Blockade the Red Sea

[magicdragon]

I am interesting in discussing how the Italians could have blockaded the Red Sea as part of co-ordinated strategy to strangle supplies and reinforcements to the British, Commonwealth & Imperial forces in the Western Desert in the early stages of an Italian attack on Egypt. Could this have been done by a laying massive minefields as close as possible to the straits of Bab-el-Mandeb, protected by MAS boats, heavy land batteries and aircraft (i.e. swapping the destroyers/submarines they historically deployed in the Red Sea for purpose built minelayers and more MAS boats)? Or would it always have been possible the RN to clear a mine free channel along the Yemen coast with too much effort and therefore making it pointless to investment in the forces necessary to achieve this strategy?

[Dili]

Not enough resources to do that. Germans aerial mined the Suez channel and even then it was not enough, the British put observer posts along it to know where the mines were dropped.

[magicdragon]

Not enough resources to do that. Germans aerial mined the Suez channel and even then it was not enough, the British put observer posts along it to know where the mines were dropped.

Surely not if it was part of planned strategy? - the strait was less than 30 miles wide, the Italian naval bases were close at hand, British minesweepers would have had to come either from Kenya or Port Said - this is not easy to sweep so far from their bases. If nothing else this would have forced the RN to use lost of assets better served in the Med (plus released the Italian larger ships for service in the Med where they would have been better used). If say the sea conditions were unsuitable for the sea mines I can understand? But the resources issue could have been solved by building up stocks over a period of time (maybe if the Italian cargo ship "Umbria" which sank near Port Sudan carrying 360,000 aircraft bombs had been carrying sea mines instead - and arrived a week earlier).

[Dili]

No the British had a base in Aden. There is no way that an effort of that nature could be done with forces in East Africa.

[magicdragon]

Dili

Thanks I had forgotten about Aden, this could be a issue, although it begs the question what RN forces were actually deployed in Aden (I know Force D operated out of Aden at a later stage of the war) in late 1940 and if any were minesweepers?

[Pedro Ruíz]

In East Africa the Italians used the mines for to protect all access to the entrance of the port of Massawa,the Royal Navy spent several days in to clean and to clear the way to their warships for to can entry in Massawa port,the main Italian naval base in East Africa.

When Mussolini declared the war to France and England,he was convinced that he went into the war in the key moment for to give the last blow of the Allied,he thought that after of the surrender of France the war would last some weeks more and Great Britain would follow the same way of France,therefore the Italians in East Africa didn´t use their arsenal of mines for to blockade the Ab-el-Mandeb straight.The Duke of Aosta thought that the war would last few weeks and therefore he attacked to the British in land only,striking to the British forces in north Kenya,south Sudan and British Somaliland.

When the Italians saw that Great Britain didn´t surrender and she was able to avoid the invasion of mortherland and in January 1941 launched a offensive to great scale from Kenya and Sudan against the Italian East Africa,then the Italians used all their weapons for to defend their colonies in the Horn Africa,and the Rear-Admiral Bonetti used the mines for to protect all access to the base of Massawa.

Best wishes

Pedro

[Phaing]

No the British had a base in Aden. There is no way that an effort of that nature could be done with forces in East Africa.

Except seize Aden itself in a surprise attack within hours of the Declaration of War.
Daring, sneaky and calling for very careful planning, it would have been the only way to protect IEA from a lot of grief. (also, possible; there were only 2-3 British Battalions on site at the time)

The Italian military should have planned its work, like Japan did, and insisted on at least 72 hours advanced notice of a D.O.W.

The number of mines they planted defensively would have wrecked havoc if used to close "the gate of tears", but only if the mines were guarded against minesweepers by aircraft and patrol boats. If enough torpedoes were there for the SM.79s, that would have been a real killer.
Forget the MAS boats, 4 out of 5 were practically wrecks... but the fifth one did nail a Cruiser pretty hard.

Maybe, just maybe... a little preparation and the nerve to risk all the DDs could have turned the trick.