Hi Ironmachine,
Guadalajara was only not a defeat if one chooses to overlook generally accepted definitions of "defeat". The offensive's objectives were not achieved in its own terms, losses of men and equipment were significant (and higher than those of the Republicans), the commander of the CTV was shortly replaced, Fascist Italy's military reputation dented by the manner of the Blackshirts' flight and the morale of the Republicans lifted. Certainly the Italian front ended up to 12 kilometers beyond its start line and the army's Littorio Division performed creditably, but a dent in the Republican line was not the CTV's objective and was heavily outweighed by the other factors. Guadalajara was a clear defensive success for the Republicans - perhaps their last of significance.
The subsequent propaganda defeat, while certainly beyond the CTV's control, depended on its defeat in battle for Republican propaganda to be plausible.
Certainly two or three other Nationalist spearhead corps, often largely equipped by the Italians, also tended draw on themselves the best Republican units. The CTV was one of these few, not many, such corps.
You are right that the Republicans were weak at Malaga. But the Nationalists were even more so. The fall of Malaga to the Nationalists was largely due to the presence of the CTV.
The fall of Santander to the CTV was a severe blow to the Republicans in the north as it was their main port for receiving blockade runners. After it the CTV was withdrawn and the remaining Republican positions in the north collapsed progressively over the following few months to Spanish Nationalist forces.
Certainly the CTV was not the first Nationalist corps to reach the Mediterranean coast. However, it was integral to the Nationalist offensive that achieved this.
Yup, there was no reason for the relatively well mechanized CTV to lag behind in the advance through Catalonia - and it didn't. It only failed to reach the French border in the forefront because it was halted short for political reasons.
I would agree that "the Republicans did not specifically opposed the CTV with their best troops". They often opposed the CTV with their best troops because it was often one of the major threats they faced. It was usually at or near the Nationalist offensive spearhead.
One cannot reasonably separate the CTV from its equipment. Its men did not arrive nude and would have been pretty useless if they had. What is more, not only was it unusually well equipped, but much of the entire Nationalist army was also heavily dependent on Italian weaponry.
Cheers,
Sid.
101 Italian WW2 victories & counting
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Sid Guttridge
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Ironmachine
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Re: 101 Italian WW2 victories & counting
First, a pair of points that should be considered:
Regarding Guadalajara, it is difficult to see how the CTV, which was not an elite unit in any sense, could have performed better against an enemy with more experience, better equipped (at least in some vital areas) and with air superiority. The offensive's objectives were just a wet dream, the planning of the operation was highly defficient, and the bad weather further compounded the problems faced by the Italians. However, even if Guadalajara was certainly a strategic failure, it is far from clear that it was a defeat, at least in the tactical sense. And yes, Guadalajara was certainly important for the Republicans (though it was not their last defensive success of significance), but mainly in the moral field.
Regarding the propagande defeat, it should be noted that it was completely out of proportion with the Italian military failure, which clearly shows that it did not depended on a defeat to be plausible, but only on a perception of defeat, which is somewhat different.
As for Málaga, there was no way in which the Nationals were weaker there than the Republicans. You probably could not find a detailed OOB for the Republicans due to the fact that there was simply no organized force as such, but by some stimations the National troops alone that fought in the offensive besides the CTV were stronger than the Republican forces available, and regarding quality they were a universe away. The fact that Malaga was an utter chaos was acknowledged even by the Republican authorities. CTV or not CTV, Málaga was going to fall as soon as seriously attacked by the Nationals.
Now, as for the rest of you post, the arguments seem to be one and the same: the CTV was there in some big National offensives. Yes, that's obvious, but what should we do from that? It should be noted that, first, it did not fight alone in those offensives, and second, there were other offensives in which the CTV did not take part; besides, it was not employed in defensive taks. So why was the CTV used in this way? IMO, this was not born out of any special consideration for its combat prowess, but because its high level of motorization made it specially useful in offensive operations. It didn't hurt, either, that it was kind of a free asset, to be replenished without charge by the Italians. It performed reasonably well in that way, but nothing extraordinary. It should be noted that there were very few failed offensives made by the Nationals, but this number includes some in which the CTV took part.
Also, the CTV was extremely small for the standards of the war, which additionally limited its impact in the fight. For example, for the Aragón offensive it consisted of 2(+) divisions, for a total of about 24 National divisions. For the Cataluña campaign, it was just 1 of 6 corps involved, and even less important in term of divisions because even if it consisted of 4 divisions, 3 of them were "Flechas" units in which about 90% of the men were Spanish. So yes, you are right in that if the men of the CTV would have arrived nude they have been useless. You are also right in that "one cannot reasonably separate the CTV from its equipment", but on the other hand one can reasonably separate its equipment from the CTV: if their weapons and equipment would have arrived without the men, they would have been extremely useful. So at the end it is all nicely summed up in that Italians weapons were vital for the Nationals; the CTV was not.
Regarding Guadalajara, it is difficult to see how the CTV, which was not an elite unit in any sense, could have performed better against an enemy with more experience, better equipped (at least in some vital areas) and with air superiority. The offensive's objectives were just a wet dream, the planning of the operation was highly defficient, and the bad weather further compounded the problems faced by the Italians. However, even if Guadalajara was certainly a strategic failure, it is far from clear that it was a defeat, at least in the tactical sense. And yes, Guadalajara was certainly important for the Republicans (though it was not their last defensive success of significance), but mainly in the moral field.
Regarding the propagande defeat, it should be noted that it was completely out of proportion with the Italian military failure, which clearly shows that it did not depended on a defeat to be plausible, but only on a perception of defeat, which is somewhat different.
As for Málaga, there was no way in which the Nationals were weaker there than the Republicans. You probably could not find a detailed OOB for the Republicans due to the fact that there was simply no organized force as such, but by some stimations the National troops alone that fought in the offensive besides the CTV were stronger than the Republican forces available, and regarding quality they were a universe away. The fact that Malaga was an utter chaos was acknowledged even by the Republican authorities. CTV or not CTV, Málaga was going to fall as soon as seriously attacked by the Nationals.
Now, as for the rest of you post, the arguments seem to be one and the same: the CTV was there in some big National offensives. Yes, that's obvious, but what should we do from that? It should be noted that, first, it did not fight alone in those offensives, and second, there were other offensives in which the CTV did not take part; besides, it was not employed in defensive taks. So why was the CTV used in this way? IMO, this was not born out of any special consideration for its combat prowess, but because its high level of motorization made it specially useful in offensive operations. It didn't hurt, either, that it was kind of a free asset, to be replenished without charge by the Italians. It performed reasonably well in that way, but nothing extraordinary. It should be noted that there were very few failed offensives made by the Nationals, but this number includes some in which the CTV took part.
Also, the CTV was extremely small for the standards of the war, which additionally limited its impact in the fight. For example, for the Aragón offensive it consisted of 2(+) divisions, for a total of about 24 National divisions. For the Cataluña campaign, it was just 1 of 6 corps involved, and even less important in term of divisions because even if it consisted of 4 divisions, 3 of them were "Flechas" units in which about 90% of the men were Spanish. So yes, you are right in that if the men of the CTV would have arrived nude they have been useless. You are also right in that "one cannot reasonably separate the CTV from its equipment", but on the other hand one can reasonably separate its equipment from the CTV: if their weapons and equipment would have arrived without the men, they would have been extremely useful. So at the end it is all nicely summed up in that Italians weapons were vital for the Nationals; the CTV was not.
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Sid Guttridge
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Re: 101 Italian WW2 victories & counting
Hi Ironmachine,
It doesn't matter whether a military defeat is the result of a "wet dream" of an objective, attempted with inadequate resources or not. Defeat is defeat. There are few redeeming features about the Guadalajara debacle from the Italian point of view, beyond the Littorio's action in covering the flight of the Blackshirts.
I have always contended that the Republican propaganda crowing over the Italian defeat at Guadalajara massively over inflated its scale and significance. However, without a plausible Italian defeat to use as hook to hang that propaganda on, it would have been far less convincing. The Italians are partly responsible for the scale of the Republican propaganda victory, because their own propaganda had so over inflated Italian military potential beforehand.
I would suggest that at Malaga the Nationalists were weaker than the Republicans. All the regular Nationalist units with independent offensive potential had been drawn towards the Madrid front. What made the Malaga offensive practicable was the arrival of the CTV.
Yes, I have already noted noted that the CTV mounted no other independent offensives after Guadalajara. This is another measure of its defeat there.
Yes, there were other Nationalist offensives in which the CTV did not take a full part, most notably the mopping up of northern Spain after it had captured Santander. However, even in these, and defensive battles such as the Ebro, its artillery played a significant role. The full CTV missed none of the decisive Nationalist offensives after Guadalajara, though it should be noted again that its composition became increasingly Spanish.
Absolutely, "Italians weapons were vital for the Nationals; the CTV was not." But then nobody has claimed that the CTV was vital. My point is that the single defeat at Guadalajara has overshadowed the CTV's otherwise consistent run of successes before and after. The Italians performed much better in Spain than they are given credit for and were usually at or near the centre of Nationalist offensive successes. As a result, they often found themselves opposed by some of the best Republican units.
Cheers,
Sid.
It doesn't matter whether a military defeat is the result of a "wet dream" of an objective, attempted with inadequate resources or not. Defeat is defeat. There are few redeeming features about the Guadalajara debacle from the Italian point of view, beyond the Littorio's action in covering the flight of the Blackshirts.
I have always contended that the Republican propaganda crowing over the Italian defeat at Guadalajara massively over inflated its scale and significance. However, without a plausible Italian defeat to use as hook to hang that propaganda on, it would have been far less convincing. The Italians are partly responsible for the scale of the Republican propaganda victory, because their own propaganda had so over inflated Italian military potential beforehand.
I would suggest that at Malaga the Nationalists were weaker than the Republicans. All the regular Nationalist units with independent offensive potential had been drawn towards the Madrid front. What made the Malaga offensive practicable was the arrival of the CTV.
Yes, I have already noted noted that the CTV mounted no other independent offensives after Guadalajara. This is another measure of its defeat there.
Yes, there were other Nationalist offensives in which the CTV did not take a full part, most notably the mopping up of northern Spain after it had captured Santander. However, even in these, and defensive battles such as the Ebro, its artillery played a significant role. The full CTV missed none of the decisive Nationalist offensives after Guadalajara, though it should be noted again that its composition became increasingly Spanish.
Absolutely, "Italians weapons were vital for the Nationals; the CTV was not." But then nobody has claimed that the CTV was vital. My point is that the single defeat at Guadalajara has overshadowed the CTV's otherwise consistent run of successes before and after. The Italians performed much better in Spain than they are given credit for and were usually at or near the centre of Nationalist offensive successes. As a result, they often found themselves opposed by some of the best Republican units.
Cheers,
Sid.
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Ironmachine
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Re: 101 Italian WW2 victories & counting
Well, when one considers the circunstances, Italian performance at Guadalajara was not so bad. It was only because the expectations were so high that the results seem so poor. But it should be noted that there is also few redeeming features about the Republican performance in Guadalajara, and this did not prevent them from claiming a decisive victory.It doesn't matter whether a military defeat is the result of a "wet dream" of an objective, attempted with inadequate resources or not. Defeat is defeat. There are few redeeming features about the Guadalajara debacle from the Italian point of view, beyond the Littorio's action in covering the flight of the Blackshirts.
The Nationals were not weaker than the Republicans at Malaga. No way. I don't know what do you mean by "regular Nationalist (sic) unis with independent offensive potential"; evidently the National units there had such potential, because when the offensive began they attacked independently of the Italians. In fact, they had made successful ofensive operations in the área before the arrival of the Italians. And anyway, units from the Madrid front could have been moved to the Málaga front if needed. In that sense, the arrival of the CTV did not make the offensive practicable; at most, it only made it practicable without weakening the Madrid front.I would suggest that at Malaga the Nationalists were weaker than the Republicans. All the regular Nationalist units with independent offensive potential had been drawn towards the Madrid front. What made the Malaga offensive practicable was the arrival of the CTV.
No. It is a measure of, first, the Italians realizing that there was a war, and not a parade, going on and second, of the Spanish command obtaining enough political leverage to force the Italians to comply. That is, it was a measure of their embarrassment, not of their defeat. Or simply it was due to the fact that, with both armies getting stronger and bigger each day, there was no more place for one-corps offensives, especially for such a small corps as the CTV was.Yes, I have already noted noted that the CTV mounted no other independent offensives after Guadalajara. This is another measure of its defeat there.
Or other way to look at it: the fact that they were used in operations after Guadalajara is an indicator that their failure at Guadalajara was not so great.
Yes. But the point is not what, but why. For example, if their employment in those offensives is a proof of their good performance, should not their non-appearance in other operations be used as proof of bad performance?Yes, there were other Nationalist offensives in which the CTV did not take a full part, most notably the mopping up of northern Spain after it had captured Santander. However, even in these, and defensive battles such as the Ebro, its artillery played a significant role.
So which ones do you consider to be the decisive National offensive after Guadalajara?The full CTV missed none of the decisive Nationalist offensives after Guadalajara, though it should be noted again that its composition became increasingly Spanish.
And my point is that propaganda has overshadowed the CTV's performance before, after and even during the battle of Guadalajara. The National army had a consistent run of successes before and after Guadalajara, and the CTV just went along with it. The Italians usually were not at or near the centre of National defensive successes. As a result, they usually didn't find themselves opposed by an enemy with the initiative and the surprise on its side. The CTV performance before and after Guadalajara was fairly average, comparable to many Spanish units of similar size, and not extraordinary by any measure. As I don't know of any reference in which their performance is considered inferior to that of Spanish units, I think their performance has received the credit it deserves. If anything, it is the CTV's performance at Guadalajara the one that has been overshadowed by propaganda.Absolutely, "Italians weapons were vital for the Nationals; the CTV was not." But then nobody has claimed that the CTV was vital. My point is that the single defeat at Guadalajara has overshadowed the CTV's otherwise consistent run of successes before and after. The Italians performed much better in Spain than they are given credit for and were usually at or near the centre of Nationalist offensive successes. As a result, they often found themselves opposed by some of the best Republican units.
Regards.
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Sid Guttridge
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Re: 101 Italian WW2 victories & counting
Hi Ironmachine,
I don't think we are too far apart.
You wtrite, "Well, when one considers the circumstances, Italian performance at Guadalajara was not so bad. It was only because the expectations were so high that the results seem so poor." Yup. But those expectations and ambitions were thwarted emphatically. It was a defeat precisely because of this.
You write, ""But it should be noted that there is also few redeeming features about the Republican performance in Guadalajara, and this did not prevent them from claiming a decisive victory." The Republicans certainly overstated their victory, but it was a victory nonetheless. They had foiled a major offensive by a major power. They had reason to feel more than a little self satisfied.
The Nationalists had limited regular troops with serious offensive potential at the outset and these were necessarily mostly directed at Madrid, which was the key strategic objective. Certainly they could have switched such troops from Madrid (as they probably mistakenly did to relieve the Alcazar de Toledo), but why, when the CTV was available? On the Malaga front the Nationalists did not have significant offensive potential and it was the arrival of the relatively well equipped CTV that made the offensive there practicable. Of course the local Nationalists attacked at the same time as the CTV. What else would one expect? However, they were very much secondary to the CTV. The CTV was very definitely "alue added" at Malaga.
You write of the CTV's reduced role after Guadalajara, ".....it was a measure of their embarrassment, not of their defeat." No defeat, no embarassment!
The decisive Nationalist offensives after Guadalajara were (1) the reduction of the Republican enclave in the north, (2) the drive to the Mediterranean coast which split the rump Republic in two, and (3) the clearing of Catalonia, which cost the Republic its best residual units and severed overland links with the outside world. The CTV had a central role in all of them.
You write, "The National army had a consistent run of successes before and after Guadalajara, and the CTV just went along with it." What about their repulse from Madrid, which turned a single campaign into a three-year civil war?
"You write, "The Italians usually were not at or near the centre of National defensive successes." The CTV as a whole wasn't, but its artillery certainly was.
You write, "As a result, they usually didn't find themselves opposed by an enemy with the initiative and the surprise on its side." True. So no failures to be reported from this angle then.
You write, "The CTV performance before and after Guadalajara was fairly average, comparable to many Spanish units of similar size, and not extraordinary by any measure." Firstly, nobody has claimed that the CTV's performance "was extraordinary by any measure". Just that the Guadalajara defeat has tended to overshadow consistent later successes.
But no, the CTV's performance was not average by local standards. Most divisions on either side were too poorly equipped and trained to have much offensive potential at all. Offensive operations on both sides were spearheaded by a comparitively small proportion of each army. The CTV was one of these formations with offensive potential. Nobody, as far as I am aware, has claimed it was better than the few other Nationalist formations with significant offensive potential, but it was not "average" by general Spanish Civil War standards.
The real defeat at Guadalajara has tended to obscure the consistent run of success enjoyed by the CTV before and after. Certainly its opposition was limited at Malaga and it was only part of wider Nationalist offensives after Guadalajara, but the essential point remains - the CTV performed better in the Spanish Civil War than is generally acknowledged, largely because defeat at Guadalajara on the ground and in the post battle propaganda struggle has obscured its other activities.
Cheers,
Sid.
I don't think we are too far apart.
You wtrite, "Well, when one considers the circumstances, Italian performance at Guadalajara was not so bad. It was only because the expectations were so high that the results seem so poor." Yup. But those expectations and ambitions were thwarted emphatically. It was a defeat precisely because of this.
You write, ""But it should be noted that there is also few redeeming features about the Republican performance in Guadalajara, and this did not prevent them from claiming a decisive victory." The Republicans certainly overstated their victory, but it was a victory nonetheless. They had foiled a major offensive by a major power. They had reason to feel more than a little self satisfied.
The Nationalists had limited regular troops with serious offensive potential at the outset and these were necessarily mostly directed at Madrid, which was the key strategic objective. Certainly they could have switched such troops from Madrid (as they probably mistakenly did to relieve the Alcazar de Toledo), but why, when the CTV was available? On the Malaga front the Nationalists did not have significant offensive potential and it was the arrival of the relatively well equipped CTV that made the offensive there practicable. Of course the local Nationalists attacked at the same time as the CTV. What else would one expect? However, they were very much secondary to the CTV. The CTV was very definitely "alue added" at Malaga.
You write of the CTV's reduced role after Guadalajara, ".....it was a measure of their embarrassment, not of their defeat." No defeat, no embarassment!
The decisive Nationalist offensives after Guadalajara were (1) the reduction of the Republican enclave in the north, (2) the drive to the Mediterranean coast which split the rump Republic in two, and (3) the clearing of Catalonia, which cost the Republic its best residual units and severed overland links with the outside world. The CTV had a central role in all of them.
You write, "The National army had a consistent run of successes before and after Guadalajara, and the CTV just went along with it." What about their repulse from Madrid, which turned a single campaign into a three-year civil war?
"You write, "The Italians usually were not at or near the centre of National defensive successes." The CTV as a whole wasn't, but its artillery certainly was.
You write, "As a result, they usually didn't find themselves opposed by an enemy with the initiative and the surprise on its side." True. So no failures to be reported from this angle then.
You write, "The CTV performance before and after Guadalajara was fairly average, comparable to many Spanish units of similar size, and not extraordinary by any measure." Firstly, nobody has claimed that the CTV's performance "was extraordinary by any measure". Just that the Guadalajara defeat has tended to overshadow consistent later successes.
But no, the CTV's performance was not average by local standards. Most divisions on either side were too poorly equipped and trained to have much offensive potential at all. Offensive operations on both sides were spearheaded by a comparitively small proportion of each army. The CTV was one of these formations with offensive potential. Nobody, as far as I am aware, has claimed it was better than the few other Nationalist formations with significant offensive potential, but it was not "average" by general Spanish Civil War standards.
The real defeat at Guadalajara has tended to obscure the consistent run of success enjoyed by the CTV before and after. Certainly its opposition was limited at Malaga and it was only part of wider Nationalist offensives after Guadalajara, but the essential point remains - the CTV performed better in the Spanish Civil War than is generally acknowledged, largely because defeat at Guadalajara on the ground and in the post battle propaganda struggle has obscured its other activities.
Cheers,
Sid.
Re: 101 Italian WW2 victories & counting
When it comes to CTV, it should be compared with other foreign units in Spanish Civil War. If we take CTV as an average unit, we can say that it was not particularly good but not that bad either. I think that it filled its task in Nationalist Army by taking responsability of some parts of front, which otherwise would have required other Nationalist units. In every case CTV performed better than the Irish Brigade of O´Duffys blueshirts!
Comparing CTV with International Brigades at the other side could be interesting. I´m still not sure how to evaluate the fighting performance of International Brigades - were they better than Spanish Republican units or just average or even worse? The command of International Brigades was not at good level - their commanding officers made repeated mistakes of same type, wasted men. AFAIK many of commanding officers of International Brigades were selected by political standards, not by their military abilities. I do not believe that the commanding officers of CTV were worse.
What I hope to learn more is about the performance of Aviazione Legionaria and compare it to Legion Condor/Aviación Nacional. Also a comparison with Republican Air Force could make sense - my guess is that Aviazione Legionaria was at least as good in performance if not better. AFAIK, Aviazione Legionaria played a underestimated role in air war in Spanish Civil War and it was as important as Legion Condor. I do not trust in German statements 100 % when it comes to their Spanish and Italian allies. Germans suffered of certain "superiority complex" which later in WW2 would prove fatal to them. Günther Lützow wrote in his diary in 1937 about the attitude of many of his compatriots in Spain: "...again that wrong arrogance!"
Comparing CTV with International Brigades at the other side could be interesting. I´m still not sure how to evaluate the fighting performance of International Brigades - were they better than Spanish Republican units or just average or even worse? The command of International Brigades was not at good level - their commanding officers made repeated mistakes of same type, wasted men. AFAIK many of commanding officers of International Brigades were selected by political standards, not by their military abilities. I do not believe that the commanding officers of CTV were worse.
What I hope to learn more is about the performance of Aviazione Legionaria and compare it to Legion Condor/Aviación Nacional. Also a comparison with Republican Air Force could make sense - my guess is that Aviazione Legionaria was at least as good in performance if not better. AFAIK, Aviazione Legionaria played a underestimated role in air war in Spanish Civil War and it was as important as Legion Condor. I do not trust in German statements 100 % when it comes to their Spanish and Italian allies. Germans suffered of certain "superiority complex" which later in WW2 would prove fatal to them. Günther Lützow wrote in his diary in 1937 about the attitude of many of his compatriots in Spain: "...again that wrong arrogance!"
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Sid Guttridge
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Re: 101 Italian WW2 victories & counting
Hi durb,
There were no other similar foreign units on either side. The Germans supplied a much smaller number of specialist regular army units, the Russians poured in large numbers of specialist advisers, while the International Brigades arrived as weaponless volunteer individuals from everywhere. Only the Italians made a mass deployment able to play a significant role at the front.
You write, "I think that it filled its task in Nationalist Army by taking responsability of some parts of front, which otherwise would have required other Nationalist units." This, I would suggest, is not the case. The CTV was not a front-filler. It was introduced for specific offensive operations.
Cheers,
Sid.
There were no other similar foreign units on either side. The Germans supplied a much smaller number of specialist regular army units, the Russians poured in large numbers of specialist advisers, while the International Brigades arrived as weaponless volunteer individuals from everywhere. Only the Italians made a mass deployment able to play a significant role at the front.
You write, "I think that it filled its task in Nationalist Army by taking responsability of some parts of front, which otherwise would have required other Nationalist units." This, I would suggest, is not the case. The CTV was not a front-filler. It was introduced for specific offensive operations.
Cheers,
Sid.
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Ironmachine
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Re: 101 Italian WW2 victories & counting
Hi Sid,
About Guadalajara: a battle in which you fight a stronger enemy, gain territory and your losses are at most similar to those of the enemy is not a defeat. Now, if you have been boasting right and left that you were going to win the war with a single stroke, and you end just making a small dent in the enemy front, some of your units just ran away, and an underequipped allied unit on your flank gets better results than you, you can reasonable feel defeated; it is much less reasonable that your opponent feels victorious unless he has a very poor opinion of his own capacity, but that's another problem.
About Málaga: I can't see why you keep saying that the Spanish units in the Málaga front had no offensive potential. It is evident that when the offensive started, they went on the offensive. In fact, they have been on the offensive previously to the arrival of the Italians, and with success. You are right in that most (not all) of the "best" Spanish units (those from the Ejército de África) were around Madrid, but other units also had "offensive potential". For example, the Brigada Marzo that at Guadalajara outperformed the CTV had no infantry units from the Ejército de África...
So the CTV in Málaga added no offensive potential that was lacking in the Spanish troops already there. It added numbers that made the offensive easier, but no special capacity that was not possible with just Spanish troops.
Certainly, the CTV took part in some decisive Nationalist offensives after Guadalajara, though the Italian role in those campaigns was less important than you say. But, anyway, this participation can not be taken as indication of the quality of its performance, because in that case the fact that it was employed after Guadalajara would mean that its performance there was better than you think, and it not being employed in other operations would mean that its performance was at least expected to be inferior to that of Spanish units, and the employment of its artillery but not its infantry in other operations would mean that the Spanish had serious doubts about the Italian infantry value (remember the Spanish popular perception about the CTV: "¡Menos cañones y más cojones!".)+
As I said previously, there were good reasons other than its performance to employ the CTV in offensive operations. It's true that if its performance in such operations would have been no good, it probably would have excluded from further participation, and its performance was generally good.
You are right in that the CTV was not average in terms of equipment. However, its performance in each of the campaigns in which it took part was no better than one had reason to expect of a superbly equipped (by SCW standards) motorized formation, and in Guadalajara it was much worse, though considering the circunstances it was not so bad as it is usually told.
There was no consistent run of successes enjoyed by the CTV before Guadalajara: they only fought at Málaga, and it was in cooperation with Spanish units. There was also no consistent run of successes enjoyed by the CTV after Guadalajara, but a consistent run of successes enjoyed by that National Army in which the CTV was a (minor) part. In these campaigns, even a growing proportion of the CTV was Spanish.
IMO, it is not that the CTV is said to have performed worse in the Spanish Civil War than it really did, but just that it is generally ignored but for Guadalajara. Being, as I said previously, that Guadalajara was the only offensive in which the CTV fought more or less independently (Málaga could qualify, but the opposition there was ridiculous, something acknowledged by both sides), there is a good reason to single it out when talking about the CTV's performance, and its performance there was better than is generally acknowledged. Now, I agree that the CTV performed far better in other campaigns that at Guadalajara (it would have been really difficult to perform worse); however, when those other campaigns are considered there is little point in studying its performance separatedly from that of the cooperating Spanish units. In that sense, I have never seen the CTV's performance undervalued in any serious Spanish work. Maybe the situation is different in English-language studies.
Regards.
About Guadalajara: a battle in which you fight a stronger enemy, gain territory and your losses are at most similar to those of the enemy is not a defeat. Now, if you have been boasting right and left that you were going to win the war with a single stroke, and you end just making a small dent in the enemy front, some of your units just ran away, and an underequipped allied unit on your flank gets better results than you, you can reasonable feel defeated; it is much less reasonable that your opponent feels victorious unless he has a very poor opinion of his own capacity, but that's another problem.
About Málaga: I can't see why you keep saying that the Spanish units in the Málaga front had no offensive potential. It is evident that when the offensive started, they went on the offensive. In fact, they have been on the offensive previously to the arrival of the Italians, and with success. You are right in that most (not all) of the "best" Spanish units (those from the Ejército de África) were around Madrid, but other units also had "offensive potential". For example, the Brigada Marzo that at Guadalajara outperformed the CTV had no infantry units from the Ejército de África...
So the CTV in Málaga added no offensive potential that was lacking in the Spanish troops already there. It added numbers that made the offensive easier, but no special capacity that was not possible with just Spanish troops.
Certainly, the CTV took part in some decisive Nationalist offensives after Guadalajara, though the Italian role in those campaigns was less important than you say. But, anyway, this participation can not be taken as indication of the quality of its performance, because in that case the fact that it was employed after Guadalajara would mean that its performance there was better than you think, and it not being employed in other operations would mean that its performance was at least expected to be inferior to that of Spanish units, and the employment of its artillery but not its infantry in other operations would mean that the Spanish had serious doubts about the Italian infantry value (remember the Spanish popular perception about the CTV: "¡Menos cañones y más cojones!".)+
As I said previously, there were good reasons other than its performance to employ the CTV in offensive operations. It's true that if its performance in such operations would have been no good, it probably would have excluded from further participation, and its performance was generally good.
You are right in that the CTV was not average in terms of equipment. However, its performance in each of the campaigns in which it took part was no better than one had reason to expect of a superbly equipped (by SCW standards) motorized formation, and in Guadalajara it was much worse, though considering the circunstances it was not so bad as it is usually told.
There was no consistent run of successes enjoyed by the CTV before Guadalajara: they only fought at Málaga, and it was in cooperation with Spanish units. There was also no consistent run of successes enjoyed by the CTV after Guadalajara, but a consistent run of successes enjoyed by that National Army in which the CTV was a (minor) part. In these campaigns, even a growing proportion of the CTV was Spanish.
IMO, it is not that the CTV is said to have performed worse in the Spanish Civil War than it really did, but just that it is generally ignored but for Guadalajara. Being, as I said previously, that Guadalajara was the only offensive in which the CTV fought more or less independently (Málaga could qualify, but the opposition there was ridiculous, something acknowledged by both sides), there is a good reason to single it out when talking about the CTV's performance, and its performance there was better than is generally acknowledged. Now, I agree that the CTV performed far better in other campaigns that at Guadalajara (it would have been really difficult to perform worse); however, when those other campaigns are considered there is little point in studying its performance separatedly from that of the cooperating Spanish units. In that sense, I have never seen the CTV's performance undervalued in any serious Spanish work. Maybe the situation is different in English-language studies.
Regards.
Re: 101 Italian WW2 victories & counting
Now the more difficult question: did Italy win in the Spanish Civil War or did it invest more than it gained from its participation?
There is no doubt that the laurels of victory were gained by CTV and Aviazione Legionaria when the war in Spain ended in Nationalist victory.
However, I have read that the Italian war investments in SCW were heavy and led to serious minus balance in state budget. Germans got better bargain by making sure that they would have access to raw materials in Spain. What did Italy get besides the glory of victory - did they have similar arrangements with Franco´s government as Germany?
Thinking it from Franco´s perspective he paid much more acceptable price for Italian/German (and specially Italian) support than what the Republican government had to pay for Soviet support. It is noteworthy that neither Italy or Germany tried seriously mess in the domestic politics of Nationalist Spain (again compare this to the Soviets and Republican Spain). One might think that Franco was not grateful enough to Italians during WWII, but there is no doubt that for Spain the best option was to remain "non-belligerent" in WWII. What Franco paid to Italians (and Germans) was probably all that he could afford to pay to them (when governing a country in ruins after Civil War).
There is no doubt that the laurels of victory were gained by CTV and Aviazione Legionaria when the war in Spain ended in Nationalist victory.
However, I have read that the Italian war investments in SCW were heavy and led to serious minus balance in state budget. Germans got better bargain by making sure that they would have access to raw materials in Spain. What did Italy get besides the glory of victory - did they have similar arrangements with Franco´s government as Germany?
Thinking it from Franco´s perspective he paid much more acceptable price for Italian/German (and specially Italian) support than what the Republican government had to pay for Soviet support. It is noteworthy that neither Italy or Germany tried seriously mess in the domestic politics of Nationalist Spain (again compare this to the Soviets and Republican Spain). One might think that Franco was not grateful enough to Italians during WWII, but there is no doubt that for Spain the best option was to remain "non-belligerent" in WWII. What Franco paid to Italians (and Germans) was probably all that he could afford to pay to them (when governing a country in ruins after Civil War).
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Sid Guttridge
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Re: 101 Italian WW2 victories & counting
Hi durb,
Italy made a major investment in the Spanish Civil War and was arguably more influential on its outcome than any outside power, including Germany. The CTV was only a part of this investment.
However, the Italian contribution was particularly influential early on. At one stage in 1937, around 70% of Nationalist artillery pieces were reportedly of Italian origin. This later fell to 50% or lower. By contrast, Germany was more influential at the end as it introduced a range of new weaponry, especially in the air, that Italy could not match qualitatively and Berlin took the laurels. For example, the production of Spanish iron ore mines, which Mussolini badly wanted for his own rearmament, ended up largely being contracted to Germany.
Yes, Italy expended a lot of resources, including a measurable proportion of its artillery, in Spain, and this, and its other adventures in Ethiopia and Albania, meant the country entered WWII short of resources of all kinds.
Cheers,
Sid.
Italy made a major investment in the Spanish Civil War and was arguably more influential on its outcome than any outside power, including Germany. The CTV was only a part of this investment.
However, the Italian contribution was particularly influential early on. At one stage in 1937, around 70% of Nationalist artillery pieces were reportedly of Italian origin. This later fell to 50% or lower. By contrast, Germany was more influential at the end as it introduced a range of new weaponry, especially in the air, that Italy could not match qualitatively and Berlin took the laurels. For example, the production of Spanish iron ore mines, which Mussolini badly wanted for his own rearmament, ended up largely being contracted to Germany.
Yes, Italy expended a lot of resources, including a measurable proportion of its artillery, in Spain, and this, and its other adventures in Ethiopia and Albania, meant the country entered WWII short of resources of all kinds.
Cheers,
Sid.
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Sid Guttridge
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Re: 101 Italian WW2 victories & counting
Hi Ironmachine,
You write, "a battle in which you fight a stronger enemy, gain territory and your losses are at most similar to those of the enemy is not a defeat."
It was not the aim of the Italians to fight a stronger enemy. It was not the aim of the Italians to make an insignificant dent in the enemy's line and it was not the aim of the Italians to suffer losses similar to the enemy. These are just the unfortunate consequences of defeat.
The Italians hoped to mount a surprise attack against a much weaker enemy, break through and by speed of movement (guerra celere?) descend on Madrid from the rear in concert with a Nationalist assault from the south. They achieved none of these things, were repulsed with loss having failed to gain any ground of strategic significance.
The Italians set their own goals and these are what defeat or victory must be measured against. They failed in these goals with loss. This is defeat by any rational standard.
There are some sound reasons for the Italian defeat. We can discuss the role of the weather in restricting Italian air and ground movement early on, or why the Nationalists did not mount their planned southern attack, thereby allowing most of the best Republican formations to concentrate against CTV.
But the fact remains that Guadalajara was an Italian defeat.
It just wasn't the scale of defeat that Republican propaganda successfully portrayed it as.
Cheers,
Sid.
You write, "a battle in which you fight a stronger enemy, gain territory and your losses are at most similar to those of the enemy is not a defeat."
It was not the aim of the Italians to fight a stronger enemy. It was not the aim of the Italians to make an insignificant dent in the enemy's line and it was not the aim of the Italians to suffer losses similar to the enemy. These are just the unfortunate consequences of defeat.
The Italians hoped to mount a surprise attack against a much weaker enemy, break through and by speed of movement (guerra celere?) descend on Madrid from the rear in concert with a Nationalist assault from the south. They achieved none of these things, were repulsed with loss having failed to gain any ground of strategic significance.
The Italians set their own goals and these are what defeat or victory must be measured against. They failed in these goals with loss. This is defeat by any rational standard.
There are some sound reasons for the Italian defeat. We can discuss the role of the weather in restricting Italian air and ground movement early on, or why the Nationalists did not mount their planned southern attack, thereby allowing most of the best Republican formations to concentrate against CTV.
But the fact remains that Guadalajara was an Italian defeat.
It just wasn't the scale of defeat that Republican propaganda successfully portrayed it as.
Cheers,
Sid.
Re: 101 Italian WW2 victories & counting
Well, the Guadalajara question has perhaps gone too far in this thread. Maybe we should discuss it more in SCW section.
If we go to WW2, I think that some attention should be given to East African campaign. Strategically it was a lost enclave already in 1940 as Italian forces were not able to mount successfull attack in North Africa.
It was a campaign that could not be won, but the little I know about this is that it was a some kind of "glorious defeat". I think that Italians managed in East Africa to do the best of their abilities - thus East African "pocket" could hold surprisingly long time. Italian Air Forces in East Africa flew as long as they could and had also some success in aereal combat. One notable Italian flyer was Mario Visintini: http://surfcity.kund.dalnet.se/italy_visintini.htm
The occupation of British Somaliland is not important in this context (although one of Italian WW2 victories) but the way how Italians managed to prolong the war in East Africa.
If we go to WW2, I think that some attention should be given to East African campaign. Strategically it was a lost enclave already in 1940 as Italian forces were not able to mount successfull attack in North Africa.
It was a campaign that could not be won, but the little I know about this is that it was a some kind of "glorious defeat". I think that Italians managed in East Africa to do the best of their abilities - thus East African "pocket" could hold surprisingly long time. Italian Air Forces in East Africa flew as long as they could and had also some success in aereal combat. One notable Italian flyer was Mario Visintini: http://surfcity.kund.dalnet.se/italy_visintini.htm
The occupation of British Somaliland is not important in this context (although one of Italian WW2 victories) but the way how Italians managed to prolong the war in East Africa.
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Ironmachine
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Re: 101 Italian WW2 victories & counting
Italy was seen with reticence by the Spanish because the Italian area of interest was partially coincident with the Spain's own area of interest; Italian interest in the Balearic Islands was particularly problematic. That was not a problem with Germany.durb wrote:However, I have read that the Italian war investments in SCW were heavy and led to serious minus balance in state budget. Germans got better bargain by making sure that they would have access to raw materials in Spain. What did Italy get besides the glory of victory - did they have similar arrangements with Franco´s government as Germany?
Thinking it from Franco´s perspective he paid much more acceptable price for Italian/German (and specially Italian) support than what the Republican government had to pay for Soviet support. It is noteworthy that neither Italy or Germany tried seriously mess in the domestic politics of Nationalist Spain (again compare this to the Soviets and Republican Spain). One might think that Franco was not grateful enough to Italians during WWII, but there is no doubt that for Spain the best option was to remain "non-belligerent" in WWII. What Franco paid to Italians (and Germans) was probably all that he could afford to pay to them (when governing a country in ruins after Civil War).
Italy did make a major investment in the Spanish Civil War and was paid for it, but Germany was clever in negotiations and obtained better conditions. And once World War II began, it quickly became evident that the real power was Germany, not Italy.
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Ironmachine
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Re: 101 Italian WW2 victories & counting
Hi Sid,
If we are to measure victory against the goals set by each side in a given battle, there would be few victories in history. Many battles would be defeats for both sides, which is in itself rather contradictory. Victory or defeat should be considered with regards to the actual results of a given battle. The objectives set by each side should be considered to estimate the level of their victory/defeat, but not for establishing whether it was such.
In fact, in many battles is perfectly possible that one side (or even both) did not have any previous goals. Or, given that no plan survives the first contact with the enemy, goals would change during the battle. Are we going to measure victory against the initial goals, the middle goals, or the final goals?
The Italians in Guadalajara attacked a much weaker enemy, break through and advanced. The enemy, with unprecedented speed, brought stronger forces and counterattacked, partially repelling the Italians but not recovering all the terrain they had lost. It would be interesting if you could state which were the Republican goals so that, following your method, we can measure their "victory" against them.
There is no "fact" in claiming that Guadalajara was an Italian defeat. It just was because Italian achievements in the battle were ridiculous that it was a strategic and moral failure, but tactically it was a different thing.
Regards.
If we are to measure victory against the goals set by each side in a given battle, there would be few victories in history. Many battles would be defeats for both sides, which is in itself rather contradictory. Victory or defeat should be considered with regards to the actual results of a given battle. The objectives set by each side should be considered to estimate the level of their victory/defeat, but not for establishing whether it was such.
In fact, in many battles is perfectly possible that one side (or even both) did not have any previous goals. Or, given that no plan survives the first contact with the enemy, goals would change during the battle. Are we going to measure victory against the initial goals, the middle goals, or the final goals?
The Italians in Guadalajara attacked a much weaker enemy, break through and advanced. The enemy, with unprecedented speed, brought stronger forces and counterattacked, partially repelling the Italians but not recovering all the terrain they had lost. It would be interesting if you could state which were the Republican goals so that, following your method, we can measure their "victory" against them.
There is no "fact" in claiming that Guadalajara was an Italian defeat. It just was because Italian achievements in the battle were ridiculous that it was a strategic and moral failure, but tactically it was a different thing.
Regards.
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Ironmachine
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Re: 101 Italian WW2 victories & counting
However, that depended on the branch considered. For their rearmament plans after the war, the Spanish Air Force wanted German aircraft models (but circunstances still made the CR.32 the only combat aircraft produced immediatly after the war); on the other hand, the Spanish Navy dedided mainly for Italian designs. However, all those plans came to nothing.Sid Guttridge wrote:By contrast, Germany was more influential at the end as it introduced a range of new weaponry, especially in the air, that Italy could not match qualitatively and Berlin took the laurels.