Abyssinia

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An Overseas Expedition.

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NORTH: DE BONO AND BADOGLIO.

a. The occupation of Adigrat and Adua, 1 October 1935. The initial Italian concentrations were close to the border; the units crossed, in the night 2-3 October, on a front of about 72 kms; their first objective was the line Adigrat—Enticcio—Adua, about 40 kms below the border; the advance was conducted in three columns; elements of the Eritrean Corps furnished flank and advance guards.

The Abyssinian covering forces under Ras Seyum did not oppose any serious resistance. The pass Daro Tacle was held initially but abandoned when the division "Gavinana" deployed for an envelopment. Italian aviation executed distant reconnaissance as far as the Taccaze, while low-flying, close-in reconnaissance searched every fold in the ground. In the morning of 6 October, the 86th Infantry entered Adua; the first objective was reached.

A pause of a few days was necessary to convert the pack trails in this area into roads passable for motor transport; this activity became normal from now on, and it can be said, without exaggeration, that the advance of the Italian troops was predicated on the progress of road construction. An inkling of the problems involved is furnished by the fact that the road Asmara—Adigrat, as finally built, contained 3500 curves. By the end of October, the lines of communication were sufficiently developed to undertake the second bound, in an advance on Makalle.

Source: FMFRP 12-13. Maneuver in War. Reprint of 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.

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THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NORTH: DE BONO AND BADOGLIO.

b. The occupation of Makalle, 8 November 1935. Utilizing the existing trails, the corps advanced in several columns, the Eritrean Corps via Entischo—Hausien—Makalle, the I Corps via Agula—Dolo.

The Abyssinians continued to fall back without offering serious resistance, although guerrillas were active in Schire and the Tembien. De Bono became apprehensive of his right flank and diverted the II Corps via Axum on the line of the Takkaze (Tacazze) River. The remaining corps reached Makalle on 8 November and established covering forces to the south.

The Tembien is a wild, mountainous region; Abyssinian bands had no trouble in infiltrating and repeatedly attacked the supply trains of the Eritrean Corps; considerable forces had to be used for close-in protection, in this area, thereby weakening the tip of the wedge at Makalle.

De Bono's left flank also experienced trouble. General Mariotti, commanding a flank detachment, crossed the barren Danakil, when he was attacked by the Abyssinian, Cassa Sebat, in a typical colonial surprise engagement.

With an enemy reported advancing, the unity of front of the Italian corps appeared jeopardized. At this point Marshal Badoglio stepped into the picture, replacing De Bono without prejudice.

It can hardly be argued that De Bono was not aware of the risks he was running in his bold advance to Makalle. However, political pressure had been brought to bear on him; we are once again in the twilight zone of the relation of soldier and statesman, when military judgment has to give way to political expediency—sometimes with disastrous results.

Source: FMFRP 12-13. Maneuver in War. Reprint of 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.

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An Overseas Expedition.

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NORTH: DE BONO AND BADOGLIO.

c. The Abyssinian Attack on Mai Timchet and Dembeguina Pass, 14-16 December 1935. Badoglio could not influence the existing situation immediately, other than push the organization of rear areas and rapidly perfect his roadnet; the "wedge" of Makalle nevertheless was vulnerable on its west flank, especially since enemy pressure made itself increasingly felt; reinforcements enabled the formation of a III Corps, which gave the Eritrean Corps a chance to operate more actively in the Tembien.

Early in December, aviation reported the advance of several enemy columns in direction of the Taccaze.

The II Corps had maintained outposts on the Taccaze but ordered a reconnaissance of the south bank. As a typical coincidence of war, the Italians collided with strong Abyssinian forces under Ayelu and were forced to retreat on the Dembeguina Pass, about 25 kms in their rear. Another Abyssinian force had crossed down river and threatened to reach the pass in advance of the retreating Italian units. A company of fast tanks hurried to their rescue but were, in turn, attacked in flank; caught in a narrow valley and unable to turn, many vehicles were lost when their ammunition ran out. Additional reinforcement reached the pass but after sharp fighting withdrew on Selaclaca.

It was apparent that the Abyssinians meant business and had opened their own offensive. In the center, Ras Kassa also became active, especially in severe fighting in vicinity of Abbi-Addi and Madam Quarar. South of Makalle, Ras Mulugueta remained comparatively passive. Nevertheless, the general strategic situation had certain ominous possibilities.

If the Abyssinians attacked along the entire front, Mulugueta might conceivably engage and pin down the I Corps in the Makalle area, while Ras Kassa pushed into the Tembien to cut the Italian communications and Ras Imru advanced north, through or past the II Corps into Eritrea. Badoglio decided to counterattack while the Abyssinians were forming for this projected maneuver; the general dispositions of the enemy in echelon on a front of over 100 miles should conceivably present an opportunity for flank attack.

Source: FMFRP 12-13. Maneuver in War. Reprint of 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.

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An Overseas Expedition.

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NORTH: DE BONO AND BADOGLIO.

d. The First Battle of Tembien: 19-23 January 1936. The operation developed in two phases: first, the advance of the III corps, southwest of Makalle via Neguida and Debri, to control the valleys of the Gabat and Gheva, as a threat to Mulugueta's left as well as preventing him from side-slipping and joining Ras Kassa in the Tembien; and, second, a main effort by the Eritrean Corps against the flank of Ras Kassa; this mission developed into one of the most critical and savage battles of the entire war and was brilliantly conducted by the able corps commander, General Pirzio-Biroli.

Pirzio-Biroli assigned the defense of Uarieu Pass to the black-shirt division "28 October" and ordered demonstrations to the south to attract Abyssinian forces frontally, while the 2d Eritrean division assembled in the Meretta valley for a decisive thrust against the Abyssinian right flank; the Italian advance frontally, while the 2d Eritrean division assembled in the Meretta valley for a decisive thrust against the Abyssinian right flank; the Italian advance began on the morning of the twentieth; the valley of the Beles appeared empty and the advance continued on the twenty-first. Then General Diamanti ran into trouble on the heights of Debra-Amba; the Abyssinians, in force, pursued; Diamanti barely made Uarieu Pass, and that important point was attacked savagely on the twenty-first and twenty-second - the black-shirt division had indeed attracted the bulk of Ras Kassa's forces!

In the meantime, the 2d Eritrean division took Mount Kerkara on the twentieth, and Lata on the twenty-first; then they were attacked heavily; Biroli, however, had sent a strong detachment, under Colonel Vaccarisi, via Addi Zubana to reestablish liaison with the hard-pressed garrison of Uarieu; this column, Prince Pignatelli in the lead, drove forward, reached the vicinity of the Pass at noon of the twenty-third and struck the Abyssinians in flank; this unexpected threat turned the tide. Full credit must also be given to the ceaseless attacks of Italian bombers, operating from a temporary field at Makalle.

Here is an interesting example of the combination of holding or secondary attack combined with a decisive flank attack; when the flank attack (2d Eritrean division) slowed down, it became a holding attack on its own local front while a part of its forces (Vaccarisi's column) was used in an envelopment. The initial maneuver was "preconceived"; the second maneuver was "improvised" to meet changing local conditions, i. e., a flexible maneuver and elastic command decisions — fast, modern generalship!

Source: FMFRP 12-13. Maneuver in War. Reprint of 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.

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THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NORTH: DE BONO AND BADOGLIO.

e. Marshal Badoglio's decisive maneuver. Reinforcements enabled the Marshal to form the III and IV Corps; this latter corps was placed along the Mareb, in vicinity of Debri Mariam, to operate in conjunction with the II Corps, now in the area Selaclaca—Aksum.

The principal enemy groupings had been more or less identified since 15 December; Badoglio contemplated a simultaneous attack along the entire front; he wired the Duce: "The machine is ready. I shall start it going, and it will not be allowed to stop."

In general terms, each operation involved a combination of frontal attack and envelopment. In the Schire, the II Corps was engaged frontally while the IV Corps attempted to envelop the enemy west flank. In the Tembien, the Eritrean Corps attacked frontally while the III Corps advanced from the southeast against the enemy flank and rear. In the Enderta, the I and III Corps operated in conjunction against the Amba Aradam, in a double envelopment; then the III Corps made an about face, to cooperate in the battle of the Tembien, while the I Corps took the Amba Alagi. It is obvious that this plan, over an extended front of about 100 miles, in a highland region, developed into locally distinct battles, nevertheless, the coordination of effort was remarkably fruitful—a credit to troops and staffs!

Source: FMFRP 12-13. Maneuver in War. Reprint of 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.

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An Overseas Expedition.

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NORTH: DE BONO AND BADOGLIO.

(1) Operations in the Enderta: 10-27 February 1936. The sharp blow administered Ras Kassa and Seyum, in the Tembien, definitely secured the principal Italian communications via Makalle—Adigrat, besides testing the relative strength and capacities of the opponents. The next step was to strike the nearest enemy grouping, under Mulugueta, who occupied a strong defensive position on the heights of the plateau of Amba Aradam, at an elevation of 6,000 feet. It was clear that this formidable position could not be taken frontally but required a methodical offensive, through a double envelopment, which might lead to a complete encirclement.

(a) The Battle of Amba Aradam: 10-15 February 1936. The operation was conceived and executed in progressive phases, over a period of five days—a characteristic feature of a modern large-scale attack in which "battle" is the ensemble of a "series" of combats, coordinated but not necessarily contiguous; it is apparent from the sketch that the initial Italian deployment was on a front of 35 kms or 22 miles.

The Italians developed along the north bank of the Gabat, during the night of 8-9 February, with corps abreast, the I Corps on the left; on the tenth, both corps established bridgeheads across the river, to the heights of Doghea Pass. The attack began on the twelfth, with the main effort in the zone of action of the I Corps, which had been suitably reinforced by the division "Sabauda" (S), the militia division "3d January" (M) and the Alpine division "Pusteria" (P), in reserve. On the thirteenth, this attack had made good progress, and the III Corps began operations on the west slopes of Aradam. Badoglio ordered a pause on the fourteenth, under cover of an artillery preparation against the Aradam positions. A general assault, including frontal attacks, was initiated on the fifteenth, and by noon elements of the command of the Duke of Pistoia hoisted the tricolor of Italy on the crest of Aradam. By far the heaviest fighting, however, took place on the twelfth, in the zone of action of the Alpine Division and the Bersaglieri.

The complete encirclement of the enemy was not accomplished; Mulugueta had given a timely order for the withdrawal, but, as in the Tembien, the Abyssinians had been badly shaken and must have realized that the bushwhacking days of Adua were over. The remnants of this army retreated to the south and occupied another strong position, on the mountain range of Amba Alagi, with elevations of 10,000 feet, a natural, intermediate delaying position on the road to Dessie. Badoglio advanced to the plain of Buia but halted there for reorganization and the opening phase of a major maneuver.

The III Corps was reconstituted and now was composed of the division "23 March (M)," the 1st Eritrean division, one infantry regiment and one battalion field artillery (division "Sila"), one battalion infantry and one squadron Eritrean cavalry; it made an about-face from its position on the west slope of the Aradam and advanced via Gargara on Gaela; to make this possible, roads were built, in forced labor, to a distance of 80 km in the space of four days only!

Source: FMFRP 12-13. Maneuver in War. Reprint of 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.
https://paginerosse.wordpress.com/2012/ ... l-negus-3/

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THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NORTH: DE BONO AND BADOGLIO.

(b) The Capture of Amba Alagi: 28 February 1936. In the meantime, the I Corps began its advance on Amba Alagi on the twentieth; its present composition was the Alpine Division "Pusteria," the division "Sabauda" the division "Sila" (less detachments), the division " 3 January," the 6th Militia group, the 8th Eritrean brigade, motorized corps artillery and fast tanks. On the twenty-sixth the corps advanced in three columns to the line: Salga—Tagorra; on the twenty-eighth it was ready for the assault, only to find that the enemy had retired to the south toward Lake Ascianghi. This was more or less unexpected and revealed the degree of demoralization of Mulugueta's army and the severe beating it had received on the Aradam.

Source: FMFRP 12-13. Maneuver in War. Reprint of 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.
https://www.delcampe.net/it/collezionis ... 85697.html

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THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NORTH: DE BONO AND BADOGLIO.

(2) Operations in the Tembien: 27-29 February 1936.

The second battle of the Tembien presented a more serious aspect. The attack was ordered for the twenty-seventh. In spite of improvised road construction, the III Corps had hard going; supply difficulties developed and several columns had to be supplied from the air. Nevertheless, Badoglio assigned progressive missions to each group for three days.

The Eritrean Corps was to debouch from the Uarieu Pass and take the hill position of Amba Uork, while the Ill Corps had to reach the Gheva River. The objectives for the twenty-eighth were Debra Amba and Mariam Quarar for the Eritrean Corps and Andino and Mai Bararus for the III Corps; on the twenty-ninth, elements of both corps were expected to join, in vicinity of Abbi Addi.

The program was carried out against heavy odds. The Alpini had a particularly hard nut to crack, in the capture of Amba Uork, which presented a practically vertical cliff of 1,200 feet; mountaineers, under Captains Polo and Pollino, actually climbed this wall in 3 and a half hours and took the crest as a complete surprise for the Ethiopians; there, they hung on and repulsed a series of savage attacks. The III Corps also ran into severe resistance; there was heavy fighting around the Debra Amba. On the evening of the twenty-eighth, Ras Kassa gave in and began his retreat; when the Italians closed the ring on the twenty-ninth at Abbi Addi considerable enemy forces had made a getaway, although large numbers were taken prisoners.

The general effect, however, was unmistakable; the army of Ras Kassa, in slow dissolution, did not appear again in this campaign.

Source: FMFRP 12-13. Maneuver in War. Reprint of 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.
http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-otAwEiVStgI/V ... tterie.jpg

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An Overseas Expedition.

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NORTH: DE BONO AND BADOGLIO.

(3) Operations in the Schire: 29 February-3 March 1936. The third phase of this vast operation likewise failed of its ultimate accomplishment, but the tactical results were far-reaching. The plan was sound—a frontal attack on Coietza and Af Gaga Pass, by the II Corps, to pin down Ras Imru's main forces, while the IV Corps, advancing from the west, would strike the enemy in flank and rear.

This is a clear-cut example of the preconceived maneuver; but any flank attack required perfect timing and coordination with the frontal effort; timing is perhaps the most essential single factor in such an operation, and it was faulty timing, i.e., delay on the part of the Italian IV Corps, that spoiled a reasonable plan for encirclement.

On 29 February this corps (II Corps) crossed the Mescerab to attack the opposite heights of Coietza and Af Gaga Pass. Ras Imru counterattacked immediately and with great violence; in a slow advance, the corps was obliged to put all divisions in line. Hand-to-hand fighting was common; on 2 March, the division commander of the "Gran Sasso", the Duke of Bergamo, was in the front lines; General Appiotti and his staff were in the thick of close fighting. It was only when the 252d Legion took the crest of the Coietza, in the morning of the third, that Ras Imru began to fall back and under heavy losses crossed the Taccaze River for a further retreat to the south.

In the meantime, the IV Corps, that should have intervened in a decisive direction, had taken no part in the fighting; its route led through a barren, mountain region without roads, and the march in the stifling tropical heat slowed down considerably; as so often, this column of 20,000 men had to be supplied by air, including water and forage; when the exhausted troops finally reached the Taccaze, at Mai Timchet, the Aybssinians had already crossed to the south bank. The brunt of the bitter fighting was borne by the II Corps alone.

The ensemble of these operations represented a major tactical and strategical achievement: three Abyssinian armies had been defeated successively and driven from the field with every evidence of demoralization; there was only one important Abyssinian concentration remaining in the field, the Imperial Army, under the Negus, south of the Amba Alagi, in vicinity of Dessie. After a brief period of reorganization, Badoglio started the advance against the remaining foe with three corps, the II Corps via Socota, the I Corps on Lake Ascianghi, the Eritrean Corps in reserve following the I Corps. The IV Corps relieved the Eritrean Corps, in the Tembien, for the pacification of the province, while the II Corps moved slowly through Tigre in support of the motorized advance on Gondar and Lake Tana.

Source: FMFRP 12-13. Maneuver in War. Reprint of 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.

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THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NORTH: DE BONO AND BADOGLIO.

f. Flank detachments: operations of motorized columns.

(1) Starace's advance on Gondar: 10-31 March 1936. The secretary-general of the Fascist Party, General Achille Starace, was in command of this spectacular dash to Lake Tana. Five hundred motor vehicles were quietly assembled in Asmara; ooo picked men were released from combat units on the front. The tactical organization of the flying column was as follows:

2 Battalions, Bersaglieri
1 Battalion, Militia "Mussolini"
1 Battalion F.A., 77-mm, motorized
1 Squadron M. G. motorcyclists
Squadron light tanks
Engineer, signal, medical and QM detachments.

Supplies for thirty days were carried along. The 41st Air Squadron was attached for reconnaissance.

The column started on 10 March and reached Om Agar in four days (380 kms). General Couture, who had held this sector in observation for some time, had advanced in the meantime to Rafi. Starace's column turned south-east and entered desert country. Enemy resistance was sporadic after they crossed the Angareb River, but the terrain gave trouble; in spite of feverish efforts, the mountain trail across Arcai and Kercher Pass (elevation 8400 feet) could not be negotiated by motor transport. Starace left his transport park behind, under cover of one battalion, and continued on foot with the remainder of his small force. The Italian High Command anticipated trouble and had dispatched elements of the II Corps via Addi Arcai-Dabat; the 3d Eritrean Brigade joined Starace and enabled him to enter Gondar on 1 April. His advance guard reached Lake Tana shortly thereafter
and occupied the Gorgora peninsula. Remnants of Ras Imru's defeated army had fallen back before Starace's column and escaped southward.

Source: FMFRP 12-13. Maneuver in War. Reprint of 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.
"LA MARCIA SU GONDAR" DI ACHILLE STARACE 1936.

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THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NORTH: DE BONO AND BADOGLIO.

f. Flank detachments: operations of motorized columns.

(2) Ruggero's Advance on Sardo, 6-11 March 1936. At about the same time, a flying column crossed the incredible Danakil Desert, starting from Assab. A previous attempt in October ig had been stopped at Muss-Alli. The Danakil is an absolutely waterless desert, interspersed with lava ridges and sand dunes; to cross it, in any force, required painstaking logistic preparation. Colonel Ruggero, the local Italian commander, made these preparations. Intensive aerial reconnaissance furnished maps and suitable routes; the supply was furnished by a special squadron of 25 transport planes; incidentally, the enormous heat compelled the aviators to deliver live animals in lieu of frozen meat. Four intermediate camps were established, organized and provisioned with rations for twenty days. The local tribe of the Haussa's had been propagandized and were ready to turn against the Abyssinians; the objective on this motor dash was the Haussa capital of Sardo, in the fertile plain of Gamarrei. The small column of several hundred men started on 6 March and reached Sardo successfully on the eleventh.

Source: FMFRP 12-13. Maneuver in War. Reprint of 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.
https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francesco_de_Martini

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THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NORTH: DE BONO AND BADOGLIO.

g. The defeat of the Negus: Mai Cieu or Lake Ascianghi (1st part).

After the practical dissolution of Imru's, Kassa's and Mulugeta's forces, the only remaining organized army was that personally commanded by the Negus, estimated from 50,000 to 60,000 men. This force became the next objective of the Italian Army. The III and I Corps advanced abreast; the Eritrean Corps echeloned to the east; division columns marched in the interval to "mop up." The I Corps reached the vicinity of Mai Cieu on 17 March and halted, since the enemy was reported just to the south, astride Agumberta Pass.

The III Corps, advancing on Socota to the west, had run into terrain difficulties; motor transport was delayed on account of sand, and 4,000 white soldiers had to pack 60 tons of supplies for 36 miles for initial Class-I requirements (food and water). Pending essential road construction, Badoglio decided, nevertheless, to attack the enemy and ordered an initial deployment.

The I Corps placed the division "Pusteria" forward, its right resting on Bohora Pass, elevation 9000 feet, its left on Mecan Pass; the division established two subsectors, occupying the right with one battalion (11th Alpine), the left with three battalions (7th Alpine Regiment); the remaining units were echeloned in depth.

The front of the I Corps, Pirzio Biroli commanding, was extended to the east by the Eritrean Corps, which formed with two divisions abreast, the 2d division on the right; a detached post was established at Corbeta. In vicinity of the command post of the I Corps, at Belago, the divisions "Sabauda" and "3d January" and the 6th Militia brigade were held in reserve; still farther in rear, the division "Assieta" was on the march. G.H.Q. was not established, and General Santini exercised command.

It was apparent that the organization of the rear was incomplete; the terrain differed from the Tembien in that the ranges were heavily wooded. While the Italian forces took up their positions, reports became urgent that the Negus had advanced from Quoram to Agumberta Pass; a major attack was imminent. The Eritreans, tested in so many engagements, promptly organized for defense.

Fields of fire were difficult to develop in this wooded terrain; some units, notably the 3d Eritrean brigade, were in exposed, forward positions, hastily fortified. The relative strength of sector troops was unfavorable; the 1st Eritrean division defended on a front on 5-8 kms, not including the detached post at Corbeta; this front had an artillery strength of only 8 batteries. That the Italians were not entirely ready for a major attack is indicated by the fact that the artillery of the 2d Division ran short of ammunition during the day.

The Negus attacked along the entire front at dawn of the thirty-first; the attack developed into a series of assaults, at different time intervals and against different objectives; it is not clear if the Negus planned the sequence of operations or expected to develop a weak spot in the Italian ensemble. He found one but could not exploit it.

Source: FMFRP 12-13. Maneuver in War. Reprint of 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.

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THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NORTH: DE BONO AND BADOGLIO.

g. The defeat of the Negus: Mai Cieu or Lake Ascianghi (2d part).

The 7th Alpine regiment received the first attack but it held. Shortly afterward an attack was directed against the 2d Eritrean division; the exposed flank of the 3d Eritrean brigade (10th battalion) was recognized as vulnerable and a major effort launched about 8 o'clock; several assaults were made, and by 9:30 this battalion had lost more than half its officers; the C. of S. of the division, Colonel Zuretti, intervened in person, with some reinforcements, and the position was held, in close combat, with the bayonet and hand grenade. At that time, an unsuccessful attack was launched in the west against Bohora. The enemy then shifted to the east and attempted an infiltration between the 1st and 2d Eritrean divisions; once more the 3d brigade was hard pressed. The division commander, General Dalmazzo, sent an order to hold at all costs. Colonel Zuretti had fallen and Captain Tarantino, who commanded the 10th battalion, sent back a grim message: "We shall all be killed, but the dead will continue to fire." It was a fact that even the wounded continued to fight, in desperation. In this extremity, the division commander scraped together every man of the rear units, including cooks and clerks, and counterattacked with three battalions.

It worked; the enemy fell back. The rest of the front was also able to react, and by 2:00 PM both Mecan passes were in Italian hands. Toward 4:30 PM the enemy renewed the attack but failed to drive it home; thereafter, a lull set in; both sides rested on their positions for the evening.

In the morning there was desultory fighting, under cover of which the Negus retreated. The weather did not favor air activity during the battle, but on the next day it cleared and aviation was able to operate decisively against the retreating Abyssinian columns, caught in narrow defiles below Ascianghi. The fighting on the first had apparently shaken the enemy badly; the demoralizing pursuit by attack aviation practically destroyed the remnants.

Source: FMFRP 12-13. Maneuver in War. Reprint of 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.

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An Overseas Expedition.

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NORTH: DE BONO AND BADOGLIO.

h. Pursuit and the capture of Addis Ababa (1st part).

With an enemy on the run, demoralized by savage and continuous air attacks, the time-honored principle of relentless pursuit, without pause, without breathing spell, to the last ounce of available strength, saw once more its historical application.

Badogilo promptly decided to pursue; immediately available, however, were only the I and the Eritrean Corps, then approaching Lake Ascianghi; the remaining corps were scattered over a wide front, from the Sudanese border via Lake Tana to Socola.

The main road to Addis Ababa could be reached by bridging a roadless gap between Mai Cieu and Quoram. Orders were issued to the Eritrean Corps advancing on foot to take Dessie without fail by the fifteenth; the I Corps, General Santini commanding, was to construct the road from Mai Cieu to Quoram by forced labor. Dall'Ora, S.O.S., received instruction to make available 1,300 motor transport vehicles at Dessie by the twenty-second of the month; Badoglio planned to push this huge motor column on Addis Ababa, expecting to reach it by the thirtieth.

Pirzio Biroli began the advance on the ninth; the 2d Eritrean division, Dalmazzo commanding, was in the lead; in six days, over mountainous terrain, the hard, seasoned Eritrean Corps covered 125 kms as the crow flies and were within a few hours of Dessie. Biroli developed in four columns for the encirclement of Dessie on the fifteenth but found the enemy gone. This corps was supplied from the air for several days.

Dall'Ora was as good or better than his word; by the seventeenth motor transportation began to arrive in the vicinity of Quoram; the general had managed to assemble 1,600 vehicles; the division "Sabauda," the 1st battalion, militia division "3d January," three battalions light and medium artillery, motorized and engineer detachments entrucked and began the advance from Dessie on the twenty-fourth. The C. in C. had arrived by air as early as the twentieth.

Source: FMFRP 12-13. Maneuver in War. Reprint of 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.

Cheers. Raúl M .

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THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NORTH: DE BONO AND BADOGLIO.

h. Pursuit and the capture of Addis Ababa (2d part).

The march dispositions involved two routes, a mountain trail via Doba, in the west, which was followed by a flank column under General Vaccarisi, and the principal motor column, on the east, via Mukfud and Debra; the composition of these columns was as follows:

Right column
1 Cavalry Squadron
1 Eritrean Brigade (1st)
1 Mtn. Battalion F.A.

Left column
1 Eritrean Battalion
1 Mtn. F.A. Battalion
Motor Transport
1 Eritrean Brigade (2d)
1 Squadron Lt. Tanks.

There were approximately 10,000 men, native and white, with eleven batteries F.A. and some light tanks.

The march serials were timed so that both columns could cooperate on the line: Dobra—Termaber Pass, where enemy resistance was anticipated. Eventually, the motor serials would advance beyond the foot elements and enter Addis Ababa first.

Vaccarisi's column made forced marches of 40 kms per day, this on a mountain trail; the motorized units on the main route were barely able to keep up with the foot elements. The engineers, under Colonel Caniglia, made phantastic efforts; twenty-two fords, in swampy areas, had already been negotiated; the worst task was on the Termaber Pass, winding in precipitate curves from 3,000 to 9,450 feet elevation; many washouts had to be repaired and enormous retaining walls constructed.

It was not until the fourth that the motor column got across; the Eritreans were already in sight of the capital when the motor elements arrived and made an entry, on the fifth; the Negus had fled to Djibuti, and marauders were pillaging in the city.

Source: FMFRP 12-13. Maneuver in War. Reprint of 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.
I comunisti e i guerriglieri del Negus. Ricerca dell’Architetto Gaspare Sciortino.
http://www.lombardiabeniculturali.it/fo ... 0-0000960/

Cheers. Raúl M .

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