German Survival at Stalingrad

[Marcus Wendel]

An uncivil post by waldzee was removed. This thread has a padlock it its immediate future if the personal remarks continues.

/Marcus

[David Thompson]

An off-topic post from waldzee was removed by this moderator - DT.

[Konig_pilsner]

I may be wrong, but wouldn't the 6th's attack on Stalingrad tie down more Russian forces then just sitting on the other side of the canal? Wouldn't it also give the Russians the initiative to attack wherever and whenever it so wished? It is my understanding that the key to protecting the forces in the Caucasaus is holding both Rostov and Stalingrad, with the higher priority being Rostov.

Perhaps it would have been better to forget about going south at all until Stalingrad is taken and sufficient forces can be entrenched along the Don. Guess that means waiting until '43.

[Qvist]

I may be wrong, but wouldn't the 6th's attack on Stalingrad tie down more Russian forces then just sitting on the other side of the canal? Wouldn't it also give the Russians the initiative to attack wherever and whenever it so wished? It is my understanding that the key to protecting the forces in the Caucasaus is holding both Rostov and Stalingrad, with the higher priority being Rostov.

Perhaps it would have been better to forget about going south at all until Stalingrad is taken and sufficient forces can be entrenched along the Don. Guess that means waiting until '43.

Hehe, it's sort of, on what level of hopelessness do we wish to consider the issues? The Volga was the only logical place to anchor the left flank of a drive into the Caucasus, and that required the capture of Stalingrad.

On a different level, Blau simply did not have the resources to have any realistic chance of succeeding - they could not get to the Volga, nor take the Caucasus. In fact, with manpower and equipment resources from late summer on sucked into force construction in the West and the Ostheer starved both of reinforcements (none of significance at all) and replacements (far too few), they did not even have the resources to defend themselves through the winter. Already before the blow fell, personell shortfall levels in the east had reached ridiculous levels, and nobody was worse hit than 6th Army, who suffered extremely heavy casualties continuously from June though October.

[Art]

On a different level, Blau simply did not have the resources to have any realistic chance of succeeding - they could not get to the Volga, nor take the Caucasus.

In fact Volga was reached and Caucasus was within reach as well. The lack of resources is arguable too, after all resources were found for meaningless operation "Wirlberwind" or several extra divisions suntanning in France.

[Qvist]

In fact Volga was reached

Well, excuse my imprecision. The volga certainly was reached, but the problem was rather that the Red army was not pushed to the other side of it, which rather negated its usefulness as a defensive anchor.

and Caucasus was within reach as well.

Was it? Then why did Army Group A stop before there were halfway?

The lack of resources is arguable too,

No, it isn't. Army Groups A and B plainly did not get the resources they needed in order to meet their aims, as is evident from the fact that they didn't meet them. Have a look at the personell situation of Army Group B if you like, and tell me if you find anything you like.

after all resources were found for meaningless operation "Wirlberwind"

By Army Group Center, from their own local means, yes. And I have a hunch they might not have considered the operation meaningless.

or several extra divisions suntanning in France.

[/quote]

They weren't suntanning, they were being rebuilt, to form Operationsarmee 43. That's why there were so few replacements and no reinforcements going East from August 42 and until December. You meet them again in December, January, February and March, when they provided the means to stabilise the front in the East and halt the allied advance into Tunisia. Not entirely wasted.

I'm not sure what's your beef here, but it is hardly in question that the forces allotted for Blau were insufficient to carry it out successfully. There also is no question that replacements east dropped sharply from August and that reinforcements stopped altogether, or that this in combination with continuing significant losses caused the condition and strength of the Ostheer in general and AG B in particular to deteriorate very badly. It is also clear, and documentable, that this was an anticipated and consciously accepted development, and that the reason for it was that the available resources were instead focussed on forming or rebuiliding a large number of divisions in the West, for use in a renewed drive into the Middle East through the Caucasus in 1943. As early as September, OKH anticipated 800,000 Fehlstellen in the Ostheer, and expected this to have grown to 1.2 million by the end of March, unless extra manpower was called up. This did not prove to be excessively pessimistic (as far as November is concerned). For other readers who might not be fully conversant with the term Fehlstellen, that means an anticipated 1.2 million empty positions in the establishment of the units on the Eastern front, relative to what their establishment strength called for. Also, it was assumed that the Red army was more or less finished, and would expend its remaining strength on hopeless winter attacks that even a greatly reduced Ostheer would be able to hold. As insane as it sounds, and is, there it is, black on white and spelled out in clear terms by OKH, if you look at the relevant documentation. The war diary of the Organisationsabteilung is particularly recommended, providing as it does a detailed running discussion of the issues.

[apollo144]

Hehe, it's sort of, on what level of hopelessness do we wish to consider the issues? The Volga was the only logical place to anchor the left flank of a drive into the Caucasus, and that required the capture of Stalingrad.

No, you could stay behind the Don. That was actually considered as a winter position to fall back upon which would mean giving up the Caucasus and Stalingrad.

[waldzee]

On a different level, Blau simply did not have the resources to have any realistic chance of succeeding - they could not get to the Volga, nor take the Caucasus.

In fact Volga was reached and Caucasus was within reach as well. The lack of resources is arguable too, after all resources were found for meaningless operation "Wirlberwind" or several extra divisions suntanning in France.

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Art ,I wish you the patience of Job, the concilliation of Ghandi, the wisdom of King Solomon & the backbone of Hercules since you will need all four in this 'special' discussion...

[Art]

Was it? Then why did Army Group A stop before there were halfway?

I don't say that they didn't stop, I am saying that they were not that far from their objectives. That seems to be a topic for what if section but my impression is that the scenario of successful competition of Caucasus operation wasn't altogether impossible.

[Qvist]

Well, the advance petered out around Malgobek and Tuapse, which must be close to 1,000 kilometers from Baku (Krasnodar-Baku is well above 1,000 - as the crow flies) - roughly similar to the distance between Kaunas and Moscow, so there was still some ground to cover. Army Group A was furthermore straddled along a mountaineous river barrier, at the far end of overstretched supply lines after having advanced more than 400 km in little more than two months. It fielded two not very strong armies with a combined Iststärke in the area of 350,000 men, facing Soviet forces who numbered some 600,000 in mid-July and would number well above 1 million by the turn of the year. They were simpply stopped cold in hard fighting in September, unable even to clear Novorossiysk completely, and thereafter, the situation did not improve. Without a major infusion of resources, I don't see what they could possibly have done that would have stood any chance of re-igniting the advance, let alone of reaching distant objectives to which they had covered barely a third of the distance during the whole summer. The progression of the autumn season did not exactly assist matters either.

[waldzee]

Fact is that no statical line in WW2 'held' anyway...this concept may work on tactical level for a short time as improvisation until reinforcements arrive.

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
defense of Leningrad and Moscow, - as two " minor temporary examples".

*personal remark removed by moderator*

[Qvist]

Fact is that no statical line in WW2 'held' anyway...this concept may work on tactical level for a short time as improvisation until reinforcements arrive.

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
defense of Leningrad and Moscow, - as two " minor temporary examples".

Except of course that neither Leningrad or Moscow was held through the means of a static fortified line. And yes, I am aware, as we all are, that there were fortifications around Leningrad and also in front of Moscow, but we are also all aware that this does not mean that this is what caused them to be held.

Art ,I wish you the patience of Job, the concilliation of Ghandi, the wisdom of King Solomon & the backbone of Hercules since you will need all four in this 'special' discussion...

You're not going to remove the impression created by ceaselessly irrelevant and erratic posts by being a drama queen into the bargain.


Look, why don't you just try to post something normal, sensible and intelligible every now and then? Nobody enjoys all the aggro, it's just you don't leave people much choice.

[Art]

Well, the advance petered out around Malgobek and Tuapse, which must be close to 1,000 kilometers from Baku (Krasnodar-Baku is well above 1,000 - as the crow flies) - roughly similar to the distance between Kaunas and Moscow, so there was still some ground to cover.

Malgobek is some 550 km from Baku. The same Malgobek is 600 km from Taganrog - the closest German-held point at the start of the Blau. The most part of the road was behind the back.

[Qvist]

Hm, so it is. I wasn't aware that Malgobek was so far East, nor actually that the German advance went that far East. And ViaMichelin couldn't deal with Baku for some reason, so I was forced to estimate from a rough knowledge of the approximate end line of the German advance that I thought stayed further west. But so what? That's still nearly the equivalent of Minsk to Moscow, across mountaineous country, in the fall, employing supply lines even longer than I thought, and against an enemy strong enough to have stopped the advance who then gained further in strength. And you still have a very large number of factors to address if your point is that success in the Caucasus was within reach for the Germans.

[ljadw]

The opinion of the Austrian historian H.Magenheimer is :
"Success or failure of the German plan de campagne of 1942 therefore depended on being able to destroy large parts of the Soviet army in southern Russia IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE START OF THE OFFENSIVE and preventing their withdrawal to the Wolga and the Caucasus"(the emphasis is from Magenheimer).(Hitler's war : PP 139-140)
As we know,this did not happen.It was Barbarossa again,with the difference that there would be no Typhoon in october 1942.