The Role of Italian Armor in the Spanish Civil War

[Marcus]

Attached is "The Role of Italian Armor in the Spanish Civil War" by Pierangeli Caiti and Alberto Pirella from Armor Magazine May-June 1986. Hopefully it is of interest.

For more on tank warfare in the Spanish Civil War see http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=32&t=86535

(Back issues of the Armor Magazine can be found at http://www.benning.army.mil/armor/eARMO ... ssues.html)

/Marcus

[Pedro Ruíz]

Marcus Wendel,dear friend much thanks for your information about the Italian tanks of the General Franco in the Spanish Civil War.Marcus,in Comando Supremo Forum makes some years ago,I wrote an article titled "Tanks war in the Spanish Civil War 1936-39",I put here the link:

http://www.comandosupremo.com/forums/to ... r-1936-39/

I hope that it can be useful.

Best wishes

Pedro

[Pedro Ruíz]

In Spanish language there is a wonderful book about the Italian armour in the Civil War 1936-39.This book is titled "El regreso de las legiones".

-de Mesa,José Luis; "El regreso de las legiones.(Voluntarios Italianos en la Guerra Civil Española",Edt. Hispan Editor S.L.,Granada (España),1994

[Ironmachine]

There is quite a number of significant mistakes in that articles, as can be seen here:
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 9#p1930319

[Marcus]

Thanks for the additions Pedro. I'm reposting the above in the thread at http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=32&t=86535

/Marcus

[Pedro Ruíz]

Marcus,much thanks for to put the link with the great article about the tanks war in the Spanish Civil War written by Kurk Belarus....! is amazing,great job.

Pedro

[Ironmachine]

Marcus,much thanks for to put the link with the great article about the tanks war in the Spanish Civil War written by Kurk Belarus....! is amazing,great job.

Kurt_Belarus only posted it. The article was written by Steven J. Zaloga. And yes, it is quite good, without the glaring mistakes of the ARMOR Magazine's articles.

[Pedro Ruíz]

Ironmachine much thanks for to leave the things clears,wholehearted thanks....I never have read to Steven Zaloga although I know some of their great works.

[steverodgers801]

Spain was also a bad classroom for the Soviets. Gen. Pavlov who commanded the western front at the start of Barbarossa, convinced Stalin that large tank forces were not practical and thus they were disbanded about 1939. One of the reason for the German success is the Soviets were in the middle of reforming tank corps and there was a severe lack of capable tank commanders among other things.

[Pedro Ruíz]

Steverogers hello:
Yes,you right,for the Soviet Army the Spanish Civil War wasn´t a good "university" for to know the handle of the tank as war machine,but the problem of the warfare in the final of 1930s wasn´t only a problem of the Soviets,this problem was a common problem of the other Staffs of several armies of West Europe and USA.

Till 1939 any Staff Army from Cambrais Battle (1917) in which a great mass of British tanks attacked and broke the static defenses of the German infantry in the front,any Army come back to use a mass tanks attacking for to break the defenses of the enemy.The lesson of Cambrais was forgot by all armies perhaps because the victory in the Great War 1914-18 was got by the countries with democracies and political parties of rights and lefts.The only that learned the lessons of Cambrais were the German militaries especially the German school led by the Colonel Luzt,school had as students to Guderian,von Manstein,Erwin Rommel...Also some British militaries as generals Fuller,Hobbart or the Capt. Liddle Hart,and in France the Col. de Gaulle,and in USA the Gen. Patton.The tank as the aircraft carrier-ship were weapons too new for the military thought of 1919-39.

In the case of the Soviet Union,in the time of Staiin had two militaries specialized in the handle of one great mass of tanks attacking: Zhukov (he was destined in the Siberia Army and he proved his knowledge of the tank warfare in the summer of 1939 against the Japanese Army in Khalkin Gol Battle) and the General Mijail Tujachesky,perhaps Tujachevsky was the maximum expert in the tank warfare in the Soviet Army.In the 1920s Tujachevsky was in contact with militaries of Germany while these trained secretly with new weapons in the Russian fields.Tujachevsky was murdered by orders of Stain or Beria in the Purge of 1937.The Purge of 1937 left with head to the Soviet Army.By his knowledge in the tank warfare perhaps the Gen. Tujachevsky was the most expert of the Soviet Army in a time in which very few high militaries were able to see the importance of the tank as war machine.

Best wishes

Pedro Ruíz

[Ironmachine]

Till 1939 any Staff Army from Cambrais Battle (1917) in which a great mass of British tanks attacked and broke the static defenses of the German infantry in the front,any Army come back to use a mass tanks attacking for to break the defenses of the enemy.

If Cambrai was indeed the model for tank actions (an idea which I don't agree with), let's not forget that by the end of the battle gains and losses of terrain by the Germans and British were largely proportionate, and the Germans had managed to break the defenses of the British infantry without tanks. So it was not really that encouraging for tank operations.

However, it should be noted that learning anything useful about the employement of large tank forces in independent operations was almost impossible in a war in which, for example:
- the Nationals: their only real tanks were were those captured from the enemy; the total number of "tanks" available amounted to just four-five battalions at their top strength and they were mostly not integrated in combined-arms units; there were two (or maybe we can count three) different doctrines about the employment of tanks in use;
- the Republicans: they had a total of just 331 useful tanks for the whole war (in any given moment the number was much lower due to losses and the fact that many tanks had not yet arrived in Spain); the amount of integrated support (artillery, infantry, etc.) the tank units had was zero;
- Both: industrial support was negligible; terrain was not optimal for tank warfare in most of the country; Spanish commanding officers' experience with independent tank operations was zero; tanks were used mostly in infantry-support missions.
So perhaps it was much more the case of not making the wrong conclusions instead of learning the good lessons.

[Pedro Ruíz]

Ironmachine hello !
The Spanish Army in the S. XX was an army of infantry.The Spanish Army doctrine in the war was the doctrine of one army before of 1914 -to use a great mass of infantry for to attack the enemy in the battlefield with rifles and bayonets in a frontal clash.Spain was a country with a economy based in the agriculture and cattle,had few heavy industries furthermore and Spain was a country in which there wasn´t military culture in their elites politicals,economicals,scientifics and intelectuals as in other countries more advanced,rich and developed as Germany,Great Britain or USA;in the Spanish schools and universities hadn´t military culture in the teachers that had to teach the History for to foster the interest for to create industries of heavy weapons as tanks,armored fighting vehicles of wheels or aircrafts.Perhaps the best exponent of the Spanish failure in the modern warfare is in the aftermath in the massacre of Annual Battle,is the failure of one infantry army.

In the Spanish Civil War all tanks used were tanks built in Germany (panzer I),Italy (Fiat-Ansaldo L3) and Soviet Union (T-26,and serie BT).More some outdated Renautl FT-17 of the Spanish Army bought to France in 1920s.

[Ironmachine]

The Spanish Army in the S. XX was an army of infantry.

Yes. At the time of the SCW most armies in the world were what you would call "armies of infantry". In 1936 there was nothing wrong "per se" in being an army of infantry.

The Spanish Army doctrine in the war was the doctrine of one army before of 1914 -to use a great mass of infantry for to attack the enemy in the battlefield with rifles and bayonets in a frontal clash.

No, the Spanish Army doctrine in 1936 was not that of "one army before of 1914". The lessons of WWI had been studied and applied to doctrine (Doctrina para el Empleo Táctico de las Armas y los Servicios of 1924 and Reglamento Táctico de Infantería of 1929), even if the materials were somewhat lacking and the new doctrine was not the most advanced in the world. But the Spanish Army in 1936 was not going to fight like a pre-1914 army.

Perhaps the best exponent of the Spanish failure in the modern warfare is in the aftermath in the massacre of Annual Battle,is the failure of one infantry army.

There was nothing of "modern warfare" at Annual, so I can't see how it qualifies as an exponent of failure in modern warfare. And in any case, then perhaps the best exponent of the Spanish success in the modern warfare is the successful conclusion of the war after Annual, with the use of modern equipment and techniques (air support, gas warfare, tanks, combined operations like Alhucemas...)?

In the Spanish Civil War all tanks used were tanks built in Germany (panzer I),Italy (Fiat-Ansaldo L3) and Soviet Union (T-26,and serie BT).More some outdated Renautl FT-17 of the Spanish Army bought to France in 1920s.

That's something that is well know. What's your point? That you don't need heavy industries for a modern army, because you can always buy the needed equipment from other countries?

[Pedro Ruíz]

Hello Ironmachine
1.- The question of AlhucemasThe operation of disembark of Alhucemas for to give a great blow against the army of Ab-del-Krim was possible thanks to the French offensive a great scale made by the French troops from French Mooroco,this offensive was led by the best French marshall,the Marshall P. Petain.The success of Ab-del-Krim Army in Annual made fear to France that a great muslin revolt could expand to French Morocco then France sent to Morocco to hers best general,the Marshall Petain.He organized a task force with colonial elite units and the Staffs of France and Spain agreed to make an offensive a great scale against the Ab-de-Krim Army.While the Spanish Army made a great disembark in the North on Alhucemas bay with crack units -this operation was prepared in detail by F. Franco- the French Army would attack by the East from French Morocco,the main was to take between two fires to the Ab del Krim Army.This operation was a great success and the Ab del Krim Army was defeated.

Alhucemas was a great military success of the Spanish Army but this success was possible thanks to the French offensive launched by French Morocco and led by Marshall Petain

2.-Advantages to have a heavy industry.To be a great power in the world.To develop high technology.To change a country of shepherds of sheets and peasants in a great industrial power.In this way all are advantages....!

[steverodgers801]

Just as bomber advocates did not comprehend how fighters would evolve, so to did few commanders in Europe understand how quickly tanks would evolve into suitable combat vehicles. What made Guderian unique among most was not the use of tanks, but the need to have combined arms in tank units, have all tanks be able to communicate and to have a large enough crew so that the commander could focus on the battle and not be burdened with helping serve the gun