101 Italian WW2 victories & counting

[durb]

I think that Italians preferred the manouverability and open cockpit visibility too much. They expected the fighter combats to be old-fashioned dogfights where more nimble plane and better aerobatic master was the king. In Spain the Republican I-16 pilots probably did not use the right tactics for their faster planes (hit-and-run, avoiding dogfight). This must have given an impression that the more nimble plane survives and emerges victorious against an opponent with more speed but less manouverability. However, Italians got a cold shower when Fiat CR 42 was tested in action over the British Channel: http://surfcity.kund.dalnet.se/falco_bob.htm

It did not need to be Spitfire or Bf 109 to show the inferiority of the biplane. Hurricane was clearly better and unfortunately to Italians they would meet Hurricanes over Malta and Africa in 1940-1941. The monoplanes that Italians had were not enough developed, although Fiat G 50 had some testing and perhaps some promise in Spanish Civil War - but over British Channel the shortcomings of Fiat G 50 became visible, notably the poor range. However, Finns were quite succesfull with Fiat G 50 (although mainly against an assortment of Polikarpov planes + SB 2 and DB 3).

The Macchi 200 was the best Italian fighter by 1940 when Italy entered to war - it was probably the only Italian fighter which could really challenge British Hurricane at that time. But according to wiki Italian pilots were conservative and loved their biplanes: "In August 1939 about 30 C.200s, by then nicknamed Saetta ("Arrow"), were delivered to 10° Gruppo of 4° Stormo, stationed in North Africa. Pilots of this elite unit of the Regia Aeronautica opposed the adoption of the C.200, preferring the more manouvrable Fiat CR.42." And their prejudices were probably confirmed when the combat debut of "Saetta" ended unfavourably one to be shot down by British Gladiator. But that was due to mistakes of Saetta pilot (maybe he repeated the errors made by Republican I-16 pilots in SCW?). It was not because of his plane, which was technically much better than British biplane. But as they say: "every plane is as good as its pilot".

[Ironmachine]

although Fiat G 50 had some testing and perhaps some promise in Spanish Civil War

Hardly. They arrived on Spain in in February-March 1939, were not ready to fly until mid-March 1939, and the war ended on 1 April 1939. AFAIK they did not take part in any combat. The Spanish Air Force showed no interest at all in this model.

[durb]

Yes, the Fiat G 50 was not interesting for Spaniards if Bf 109 was available. Finns adquired Fiat G 50 in 1939 mainly because there were not other realistic options available at that time (and Finns needed some at least decent fighter with as short delivery time as possible). Without Germans Fiats would have been available more numerous and more important in Winter War (Germans blocked the transport connections through their country - that was due to Molotov-Ribbentrob pact - which was the reason why Finnish attempts to buy Bf 109 were doomed to fail). What is remarkable is that Italian and Finnish mechanics managed to make Fiat G 50 to fly and fight succesfully in arctic conditions (the Italian plane was not particularly well suited for Finnish winter conditions).

Comparing the performance of Aviazione Legionaria in Spain and Regia Aeronautica in Italian-Greek war raises some questions. Why did AL perform so well in Spain and why did RA fail to crush Greek Air Force although the odds were well at Italians side? Unfavourable weather conditions are not the only explanation as there were plenty of air combats where Italians could have showed their superiority.

"In total, from airbases bases in Albania and Puglia there were 135 Italian bombers, 151 fighters and 25 reconnaissance aircraft.

Greece could not oppose this air force on equal footing. The fighters available to the Greek Air Force included 36 PZL P24 of Polish design divided into three Squadrons. There were 9 Bloch MB.151 of French design equipping a squadron to protect Athens. Greek bombers included 9 modern French designed Potez 633 equipping, 12 Bristol Blenheim Mk I and 10 Fairey Battle Mk I. Reconnaissance units were equipped with 16 German Henschel Hs.126 and the navy had 10 Avro Ansons and 9 obsolete fighter biplanes, the Fairey IIIF. Comparing the Fiat CR 42 with main Greek fighter PZL P 24 shows that the Italian biplane was somewhat better (on the paper at least).

On paper the disparity was remarkable, not just in numbers (in fighters Italian superiority about 3:1). The modern Greek equipment such as the Potez and the Bloch were hardly available due to pilot training and limited supplies of spare parts. Thus the Regia expected to sweep the Greek Air Force in a maximum of 5 days and then concentrate its support on army operations undisrupted, however this did not happen, and until the German participation the combined Greek and British Air Forces continued to harass the Regia Aeronautica."

Of course the defense spirit makes much. One who defends his country against invader has always some "morale advantage" and it may well have made Greek pilots to "overperform" - fighting at the very maximum of their skill level. I wonder what Italian soldiers and pilots thought about invading Greece - was it well motivated war for them? But that does not explain the problem - if AL in Spain showed the Italian pilots perform well, how could they not deal easily with the Greeks? Of course this does not mean that the performance of RA would have been utterly bad - if one studies the air combats, they managed to inflict considerable losses both to Greeks and RAF auxiliary force. I would say that they performed better than the Soviets against Finns (although Soviets had about 2350 planes concentrated against the 114 of Finns when Winter War started).

Here is an episode showing that Italians could perform sometimes very well in air: "on 8th of February 1941 fifteen (!) Greek fighters attacked against a lone two-engine Italian bomber, which, thanks to the skills of its pilot and the inexperience of the Greek pilots, managed to escape safe and sound."

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi durb,

The weather was the main obstacle to the Italians in the air. The invasion began on 28 October but, as I understand it, the first air operations in support could only be mounted on 1 November. If the Italians really intended to knock the Greek Air Force out in five days, they had lost surprise and had just that one day left to meet their schedule. As the RAF began to arrive in Greece from 6 November, the window of opportunity for the Italians to fly effectively unopposed operations in the air was small, even if they had destroyed the Royal Hellenic Air Force to schedule.

The weather also led to much overscoring on both sides. Post war checks of actual Italian losses showed that the RAF, for example, overclaimed threefold in Greece in 1940-41.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Ironmachine]

Had the CTV's equipment arrived without the men, the Nationalists would have to have found 35,000 extra men to use it. The CTV's men were a significant asset to the Nationalists in 1937, adding some 10% to their numerical strength when they were significantly outnumbered.

The original argument was about the Malaga campaign, so no 35,000, just 15,000 will do. And yes, the CTV's men were a significant asset to the Nationals, but the CTV's men were not irreplaceable; their weapons were.

However, that is irrelevant. We are discussing the CTV as it existed, not as it did not exist. Doubtless 35,000 German regulars could have used the same equipment better, but they didn't exist either.

Discussing the CTV should include discussing its performance, which is what I'm discussing.

My point is that the defeat of Guadalajara, and the effective propaganda use made of it by the Republicans, has dominated the image of the CTV ever since and has obscured its successes elsewhere in Spain. It was arguably decisive at Malaga, thereby being highly influential in securing the Nationalists their first major Mediterranean sea port. It was the force that entered Santander, the main seaport used by Republican blockade runners to supply their enclave in the north. It was an important component in the Nationalist drive to the Mediterranean which cut the Republic in two again. It also took a full part in the clearance of Catalonia until ordered to halt short of the French border for political reasons. Its artillery was influential beyond these offensive operations in supporting Nationalist defenders on the Ebro. Yer all of these combined get less coverage than the single reverse at Guadalajara, which was the nearest it got to an independent operation..

Its successes elsewhere were not its own, but successes of National forces of which the CTV was just a part. When talking about the CTV specifically, it makes much more sense to study the battle of Guadalajara, an operation that was planned and executed by the CTV as an independent force, than those other operations in which it was closely integrated in the general National effort. After all, if there was no particular quality of "CTV-edness", there is no need for a particular coverage of the CTV in operations on which it was just a part of the forces employed. Then, we can say that Guadalajara has dominated the image of the SCW, not just that of the CTV. But that's mainly for "political" reasons: probably the most "well known" battles of the SCW all around the world are Guadalajara and El Ebro (and for this last one just the Republican offensive, not the National counteroffensive), battles in which the EPR can be shown in a better light than usually.

I agree that the CTV, or at least the Army elements of it, performed better than they are generally credited for at Guadalajara, but this doesn't stop it being a defeat.

Strategically, yes. Tactically, no.

[Ironmachine]

I continue:

You wrote, "You are making an argument about troop availability, not about troop performance." Yup. I never claimed the CTV was a military elite, just that, Guadalajara aside, its other, lesser known, operations were all successful.

Its other operations were not "its" operations, but operations in which it took part, many times as a minor component. All CTV operations, Guadalajara aside, were part of wider National Army operations. Usually the CTV was a minority presence, though in occasion its formations were disproportionally influential. However, it was due to the fact that the CTV was always far better motorized, armored and artillery-supported than Spanish units.
And, no, not all "its" other, lesser known, operations were successful, at least if we follow your criterion.

No major Nationalist offensive operations took place without it after Guadalajara...

That's simply not true.

I do not find it at all plausible that "the fact that the Nationals were outnumbered was never a problema for them." Particularly at the beginning, when they were largely reliant on the 35,000 man Army of Africa for the key offensive operation against Madrid, numbers were a real problem. The CTV, also 35,000 strong at its peak, arrived at just this time.

Well, particularly at the beginning, they made the most spectacular advances. Taking Madrid was despendent on a Republican moral break down, and failing that it would have been just equally unfeasible even with the Nationals not being outnumbered, unless they could have achieved a massive numerical superiority, someting that was simply impossible. The CTV did not solve the problem, and that's why the CTV was not employed directly against Madrid. Guadalara was intended to obtain the surrender of Madrid by an indirect approach, not by direct assault.
In fact, the National Army, even with the CTV, was outnumbered probably until the fall of Cataluña. That was never a big problem for the rebels, and never prevented them from having the initiative in the war.
The Nationals did not ask for the CTV, they asked for Italian weapons. Had the Italian weapons arrived alone, they would have been unvaluable; had the Italians arrived without weapons they would have been useless; the arrival of the men with the weapons forming the CTV was a bonus asset, but it created problems of its own. Anyway, equipment was always the limiting factor for the growth of the National forces , not the men. We should remeber here that when after Guadalajara the CTV was much reduced in size, the National Army, outnumbered as it was, showed no concern about it.
In fact, if the Nationals were outnumbered it was simply because the Republicans opted for putting in the frontline as many units as possible, even if that resulted in them being undertrained and, above all, underequipped. It didn't made them much good. The Nationals opted for having less units, but better equipped; they could have used the same strategy that the Republicans, though.

You post, "The real question is whether the performance of the CTV could have been matched or even improved by Spanish units with that same level of equipment. My opinion is that it could have been." Well, no, that is your real question, not mine. It is entirely possible that Spanish troops could have used much of the CTV's equipment as well as the Italians fairly quickly, given how poor the Blackshirts often were. Indeed, the infantry of the three Flecha divisions became increasingly Spanish after Guadalajara.

Yes, CTV's performance being unremarkable is my point. If it not yours, there is not much to discuss, then.

But I again come back to the point that I, at least, am talking about the real world activities of the CTV as it actually existed, not your "what-if" alternative.

I'm also talking about the real world activities of the CTV, which were never more than what should be reasonably expected from a superbly armed and motorized unit, usually fighting against much less well equipped units.

I can't really see Guadalajara as even "a small tactical victory" for the CTV. It made quick early progress over ground of no major significance against weak opposition, but when the two main forces clashed it lost half its early gains and about 15% of its artillery. Only the intervention of the Italian Army's Littorio Division prevented a complete rout of the Blackshirt divisions. If you are looking for a redeeming tactical feature within the overall defeat, this is probably it.

Well, I can. The CTV made quick early progress, and when counterattacked by a stronger enemy it retained half its early gains, caused more casualties than it suffered, and stopped the enemy assault, even recovering some terrain lost earlier.

You ask "what were the Republican objectives in this battle"? The Republicans did not initiate the battle, so their main aim was to foil the Italian aims. This they did effectively. The Italians were not only stopped in their tracks, but pushed back with loss.

That was not the Republican objective in this battle, it's just your idea of their objective. Anyway, if their main aim was to foil the Italian aims, there was no need at all for the Republican counterattack to recover "ground of no major significance". Simply stopping the Italian advance, something that probably the weather alone would have done by itself, would have been enough.

Doubtless the Republicans would have liked to achieve more, but who wouldn't? They had every reason to be satisfied with the result as it stood and sensibly did not turn it into a long battle of attrition. Instead they regrouped nearer Madrid.

No, not only they would have liked to achieve more, but they actually tried to. But the CTV defeated their attacks and even recovered some ground, as can be seen in Miaja's report. So clearly the Republicans did not achieve their objectives, and so following your criterion they were defeated.

You post, "Madrid was not the objective, the objective was to cut the Valencia-Madrid road which was the supply line for Madrid." Yes. But what was the point of cutting the road? I would suggest that it was to bring about the fall of Madrid.

Accuracy is important, as there are people that is surely not as knowledgeable as you. The objective is one thing, the results to be obtained from that objective are another thing.

If the Nationalists considered the little bit of ground that the CT gained at Guadalajara to be a significant springboard for further operations, they certainly never exploited it. Similarly, the Republicans never felt so threatened by it that they tried to eliminate it.

That they never exploited it is of no relevance to its importance. In the same way, that the Republicans never tried to eliminate it does not mean that they don't feel threatened by it.

Miaja does not say that the small Italian gain of ground represented a menace. He says the Guadalajara front was a menace. He is more concerned about stabilizing that front than where it stood.

Well, Miaja specifically says in his report that:

Nuestra acción ofensiva tenía que paralizarse por la razón fundamental de que nuestro flanco izquierdo no pudo progresar todo lo necesario para romper la amenaza que suponían las posiciones enemigas de aquel sector sobre las comunicaciones del resto de nuestro dispositivo.

It is quited clear that the ground hold by the Italians represented a menace for the Republicans, and those positions were not the original Italian positions but were far in advance of them in terrain conquered during the Italian offensive.
In fact, so threatening they were that the Republicans tried to conquer them, but were defeated in their effort by the Italians:

A abatir precisamente ese flanco se encaminaron nuestros ataques sobre Padilla de Hita y Copernal, que quedaron paralizados por la seria resistencia del enemigo...

On the other hand, Miaja was concerned about stabilizing that front because he recognized that the Republican forces had no further offensive capacity, and if counterattacked they could be caught in a bad position.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Ironmachine,

Please don't invent arguments where none existed. There is no argument about the number of Italians at either Malaga or Guadalajara.

Ultimately, of course the masnpower of the CTV was replaceable. We know this because that is what gradually happened after Guadalajara in its infantry. However, when it was fully available it amounted to about 10% of Nationalist manpower or about the same size as the Army of Africa. This is a significant number and however you view it, both its men and armament were unquestionably in addition to anything the Nationalist possessed.

You are welcome to discuss the CTV's performance, and I doubt we will disagree much on that. However, it was not my portrayal of its performance you were disputing.

It might be as well at this point to remind you what I originally wrote, as you seem to arguing against a number things that I never advocated and therefore don't have to defend: "The Italians did much better in the Spanish Civil War than is generally credited. With the exception of its repulse at Guadalajara, the CTV was otherwise always successful in its actions and was near the heart of almost every key Nationalist advance - and this despite the questionable quality and motivation of much of its original manpower."

Nobody has argued against the proposition that after the Guadalajara defeat the CTV took part in combined operations within the rest of the Nationalist Army. It is notable that the CTV was integral to all the later major Nationalist offensives that eventually won the war and was an asset in all of them.

I don't see any reason why other Italian operations after Guadalajara shouldn't be studied. Indeed, I would suggest that it is important for the historical record that they are, because otherwise the defeat at Guadalajara will continue to inform the Italians' reputation disproportionally.

Surely, the strategic result is the key one? Germany had tactical successes throughout both world wars, but they didn't stop it being defeated in both strategically.

But I can't even see the supposed tactical success of the Italians at Guadalajara. Despite significant human and materiel losses, they failed in their offensive's objective. Their aims were defeated. They left 15% of their artillery behind, sacked their commander, their morale fell, they began to send thousands of poorly performing Blackshirts home and submitted themselves more closely to Nationalist command thereafter.

By contrast, the defensive aims of the Republicans were essentially successful. Madrid's supply lines were protected, the city saved and morale boosted.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Sid Guttridge]

You write, "Its other operations were not "its" operations, but operations in which it took part, many times as a minor component. All CTV operations, Guadalajara aside, were part of wider National Army operations. Usually the CTV was a minority presence, though in occasion its formations were disproportionally influential. However, it was due to the fact that the CTV was always far better motorized, armored and artillery-supported than Spanish units." Nobody is arguing with that, except that the CTV's operations within the wider Nationalist offensive were still "its". "It" entered Santander. Bermeo was "its" narrow squeak, etc., etc.

You write, "And, no, not all "its" other, lesser known, operations were successful, at least if we follow your criterion." OK. Please tell us more.

If any major Nationalist operations took place without the CTV after Guadalajara, what were they? The largest operation I recall without an Italian presence was in mopping up the Republicans in the far north-west after the fall of Santander, their main supply port, to the CTV. And I don't consider this "mopping up" a major operation. They were secondary against the Basques, but present nonetheless. Their infantry missed the Ebro battle, but is artillery played a significant role, etc., etc..

The CTV was employed against Malaga, because almost all Nationalist regulares were tied down in Madrid, where the street fighting did much to allow Republican militias to counter the superior professional skills of the Army of Africa in field combat. It was a very useful addition to the overstretched Nationalist forces at an important time.

Must go in haste,

Sid.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Ironmachine,

You write, "The Nationals opted for having less units, but better equipped". I find it unlikely that the Nationalists would have foresworn getting as many men into the field as possible. The idea that any army would voluntarily give up the advantage of numbers seems unlikely. What is your evidence for this?

You write, "I'm also talking about the real world activities of the CTV, which were never more than what should be reasonably expected from a superbly armed and motorized unit, usually fighting against much less well equipped units." No, in talking about the CTV's weaponry being given to Nationalist units instead, you are entering what-if territory. If this had happened, there would have been no CTV and this discussion would not be happening, because this is a thread about Italians. Italian weaponry in the hands of the Spanish Nationalists would not be a subject for this particular thread.

You write, "The CTV made quick early progress, and when counterattacked by a stronger enemy it retained half its early gains, caused more casualties than it suffered, and stopped the enemy assault, even recovering some terrain lost earlier." (1) and most importantly, this was not the goal of the CTV's attack at Guadalajara. (2) It only retained part of even its limited gains. (3) It did not stop an enemy assault. It stopped an enemy counter-attack that was not pressed further for very sensible reasons. (4) We have no hard figures on Republican casualties, so the assertion that the Republicans suffered higher casualties is just that - an unsupported assertion.

With regard to casualties. Casualties are the currency of battle. If they achieve a goal without reaching Pyrrhic proportions, they may be considered well spent. This was what happened for the Republicans at Guadalajara. It was not what happened for the Italians. They expended their casualties without achieving their objective. They were not well spent.

You write "That was not the Republican objective in this battle, it's just your idea of their objective." You asked me a question. You can hardly object if I answer it!

OK, given that the Republicans did not initiate the battle, or even expect the battle and had therefore made no plans for it, what do propose the Republican objective was, if not to stop the Italians from achieving their objective?

You write, "Anyway, if their main aim was to foil the Italian aims, there was no need at all for the Republican counterattack to recover "ground of no major significance". Simply stopping the Italian advance, something that probably the weather alone would have done by itself, would have been enough." Errr, how could the Republicans know the Italians would come to a halt if not counter-attacked? How were they meant to predict either the weather or the Italian reaction to it? The point of a counter-attack is to seize the initiative back from the enemy. This the Republicans did most successfully. The CTV was withdrawn to lick its wounds and the Nationalists mounted no more offensives over the same ground. As far as the Republicans, who were on the defensive, were concerned, it was a mission well accomplished! For the Italians it was the reverse - a mission inadequately executed and unaccomplished.

You write, accurately, "The objective is one thing, the results to be obtained from that objective are another thing." And in this case neither was achieved by the Italians, because they were defeated.

You write, "That they (the Nationalists) never exploited it is of no relevance to its importance. In the same way, that the Republicans never tried to eliminate it does not mean that they don't feel threatened by it." I beg to differ. If the Republican side never felt inclined to retake the little ground gained left in Nationalist hands by the Italians and the Nationalists never sought to make further use of it as a later springboard, this is a good indicator that both sides considered the Italian gain as pretty insignificant for any purpose.

You write, "In fact, so threatening they were that the Republicans tried to conquer them, but were defeated in their effort by the Italians." Firstly, Miaja does not mention the Italians at all in this context. What makes you sure that Miaja isn't talking about the Spanish Nationalist division on the Italian right (his left)? Indeed, according to the map that accompanies the Miaja text you quote, "Padilla de Hita y Copernal" were in the hands of the Spanish Nationalist troops of General Moscardo, whose arrival thereby took pressure off the defeated Italians.

Of course the Republicans would like to have gone further and inflicted more damage on their enemies, but they broke the action off early without turning it into a battle of attrition for ground apparently little valued by either side.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Ironmachine]

Sid, I see no point in further discussing the relative importance of the CTV, its actual performance in combate or the battle of Guadalajara. I'm quite sure that I'm not going to convince you, and neither are you going to convince me, just by repeating the same arguments. It's a matter of opinion, and each of us has its own opinion about those subject.
However, as you have asked a pair of questions in your last post, I'm going to answer them:

You write, "And, no, not all "its" other, lesser known, operations were successful, at least if we follow your criterion." OK. Please tell us more.

The offensive against Valencia in july 1938 failed against the XYZ Line and had to be ended without reaching its objective of taking Valencia, so the Nationals failed in their offensive's objective. Their aims were defeated. By contrast, the defensive aims of the Republicans were essentially successful. Valencia was saved and Republican morale boosted. Then, following your criterion, the offensive was not successful.

If any major Nationalist operations took place without the CTV after Guadalajara, what were they? The largest operation I recall without an Italian presence was in mopping up the Republicans in the far north-west after the fall of Santander, their main supply port, to the CTV. And I don't consider this "mopping up" a major operation. They were secondary against the Basques, but present nonetheless. Their infantry missed the Ebro battle, but is artillery played a significant role, etc., etc..

Just a pair of examples:
What you describe disparagingly as "mopping up the Republicans in the far north-west after the fall of Santander" was the Ofensiva de Asturias. If Santander is a major operation for you, then Asturias should be considered no less. Asturias was not less important strategically than Santander: its industrial value was much higher than that of Santander, it had more valuable natural resources, the ports there could be equally used to resupply the Republican forces... and tactically the terrain was much more favourable for the defense. Finishing the North front would free two corps of National troops for further campaigning. The campaign lasted more than the operations in Santander, and the number of troops employed by the Nationals was similar. So if Santander is a major operation, then Asturias should also be considered as such. And the CTV took no part in this campaign.
The operation known as "cierre de la bolsa de La Serena", a major operation involving about eight National divisions that the conquered an important area of about 2.700 km² with a significant agricultural and cattle wealth, and a few thousands prisoners were captured. However, its main strategic importance came from the fact that the Republican territory there advanced into the National positions and was the perfect launching point for a Republican operation intended to reach the Portuguese border and cut the National territory in two, operation that was indeed planned by the Republican high command; the conquered area put the border at a secure distance from the new Republican positions. So another major operation without CTV involvement.

[durb]

Although interrupting the CTV discussion, I wonder if someone could confirm these claims/losses in Italian-Greek war 1940-1941:

Allied combat losses against Italians were 35 aircraft (19 Greek + 16 British). I guess that they knew their losses, so no comment.

According to Greeks the Italian claims were wildly exaggerated (incl. 20 Spitfires, which were not in Greece). It may well be that the Italian system to credit the unit rather than the pilot generated much more overclaiming than crediting the pilot for a air victory! (comparison should be made with Japanese and some Soviet claims - their "unit system" generating fancy overclaims like 8:1 or even more - maybe due the "shared" wins of pilots which often became "full" wins for the unit?).

Italian air combat losses 64 (22 Greek claims + 42 British claims). This is based only on Greek+British claims and as far as I know the claim figures are usually higher than the actual losses of enemy. Anyone knows what actual Italian aircraft combat losses were between 28.10.1940 - 26.4.1941?

According to above numbers the Italian-Greek airwar in 1940-1941 was rather even between the two - Greeks losing 19 aircraft and making 22 claims (and actual Italian air combat losses less?). RAF looks like the king of the Greek/Albanian sky with 42 claims (losing only 16 of their own). Maybe less should be credited to British?

I find the Italian-Greek air campaign as a interesting case study because Germans were not involved until the very late of conflict.

The other case study (without German involvement) is the East African campaign which was actually quite long - from the June of 1940 up to November 1941, when last Italian stronghold in East Africa surrendered.

It should be noted that in the East African campaign participated some veterans of Spanish Civil War like Mario Visintini. I guess that also against Greeks the expertise of some "Spanish" veterans was used.

The short French-Italian war, North African campaign and air attacks on Malta (without or before German involvement) are "less glorious" stories as far as I know. Maybe the airwar over Malta not so bad?

[Annelie]

I found some communications from 2001.
There was something interesting so I thought I would share.
Both parties are now deceased.
It was not through Axis forum I met Harold but AOL Berlin of all places.

Harold von Hahn was recounting his training for Viet Nam to someone from Budapest.

I had a German instructor at the JFK School for Unconventional Warfare,
he told me in German.....Recruits are like rohe Diamanten, die muessen erst deschliffen warden." and deschiliffen
I was. I was in my 20's and as a Marine at a Army School was one thing, but the damn training about killed me\
(or so I thought). His name was Kropek ( I will never forget) E-8 type. He had 4 sets of jump wings. US, French, German and
VN. His background was worthy of a book. German Army (WW2) FFL, US Army and Advisor to the VN. Hell of a guy.
Hated him, but would go on any operation with him.

the man from Budapest replied

I had experience with German soldiers in 1945 January at the siege of Budapest. Their assignment was to hold and opening position
to a big plaza. Four of them with one officer held that street corner, behind a stone barricade for some ten days...they had the so called lightning
machine guns, very high cycle weapons, fifteen hundred a minute - I am not sure. the russki could not break through. Finally they
were ordered back. they could have defected, because there was not any hope left. The people offered them civilian clothes, they
refused with a smile. Before they left, have us some letters to their relatives. Few years later someone with connections to the Swiss Red
Cross gave those papers to the Swiss Embassy.

Harold von Hahn was an very nice and interesting person.
His grandfather was released by the Russians in 1952 and he became disabled, the son (Harold father) was also an officer
and was seriously wounded and he came home in 1950 but died in 1952 as a result of his wounds.
Harold served in Viet Nam and also became disabled and recent years died and sadly enough his son also has passed on.

[durb]

I guess the post above has come to a wrong place? Irren ist menslich.

[Mechili]

A list of victories could include minor actions like the Sagittario convoy action on 22 May 1941 and the counter-landings at Castelorizzo on 26/27 February 1941 as well as others.

Quality over quantity.

Vince

Dear Vince,
as you know well, and as has been pointed out of late also by our common friend Enrico Cernuschi in his book on ULTRA and the Italian-British intelligence contest, the (Italian) problem with the Castelorizzo/Castelrosso action is that while it led to a British setback on the ground, - a micro-Dieppe as a little irritant for Churchill - during their very short stay on the island the British laid their hands on Hagelin crypting machine material, and after a few months of hard work, in July 1941, they finally cracked it.

So there was some poison in the cup of sweet victory...

[Mechili]

Well you're welcome to provide your evidence for the Tugun situation on 24/25 November. I would be happy to see it. If it is just Rob Lyman's book, please let me tell you that I have been in contact with him correcting a few errors when it first came out, and he would be the first to admit that it is not error-free, and this to me seems to be a clear-cut case of a date error.

The following is the POW identification from 70 Division of POW taken in TUGUN and DALBY SQUARE on 23 November:
1. HQ Coy entire 5&6 Coys 2 Bn 27 Inf Regt PAVIA DIv killed or captured including Bn Comd & 8 officers captured.
2. 60 tp 20mm AA att 2 Bn 27 Inf Regt
3. Pl 47/32 A.Tk. Coy 3 Bn 27 Inf Regt
4. 2 tp and 47/32 A.Tk. Coy 103 Bty 1 tp 147 Bty 8 Arty Raggruppamento all 149mm guns
5. Entire 4&5 tps 44 Bty 16 Arty Raggrupamento all 105mm guns including Bty Comd & 3 Offrs.
6. HQ unit 131 autonomous Bty Corps Arty

On the 24th it was then reported that nearly the whole of 16 Raggruppamento had been killed or captured.

The evidence that Bologna wasn't destroyed is quite clear, but it was certainly very heavily damaged, with just over a third of authorised strength at the end of the battle.

http://rommelsriposte.com/2009/02/01/it ... he-battle/

It's a little strange that no German-made 37/45 guns appear on the list of the Dalby Square booty, as the antitank defense there, in addition to the artillery to the rear but with a field of fire over the entire stronghold, was IIRC made up by German 37 mm guns in service with the Italians rather than 47/32 pieces. Or perhaps a mix of the two types?

Anyway, neither Tugun nor Dalby Square were "Italian victories" clearly, but fighting was pretty tough and rough over there, by any standards. Perhaps the OP puts on the victory roster battles where the Italians made the Commonwealth sweat and toil to achieve success, which in several cases can be considered a victory of sort given the average leadership, training, physical shape, cohesion and equipment of those troops.

BTW according to the commander of the Pavia battalion at Dalby Square, a short essay of whom was published in the Italian Army studies periodical, Memorie Storico-Militari, in the 1980s (or 1970s, sorry I don't have the source at hand right now), Dalby Square did not fall because the British broke through, but because the commander of the rightmost company on the battalion line was a stray artillery officer he didn't know and didn't trust, and when the British - fought off with heavy losses up until then - mounted another attack, he just caved in and let them into the stronghold. Interesting, though of course debatable, point of view which I doubt can be found in any archival sources of either side.