after the putsch had failed, his action is consistent with the orders I mentioned earlier. He arrived with Kaltenbrunner, who was Himmler’s personal representative with full authority (Himmler had already been given full control of all the troops in Berlin).
Skorzeny's memoirs apparently indicate that he went around Berlin trying to convince units to not obey the Valkerie orders and stay calm and in place. It makes sense that he would not telephone his own commando unit who (as you have mentioned were nearby) and order them into Berlin.
Sid Guttridge wrote: I still think the credit(?) for suppressing the coup was largely down to the quick thinking of, initially, Goebbels and then the decisive counter-action of Major Remer of the Großdeutschland Guard Battalion. Hitler rapid powers of recovery was also vital. They simply out-thought and then paced anyone else.
Goebbels, the most senior Nazi in berlin at the time, deserves credit for his brave and decisive leadership, but is also criticised by some for not broadcasting Hitler's escape from death earlier (he was preparing a national propaganda broadcast for later on and got surprised by the putsch). Nevertheless, the quick announcements made after the putsch started had a decisive effect.
Remer was duped by the plot and was on the scene only because he was carrying out the plot! Once invited by Goebbels for a meeting and convinced of the true situation, his actions were decisive and bold. He was given full power in Berlin by Hitler during his telephone call with him.
Keitel's response was very quick as his suspicions were already aroused by telephone call from Berlin. Shortly after the initially telex orders were made by the plotters, Keitel was able to quickly telex senior commanders to ignore the plot because the Fuehrer was alive. He reached both Army, Navy and Air Force commands.
Actions by Keitel, Goebbels and Remer were decisive because they were in positions of authority AND knew for certain through personal contact that Hitler was alive. Unlike many of the other players who had no idea, or had to trust in the orders of their superiors.
Guderian was also instrumental, as he controlled the powerful armoured reserves. He did not sided with the plotters.
Sid Guttridge wrote:The SS and police organs in Vienna, Paris and Prague were either arrested or co-opted by the plotters there, and I suspect the SS and police organs in Berlin were simply outpaced by events.
The SS and police organs were quick to identify the plot once it was in action - detection of unusual troop movements. Up to then the blast looked like a lone wolf attack with no follow-up (the Gestapo response up to then was to quickly send a forensic police team to Rastenburg). Indeed after becoming C-in-C Home Army Himmler had telephoned and ordered the Gestapo to interview/arrest Stauffenberg. They sent an officer to the Bendlerstrasse in the late afternoon to do just that. Ironically, he arrived about 5:00pm, just as the plot began in ernest. By the time Valkerie started there was little else the Police and Gestapo could do buy stay put. After all, it ended just 6 hours later.
Sid Guttridge wrote:The plotters planned to absorb the Waffen-SS wholesale into the Army - arguably the situation that should have prevailed all along.
The plotters has no authority over the Waffen-SS in Germany. Once a new German government was in place, they could only hope that the Navy, Air Force, Waffen-SS and police would come over. The SD however were earmarked by them for special treatment.
Dennis