Abyssinia
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Stephen_Rynerson
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Re: Abyssinia
Thank you for all your work on this and the other campaign threads, tigre.
Re: Abyssinia
Hello to all 
; thanks to you for joining Stephen 
. A little more.....................................
An Overseas Expedition.
THE CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH: GRAZIANI.
a. Initial operations: the protective force. The strategic role assigned to the forces in Somalia was secondary; consequently, relatively smaller forces and resources were initially allotted to this theater of operations. Nevertheless, it was in keeping with the soldierly qualities of the theater commander, General Graziani, that operations were conducted aggressively, with the result that considerable Ethiopian forces were drawn from the northern front and a series of remarkable, local successes were obtained. General Graziani, then 53 years old, had distinguished himself by reckless bravery during the World War and great capacity in colonial warfare; it was he who finally subjugated the Cyrenaica, in 1930-31, by a campaign that combined sheer audacity with the most painstaking logistic preparations.
Graziani had initially available the permanent Somali native formations, about twelve battalions, to which were added the regular division
"Peloritana," two militia divisions, including the "Tevere" and a Lybian division, a total of approximately 50,000, of which only half was available for service at the front, since the enormous distances in this theater required an extensive line of communication service.
Ethiopian strength was estimated between 50,000 and 75,000 under Ras Nasibu, holding the waterholes and defiles of the river system, the Juba, Webbe Schebeli and Fafan.
Graziani did not waste any time; he improvised motorized columns and in October took the posts of Dab, Mustahil, Gherlogubi and Damerei, on a broad front of 500 kms, but he failed to get the important post of Gorrahei, which blocked the entrance into the valley of the Fafan.
Gorrahei became Graziani's next immediate objective. In order to cover his left flank, the capture of Dagnerrei became an intermediate step; it was taken on the tenth, in a tactical pattern that Graziani thereafter employed on many occasions. The assault troops were brought up in night marches; attack aviation harassed the enemy previously; the assault was then launched under the protective fire of heavy bombardment aviation and motorized machine-gun units. The defeat of the Ethiopians brought in neighboring tribes, particularly the Sultan Olol Dinle, who became a useful ally thereafter.
Source: FMFRP 12-13. Maneuver in War. Reprint of 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.
Cheers. Raúl M
.
Feliz Año Nuevo - Happy New Year - Feliz Ano Novo - Gluckliches Neues Jahr - Bonne Année - Felice Anno Nuovo - Szczęśliwego nowego roku!!!.
; thanks to you for joining Stephen . A little more.....................................An Overseas Expedition.
THE CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH: GRAZIANI.
a. Initial operations: the protective force. The strategic role assigned to the forces in Somalia was secondary; consequently, relatively smaller forces and resources were initially allotted to this theater of operations. Nevertheless, it was in keeping with the soldierly qualities of the theater commander, General Graziani, that operations were conducted aggressively, with the result that considerable Ethiopian forces were drawn from the northern front and a series of remarkable, local successes were obtained. General Graziani, then 53 years old, had distinguished himself by reckless bravery during the World War and great capacity in colonial warfare; it was he who finally subjugated the Cyrenaica, in 1930-31, by a campaign that combined sheer audacity with the most painstaking logistic preparations.
Graziani had initially available the permanent Somali native formations, about twelve battalions, to which were added the regular division
"Peloritana," two militia divisions, including the "Tevere" and a Lybian division, a total of approximately 50,000, of which only half was available for service at the front, since the enormous distances in this theater required an extensive line of communication service.
Ethiopian strength was estimated between 50,000 and 75,000 under Ras Nasibu, holding the waterholes and defiles of the river system, the Juba, Webbe Schebeli and Fafan.
Graziani did not waste any time; he improvised motorized columns and in October took the posts of Dab, Mustahil, Gherlogubi and Damerei, on a broad front of 500 kms, but he failed to get the important post of Gorrahei, which blocked the entrance into the valley of the Fafan.
Gorrahei became Graziani's next immediate objective. In order to cover his left flank, the capture of Dagnerrei became an intermediate step; it was taken on the tenth, in a tactical pattern that Graziani thereafter employed on many occasions. The assault troops were brought up in night marches; attack aviation harassed the enemy previously; the assault was then launched under the protective fire of heavy bombardment aviation and motorized machine-gun units. The defeat of the Ethiopians brought in neighboring tribes, particularly the Sultan Olol Dinle, who became a useful ally thereafter.
Source: FMFRP 12-13. Maneuver in War. Reprint of 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.
Cheers. Raúl M
.Feliz Año Nuevo - Happy New Year - Feliz Ano Novo - Gluckliches Neues Jahr - Bonne Année - Felice Anno Nuovo - Szczęśliwego nowego roku!!!.
- Attachments
-
Re: Abyssinia
Hello to all ; a little more.....................................
An Overseas Expedition.
THE CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH: GRAZIANI.
a. Initial operations: the protective force. Graziani organized a flying column, consisting of three Somali battalions, two guerrilla groups, one battalion of field artillery, one company of tanks, and one squadron of armored cars, under the command of Colonel Maletti. Once again, the assault was accompanied by heavy bombing concentrations, and Gorrahei was taken on 7 November. Flushed with success, this detachment attempted an advance up the valley of the Fafan but ran into an ambush at Gabrehor and was stopped.
At this time the Ethiopians under Ras Desta were reported advancing on Dolo; Graziani shifted the bulk of his forces to his left wing in anticipation and postponed further offensive operations in the Fafan valley. The reports of Ethiopian concentrations, while probably exaggerated, were of such a nature that the Italians organized for defense in the vicinity of Dolo. Ras Desta was advancing south, in the valley of Juba, with about 35,000 men; Ras Nassibu with 45,000 was reported along the upper Fafan; between Nassibu and Desta, Dedjasmaj Beiene Mered was located on the upper Scebeli with about 20,000 men.
As a diversion, Olol Dinle was ordered to attack Beiene Mered; provided with irregulars only, Dinle failed in the attempt but managed to immobilize Mered, which was the real object of his strategic mission.
Source: FMFRP 12-13. Maneuver in War. Reprint of 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.
Cheers. Raúl M.
; a little more.....................................An Overseas Expedition.
THE CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH: GRAZIANI.
a. Initial operations: the protective force. Graziani organized a flying column, consisting of three Somali battalions, two guerrilla groups, one battalion of field artillery, one company of tanks, and one squadron of armored cars, under the command of Colonel Maletti. Once again, the assault was accompanied by heavy bombing concentrations, and Gorrahei was taken on 7 November. Flushed with success, this detachment attempted an advance up the valley of the Fafan but ran into an ambush at Gabrehor and was stopped.
At this time the Ethiopians under Ras Desta were reported advancing on Dolo; Graziani shifted the bulk of his forces to his left wing in anticipation and postponed further offensive operations in the Fafan valley. The reports of Ethiopian concentrations, while probably exaggerated, were of such a nature that the Italians organized for defense in the vicinity of Dolo. Ras Desta was advancing south, in the valley of Juba, with about 35,000 men; Ras Nassibu with 45,000 was reported along the upper Fafan; between Nassibu and Desta, Dedjasmaj Beiene Mered was located on the upper Scebeli with about 20,000 men.
As a diversion, Olol Dinle was ordered to attack Beiene Mered; provided with irregulars only, Dinle failed in the attempt but managed to immobilize Mered, which was the real object of his strategic mission.
Source: FMFRP 12-13. Maneuver in War. Reprint of 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.
Cheers. Raúl M
.- Attachments
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- A Unit of Bersaglieri Crossing a Ford in Ogaden............................................
http://www.allposters.com.au/-sp/A-Unit-of-Bersaglieri-Crossing-a-Ford-in-Ogaden-1935-36-posters_i12139862_.htm - image009.jpg (51.06 KiB) Viewed 3199 times
Re: Abyssinia
Hello to all ; a little more.....................................
An Overseas Expedition.
THE CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH: GRAZIANI.
b. The offensive against Ras Desta. The advance of Desta's main column along the Ganale Doria was observed on January 1. Graziani advanced promptly and took Amino in order to control the area between the river and Lake Huco; the division "Peloritana" was then drawn forward, in a position in readiness. On the eleventh, Desta's leading elements collided with the Italian outposts.
(1) The Battle of Ganale Doria, 11-13 January 1936. The Italian plan ripened into swift execution: a frontal attack in the center, with flank columns securing the valleys of the Doria and Gestro.
The height of Halejo became the first objective. It was taken on the twelfth. Graziani, himself, conducted the main effort south of Lake Huco; tanks opened the way in the dense underbrush, and fighting was severe. Colonel Miele, the Chief of Staff, personally brought up artillery for flanking fire. The Abyssinian front broke, finally, when elements of the column in the Doria valley turned south from Gogoru and enveloped the enemy's north flank. Graziani recognized the enemy's demoralization and immediately organized for pursuit.
(2) The pursuit to Neghelli, 15-20 January 1936. A motor-mechanized force of 1,100 vehides was assembled, containing tanks and motorized artillery. Limited supplies were made available as follows: Class-I supplies, 300 tons; 40,000 gallons of water in 60 tank trucks; 300 tons of gasoline and 150 tons of ammunition. Seven thousand troops were entrucked, preceded by the machine-gun squadrons of the cavalry regiments "Aosta" and "Genoa." Attack aviation operated far in advance of the column, dispersing every enemy concentration. Graziani reached Filtu on the seventeenth and Neghelli on the twentieth; this bold advance of 300 kms, in relentless pursuit into the heart of the enemy country, is a maneuver in the Napoleonic manner. General Agostini, commanding the southern flank-column, ran into hard fighting in the Daua Parma valley but continued successfully on his covering mission by an expedition from Malca Murri on Cellago. The remnants of Desta's forces made a stand in the difficult lake country along the route: Irghalem—Addis Ababa.
The temptation for a further dash straight to the enemy capital, must have been great; Graziani, however, had to consider the remaining Ethiopian concentrations under Mered and Nasibu and decided to 'hold the Neghelli area defensively while shifting his main forces to northern Ogaden for eventual operations in the direction of Harrar. The great talent of this commander is amply demonstrated by his amazing capacity to adjust to rapidly changing strategical conditions through maneuver.
Source: FMFRP 12-13. Maneuver in War. Reprint of 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.
Cheers. Raúl M.
; a little more.....................................An Overseas Expedition.
THE CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH: GRAZIANI.
b. The offensive against Ras Desta. The advance of Desta's main column along the Ganale Doria was observed on January 1. Graziani advanced promptly and took Amino in order to control the area between the river and Lake Huco; the division "Peloritana" was then drawn forward, in a position in readiness. On the eleventh, Desta's leading elements collided with the Italian outposts.
(1) The Battle of Ganale Doria, 11-13 January 1936. The Italian plan ripened into swift execution: a frontal attack in the center, with flank columns securing the valleys of the Doria and Gestro.
The height of Halejo became the first objective. It was taken on the twelfth. Graziani, himself, conducted the main effort south of Lake Huco; tanks opened the way in the dense underbrush, and fighting was severe. Colonel Miele, the Chief of Staff, personally brought up artillery for flanking fire. The Abyssinian front broke, finally, when elements of the column in the Doria valley turned south from Gogoru and enveloped the enemy's north flank. Graziani recognized the enemy's demoralization and immediately organized for pursuit.
(2) The pursuit to Neghelli, 15-20 January 1936. A motor-mechanized force of 1,100 vehides was assembled, containing tanks and motorized artillery. Limited supplies were made available as follows: Class-I supplies, 300 tons; 40,000 gallons of water in 60 tank trucks; 300 tons of gasoline and 150 tons of ammunition. Seven thousand troops were entrucked, preceded by the machine-gun squadrons of the cavalry regiments "Aosta" and "Genoa." Attack aviation operated far in advance of the column, dispersing every enemy concentration. Graziani reached Filtu on the seventeenth and Neghelli on the twentieth; this bold advance of 300 kms, in relentless pursuit into the heart of the enemy country, is a maneuver in the Napoleonic manner. General Agostini, commanding the southern flank-column, ran into hard fighting in the Daua Parma valley but continued successfully on his covering mission by an expedition from Malca Murri on Cellago. The remnants of Desta's forces made a stand in the difficult lake country along the route: Irghalem—Addis Ababa.
The temptation for a further dash straight to the enemy capital, must have been great; Graziani, however, had to consider the remaining Ethiopian concentrations under Mered and Nasibu and decided to 'hold the Neghelli area defensively while shifting his main forces to northern Ogaden for eventual operations in the direction of Harrar. The great talent of this commander is amply demonstrated by his amazing capacity to adjust to rapidly changing strategical conditions through maneuver.
Source: FMFRP 12-13. Maneuver in War. Reprint of 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.
Cheers. Raúl M
.- Attachments
-
-
Re: Abyssinia
Hello to all ; a little more.....................................
An Overseas Expedition.
THE CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH: GRAZIANI.
c. The offensive against Ras Nasibu, April 1936. In order to keep the Neghelli front secure, a purely passive defense was not sufficient; in the next two months the Italians executed a number of raids and expeditions and sometimes ran into trouble, as the machine-gun squadron of the "Aosta" in its raid on Uardara, on 12 April. This is "active defense" in the best meaning of the term, and the general mission of flank security was amply fulfilled, permitting Graziani's concentration against his only remaining opponent, Ras Nasibu.
(1) The advance on Sassabaneh, April 1936. The general situation in the period January-March 1936 developed in three phases: (a) exploitation in the Neghelli area, (b) containing action against Beiene Mered in the Scebeli valley, and (c) concentration against Ras Nasibu in the Sassabaneh area.
The Italian intelligence reported three enemy groupings: (a) Ras Maconnen in vicinity of Bircut with 9,000 men, (b) Ras Nasibu with 10,000 men in vicinity of Sassabaneh in a fortified position, and (c) a reserve force of 9,000 men in vicinity of Djidjida; the entire area was fortified in the sense that every waterhole was organized for defense in considerable depth.
Graziani concentrated on a broad front about 50 miles south of the line Gianagobo—Gabredarre—Gerlogubi; he assembled a considerable park of motor vehicles; new wells were dug to insure a daily supply of 250,000 gallons of water. Reinforcements had been made available, through the arrival of the Lybian division and parts of the division "Tevere." Real resistance was not expected until the line Dagamedo—Sassabaneh—Wedhel had been reached.
Graziani planned an advance in three columns with the main effort to be made by the left column, General Nasi (N) commanding; the Lybian division, reinforced, was assigned to this column. The center column, General Frusci (Fr) commanding, was heavily motorized, comprising armored cars, tanks, and machine gun motorcycles, engineers (white) and some Somali battalions; the right column, General Agostini (A) commanding, contained Italian and native units. Graziani held out motorized reserves.
Source: FMFRP 12-13. Maneuver in War. Reprint of 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.
Cheers. Raúl M.
; a little more.....................................An Overseas Expedition.
THE CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH: GRAZIANI.
c. The offensive against Ras Nasibu, April 1936. In order to keep the Neghelli front secure, a purely passive defense was not sufficient; in the next two months the Italians executed a number of raids and expeditions and sometimes ran into trouble, as the machine-gun squadron of the "Aosta" in its raid on Uardara, on 12 April. This is "active defense" in the best meaning of the term, and the general mission of flank security was amply fulfilled, permitting Graziani's concentration against his only remaining opponent, Ras Nasibu.
(1) The advance on Sassabaneh, April 1936. The general situation in the period January-March 1936 developed in three phases: (a) exploitation in the Neghelli area, (b) containing action against Beiene Mered in the Scebeli valley, and (c) concentration against Ras Nasibu in the Sassabaneh area.
The Italian intelligence reported three enemy groupings: (a) Ras Maconnen in vicinity of Bircut with 9,000 men, (b) Ras Nasibu with 10,000 men in vicinity of Sassabaneh in a fortified position, and (c) a reserve force of 9,000 men in vicinity of Djidjida; the entire area was fortified in the sense that every waterhole was organized for defense in considerable depth.
Graziani concentrated on a broad front about 50 miles south of the line Gianagobo—Gabredarre—Gerlogubi; he assembled a considerable park of motor vehicles; new wells were dug to insure a daily supply of 250,000 gallons of water. Reinforcements had been made available, through the arrival of the Lybian division and parts of the division "Tevere." Real resistance was not expected until the line Dagamedo—Sassabaneh—Wedhel had been reached.
Graziani planned an advance in three columns with the main effort to be made by the left column, General Nasi (N) commanding; the Lybian division, reinforced, was assigned to this column. The center column, General Frusci (Fr) commanding, was heavily motorized, comprising armored cars, tanks, and machine gun motorcycles, engineers (white) and some Somali battalions; the right column, General Agostini (A) commanding, contained Italian and native units. Graziani held out motorized reserves.
Source: FMFRP 12-13. Maneuver in War. Reprint of 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.
Cheers. Raúl M
.- Attachments
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- Supplies for the troops of Graziani .................................
http://www.gettyimages.com/photos/ethiopian-historical-events?excludenudity=true&mediatype=photography&phrase=ethiopian%20historical%20events&sort=mostpopular - image013.jpg (26.36 KiB) Viewed 3148 times
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Re: Abyssinia
Hello to all ; a little more.....................................
An Overseas Expedition.
THE CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH: GRAZIANI.
2) The Battle of Gianagobo, 15-17 April 1936. In spite of the rainy season, the advance was begun on the fourteenth, under difficulties, and contact was not made with the main enemy position until the twenty-sixth. Air reconnaissance was profitable in spite of poor visibility, and indicated enemy strength opposite the center column, which was reinforced.
The left column, however, ran early into the enemy in a meeting engagement at Gianagobo on 15 April.
The Lybian Division became gradually committed; the enemy fought vigorously, even to attacking the Italians on the sixteenth; on the seventeenth, an envelopment by the 1st Lybian Infantry Regiment brought on the decision and the enemy retreated via Bircut.
Graziani released a motorized column, General Verne (V) commanding, consisting of the 45th Eritrean Battalion and certain native guerrillas, for pursuit, to intercept the enemy at Segag; this is the classical pattern of pursuit: direct pressure by the units in contact (Lybian Division) and encircling pursuit to intercept the enemy at a critical rearward point along his route of withdrawal. Verne's column was delayed by creeks in flood, and the bulk of the enemy was able to escape, but, in its advance, this column occupied Dagamedo as early as the twenty third and was consequently on the flank of the main enemy position.
Source: FMFRP 12-13. Maneuver in War. Reprint of 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.
Cheers. Raúl M.
; a little more.....................................An Overseas Expedition.
THE CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH: GRAZIANI.
2) The Battle of Gianagobo, 15-17 April 1936. In spite of the rainy season, the advance was begun on the fourteenth, under difficulties, and contact was not made with the main enemy position until the twenty-sixth. Air reconnaissance was profitable in spite of poor visibility, and indicated enemy strength opposite the center column, which was reinforced.
The left column, however, ran early into the enemy in a meeting engagement at Gianagobo on 15 April.
The Lybian Division became gradually committed; the enemy fought vigorously, even to attacking the Italians on the sixteenth; on the seventeenth, an envelopment by the 1st Lybian Infantry Regiment brought on the decision and the enemy retreated via Bircut.
Graziani released a motorized column, General Verne (V) commanding, consisting of the 45th Eritrean Battalion and certain native guerrillas, for pursuit, to intercept the enemy at Segag; this is the classical pattern of pursuit: direct pressure by the units in contact (Lybian Division) and encircling pursuit to intercept the enemy at a critical rearward point along his route of withdrawal. Verne's column was delayed by creeks in flood, and the bulk of the enemy was able to escape, but, in its advance, this column occupied Dagamedo as early as the twenty third and was consequently on the flank of the main enemy position.
Source: FMFRP 12-13. Maneuver in War. Reprint of 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.
Cheers. Raúl M
.- Attachments
-
Re: Abyssinia
Hello to all ; a little more.....................................
An Overseas Expedition.
THE CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH: GRAZIANI.
(3) The battle of Sassabaneh, 24-30 April 1936. (a) First phase: the situation to 25 April. The weather cleared on the twenty-third and attack aviation began a bombardment of enemy positions; the order for the attack was issued that night. Viewed from Gabrehor, the heights of Gumar, Dane and Birgot showed enemy trenches.
Graziani decided on a double envelopment: Verne (V), on the left, was ordered to close in to the east via Renda; Agostini (A), on the right, was to advance west via Gunagado; Frusci (F), in the center, was to attack on both sides of the Fafan River; he held out a motorized reserve, including General Navarra's detachment, further to the rear, the army reserve was intact. The attack was launched at 7:00 AM of the twenty-fourth, preceded by waves of attack aviation. The enemy was encountered in the dense undergrowth; snipers from the tree tops caused considerable losses; the brush was so thick in the center that Frusci's columns had to advance in single file. Armored cars finally made the heights and found that it was covering an outpost position only and that the main line of resistance was in rear in vicinity of Hamanlei. As the terrain was clearer, the attack continued but was stopped frontally; the 6th Eritrean battalion suffered 40 per cent losses. Frusci called a halt to his frontal attack to await the effect of his enveloping forces.
The envelopment, however, had run into stiff resistance which slowed down its advance appreciably; Verne, in the west, was counterattacked by the enemy and barely held his ground; Agostini reached Gunagado but encountered serious opposition; he received reinforcements in the form of a volunteer battalion (S) but could make no appreciable headway.
This left Frusci to his own resources; after some local reorganization he continued the attack on the twenty-fifth, relying mainly on his heavy supporting weapons. Fighting like demons, the Abyssinians counterattacked that day, getting uncomfortably close to division staffs. Nightfall indicated a weakening of attacks, and Frusci stubbornly ordered a further advance; he reached Hamanlei on the morning of the twenty-sixth. Verne was still fighting at Dagamedo; Agostini had made little headway, and the enemy was still at Sassabaneh.
Source: FMFRP 12-13. Maneuver in War. Reprint of 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.
Cheers. Raúl M.
; a little more.....................................An Overseas Expedition.
THE CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH: GRAZIANI.
(3) The battle of Sassabaneh, 24-30 April 1936. (a) First phase: the situation to 25 April. The weather cleared on the twenty-third and attack aviation began a bombardment of enemy positions; the order for the attack was issued that night. Viewed from Gabrehor, the heights of Gumar, Dane and Birgot showed enemy trenches.
Graziani decided on a double envelopment: Verne (V), on the left, was ordered to close in to the east via Renda; Agostini (A), on the right, was to advance west via Gunagado; Frusci (F), in the center, was to attack on both sides of the Fafan River; he held out a motorized reserve, including General Navarra's detachment, further to the rear, the army reserve was intact. The attack was launched at 7:00 AM of the twenty-fourth, preceded by waves of attack aviation. The enemy was encountered in the dense undergrowth; snipers from the tree tops caused considerable losses; the brush was so thick in the center that Frusci's columns had to advance in single file. Armored cars finally made the heights and found that it was covering an outpost position only and that the main line of resistance was in rear in vicinity of Hamanlei. As the terrain was clearer, the attack continued but was stopped frontally; the 6th Eritrean battalion suffered 40 per cent losses. Frusci called a halt to his frontal attack to await the effect of his enveloping forces.
The envelopment, however, had run into stiff resistance which slowed down its advance appreciably; Verne, in the west, was counterattacked by the enemy and barely held his ground; Agostini reached Gunagado but encountered serious opposition; he received reinforcements in the form of a volunteer battalion (S) but could make no appreciable headway.
This left Frusci to his own resources; after some local reorganization he continued the attack on the twenty-fifth, relying mainly on his heavy supporting weapons. Fighting like demons, the Abyssinians counterattacked that day, getting uncomfortably close to division staffs. Nightfall indicated a weakening of attacks, and Frusci stubbornly ordered a further advance; he reached Hamanlei on the morning of the twenty-sixth. Verne was still fighting at Dagamedo; Agostini had made little headway, and the enemy was still at Sassabaneh.
Source: FMFRP 12-13. Maneuver in War. Reprint of 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.
Cheers. Raúl M
.- Attachments
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- Gunagado, shortly before the assault.............................................
http://salvofuca.blogspot.com.ar/2012/03/il-capitano-antonio-bonsignore-antonio.html - image018.jpg (53.32 KiB) Viewed 3039 times
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Re: Abyssinia
Hello to all ; a little more.....................................
An Overseas Expedition.
THE CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH: GRAZIANI.
(3) The battle of Sassabaneh, 24-30 April 1936. (b) Second phase: the situation to 29 April. Graziani recognized that reorganization was indicated. On the 27-28 April, units and supply dispositions had been adjusted to a fresh plan: continuation of a frontal but secondary attack against Sassabaneh, while the Lybian division, motor-drawn, was to move on Dagabur, which was set as an objective for Agostini also; this "pincer movement" was to catch Nasibu. The maneuver concept is a familiar one—recognizable in endless examples in previous chapters. The employment of motor transport, however, is a modern feature in an old pattern; its effect, naturally, was an increase in distances and mileage. This converging movement of widely separated units involved 280 kms for Nasi, 213 kms for Frusci, and 216 kms for Agostini—a neat problem in timing and coordination.
Apparently, the fight had been taken out of the Abyssinians, in what was probably the bloodiest battle of the entire war.
Agostini's column was the only one that ran into enemy resistance, at Bullaleh; the enemy had vanished; all columns reached Dagabur on the thirtieth.
Source: FMFRP 12-13. Maneuver in War. Reprint of 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.
Cheers. Raúl M.
; a little more.....................................An Overseas Expedition.
THE CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH: GRAZIANI.
(3) The battle of Sassabaneh, 24-30 April 1936. (b) Second phase: the situation to 29 April. Graziani recognized that reorganization was indicated. On the 27-28 April, units and supply dispositions had been adjusted to a fresh plan: continuation of a frontal but secondary attack against Sassabaneh, while the Lybian division, motor-drawn, was to move on Dagabur, which was set as an objective for Agostini also; this "pincer movement" was to catch Nasibu. The maneuver concept is a familiar one—recognizable in endless examples in previous chapters. The employment of motor transport, however, is a modern feature in an old pattern; its effect, naturally, was an increase in distances and mileage. This converging movement of widely separated units involved 280 kms for Nasi, 213 kms for Frusci, and 216 kms for Agostini—a neat problem in timing and coordination.
Apparently, the fight had been taken out of the Abyssinians, in what was probably the bloodiest battle of the entire war.
Agostini's column was the only one that ran into enemy resistance, at Bullaleh; the enemy had vanished; all columns reached Dagabur on the thirtieth.
Source: FMFRP 12-13. Maneuver in War. Reprint of 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.
Cheers. Raúl M
.- Attachments
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- Agostini's column on the move.............................................
http://salvofuca.blogspot.com.ar/2012/03/il-capitano-antonio-bonsignore-antonio.html - image133.jpg (38.52 KiB) Viewed 3021 times
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Re: Abyssinia
Hello to all ; a little more.....................................
An Overseas Expedition.
THE CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH: GRAZIANI.
(4) Pursuit to Harrar: The end. It was typical of the hard-hitting Graziani not to stop at this point. In spite of persistent bad weather, the able commander ordered the pursuit pushed northward, to intercept the enemy between Harrar and Djidjida. Brushing aside local resistance, the main body moved up the valley of the Djerrer while the Lybian division and Verne's motorized column advanced from Dagamedo via Golaski. Harrar was reached on 5 May. With a final effort, General Navarra pushed a detachment to Diredaua, reaching the railroad at 3:00 AM of the ninth, only to meet a battalion of the "Sabauda" that had entrained at Addis Ababa. This marked the end of organized resistance in Ethiopia; then followed a period of pacification and the far-sighted economic and administrative reorganization of the huge colonial empire.
Source: FMFRP 12-13. Maneuver in War. Reprint of 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.
http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news- ... d104420754
It's all folks. Cheers. Raúl M.
; a little more.....................................An Overseas Expedition.
THE CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH: GRAZIANI.
(4) Pursuit to Harrar: The end. It was typical of the hard-hitting Graziani not to stop at this point. In spite of persistent bad weather, the able commander ordered the pursuit pushed northward, to intercept the enemy between Harrar and Djidjida. Brushing aside local resistance, the main body moved up the valley of the Djerrer while the Lybian division and Verne's motorized column advanced from Dagamedo via Golaski. Harrar was reached on 5 May. With a final effort, General Navarra pushed a detachment to Diredaua, reaching the railroad at 3:00 AM of the ninth, only to meet a battalion of the "Sabauda" that had entrained at Addis Ababa. This marked the end of organized resistance in Ethiopia; then followed a period of pacification and the far-sighted economic and administrative reorganization of the huge colonial empire.
Source: FMFRP 12-13. Maneuver in War. Reprint of 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.
http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news- ... d104420754
It's all folks. Cheers. Raúl M
.- Attachments
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- On May 7, 1936, A Line of Trucks of General Graziani's Troops, Major of The Southern Front, crossing a Village to Reach Harrar..............................................
- image023.png (177.87 KiB) Viewed 3003 times
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Re: Abyssinia
Hello to all ; a little more.....................................
Colonial War - Abyssinia 1936.
Source: http://www.dolcevitaonline.it/amba-arad ... lastrocca/
http://images.delcampe.com/img_large/au ... 34_001.jpg
Cheers. Raúl M.
; a little more.....................................Colonial War - Abyssinia 1936.
Source: http://www.dolcevitaonline.it/amba-arad ... lastrocca/
http://images.delcampe.com/img_large/au ... 34_001.jpg
Cheers. Raúl M
.- Attachments
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- Summary executions to maintain order in the new conquered territories .............................
- image011.png (156.38 KiB) Viewed 2917 times
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- Submission of the Amhara tribe - Gondar 1936 ...........................................................
- image012.jpg (24.95 KiB) Viewed 2917 times
Re: Abyssinia
Hello to all ; a little more.....................................
Colonial War - Somali Camp of Danane.
In 1935 the regime established the Somali Camp of Danane, which housed Ethiopian and Somali dissident politicians, as well as criminals. More than 6,000 men and women passed by, many of them were interned after the attack on Graziani in 1937 and during operations of the colonial police against the Ethiopian resistance. The camp remained active until it was liberated by the British in 1941.
Source: Italian Colonialism. R. Ben-Ghiat, M. Fuller.
http://www.mikewhiteuk.com/results.php? ... ate%20DESC
Cheers. Raúl M.
; a little more.....................................Colonial War - Somali Camp of Danane.
In 1935 the regime established the Somali Camp of Danane, which housed Ethiopian and Somali dissident politicians, as well as criminals. More than 6,000 men and women passed by, many of them were interned after the attack on Graziani in 1937 and during operations of the colonial police against the Ethiopian resistance. The camp remained active until it was liberated by the British in 1941.
Source: Italian Colonialism. R. Ben-Ghiat, M. Fuller.
http://www.mikewhiteuk.com/results.php? ... ate%20DESC
Cheers. Raúl M
.- Attachments
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- Prisoners of the high society being guarded by Askaris at Danane..............................................
- image005.jpg (32.22 KiB) Viewed 2861 times
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- Danane concentration camp ..................................
- image007.jpg (31.75 KiB) Viewed 2861 times
Re: Abyssinia
Hi all,
I found this image on Ebay. According to photo caption, guns captured in AOI (Ethiopia).
In foreground an 3.7c Pak gun and in the background an 75mm Mle 1919 mountain gun (I think).
Does somebody know if Ethiopian Army used this model of mountain gun in 1935?
Sturm78
I found this image on Ebay. According to photo caption, guns captured in AOI (Ethiopia).
In foreground an 3.7c Pak gun and in the background an 75mm Mle 1919 mountain gun (I think).
Does somebody know if Ethiopian Army used this model of mountain gun in 1935?
Sturm78
- Attachments
-
Re: Abyssinia
Hello to all ; a little more.....................................
Colonial War - Abyssinia 1936.
Source: https://subastas.catawiki.es/kavels/225 ... illes-1937
Cheers. Raúl M
; a little more.....................................Colonial War - Abyssinia 1936.
Source: https://subastas.catawiki.es/kavels/225 ... illes-1937
Cheers. Raúl M
- Attachments
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- Amba Togora, alpini of the Piave commemorating Adua March 1, 1936.....................................
- image055.jpg (47.06 KiB) Viewed 2193 times