Why did the Italian goverment collapse so easily?

[phylo_roadking]

...as for the outside factors that brought on the collapse of Mussolini's government...

...I would hesitate to call over three years of hard fighting in North Africa, the Med, and Sicily as "easy" for either Axis or Allies! It took a hell of a lot to bring Italy to that point...

[CJK1990]

Well, I think that Italy cracked a lot easier than the other Axis states. Romania had a coup, but it was three days after the Soviets opened a massive land offensive against them right on their border. Bulgaria had a coup shortly after the USSR declared war, of course Bulgaria was a small country and had been cut off from German assistance. Japan surrendered without an invasion but that was only after getting heavily bombed, blockaded, nuked, and facing the combined might of two superpowers without any allies.

[CJK1990]

Everyone knew that North Italy was a puppet of Germany just like South Italy was a puppet of the Anglo-Americans. Italians instictively hated the Germans far more than the Allies, so after their own government betrayed them it was just a matter of siding with the lesser evil. If Italy didn't surrender the Anglo-Americans could have been portrayed as the aggressors who were to blame for the war in Italy. The Italian military suffered appalling casualties fighting against that Austrians in World War I, I see no reason why they couldn't wage a defensive war on similar terrain. The Allies only fought a part of Italian strength in North Africa and Sicily, in mainland Italy they would be going up against virtually the entire Italian army.

[waldzee]

Everyone knew that North Italy was a puppet of Germany just like South Italy was a puppet of the Anglo-Americans. Italians instictively hated the Germans far more than the Allies, so after their own government betrayed them it was just a matter of siding with the lesser evil. If Italy didn't surrender the Anglo-Americans could have been portrayed as the aggressors who were to blame for the war in Italy. The Italian military suffered appalling casualties fighting against that Austrians in World War I, I see no reason why they couldn't wage a defensive war on similar terrain. The Allies only fought a part of Italian strength in North Africa and Sicily, in mainland Italy they would be going up against virtually the entire Italian army.

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They were offered an honorable armistice & had nothing to gain from Nazi collaboration except more grief.
I suggest more study. Less "italian mythology'.

[Carl Schwamberger]

And I'm not sure why the King thought he was going to get away with keeping his thrown by making peace at any price with the Allies.

The King thought so becuase the Allies made no demands for his abdication of removal. The monarchy continued its legal existance. A Italian national plebicite removed the monarchy post war.

It would be incorrect to think the Italian captulation was peace at any price. Eisenhower was allowed to drop the 'unconditional surrender policy & the Italian leaders allowed to remain in the government and retain what they could of their army and civil government. That they lost real power over the next few years had to do with the demoralization of the Italian population and soldiers. This was a event that was occuring anyway surrender or no.

I'm probably in the minority on this but I think the Italian surrender was not military justified, at least at the time.

A relatively large Italian 'army' failed completely to defend Sicilly. There is the excuse of most of that army being miltia & badly armed & trained, but that applied to the remaining Italian army as well. The remaining regular army formations were subject to very low morale and declining discipline. Training was declining and poor from the start for the Blackshirt component. The artillery was largely obsolete, AT guns & armored vehicles in short supply. Most important was the Axis had lost any semblance of parity in the air. Already in 1943 the Axis airforces had been shot out the air in two campaigns, in Febuary and March over Tunisia and in June and July over Sicilly. By September the ratio of operational aircraft in the Med was better than 4-1 against the Axis and becoming worse.

The German ground forces that fought in Italy were backed by a high portion of elite mechanized corps and Para divisions, reasonablly well armed with modern artillery and armored vehicles. Unklike the Italians their morale was still very high.

[CJK1990]

Well, they didn't use the words "unconditional surrender" but they demanded the surrender of the Italian military, Allied control of the demilitarization process, control of Italian foreign trade and relations, control over Italian media, control of ports and transportation, unrestricted movement of Allied forces throughout Italy, substantial control over Italian finances, suppression of Fascism and restoration of political freedoms, the right to establish a military occupation government anywhere and at any time the Allies saw fit, and the establishment of an Allied Control Comission to enforce the agreement as they saw fit, which wasn't abolished until 1947. It sure sounds like "peace at any price" to me. My point being is that the King was already tainted by his association with fascism so it seemed unreasonable to think that any future Italian government would be favorable to him. As for demoralization, that could be overcome. The French army was demoralized in 1917. The Soviet army was demoralized in 1941. As I said before, Italian morale might pluck up if they were directly defending their homeland. Sicily tended to feel more independent from the rest of Italy, so it isn't surprising the local forces didn't put up much of a fight. The Allies had air and tank superiority but that would be offset by Italy's rough and defensible geography. Operating in conjunction with German forces they might have put up stiff resistance. As I said before, the Italians would be fighting with their entire army instead of just a part.

[waldzee]

Well, they didn't use the words "unconditional surrender" but they demanded the surrender of the Italian military, Allied control of the demilitarization process, control of Italian foreign trade and relations, control over Italian media, control of ports and transportation, unrestricted movement of Allied forces throughout Italy, substantial control over Italian finances, suppression of Fascism and restoration of political freedoms, the right to establish a military occupation government anywhere and at any time the Allies saw fit, and the establishment of an Allied Control Comission to enforce the agreement as they saw fit, which wasn't abolished until 1947. It sure sounds like "peace at any price" to me. My point being is that the King was already tainted by his association with fascism so it seemed unreasonable to think that any future Italian government would be favorable to him. As for demoralization, that could be overcome. The French army was demoralized in 1917. The Soviet army was demoralized in 1941. As I said before, Italian morale might pluck up if they were directly defending their homeland. Sicily tended to feel more independent from the rest of Italy, so it isn't surprising the local forces didn't put up much of a fight. The Allies had air and tank superiority but that would be offset by Italy's rough and defensible geography. Operating in conjunction with German forces they might have put up stiff resistance. As I said before, the Italians would be fighting with their entire army instead of just a part.

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Given that Musso had been in power for over two DECADES & had walked them into one horrendous mess, the better question is why woudl Italy want to keep him?
Should Calvin Colledge have stayed on as abosolute ruler of the USA?

[Trackhead M2]

givne that Musso had been in power for over two DECADES & ahd woalked them into one horrendous mess, the better question is why woudl Itlay want to keep him?
Should Calvin Colledge have styed on as abosolute ruler of the USAÉ

Dear w,
Old Silent Cal wouldn't have made much of a charismatic despot. His wit was limited to an incident; while attending a dinner party as President, a lady approached him saying " I my husband $ 10,000.00 ( A lot of cash in 1920's dollars) that I could get you to say 3 words to me" The President answered "You lose". That was his shining moment. He is better remembered for saying the Business of America is Business.
Strike Swiftly,
TH-M2

[Patton42]

CJK1990, you make some nice points, but my question to you is when SHOULD have Italy capitulated?? Do you think it would have been better for them to wait till their cities were bombed into ruin like German and Japanese cities??? Would hanging on till Milan was razed like Dresden made the Italian stand more heroic?? Remember the Japanese were fighting for their ‘god emperor’, so fighting for the Japanese soldier was seen as fighting for their living god. Hitler would never surrender, not even when the Red Army was in Berlin, but were the hundreds of thousands of people who died for his failure to face reality after the war was clearly lost worth the price of admiration for his tenacity decades later? Plus, the Russians were killing and raping their way across Europe, surrender was not an appealing option. On the other hand, tens of thousands of Germans were surrendering to Allied troops once they crossed the Rhine, much like Italian troops had years earlier.

With the Allies set to land on Italian mainland, it was very clear that the end was near for Italy. The USA and USSR manufacturing capabilities dwarfed those of Italy, Germany, and Japan. Italian airpower was devastated, and the Italians lacked the modern weapons, fuel, and training to have ANY chance at winning the war. The Axis had zero chance at winning the war by the summer of 43’. Why should Italy now make their cities the frontlines for Hitler while he lived in denial? How many Italians were to die to make their defense nobler?? You mentioned that the USSR was able to overcome a low morale in 41, but they also had thousands of miles to fall back, millions of men, and an immense manufacturing base behind the Ural Mountains to support them. The Italians had none of this, only an ‘ally’ that had looked down upon them for the entirety of the war.

[waldzee]

[quote="CJK1990"]Well, they didn't use the words "unconditional surrender" but they demanded the surrender of the Italian military, Allied control of the demilitarization process, control of Italian foreign trade and relations, control over Italian media, control of ports and transportation, unrestricted movement of Allied forces throughout Italy, substantial control over Italian finances, suppression of Fascism and restoration of political freedoms, the right to establish a military occupation government anywhere and at any time the Allies saw fit, and the establishment of an Allied Control Comission to enforce the agreement as they saw fit, which wasn't abolished until 1947. It sure sounds like "peace at any price" to me.
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The 'they' was your country, who pumped billions into the Italian economy after the armistice- troops, ports, salaries, loans,& outright grants. The Republic of Italy lifted masses of People out of grinding poverty.
the Italians, in world war two, outlasted the Finns
They have nothing to prove onthe field of valor.
I am assuming from the Flag beside your name that you are American...

[CJK1990]

I just think it was a disgrace to surrender so cravenly, betraying their ally in the process when a) their homeland was under attack by foreigners who demanded unconditional surrender, something that no government worth it's name would accept except under extreme duress and b) the bulk of the Italian army had not even been engaged with the Anglo-Americans who had not even landed in mainland Italy yet. A King whose only thought was to save his own hide accomplished this treachery only to get kicked out by his own people anyway. And in the end Italy was still devastated by the war, over 100,000 civilians died after it officially "ended" with the Armistice.

[waldzee]

I just think it was a disgrace to surrender so cravenly, betraying their ally in the process when a) their homeland was under attack by foreigners who demanded unconditional surrender, something that no government worth it's name would accept except under extreme duress and b) the bulk of the Italian army had not even been engaged with the Anglo-Americans who had not even landed in mainland Italy yet. A King whose only thought was to save his own hide accomplished this treachery only to get kicked out by his own people anyway. And in the end Italy was still devastated by the war, over 100,000 civilians died after it officially "ended" with the Armistice.

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It is more accurate to state that that they died as a result of Nazi Germany's military occupation after the surrender.
the concensus of this thread appears to be against you-

[DrG]

I see that some equivalences have been proposed, which I think are not correct.
One of them is: ending Mussolini's govern = treason. Despite the fact that the choice by the King to dismiss Mussolini was probably based upon partially false information and pressures made by Ambrosio, Acquarone and Montezemolo, it should be noted that the vote of the Grand Council of Fascism was more than enough to justify, legally and morally, the action taken by the King.
Another equation: Badoglio govern = request for an armistice. This is not true again: after the dismissal of Mussolini King Victor Emanuel III asked Hitler a personal meeting with him in order to explain him the situation and cohordinate the future actions. Hitler, enraged due to the ousting of Mussolini, refused any meeting and, instead, ordered the evacuation of any German unit from Sicily. Only when Gen. Luigi Efisio Marras, Italian attaché in Berlin, phoned a report, speaking in strict Sardinian dialect in order to deceive the German intelligence tapping the line, in which he explained that Hitler had refused any contact with the King and the new govern, the King and Badoglio decided to start negotiations with the Allies.
Third equation: Italian armistice = treason of the alliance with Germany. In international relations national interest is the only important thing, there are so many examples of this in world history that I don't think that this topic deserves more words. Just briefly: Germany had already violated the Anti-Comintern Pact with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the Pact of Steel with the start of the war in 1939 instead of post-1943, as agreed with Italy. Moreover, the Germans had started planning the occupation of Italy and the arrest of its authorities just after 25 July 1943, in other words about a week before the choice by the Italian govern to ask for an armistice. Finally, in April 1945 it was the German command in Italy that made a separate armistice with the Allies, without informing the Italian Fascist govern: the "betrayed" became the "traitor" (if we have to use such a melodramatic wording).

About the timing of the Italian armistice, there were three possibilities.
1) The die-hard choice, which is quite loved by harmchair generals writing 70 years after the war and living confortably in their homes, thousands of kilometers far from any bomb (note, by the way, that the bombing suffered by Italian cities in the summer of 1943 were among the largest ever happened up to that day; today, with hindsight, we know that something more horrible could have happened, but in 1943 they were the worst bombings that humans had even seen, except for the Hamburg firestorm, which the Italian authorities feared would have been repeated by the Allies also on one or more Italian cities). In other words, the Italian govern should have gone on fighting just for sake of fighting, without a clear aim for the war. And, fighting with what forces?
- Italian Army veteran units, with the best equipment, had been destroyed in Tunisia and on the Don River. Scrapping the barrel, the Italian Army managed to get a few decent divisions for Sicily (where the Livorno and the 206th coastal division fought very well) and Sardinia, with a three more around Rome that were still training (armored divisions Ariete II and M, motorized division Piave), the Brennero motorized division in the Balkans and the Nembo parachutist division scattered around in small units in Southern Italy and Sardinia. The rest was formed of infantry divisions, almost all with obsolete equipment (the best one had been lost in Africa and Russia), or even occupation divisions (in the Balkans), which were pratically without artillery and of no military use except against partizans.
- The Italian Air Force had been wiped out during the escort of the last convoys to Tunisia and the air battle of Sicily and Italy. Just remember the "bombe alari" (wing bombs) obsolete fighters used to bomb the landing areas in Sicily, pratically suicide missions, or the "Stuka shoot", again in Sicily, in which the Italian Stuka units were completely destroyed.
- The Italian Navy was still a capable force, but divided into two fleets by the landing in Sicily. Moreover, it was going to be completely destroyed within a few weeks/months. Why I say so? Because, thanks to North African and Sicilian air bases, the Allies were finally able to fly bombing missions with heavy bombs (2,000 kg or more) on La Spezia or Taranto naval bases. The last two Italian heavy cruisers, Trieste and Gorizia, were put out of service by American bombers in La Maddalena base in April 1943 (the Trieste was sunk, the Gorizia was almost destroyed but managed to reach Liguria to be repaired, but it never returned in service). Then, on 5 June 1943, the battleships Roma and Vittorio Veneto were damaged by another bombing, this time on La Spezia. Given the new caliber of the bombs used by the Allies, the Navy decided to put additional armor plates on the deck of batteships while in the base, and then remove them when they had to steam for a mission. This decision was extremely impractical and not very useful, but gives an idea of the level of alarm caused by the new bombers menace: a few well centered bombs could have sunk the last assets of the Italian Navy.
- By the date of the armistice (8 Sept. 1943), also due to the stop of German exports in Italy, the Army and the Ministry of Corporations (the latter for industries and transports) had fuel reserves for 1 month, the Air Force for 12 days and the Navy for 5 days.
2) Mussolini's (probable) choice. As I wrote, Mussolini had managed to get Hitler promise to start negotiations with the Soviets. If the Führer hadn't obliged to his promise or the Soviets hadn't accepted an armistice or at least a truce, the Duce considered Italy free of any duty towards Germany and would have started his own negotiations. So, even if the Duce hadn't fallen, anyway Italy would have finished its war by the end of 1943. This choice was the most rational, in my opinion, because if Hitler had success with Stalin maybe the Axis would have won the war, at least in the West. On the other hand, we should understand if a German-Soviet Europe would have been a continent in which Italy would have developed and lived well, or just a mix of lagers and gulags... I guess that, along with Spain and Portugal (and maybe France, if let free enough by Germany), Italy would have ended the Fourties as an ally of the USA anyway, with a new kind of cold war between German, Soviet and Americanophile Europes.
3) The choice of asking an armistice before any negotiation between Germany and USSR had started (in other words, what actually happened). Certainly this decision had the wrong timing, but was not a mostruosity. With German forces firmly present in Italy, mixed with the Italian ones and prepared to disarm them, it would have been quite difficult to get a better outcome, or, to be precise, a less terrible tragedy. The armistice was, anyway, the mildest signed by an Axis country, and even milder than the one signed by French Vichy authorities in North Africa 10 months before. Moreover, the Italian govern aimed at neutralizing Italy, not turning it into a battlefield, just like by Vichy France in 1940-42. The Allies would have stopped at the frontline reached at the signature of the armistice, the Germans would have occupied the areas held by Italian troops outside Italy, and the rest of the peninsula would have been neutral (the hypothetical worst case scenario included a German occupation of the Po Valley). The German resistance on the Gustav Line, which was unexpected and was the outcome of a military masterpiece by Marshal Kesselring, destroyed this, somewhat delusional, Italian plan.

Guido

[Sid Guttridge]

I would suggest that it is very simple.

Mussolini had lost the confidence of virtually everyone in Italy, from his own Fascist Grand Council to the striking workers in the armaments factories. Even his son-in-law voted against him!

His regime was therefore a house of cards by mid 1943.

Repeated defeats had destroyed his and Fascism's popular credibility.

Cheers,

Sid.

[CJK1990]

Thank you for the thoughtful response. Treason: people like Grandi and Ambrosio were certainly guilty of treason and enabled the King to take his drastic action, which was technically legal but by this time regarded as a formality that would not be exercised. Moreover, the Fascist Grand Council wanted to maintain a fascist government and the King double crossed them by appointing Badoglio. Additionally, they were guilty of treason in the sense that they surrendered Italy to foreign powers. The purpose of the Badoglio government was certainly peace at any price and Hitler was correct to regard it as such. Mussolini entered the war on his own free will, with the consent of the King and of his own free will signed an agreement not to make a separate peace. Bombing: 20,000 Italians were killed by bombing before the armistice, that was less than half the British toll in the Blitz. In real life it is a fact that without Italian participation the Allies were held south of Rome for nine months. The territory north of the Gothic Line contained over 1/3 of the Italian population and the Allies did not acheive a breakthrough until April 20, 1945 ten days before Hitler committed suicide. It stands to reason that even a relatively poorly equipped Italian army numbering 1,700,000 could have dug in along with the Germans in a narrow mountainous front with some success given that in stark contrast to North Africa the flanks were not open and Italy was not suitable for tank warfare. In real life the Germans nearly drove the Americans into the sea at Salerno, greater success may have been acheived had the Italian units participated and had the Germans not had to put so many of their units further north to cope with Italian treason. The reason the Germans stopped delivering supplies was due to their accurate belief post coup that the Italians would betray them. Negotiations: the chances that Stalin would negotiate peace after the massive destruction Hitler inflicted on his country was near zero. The only conceivable scenario in which that occurs is if the Western Allies drop out of the war. Mussolini may have tried to negotiate peace but the Allies would have accepted nothing less than surrender, something which he would not agree to. Regardless of the Italian government's intentions, the fact is that the Allies were going to demand the entry of Allied troops into Italy for the purposes of fighting Germany. That was the whole point of the campaign.