Is this book specifically related o the use of Chemical weapons in the war or is it more of a general history? I do like the maps.
Feel free to continue
Cheers
Happy W
Italian Army Combat Analysis- Abyssinia
-
Happy Wanderer
- Member
- Posts: 25
- Joined: 12 Nov 2013, 00:36
Re: Italian Army Combat Analysis- Abyssinia
Nice one Tigre.
Is this book specifically related o the use of Chemical weapons in the war or is it more of a general history? I do like the maps.
Feel free to continue
Cheers
Happy W
Is this book specifically related o the use of Chemical weapons in the war or is it more of a general history? I do like the maps.
Feel free to continue
Cheers
Happy W
Re: Italian Army Combat Analysis- Abyssinia
Hello to all 
; thanks for your kind words Happy W, the article put its focus on the gas war but without forgetting the history. Now a little more................
The Chemical Weapons in the Italian-Abyssinian war 1935/1936.
Colonel W. Volkart, Instr. Of. Infantry.
The Battle of Enderta - 10th-15th February.
Besides the previously reported action also played an important role the numerous, but more disorganized aerial harassment bombing with gas at Uarieu Pass. Only from Makalle over 100 sorties were recorded on 23 January. During the first battle of Tembien the Italians bombed with gas the supply routes linking the Imperial Headquarters in Dessie with the Army of Mulugheta.
The troops of Ras Mulugheta now occupied a defensive position in the area of Amba Aradam (2980 m), 16 km south of Makalle, forming a defensive system of 3 km deep and 8 km wide, blocking all avenues of approach north- south, a situation that General Badoglio could not accept.
From 10 to 12 February some 80,000 italian troops, with great support from artillery, successfully occupied their starting positions for the attack having in mind a double envelopment, while gripping to the front. During the next two days a break followed due to heavy rain and while waiting for the artillery.
The supply to the first line was so difficult that often had to be done through airdrops and additionally on February 13 several Ethiopians counterattacks had been rejected.
On February 15 at 07:00 hours, began the main movement after a preparation carried out by several hundred pieces of artillery, implementing a fire plan imposed firmly by General Badoglio. The resistance of the defenders held until nightfall. The envelop of the position of Amba Aradam did not succeed, nor the encirclement of its defenders. Meanwhile Ras Mulugheta had escaped leaving behind but a few prisoners.
The Air Force took over the chase south of Buja. Some 170 aircraft dropped 396 tons of bombs in 546 sorties. While the army stopped, raked the battlefield, was reorganized and then waited for resuming the attack. The victory in Amba Aradam was completed on February 28 with the conquest of the former main position of Amba Alagi (3411 m) and the Passes to the east and west of it. These fights present no difficulties.
The Army Corps operating on the left wing resumed its progress only on February 20 at 06:30 hours and at noon had reached Aderat and Mount Garagiam without resistance. After a one-week halt, during which the Army Corps deployed to the right of Amba Aradam moved west toward Gaela, the Italians conquered Amba Alagi and the Passes of Tagora and Falaga. Corbeta was also occupied in the southeast. No one gas attacks were reported during the fighting with the troops of Ras Mulugheta, although on February 16 Magalo was bombarded with gas on the southern front.
Source: Die Gaswaffe im italienisch-abessinischen Krieg 1935/1936. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift : ASMZ Band (Jahr): 116 (1950). Heft 12
Cheers. Raúl M
.
; thanks for your kind words Happy W, the article put its focus on the gas war but without forgetting the history. Now a little more................The Chemical Weapons in the Italian-Abyssinian war 1935/1936.
Colonel W. Volkart, Instr. Of. Infantry.
The Battle of Enderta - 10th-15th February.
Besides the previously reported action also played an important role the numerous, but more disorganized aerial harassment bombing with gas at Uarieu Pass. Only from Makalle over 100 sorties were recorded on 23 January. During the first battle of Tembien the Italians bombed with gas the supply routes linking the Imperial Headquarters in Dessie with the Army of Mulugheta.
The troops of Ras Mulugheta now occupied a defensive position in the area of Amba Aradam (2980 m), 16 km south of Makalle, forming a defensive system of 3 km deep and 8 km wide, blocking all avenues of approach north- south, a situation that General Badoglio could not accept.
From 10 to 12 February some 80,000 italian troops, with great support from artillery, successfully occupied their starting positions for the attack having in mind a double envelopment, while gripping to the front. During the next two days a break followed due to heavy rain and while waiting for the artillery.
The supply to the first line was so difficult that often had to be done through airdrops and additionally on February 13 several Ethiopians counterattacks had been rejected.
On February 15 at 07:00 hours, began the main movement after a preparation carried out by several hundred pieces of artillery, implementing a fire plan imposed firmly by General Badoglio. The resistance of the defenders held until nightfall. The envelop of the position of Amba Aradam did not succeed, nor the encirclement of its defenders. Meanwhile Ras Mulugheta had escaped leaving behind but a few prisoners.
The Air Force took over the chase south of Buja. Some 170 aircraft dropped 396 tons of bombs in 546 sorties. While the army stopped, raked the battlefield, was reorganized and then waited for resuming the attack. The victory in Amba Aradam was completed on February 28 with the conquest of the former main position of Amba Alagi (3411 m) and the Passes to the east and west of it. These fights present no difficulties.
The Army Corps operating on the left wing resumed its progress only on February 20 at 06:30 hours and at noon had reached Aderat and Mount Garagiam without resistance. After a one-week halt, during which the Army Corps deployed to the right of Amba Aradam moved west toward Gaela, the Italians conquered Amba Alagi and the Passes of Tagora and Falaga. Corbeta was also occupied in the southeast. No one gas attacks were reported during the fighting with the troops of Ras Mulugheta, although on February 16 Magalo was bombarded with gas on the southern front.
Source: Die Gaswaffe im italienisch-abessinischen Krieg 1935/1936. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift : ASMZ Band (Jahr): 116 (1950). Heft 12
Cheers. Raúl M
.- Attachments
-
- Battle of Enderta................................
- image002.png (143.58 KiB) Viewed 1630 times
Re: Italian Army Combat Analysis- Abyssinia
Hello to all ; a little more................
The Chemical Weapons in the Italian-Abyssinian war 1935/1936.
Colonel W. Volkart, Instr. Of. Infantry.
The second Battle of Tembien - 27th February - 1st March.
The operation was protected from the east and was launched from the north and south towards Abbi Addi and then to Andino. A 24 hours long lasting artillery barrage had a resounding success. After two days of tough fighting and counter-attacks by all sides, the Abyssinian threw themselves in a random flight into the mountains, escaping to the west.
While the Abyssinian attackers were bound all together and engaged by the automatic weapons, the Italians poisoned by gas attacks the ground to the rear, or rather, the land previously marked on the western flank and probably the Abyssinian routes of retreat toward the Takazze river.
The Ethiopian attacks on the northern front had been thrown from the west to the east in Mai Timchet - Hausien - Makalle, so in turn the Italians launched their own attacks in the opposite direction: Enderta - Second Battle of Tembien - Battle of Sciré.
While Ras Immru by his attack to Axum, had pushed back the Italian right wing in Selaklaka, he had re-occupied the grounds of Adi Abo and Sciré and even threatened Erythrea.
Source: Die Gaswaffe im italienisch-abessinischen Krieg 1935/1936. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift : ASMZ Band (Jahr): 116 (1950). Heft 12
Cheers. Raúl M.
; a little more................The Chemical Weapons in the Italian-Abyssinian war 1935/1936.
Colonel W. Volkart, Instr. Of. Infantry.
The second Battle of Tembien - 27th February - 1st March.
The operation was protected from the east and was launched from the north and south towards Abbi Addi and then to Andino. A 24 hours long lasting artillery barrage had a resounding success. After two days of tough fighting and counter-attacks by all sides, the Abyssinian threw themselves in a random flight into the mountains, escaping to the west.
While the Abyssinian attackers were bound all together and engaged by the automatic weapons, the Italians poisoned by gas attacks the ground to the rear, or rather, the land previously marked on the western flank and probably the Abyssinian routes of retreat toward the Takazze river.
The Ethiopian attacks on the northern front had been thrown from the west to the east in Mai Timchet - Hausien - Makalle, so in turn the Italians launched their own attacks in the opposite direction: Enderta - Second Battle of Tembien - Battle of Sciré.
While Ras Immru by his attack to Axum, had pushed back the Italian right wing in Selaklaka, he had re-occupied the grounds of Adi Abo and Sciré and even threatened Erythrea.
Source: Die Gaswaffe im italienisch-abessinischen Krieg 1935/1936. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift : ASMZ Band (Jahr): 116 (1950). Heft 12
Cheers. Raúl M
.- Attachments
-
- Second Battle of Tembien ............................................
- image002.png (110.72 KiB) Viewed 1615 times
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- Italian light artillery in action in Ethiopia .......................
Hechos de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Tomo I. Editorial Cardon - image004.jpg (55.42 KiB) Viewed 1615 times
Re: Italian Army Combat Analysis- Abyssinia
Hello to all ; a little more................
The Chemical Weapons in the Italian-Abyssinian war 1935/1936.
Colonel W. Volkart, Instr. Of. Infantry.
The Battle of Sciré - 1st to 3rd March.
The Italian Army Corps holding the front in Selaklaka was to move westwards, while a second Army Corps would advance from the north against the flank and rear of Ras Immru. In the front the Italians were ready to attack since February 29. After a massive artillery fire and strong attacks, the Abyssinians were pressed back on the first day of the offensive and next day at dusk launched their counterattacks. The Italians moved slowly. The bloodbath was great. On the third morning the Ras Immru retreated towards the Takazze river leaving a veil of security and was chased for 7 hours by the Italian aviation. The Italian Army Corps advancing from the north no longer saw combat. It came too late despite never had an enemy in front of it. All supplies, including water and fodder for the horses, was transported by air. However the northern Ethiopian army had been totally defeated and annihilated.
During these struggles in the provinces of Tembien and Sciré, the Italian Air Force carried out its task of harassing and interdicting the communications lines of the Mulugheta's Army on the main axis of Quoram - Waldja - Dessie; apparently the bombardment with gas played an important role in these actions.
Of all Ethiopians armies in retreat, only escaped the dissolution the one led by Mulugheta, because its withdrawal route to the south was not run over rough terrain, but through the caravan route to Dessié. There he was seeking to join with the still intact units led by the Crown Prince and the Negus himself, who on March 21 marched by Dessie to Quoram, establishing its headquarters there. Since the end of February already strong Abyssinian forces held at Kobbo and Quoram. The latter town was particularly so important, because there had its starting point the road to Addis Abeba.
Source: Die Gaswaffe im italienisch-abessinischen Krieg 1935/1936. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift : ASMZ Band (Jahr): 116 (1950). Heft 12
Cheers. Raúl M.
; a little more................The Chemical Weapons in the Italian-Abyssinian war 1935/1936.
Colonel W. Volkart, Instr. Of. Infantry.
The Battle of Sciré - 1st to 3rd March.
The Italian Army Corps holding the front in Selaklaka was to move westwards, while a second Army Corps would advance from the north against the flank and rear of Ras Immru. In the front the Italians were ready to attack since February 29. After a massive artillery fire and strong attacks, the Abyssinians were pressed back on the first day of the offensive and next day at dusk launched their counterattacks. The Italians moved slowly. The bloodbath was great. On the third morning the Ras Immru retreated towards the Takazze river leaving a veil of security and was chased for 7 hours by the Italian aviation. The Italian Army Corps advancing from the north no longer saw combat. It came too late despite never had an enemy in front of it. All supplies, including water and fodder for the horses, was transported by air. However the northern Ethiopian army had been totally defeated and annihilated.
During these struggles in the provinces of Tembien and Sciré, the Italian Air Force carried out its task of harassing and interdicting the communications lines of the Mulugheta's Army on the main axis of Quoram - Waldja - Dessie; apparently the bombardment with gas played an important role in these actions.
Of all Ethiopians armies in retreat, only escaped the dissolution the one led by Mulugheta, because its withdrawal route to the south was not run over rough terrain, but through the caravan route to Dessié. There he was seeking to join with the still intact units led by the Crown Prince and the Negus himself, who on March 21 marched by Dessie to Quoram, establishing its headquarters there. Since the end of February already strong Abyssinian forces held at Kobbo and Quoram. The latter town was particularly so important, because there had its starting point the road to Addis Abeba.
Source: Die Gaswaffe im italienisch-abessinischen Krieg 1935/1936. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift : ASMZ Band (Jahr): 116 (1950). Heft 12
Cheers. Raúl M
.- Attachments
-
- image002.png (98.4 KiB) Viewed 1592 times
Re: Italian Army Combat Analysis- Abyssinia
Hello to all ; a little more................
The Chemical Weapons in the Italian-Abyssinian war 1935/1936.
Colonel W. Volkart, Instr. Of. Infantry.
General Advance.
A week after the ending of the last battle began the advance of General Badoglio, seeking a frontal pursuit of the enemy. However, are of interest only those fights on the main axis Macalle - Dessié, while to the West the raid on Gondar in the second half of March, continued almost without a struggle, and eastward the campaigns on the Aussa lands, that failed previously, continued on March 12 from Assab to Sardo. Both operations had enormous advantages for the motorized troops, but no clashes with the natives.
On March 17, the Italian vanguard pushed on Agumberta Pass, 15 km south of Mai Chio against the imperial army, which had a magnitude of 50 to 60,000 troops, according to other sources than 80,000 men and had not taken strong positions. General Badoglio reached the line Corbeta - Mecan Pass - Amba Bohora and stood there, fortifying the line waiting for the mass of his artillery, carrying a total of 65,000 shells, which could not reach the position before April 5. The Italian progress was understandably very slow in this rugged and arid part of Ethiopia and demanded meanwhile the building of a road.
Instead of exploiting the difficult terrain, organizing a mobile defense and guerrilla warfare, where the artillery or aviation, nor the explosive and chemical bombs were not decisive and wear down the attacker in order to gain time, the Emperor gathered in only one army the remnants forces of Ras Seyum, Kassa and Mulugheta with his Guard. He left his fortified positions and tried to reach the decision under his personal leadership with a major offensive against Amba Bohora (2955 m), against the vanguard of the Italian wing at Mai Chio, just north of Lake Ascianghi and Corbeta. The General Badoglio had to accelerate the shifting from attack preparations to the defensive.
Source: Die Gaswaffe im italienisch-abessinischen Krieg 1935/1936. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift : ASMZ Band (Jahr): 116 (1950). Heft 12
Cheers. Raúl M.
; a little more................The Chemical Weapons in the Italian-Abyssinian war 1935/1936.
Colonel W. Volkart, Instr. Of. Infantry.
General Advance.
A week after the ending of the last battle began the advance of General Badoglio, seeking a frontal pursuit of the enemy. However, are of interest only those fights on the main axis Macalle - Dessié, while to the West the raid on Gondar in the second half of March, continued almost without a struggle, and eastward the campaigns on the Aussa lands, that failed previously, continued on March 12 from Assab to Sardo. Both operations had enormous advantages for the motorized troops, but no clashes with the natives.
On March 17, the Italian vanguard pushed on Agumberta Pass, 15 km south of Mai Chio against the imperial army, which had a magnitude of 50 to 60,000 troops, according to other sources than 80,000 men and had not taken strong positions. General Badoglio reached the line Corbeta - Mecan Pass - Amba Bohora and stood there, fortifying the line waiting for the mass of his artillery, carrying a total of 65,000 shells, which could not reach the position before April 5. The Italian progress was understandably very slow in this rugged and arid part of Ethiopia and demanded meanwhile the building of a road.
Instead of exploiting the difficult terrain, organizing a mobile defense and guerrilla warfare, where the artillery or aviation, nor the explosive and chemical bombs were not decisive and wear down the attacker in order to gain time, the Emperor gathered in only one army the remnants forces of Ras Seyum, Kassa and Mulugheta with his Guard. He left his fortified positions and tried to reach the decision under his personal leadership with a major offensive against Amba Bohora (2955 m), against the vanguard of the Italian wing at Mai Chio, just north of Lake Ascianghi and Corbeta. The General Badoglio had to accelerate the shifting from attack preparations to the defensive.
Source: Die Gaswaffe im italienisch-abessinischen Krieg 1935/1936. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift : ASMZ Band (Jahr): 116 (1950). Heft 12
Cheers. Raúl M
.- Attachments
-
- In Tembien, summits north and south of Uore Amba .........................................
Abessinische Der Krieg. Pietro Badoglio
Re: Italian Army Combat Analysis- Abyssinia
Hello to all ; a little more................
The Chemical Weapons in the Italian-Abyssinian war 1935/1936.
Colonel W. Volkart, Instr. Of. Infantry.
The battle of "Mai Chio" or "Lake Ascianghi", from March 31 to April 4.
After a start with very good results and a fierce hand to hand combat, the first day ended with the Abyssinians suspending the attack, the Italian air force had a very limited role because of bad weather, because with only 57 aircraft they could intervene at low altitudes. The plan prepared, in which each unit had set their goals could not be done, because the winds were too strong and the cloud cover too low. The Abyssinians carried out repeated attacks the next day but were less intense and could be easily rejected; the Italians were satisfied with retaining their positions and hold the ground under the influence of shelling and machine gun fire.
The deployment of artillery was accelerated and completed. On April 2, Marshal Badoglio was reinforced with 62 aircraft which, while using artillery and machine gun fire to engage the Abyssinians, released tons of bombs and precipitated their incipient withdrawal and the establishment of a rearguard position in Ezba Pass. The next day Badoglio attacked with an army corps along the imperial road, an another army corps deployed in the rear of Agumberta Pass. In the front the Abyssinian resistance was very strong again, especially in Ezba Pass. But the strength of the defenders faded shortly after April 2 when they bleed beneath the mass of the Italian machine gun and artillery fire. At midnight on 3/4 April, the Negus issued the order to retreat when he recognized the threat of encirclement. Pursued by Badoglio, the Abyssinians lost Quoram on April 06 and 5 days later Kobbo. For the second time the Italian aircrafts had reached a success against the fleeing masses.
Source: Die Gaswaffe im italienisch-abessinischen Krieg 1935/1936. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift : ASMZ Band (Jahr): 116 (1950). Heft 12
Cheers. Raúl M.
; a little more................Der Abessinische Krieg. Pietro BadoglioAbessinische Der Krieg. Pietro Badoglio
The Chemical Weapons in the Italian-Abyssinian war 1935/1936.
Colonel W. Volkart, Instr. Of. Infantry.
The battle of "Mai Chio" or "Lake Ascianghi", from March 31 to April 4.
After a start with very good results and a fierce hand to hand combat, the first day ended with the Abyssinians suspending the attack, the Italian air force had a very limited role because of bad weather, because with only 57 aircraft they could intervene at low altitudes. The plan prepared, in which each unit had set their goals could not be done, because the winds were too strong and the cloud cover too low. The Abyssinians carried out repeated attacks the next day but were less intense and could be easily rejected; the Italians were satisfied with retaining their positions and hold the ground under the influence of shelling and machine gun fire.
The deployment of artillery was accelerated and completed. On April 2, Marshal Badoglio was reinforced with 62 aircraft which, while using artillery and machine gun fire to engage the Abyssinians, released tons of bombs and precipitated their incipient withdrawal and the establishment of a rearguard position in Ezba Pass. The next day Badoglio attacked with an army corps along the imperial road, an another army corps deployed in the rear of Agumberta Pass. In the front the Abyssinian resistance was very strong again, especially in Ezba Pass. But the strength of the defenders faded shortly after April 2 when they bleed beneath the mass of the Italian machine gun and artillery fire. At midnight on 3/4 April, the Negus issued the order to retreat when he recognized the threat of encirclement. Pursued by Badoglio, the Abyssinians lost Quoram on April 06 and 5 days later Kobbo. For the second time the Italian aircrafts had reached a success against the fleeing masses.
Source: Die Gaswaffe im italienisch-abessinischen Krieg 1935/1936. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift : ASMZ Band (Jahr): 116 (1950). Heft 12
Cheers. Raúl M
.- Attachments
-
- Battle of Lake Ascianghi ....................................
- image022.png (125.17 KiB) Viewed 1357 times
Re: Italian Army Combat Analysis- Abyssinia
Hello to all ; a little more................
The Chemical Weapons in the Italian-Abyssinian war 1935/1936.
Colonel W. Volkart, Instr. Of. Infantry.
The Battle of Sassabaneh - 13/24 to 29 April.
The Abyssinian Northern Front had ceased to exist. But there was still undefeated Ras Nasibu in the eastern sector of the Southern Front in the area Dagamedo - Sassabaneh - Uadhel and there had developed a defensive system according to modern standards with three strong and tough positions: Gabrehor - Sassabaneh - Dagabour. Far to the rear in the fortified Djidjiga and Harrar were reported other native groups.
Because of the rainy session and flooding the South Army of General Graziani could leave the line Ual-Ual - Gabredarre - Danane on April 14 and continue its advance. The departure was planned from the line Uardere - Gerlogubi - Gorrahei - Danane. General Graziani's intention was to attack along the river Faf with three columns, with the left column as the main effort to defeat the Abyssinians. The intensive use of air power and artillery formed the basis for the battle of Sassabaneh.
The columns of the center and the right approached the Ethiopian position without contact with the enemy. The column on the left had a different fate: on April 16 the natives attacked with the old verve. Battles were fought at close range. The artillery opened fire at 100-150 meters. The Italians gradually moved ahead until the next day the Abyssinians withdrew eastward without being beaten or pursued. A motorized chase planned later also failed.
On April 23, about 25 Italian aircrafts dropped 12 tons of bombs on Ethiopians fortifications and suspected hideouts. Interestingly, the Abyssinians managed to deceive the Italian air reconnaissance with numerous dummies buildings. The next day a bombing campaign began with the intention of obtaining a double envelopment. The focus remained on the left stripe. In the center the defensive positions were abandoned by the defenders. At the position of Hamanlei the attack quickly stalled due to the admirable courage and excellent fire discipline of the Abyssinians.
A successful defense along the frontline, leaving intact the main position of Ras Nasibu, forced the attackers to a lull. The battle was hard and bloody for both sides. The second attack was unleashed on April 29, though the rains and flooding impeded the progress of the attacker. All vehicles were stuck, on the left the advance was resumed by patrols which took the abandoned Abyssinian position. The right column suffered less from the weather and breaking the weak resistance before Bullaleh, advanced to Dagabour which fell on May 2. Sassabaneh was taken by the central column on April 30. The enemy against the threat of encirclement, retreated to positions further north.
Source: Die Gaswaffe im italienisch-abessinischen Krieg 1935/1936. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift : ASMZ Band (Jahr): 117 (1951). Heft 2
Cheers. Raúl M.
; a little more................The Chemical Weapons in the Italian-Abyssinian war 1935/1936.
Colonel W. Volkart, Instr. Of. Infantry.
The Battle of Sassabaneh - 13/24 to 29 April.
The Abyssinian Northern Front had ceased to exist. But there was still undefeated Ras Nasibu in the eastern sector of the Southern Front in the area Dagamedo - Sassabaneh - Uadhel and there had developed a defensive system according to modern standards with three strong and tough positions: Gabrehor - Sassabaneh - Dagabour. Far to the rear in the fortified Djidjiga and Harrar were reported other native groups.
Because of the rainy session and flooding the South Army of General Graziani could leave the line Ual-Ual - Gabredarre - Danane on April 14 and continue its advance. The departure was planned from the line Uardere - Gerlogubi - Gorrahei - Danane. General Graziani's intention was to attack along the river Faf with three columns, with the left column as the main effort to defeat the Abyssinians. The intensive use of air power and artillery formed the basis for the battle of Sassabaneh.
The columns of the center and the right approached the Ethiopian position without contact with the enemy. The column on the left had a different fate: on April 16 the natives attacked with the old verve. Battles were fought at close range. The artillery opened fire at 100-150 meters. The Italians gradually moved ahead until the next day the Abyssinians withdrew eastward without being beaten or pursued. A motorized chase planned later also failed.
On April 23, about 25 Italian aircrafts dropped 12 tons of bombs on Ethiopians fortifications and suspected hideouts. Interestingly, the Abyssinians managed to deceive the Italian air reconnaissance with numerous dummies buildings. The next day a bombing campaign began with the intention of obtaining a double envelopment. The focus remained on the left stripe. In the center the defensive positions were abandoned by the defenders. At the position of Hamanlei the attack quickly stalled due to the admirable courage and excellent fire discipline of the Abyssinians.
A successful defense along the frontline, leaving intact the main position of Ras Nasibu, forced the attackers to a lull. The battle was hard and bloody for both sides. The second attack was unleashed on April 29, though the rains and flooding impeded the progress of the attacker. All vehicles were stuck, on the left the advance was resumed by patrols which took the abandoned Abyssinian position. The right column suffered less from the weather and breaking the weak resistance before Bullaleh, advanced to Dagabour which fell on May 2. Sassabaneh was taken by the central column on April 30. The enemy against the threat of encirclement, retreated to positions further north.
Source: Die Gaswaffe im italienisch-abessinischen Krieg 1935/1936. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift : ASMZ Band (Jahr): 117 (1951). Heft 2
Cheers. Raúl M
.- Attachments
-
- image009.png (125.32 KiB) Viewed 1280 times
-
- Ethiopian position ................................................ .
http://www.unsertirol24.com/2015/03/01/voelkermord-aethiopien-abessinien/ - image011.jpg (40.32 KiB) Viewed 1280 times
Re: Italian Army Combat Analysis- Abyssinia
Hello to all ; a little more................
The Chemical Weapons in the Italian-Abyssinian war 1935/1936.
Colonel W. Volkart, Instr. Of. Infantry.
Pursuit.
The advance of the northern army after the battle of Mai Chio took the character of a pursuit. The completion of the guerrilla war and the actions of raking took all the attention of Italians. Furthermore, the conditions of re-supply only allowed to put one army corps on the front. On April 15, was reached Dessie, the capital of Wollo and the center of the caravan routes to the four cardinal points. The Marshal Badoglio arrived there by plane arranged a new base and expanded its forces deployed first wisely. For everything else, he personally took command. Five days later, in the Pass of Derek, 40 km southwest of Dessie, it is again established contact with the enemy. The Abyssinians fought there, but only skirmishes, and there was no real resistance. As a final operational action the Italian Northern Army began the forced march to Addis Ababa in three columns along the imperial road, through Debra Brehan and west of it, to achieve the junction North-South by Worra Ilu - Egersa.
The imperial road was poor, without retaining walls, with small slopes and impossible bends. The western route of march was even worse. The Abyssinians showed no fighting spirit. On May 5 came the news that the Negus's capital was occupied, and General Badoglio had moved there, the Ethiopian army was totally defeated.
On the southern front, the conditions were similar, although the Reserve of Ras Nasibu in Djidjiga actually remained intact. It was assumed that probably the remains of the Battle of Sassabaneh, would meet the reserve, but without leaders soon dispersed. So the General Graziani went in two columns on roads in bad condition over Ddidjiga, Harrar and Diredaua. On May 7, 8 and 9 these objectives were achieved. There was probably still shots, but not as an organized resistance. On May 9, the two Italian armies met in Diredaua on the railroad Djibouti - Addis Ababa and thus officially ended the military operations.
Source: Die Gaswaffe im italienisch-abessinischen Krieg 1935/1936. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift : ASMZ Band (Jahr): 117 (1951). Heft 2
http://www.unsertirol24.com/2015/03/01/ ... bessinien/
Cheers. Raúl M.
; a little more................The Chemical Weapons in the Italian-Abyssinian war 1935/1936.
Colonel W. Volkart, Instr. Of. Infantry.
Pursuit.
The advance of the northern army after the battle of Mai Chio took the character of a pursuit. The completion of the guerrilla war and the actions of raking took all the attention of Italians. Furthermore, the conditions of re-supply only allowed to put one army corps on the front. On April 15, was reached Dessie, the capital of Wollo and the center of the caravan routes to the four cardinal points. The Marshal Badoglio arrived there by plane arranged a new base and expanded its forces deployed first wisely. For everything else, he personally took command. Five days later, in the Pass of Derek, 40 km southwest of Dessie, it is again established contact with the enemy. The Abyssinians fought there, but only skirmishes, and there was no real resistance. As a final operational action the Italian Northern Army began the forced march to Addis Ababa in three columns along the imperial road, through Debra Brehan and west of it, to achieve the junction North-South by Worra Ilu - Egersa.
The imperial road was poor, without retaining walls, with small slopes and impossible bends. The western route of march was even worse. The Abyssinians showed no fighting spirit. On May 5 came the news that the Negus's capital was occupied, and General Badoglio had moved there, the Ethiopian army was totally defeated.
On the southern front, the conditions were similar, although the Reserve of Ras Nasibu in Djidjiga actually remained intact. It was assumed that probably the remains of the Battle of Sassabaneh, would meet the reserve, but without leaders soon dispersed. So the General Graziani went in two columns on roads in bad condition over Ddidjiga, Harrar and Diredaua. On May 7, 8 and 9 these objectives were achieved. There was probably still shots, but not as an organized resistance. On May 9, the two Italian armies met in Diredaua on the railroad Djibouti - Addis Ababa and thus officially ended the military operations.
Source: Die Gaswaffe im italienisch-abessinischen Krieg 1935/1936. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift : ASMZ Band (Jahr): 117 (1951). Heft 2
http://www.unsertirol24.com/2015/03/01/ ... bessinien/
Cheers. Raúl M
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Re: Italian Army Combat Analysis- Abyssinia
hi
remember in Casablanca where the Inspector says to Rick Blaine "in 1935 you ran guns in Ethiopia?"
i'm working on a screenplay about this. looking for routes / weapons / players with which to flesh this out.
thanks
gus
http://www.quotes.net/mquote/15863
Captain Renault: In 1935, you ran guns to Ethiopia. In 1936, you fought in Spain, on the Loyalist side.
Rick: I got well paid for it on both occasions.
Captain Renault: The *winning* side would have paid you *much better*.
remember in Casablanca where the Inspector says to Rick Blaine "in 1935 you ran guns in Ethiopia?"
i'm working on a screenplay about this. looking for routes / weapons / players with which to flesh this out.
thanks
gus
http://www.quotes.net/mquote/15863
Captain Renault: In 1935, you ran guns to Ethiopia. In 1936, you fought in Spain, on the Loyalist side.
Rick: I got well paid for it on both occasions.
Captain Renault: The *winning* side would have paid you *much better*.
Re: Italian Army Combat Analysis- Abyssinia
Hello to all ; a little more..............................
PRINCIPAL LESSONS FROM THE ABYSSINIAN WAR.
Tactics depends upon the technical possibilities of materiel; but these possibilities vary each day with the progress of invention. Technical facts which have been decisive in wars of the past may no longer have application. If we are not to be hypnotized by the facts of the past we have to follow all the practical tests in which war materiel is employed. The Italian-Ethiopian conflict acquires an obvious interest in this respect. The observations drawn from an essentially colonial campaign cannot be transposed without reflection to a European theater of war; but they can be considered from the point of view of mechanical performance of materiel and will give positive results as to the service we can demand of it.
The Italian success in Ethiopia is the result of foresight and careful staff preparation. The seaport at Massaoua had to be rebuilt to handle the traffic anticipated. A base had to be built at Asmara, 6,000 feet above sea level. Men debarking at Massaoua were moved at once to Asmara; supplies were kept there only long enough to be classified before being forwarded. The climate at Massaoua is intolerable for Europeans while that at Asmara is quite supportable.
Before the war, connection with Massaoua and Asmara was maintained by a narrow gauge railway of doubtful dependence. The first feat of the Italians was the construction, in a few weeks, of an automobile route between Massaoua and Asmara. It is 75 miles long, cutting and climbing the most difficult mountains. Thirty thousand laborers working day and nigh accomplished this gigantic task.
The number of automobiles running over this highway quickly reached 1,200 each way. But since the load was too narrow for two-way circulation, the convoys going up used the road for twelve hours and the convoys coming down for the twelve hours following. In spite of heavy day and night traffic, numerous sharp turns and steep slopes, the number of accidents was extremely few.
The next step was the building of a second route to establish a one-way round trip between Massaoua and Asmara. This was opened to traffic in November. Finally, an aerial cable was installed to carry trucks over the most difficult ravine, reducing the length of the journey by an appreciable amount.
Routes were equally important in all operations. To borrow a sentence from General Badoglio: "We had to give two thousand blows with a pick for each blow (shot) with a gun." The labor for road building was furnished initially by enlisted laborers. These were managed by cadres of engineers. When the continuous offensive was finally taken up it was necessary to turn all troops into road builders as necessary. Between 9 and 17 April, when a road was cut between Quorum and Dessie, Marshal Badoglio wrote: "For 50 miles all the men of all the corps, without exception, including the doctors and medical attendants, worked on the opening of a trail with an ardor that no words can express." It was often necessary to construct long difficult roads to bring artillery into position. In one of the last battles, 2,500 artillerymen went to build a road of access to their positions of the next day while their guns remained parked in a ravine.
There is no region in Europe with as few roads as Ethiopia; but this, is no reason to believe that the enormous movements of motors foreseen in the future will be practicable with existing communications. As in Ethiopia it will be necessary at times to build them.
Source: PRINCIPAL LESSONS FROM THE ABYSSINIAN WAR. ["Premier enseignements de la guerre d'Abyssinie," by General Rouquerol. Revue Militaire Suisse, June 1936.] Abstracted by Major T.R. Phillips, Coast Artillery Corps. RML, March 1937.
Cheers. Raúl M.
; a little more..............................PRINCIPAL LESSONS FROM THE ABYSSINIAN WAR.
Tactics depends upon the technical possibilities of materiel; but these possibilities vary each day with the progress of invention. Technical facts which have been decisive in wars of the past may no longer have application. If we are not to be hypnotized by the facts of the past we have to follow all the practical tests in which war materiel is employed. The Italian-Ethiopian conflict acquires an obvious interest in this respect. The observations drawn from an essentially colonial campaign cannot be transposed without reflection to a European theater of war; but they can be considered from the point of view of mechanical performance of materiel and will give positive results as to the service we can demand of it.
The Italian success in Ethiopia is the result of foresight and careful staff preparation. The seaport at Massaoua had to be rebuilt to handle the traffic anticipated. A base had to be built at Asmara, 6,000 feet above sea level. Men debarking at Massaoua were moved at once to Asmara; supplies were kept there only long enough to be classified before being forwarded. The climate at Massaoua is intolerable for Europeans while that at Asmara is quite supportable.
Before the war, connection with Massaoua and Asmara was maintained by a narrow gauge railway of doubtful dependence. The first feat of the Italians was the construction, in a few weeks, of an automobile route between Massaoua and Asmara. It is 75 miles long, cutting and climbing the most difficult mountains. Thirty thousand laborers working day and nigh accomplished this gigantic task.
The number of automobiles running over this highway quickly reached 1,200 each way. But since the load was too narrow for two-way circulation, the convoys going up used the road for twelve hours and the convoys coming down for the twelve hours following. In spite of heavy day and night traffic, numerous sharp turns and steep slopes, the number of accidents was extremely few.
The next step was the building of a second route to establish a one-way round trip between Massaoua and Asmara. This was opened to traffic in November. Finally, an aerial cable was installed to carry trucks over the most difficult ravine, reducing the length of the journey by an appreciable amount.
Routes were equally important in all operations. To borrow a sentence from General Badoglio: "We had to give two thousand blows with a pick for each blow (shot) with a gun." The labor for road building was furnished initially by enlisted laborers. These were managed by cadres of engineers. When the continuous offensive was finally taken up it was necessary to turn all troops into road builders as necessary. Between 9 and 17 April, when a road was cut between Quorum and Dessie, Marshal Badoglio wrote: "For 50 miles all the men of all the corps, without exception, including the doctors and medical attendants, worked on the opening of a trail with an ardor that no words can express." It was often necessary to construct long difficult roads to bring artillery into position. In one of the last battles, 2,500 artillerymen went to build a road of access to their positions of the next day while their guns remained parked in a ravine.
There is no region in Europe with as few roads as Ethiopia; but this, is no reason to believe that the enormous movements of motors foreseen in the future will be practicable with existing communications. As in Ethiopia it will be necessary at times to build them.
Source: PRINCIPAL LESSONS FROM THE ABYSSINIAN WAR. ["Premier enseignements de la guerre d'Abyssinie," by General Rouquerol. Revue Militaire Suisse, June 1936.] Abstracted by Major T.R. Phillips, Coast Artillery Corps. RML, March 1937.
Cheers. Raúl M
.Re: Italian Army Combat Analysis- Abyssinia
Hello to all ; a little more..............................
PRINCIPAL LESSONS FROM THE ABYSSINIAN WAR.
Roads were used by large convoys as soon as they could be without great risk; but the work of improvement was continued without ceasing. Thousands of automobiles constantly on the road furnished the transport in the theater of operations. Types of automotive vehicles are sufficiently numerous to insure their perfect adaptation to any service that is needed. In Ogaden, for example, there were trains composed of a tractor and two trailers on caterpillar treads. This was able to transport 70 tons of material across swampy country where the wheels of horse-drawn vehicles would mire themselves to the hubs.
After the month of March the Italian southern front was more than 625 miles from Mogadiscio, the base port of the southern offensive. The Ethiopian command counted on the impossibility of transport in this region as soon as the rains became frequent. This would have been true even with pack animals. But they were stupefied to see that bad weather hindered neither supply nor operations.
The extremely frequent use of motorized columns was of great military value. Certain operations effected by completely motorized detachments should be remembered. For example, the march of General Starace's corps at the end of March with 500 automobiles on GondaI, where he arrived on 1 April. His movement, completely unexpected everywhere, caused such surprise that no reaction was possible.
After the occupation of Dessie and the construction in a few days by 20,000 laborers of a road 50 miles long fit for motors, 1,600 automobiles were assembled there. They left at dawn on 26 April in a single column; the advance guard was composed of a group of armored cars. The vehicles moved with 10 yards distance between them. One hundred fifty air-planes furnished an uninterrupted service of information and reconnaissance during the entire march. The troops requested from the aviation the materials and supplies they needed. An example is cited of a repair section which received a machine lathe by air.
The effectives carried by this column reached 25,000 men. It arrived before Addis Ababa on 5 May. It had not encountered any resistance on the part of the inhabitants. A few Ethiopian soldiers who were roaming the country after the defeat of Lake Ascianghi, made a show, the first day of resistance. A short advance guard action of armored cars quickly dissipated it.
Source: PRINCIPAL LESSONS FROM THE ABYSSINIAN WAR. ["Premier enseignements de la guerre d'Abyssinie," by General Rouquerol. Revue Militaire Suisse, June 1936.] Abstracted by Major T.R. Phillips, Coast Artillery Corps. RML, March 1937.
Cheers. Raúl M.
; a little more..............................PRINCIPAL LESSONS FROM THE ABYSSINIAN WAR.
Roads were used by large convoys as soon as they could be without great risk; but the work of improvement was continued without ceasing. Thousands of automobiles constantly on the road furnished the transport in the theater of operations. Types of automotive vehicles are sufficiently numerous to insure their perfect adaptation to any service that is needed. In Ogaden, for example, there were trains composed of a tractor and two trailers on caterpillar treads. This was able to transport 70 tons of material across swampy country where the wheels of horse-drawn vehicles would mire themselves to the hubs.
After the month of March the Italian southern front was more than 625 miles from Mogadiscio, the base port of the southern offensive. The Ethiopian command counted on the impossibility of transport in this region as soon as the rains became frequent. This would have been true even with pack animals. But they were stupefied to see that bad weather hindered neither supply nor operations.
The extremely frequent use of motorized columns was of great military value. Certain operations effected by completely motorized detachments should be remembered. For example, the march of General Starace's corps at the end of March with 500 automobiles on GondaI, where he arrived on 1 April. His movement, completely unexpected everywhere, caused such surprise that no reaction was possible.
After the occupation of Dessie and the construction in a few days by 20,000 laborers of a road 50 miles long fit for motors, 1,600 automobiles were assembled there. They left at dawn on 26 April in a single column; the advance guard was composed of a group of armored cars. The vehicles moved with 10 yards distance between them. One hundred fifty air-planes furnished an uninterrupted service of information and reconnaissance during the entire march. The troops requested from the aviation the materials and supplies they needed. An example is cited of a repair section which received a machine lathe by air.
The effectives carried by this column reached 25,000 men. It arrived before Addis Ababa on 5 May. It had not encountered any resistance on the part of the inhabitants. A few Ethiopian soldiers who were roaming the country after the defeat of Lake Ascianghi, made a show, the first day of resistance. A short advance guard action of armored cars quickly dissipated it.
Source: PRINCIPAL LESSONS FROM THE ABYSSINIAN WAR. ["Premier enseignements de la guerre d'Abyssinie," by General Rouquerol. Revue Militaire Suisse, June 1936.] Abstracted by Major T.R. Phillips, Coast Artillery Corps. RML, March 1937.
Cheers. Raúl M
.- Attachments
-
- Italian motorized column moving up to the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa ....................
Das Interessante Blatt. 7 Mai 1936. - image004.jpg (31.55 KiB) Viewed 1118 times
Re: Italian Army Combat Analysis- Abyssinia
Hello to all ; a little more..............................
PRINCIPAL LESSONS FROM THE ABYSSINIAN WAR.
The absence of aerial adversaries simplified the task of the Italian aviation. After the first movements on 3 October on three routes in northern Abyssinia separated by impenetrable mountain masses, liaison between the columns was established by plane and radio. The direction of operations was thus based on the assurance of liaison that they were able to establish with even the most advanced detachments; except, and worthy of note, in case of extremely bad weather.
Airplanes were used extensively for supply service. At the outset of the operations the Italians only thought of it in especial cases of detachments difficult to reach by other means and for very restricted tonnages. This was the case with the light columns in the march on Makalle in November and in January, for the division hastening to the battle of Tembien.
But the method was rapidly standardized. The troops on the march asked for the supplies they needed by radio. They received them on the spot named by air. At the end of the campaign this was no longer a partial or exceptional operation. Transport by aviation had become a normal means of supply for troops on the march.
On 19 April, the aviation, without interrupting its reconnaissance and exploration, supplied an entire army corps, dropping packages by parachute. In the Quoram zone all of the Eritrean army corps were supplied by air. The motorized column which crossed the desert from the port of Assab to Sardo, by an audacious march of extreme difficulty, was also supplied exclusively by air.
The amplitude of these operations shows the possibility of supplying important bodies exclusively by aerial transport. This solution will, in case of necessity, be of great importance for motorized bodies, exposed by their dependence on supply, of being deprived of the independence and ubiquity that they should have due to the rapidity of their movement. The ability of an organization of this nature to order its supplies by radio, a few hours (at the most) before delivery, is a vital advantage.
Source: PRINCIPAL LESSONS FROM THE ABYSSINIAN WAR. ["Premier enseignements de la guerre d'Abyssinie," by General Rouquerol. Revue Militaire Suisse, June 1936.] Abstracted by Major T.R. Phillips, Coast Artillery Corps. RML, March 1937.
It's all folks. Cheers. Raúl M.
; a little more..............................PRINCIPAL LESSONS FROM THE ABYSSINIAN WAR.
The absence of aerial adversaries simplified the task of the Italian aviation. After the first movements on 3 October on three routes in northern Abyssinia separated by impenetrable mountain masses, liaison between the columns was established by plane and radio. The direction of operations was thus based on the assurance of liaison that they were able to establish with even the most advanced detachments; except, and worthy of note, in case of extremely bad weather.
Airplanes were used extensively for supply service. At the outset of the operations the Italians only thought of it in especial cases of detachments difficult to reach by other means and for very restricted tonnages. This was the case with the light columns in the march on Makalle in November and in January, for the division hastening to the battle of Tembien.
But the method was rapidly standardized. The troops on the march asked for the supplies they needed by radio. They received them on the spot named by air. At the end of the campaign this was no longer a partial or exceptional operation. Transport by aviation had become a normal means of supply for troops on the march.
On 19 April, the aviation, without interrupting its reconnaissance and exploration, supplied an entire army corps, dropping packages by parachute. In the Quoram zone all of the Eritrean army corps were supplied by air. The motorized column which crossed the desert from the port of Assab to Sardo, by an audacious march of extreme difficulty, was also supplied exclusively by air.
The amplitude of these operations shows the possibility of supplying important bodies exclusively by aerial transport. This solution will, in case of necessity, be of great importance for motorized bodies, exposed by their dependence on supply, of being deprived of the independence and ubiquity that they should have due to the rapidity of their movement. The ability of an organization of this nature to order its supplies by radio, a few hours (at the most) before delivery, is a vital advantage.
Source: PRINCIPAL LESSONS FROM THE ABYSSINIAN WAR. ["Premier enseignements de la guerre d'Abyssinie," by General Rouquerol. Revue Militaire Suisse, June 1936.] Abstracted by Major T.R. Phillips, Coast Artillery Corps. RML, March 1937.
It's all folks. Cheers. Raúl M
.-
Happy Wanderer
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Re: Italian Army Combat Analysis- Abyssinia
Excellent series of posts Raúl
Very much appreciated...great stuff.
Cheers
Happy Weekend
Very much appreciated...great stuff.
Cheers
Happy Weekend
Re: Italian Army Combat Analysis- Abyssinia
A more detailed description of the cableway can be seen here.tigre wrote:Hello to all
PRINCIPAL LESSONS FROM THE ABYSSINIAN WAR.
Tactics depends upon the technical possibilities of materiel; but these possibilities vary each day with the progress of invention. Technical facts which have been decisive in wars of the past may no longer have application. If we are not to be hypnotized by the facts of the past we have to follow all the practical tests in which war materiel is employed. The Italian-Ethiopian conflict acquires an obvious interest in this respect. The observations drawn from an essentially colonial campaign cannot be transposed without reflection to a European theater of war; but they can be considered from the point of view of mechanical performance of materiel and will give positive results as to the service we can demand of it.
The Italian success in Ethiopia is the result of foresight and careful staff preparation. The seaport at Massaoua had to be rebuilt to handle the traffic anticipated. A base had to be built at Asmara, 6,000 feet above sea level. Men debarking at Massaoua were moved at once to Asmara; supplies were kept there only long enough to be classified before being forwarded. The climate at Massaoua is intolerable for Europeans while that at Asmara is quite supportable.
Before the war, connection with Massaoua and Asmara was maintained by a narrow gauge railway of doubtful dependence. The first feat of the Italians was the construction, in a few weeks, of an automobile route between Massaoua and Asmara. It is 75 miles long, cutting and climbing the most difficult mountains. Thirty thousand laborers working day and nigh accomplished this gigantic task.
The number of automobiles running over this highway quickly reached 1,200 each way. But since the load was too narrow for two-way circulation, the convoys going up used the road for twelve hours and the convoys coming down for the twelve hours following. In spite of heavy day and night traffic, numerous sharp turns and steep slopes, the number of accidents was extremely few.
The next step was the building of a second route to establish a one-way round trip between Massaoua and Asmara. This was opened to traffic in November. Finally, an aerial cable was installed to carry trucks over the most difficult ravine, reducing the length of the journey by an appreciable amount.
Routes were equally important in all operations. To borrow a sentence from General Badoglio: "We had to give two thousand blows with a pick for each blow (shot) with a gun." The labor for road building was furnished initially by enlisted laborers. These were managed by cadres of engineers. When the continuous offensive was finally taken up it was necessary to turn all troops into road builders as necessary. Between 9 and 17 April, when a road was cut between Quorum and Dessie, Marshal Badoglio wrote: "For 50 miles all the men of all the corps, without exception, including the doctors and medical attendants, worked on the opening of a trail with an ardor that no words can express." It was often necessary to construct long difficult roads to bring artillery into position. In one of the last battles, 2,500 artillerymen went to build a road of access to their positions of the next day while their guns remained parked in a ravine.
There is no region in Europe with as few roads as Ethiopia; but this, is no reason to believe that the enormous movements of motors foreseen in the future will be practicable with existing communications. As in Ethiopia it will be necessary at times to build them.
Source: PRINCIPAL LESSONS FROM THE ABYSSINIAN WAR. ["Premier enseignements de la guerre d'Abyssinie," by General Rouquerol. Revue Militaire Suisse, June 1936.] Abstracted by Major T.R. Phillips, Coast Artillery Corps. RML, March 1937.
Cheers. Raúl M
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 6&t=117948
Re: Italian Army Combat Analysis- Abyssinia
Thank you very much for that link UMachine . Cheers. Raúl M .
. Cheers. Raúl M .