by valentine III on 15 Jun 2012 13:48
Paul Kenny published this in another part of these forum.
This is from 'Carpiquet Bound' a privately published account of 4th CLY in WW2.
"Bir el Gubi
---------------
The 22nd Armoured Brigade had moved up by train to the open desert area south of Mersa Matruh at the end of October 1941 where 'shakedown' exercises continued until 16th November when Brigadier Scott-Cockbum summoned his Commanding Officers to receive orders for the advance into Libya on 18th November. The "Dogs of War" were about to be unleashed.
On the night of 17th/18th as a kind of Wagnerian prelude, a storm of tropical proportions broke at the precise moment these orders were being relayed to Troop Leaders by their respective Squadron Leaders. However, by 0900 hrs on 18th November when the advance began the weather had cleared.
The Brigade advanced through the previously created gaps in the frontier wire, 2nd RGH in the centre with 4th CLVto the left and 3rd CLY to the right. By the end of the day they had reached a position some 20 miles south-east of Bir el Gubi. The next morning 19th November, 4th CLY had 'A' Squadron in the lead with 'B' Squadron and 'C' Squadron echeloned back to left and right respectively. On 'C' Squadron's right was 'G' Squadron of 2nd RGH. The approach march of someeighty miles had taken its toll of the Regiment's Crusaders, due in part to inherent weaknesses in their design, but also to the inexcusable failure of the manufacturers to make various essential modifications when asked for well before we left England. So no Squadron was at full strength at this crucial moment - 'C' Squadron for example went into battle with only eleven tanks.
It was known that Bir el Gubi was an enemy strong point and that the Italian Ariete Division was in the vicinity. Wisdom passed down to us from Brigade Intelligence was that the Italian M13 tank would present us with no difficulties, nor would the German Mk.11 and 111 tanks. As for the German MkJV there were only twenty of those in North Africa'. We almost felt sorry for the enemy, but the rude awakening was not far off. Reconnaissance had failed to spot that the concentration of 'soft' vehicles that could be seen on the horizon were in fact well dug in and disguised anti-tank defences plus some similarly entrenched M.13 tanks.
The dashing cavalry type charge with which the 4th CLY went into battle may have seemed heroic when read about in the newspapers, but with historical hindsight it can be seen to have been ill-advised. Our tanks were soon overrunning the Italian trenches whose occupants were surrendering in droves, but we had no supporting infantry to take them over so they took up their weapons again as soon as we had passed through. Several 'C' Squadron 4th CLY and 'G' Squadron2nd RGH tanks were knocked out in that way. The Gubi defences had been well prepared in advance right down to the apparently haphazard groups of empty oil drums which in fact were range markers at 500 metres, 1000 metres etc. 'C' Squadron lost three Troop Leaders that day. The tanks of Lt.P.G.C.Somerville and Count John de Bendem were knocked out almost on top of Italian gun emplacements. Lt.J.S.Hankey and his operator Tpr.N.J.Davison were killed by anti-tank fire after their tank had been immobilised in a collision with a 2nd RGH tank. Lt.Hankey's troop sergeant Sgt.D.Cardy was also killed as was Tpr.W.Appleyard who was driving Sgt.Tony Reeves's tank.
Only three of the eleven 'C' Squadron tanks that went into action were able to respond to then Colonel's recall message late in the afternoon. 'C' Squadron had lost five complete tank crews one Officer, one Sergeant and two Troopers killed and the following taken prisoner :-
Lt.Count John de Bendern.Lt.P.G.C.Somerville, Sgt.A.Reeves, Sgt.P.R.Shurmur,Cpl.W.E.Cooper
Cpl.P. J.Turner, Cpl.Franklin, L/Cpl.L.B.Ephgrave, L/CpI.E.Evans, Tpr.L.Davis Tpr R D Elliott'
Tpr.R.P.Frith, Tpr.R.F.H.Cawston, Tpr.G.Clarke, Tpr.N.F.Druce, Tpr.L.V.Colombe and
Tpr.R.O.Gulliver.
The Brigade's tank losses were estimated as forty, twenty of which belonged to 2nd RGH. The Regiment's tank losses would have been even more serious had it not been for the initiative of Sgt.M. Seaward of 'B' Squadron in towing several 'A' and 'B' Squadron tanks to safety when they ran out of petrol. For this prompt and gallant action he was subsequently awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal.
Before the order to withdraw had been given a group of Italian M.ISs came within range of 4th C.L. Y. Adjutant's tank whose gunner set one of them on fire and stopped two others before the rest hurriedly returned whence they came.
That first Regimental leaguer in action was a very anxious time for the Colonel because only seven tanks had rallied within half an hour of the recall. But eventually, in ones and twos tanks began to arrive and it was well into the evening before all the survivors of the action had
returned to the fold. This situation gave rise to an amusing incident involving Major George Kidston, 4th C.L. Y. second in command who in trying to rally the stragglers, said over the air "On the count of three I will fire a RED Very light" - and promptly fired a GREEN one!
The Axis wireless communique on the day's fighting referred to the "... annihilation of the British 22nd Armoured Brigade." Momentarily disorganised perhaps, but for many months to come the Brigade was to give such an account of itself that this lie was well and truly nailed. Certainly the Commanders of 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions were well aware of its continued existence."
