Barbarossa - what is more flawed?

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ljadw
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Re: Barbarossa - what is more flawed?

#211

Post by ljadw » 15 Sep 2014, 19:31

Don71 wrote:My response is basing on facts and reasearched primary and secondary sources.

Lance Corporals are not educated or have the knowledge to lead Armys at any tactical or strategical level!

But you can still believing in your own myths of WWI and WWII
About the 1.6 million boots,something which was totally unimportant : the Soviet shoe production in 1940 was 206 million,thus,1.6 million LL boots: :P

The SU had plenty of shoes at the start of the war and it mobilised 10 million men BEFORE the first LL boots arrived ,thus these men were shoeed by the Soviet state .

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BDV
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Re: Barbarossa - what is more flawed?

#212

Post by BDV » 16 Sep 2014, 11:08

Don71 wrote:Lance Corporals are not educated or have the knowledge to lead Armys at any tactical or strategical level!
Neither do they teach grand stratigery in the seminary...

As to Hitler, his mistakes were made before July. The mistakes in July squarely belong to lowlifes like Manstein and other junker fibbers of Wehrmacht.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion


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Appleknocker27
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Re: Barbarossa - what is more flawed?

#213

Post by Appleknocker27 » 17 Sep 2014, 17:53

BDV wrote:
Don71 wrote:Lance Corporals are not educated or have the knowledge to lead Armys at any tactical or strategical level!
Neither do they teach grand stratigery in the seminary...

As to Hitler, his mistakes were made before July. The mistakes in July squarely belong to lowlifes like Manstein and other junker fibbers of Wehrmacht.
What mistakes exactly? Barbarossa was planned on assumptions (Soviet force structure, dispositions, will to fight and force generation) that were proven false, there is the key mistake(s). The next most important errors were made in late October - December 1, which involved the complete exhaustion and over extension of AGC. Had AGC not been over extended in late Fall of 1941 they would have suffered less loss of key personnel and equipment and been in a far better position to destroy the Soviet counter-offensive. In that case, Moscow may well have been the target for 1942. If AGC had dug in instead of overextending in Nov. they would have sacrificed far fewer motorized equipment (losses due to mud and lack of maintenance in Nov), heavy equipment and held strong positions when the Soviets attacked in Dec. The net result is a healthier (relative to OTL) Wehrmacht and a more wounded RKKA when Spring 1942 comes about. The whole dynamic of 1942 was effected by the poor decisions of late Oct-Dec.

As for the decisions of July, the Wehrmacht completed the objectives as outlined in the -original- plan and did so efficiently and on time. When it was realized that the original base estimates were miscalculated, the Kiev operation was decided upon. All things considered, this was a highly successful operation and set up Typhoon which was initially also a highly successful operation. Had the Germans stopped there in mid October and subsequently smashed the Soviet counter-offensive then Barbarossa would have been far more effective. That idea has to be taken in the context of: No matter how you replay and second guess the decisions of 1941, the Wehrmacht as planned and deployed for Barbarossa lacked sufficient combat capability/mass to fulfill its mission of destroying the USSR in 1941 (simply not possible without more troops, equipment, etc.).

steverodgers801
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Re: Barbarossa - what is more flawed?

#214

Post by steverodgers801 » 17 Sep 2014, 18:26

The main mistake of Hitler was in deciding that the Soviets would fall apart right away, all staff work had to be based on that assumption. I do believe though that many of the generals shared Hitler's view and so were not concerned.

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Re: Barbarossa - what is more flawed?

#215

Post by David1819 » 17 Sep 2014, 19:07

steverodgers801 wrote:The main mistake of Hitler was in deciding that the Soviets would fall apart right away
This is not exactly what he thought it was more of a gamble speculating a Soviet collapse within 3 month. I am convinced that USSR would collapse if the Germans had hidden their true intentions temporarily and used a façade of liberation using the Russian people as tools against "Blood Thirsty Stalin" and using the same psychological warfare tactics in Ukraine the USSR would have come down like a demolished building.

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Re: Barbarossa - what is more flawed?

#216

Post by Appleknocker27 » 17 Sep 2014, 19:34

steverodgers801 wrote:The main mistake of Hitler was in deciding that the Soviets would fall apart right away, all staff work had to be based on that assumption. I do believe though that many of the generals shared Hitler's view and so were not concerned.
Not exactly from what I've gathered. The base assumptions for the staff to work up the Barbarossa plan included known Soviet strength, strategic/tactical dispositions and how fast they could be expected to mobilize. The foundation of the plan and reason for stating the Soviets would collapse in 3 months was that the Germans knew what the Soviets had West of the Dnieper and didn't believe that the Soviets had much more. What the Germans expected to meet did not impress them and thus the idea of a short campaign followed by collapse. The Germans did indeed quickly and efficiently destroy the forces that they estimated to encounter, the problems started when the base assumptions were proven false.

"By August 1941, the motorised supply system was exhausted. Ammunition and fuel, both of which were previously under-estimated were in limited supply. The reason was because the planning requirements were inaccurately based on the transportation capability rather operational consumption. Commanders were unable to exploit tactical advantage because of severe shortages of fuel and ammunition and as such resupply could not keep pace with advances. Tactical operations were curtailed for weeks waiting for resupply from the rear."

(not sure where this quote is from, a previous post of mine, a paper I did for grad school or Glantz, other author?)

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Re: Barbarossa - what is more flawed?

#217

Post by steinmetz » 18 Sep 2014, 08:22

BDV wrote: Neither do they teach grand stratigery in the seminary...

As to Hitler, his mistakes were made before July. The mistakes in July squarely belong to lowlifes like Manstein and other junker fibbers of Wehrmacht.
Given that Manstein was just a corps commander at the time, this does not make much sense.
And it seems to me that Hitler made a very important and disputable decision in august.

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Re: Barbarossa - what is more flawed?

#218

Post by ljadw » 18 Sep 2014, 16:25

steinmetz wrote: And it seems to me that Hitler made a very important and disputable decision in august.

Which one ?

And,why was it very important and disputable ?

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Re: Barbarossa - what is more flawed?

#219

Post by BDV » 18 Sep 2014, 19:41

Appleknocker27 wrote:What mistakes exactly? ... As for the decisions of July, the Wehrmacht completed the objectives as outlined in the -original- plan and did so efficiently and on time.
No, they did not. Let's use Directive 21 as starting point:

The southern group of these two Army Groups—the center of the entire front—will be given the task of annihilating the forces of the enemy in White Russia by advancing from the region around and north of Warsaw with especially strong armored and motorized units. The possibility of switching strong mobile units to the North must thereby be created in order, in cooperation with the Northern Army Group operating from East Prussia in the general direction of Leningrad, to annihilate the enemy forces fighting in the Baltic (n.ed. 1!). Only after having accomplished this most important task (n.ed.!), which must be followed by the occupation of Leningrad and Kronstadt (n.ed. 2!), are the offensive operations aimed at the occupation of the important traffic and armament center of Moscow to be pursued.

Only a surprisingly fast collapse of Russian resistance could justify aiming at both objectives simultaneously.


Unfortunately, Adolf's minions got blinded by the shiny objective of Leningrad, leading to the triple defensive Soviet victories of Luga River, Emajogi River, and Pustoshka Marshes, and the dramatic German defeat at Soltsy on the Shelon, after which the 56th Panzer Corps ceased to exist as a motorized unit.

All things considered, this was a highly successful operation and set up Typhoon which was initially also a highly successful operation. Had the Germans stopped there in mid October and subsequently smashed the Soviet counter-offensive then Barbarossa would have been far more effective.
But generals went once again for smash and grab, some talking about parading through Moscow on November 7!?!! Again, a great opportunity for encirclement and destruction of Soviet armies at Rzhev was wasted in a stupendously silly dash for Kalinin (present day Tver).

That idea has to be taken in the context of: No matter how you replay and second guess the decisions of 1941, the Wehrmacht as planned and deployed for Barbarossa lacked sufficient combat capability/mass to fulfill its mission of destroying the USSR in 1941 (simply not possible without more troops, equipment, etc.).
Sure, that's why I regard execution only as mediocre, as opposed to planning which was bad, and preparation (IMO, after this thread's argumentations) which was atrocious.
BDV wrote:
Neither do they teach grand stratigery in the seminary...


As to Hitler, his mistakes were made before July. The mistakes in July squarely belong to lowlifes like Manstein and other junker fibbers of Wehrmacht.

Given that Manstein was just a corps commander at the time, this does not make much sense.
His mishandling of the situation on the Shelon, a glorious Soviet victory, but Hoepner and VLeeb do have equal shares of blame for sticking the 56th Corps, striped of Totenkopf in that mess. 3rd Panzer, for sending the 19th Panzer out on a limb to VLuki, from where it barely escaped the fate of 8th Panzer. I have not dug up enough on Guderian and his exploits
And it seems to me that Hitler made a very important and disputable decision in august.
No dice because the 39th Panzer and the 41st panzer were stuck attacking Leningrad, not to mention the logistical questions. If you understand the folly of November 1941 german armor-only attacks (logistic strain and lack of infantry support), apply the same logik to armor-only attacks on Moscow in September. Also, contemplate Kleist's fate at Rostov.

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Re: Barbarossa - what is more flawed?

#220

Post by Appleknocker27 » 18 Sep 2014, 20:21

No, they did not. Let's use Directive 21 as starting point:
-snip-
Within the context of the original Intel estimates they certainly did. The estimated enemy forces were encountered and destroyed, which was my point. The Intel estimates were wrong, not the fault of the operational commanders or even the planners for that matter. The Abwehr/FHO failed OKH, it's as simple as "garbage in, garbage out" in regards to a plan and it's base assumptions. The operational and logistical support plans as well as force structure and timetable were all subject to the Intel estimate of enemy forces and their strategic and tactical dispositions. These estimated enemy forces had to be destroyed prior to effective Soviet mobilization, or force generation as Glantz terms it and again, the Intel estimates got it wrong.
But generals went once again for smash and grab, some talking about parading through Moscow on November 7!?!! Again, a great opportunity for encirclement and destruction of Soviet armies at Rzhev was wasted in a stupendously silly dash for Kalinin (present day Tver).
You are ignoring that these generals were all being told that the Russians had no reserves left and that they were about to collapse. Very few of them believed otherwise, von Rundstedt being the most prominent. These men were highly competent operationalists, tacticians and logisticians, but that cannot make up for a lack of good information let alone BAD information.

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Re: Barbarossa - what is more flawed?

#221

Post by steverodgers801 » 18 Sep 2014, 21:47

The decision to go south in august was made based on the German planners of Barbarossa, Paulus being the head of the group, who foresaw that there would be a need to clear the flanks on AGC before moving on to Moscow

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Re: Barbarossa - what is more flawed?

#222

Post by BDV » 18 Sep 2014, 23:57

Appleknocker27 wrote:The estimated enemy forces were encountered and destroyed, which was my point.
No they were not. And even when they were it was mostly by Adolf's armtwisting field commanders to stick to the warplan (see Kiev). Sometimes hilarity ensued (19th Panzer 80 mile foray to Velikiye Luyki and back), but sometimes, more tragic than tragicomic (8th Panzer's beatdown at Soltsy and the end of "Panzer" in the 56th "Panzer" Corps).

You are ignoring that these generals were all being told that the Russians had no reserves left and that they were about to collapse. Very few of them believed otherwise, von Rundstedt being the most prominent. These men were highly competent operationalists, tacticians and logisticians, but that cannot make up for a lack of good information let alone BAD information.
Postwar fabrications of Adolf's bootlicking wartime stooges. Both Abwehr and the field commanders had a good understanding of Soviet resistance. The blame for the December debacle lays squarely with "celebrate November 7 in Moscow" Bock, panzer hotheads Hoth, Hopner, and (much less) Guderian, and the Brauchitsch-Halder deskjockey duo.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

steinmetz
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Re: Barbarossa - what is more flawed?

#223

Post by steinmetz » 20 Sep 2014, 15:30

ljadw wrote:
steinmetz wrote:
Which one ?

And,why was it very important and disputable ?
You know that it is the decision to go south which is one of the most discussed decisions of ww2.

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Re: Barbarossa - what is more flawed?

#224

Post by steinmetz » 20 Sep 2014, 15:36

BDV wrote: But generals went once again for smash and grab, some talking about parading through Moscow on November 7!?!! Again, a great opportunity for encirclement and destruction of Soviet armies at Rzhev was wasted in a stupendously silly dash for Kalinin (present day Tver).
The decision of the Armygroup can be critized but you have to name a specific commander instead of blustering.

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Re: Barbarossa - what is more flawed?

#225

Post by steinmetz » 20 Sep 2014, 15:39

BDV wrote: His mishandling of the situation on the Shelon, a glorious Soviet victory, but Hoepner and VLeeb do have equal shares of blame for sticking the 56th Corps, striped of Totenkopf in that mess. 3rd Panzer, for sending the 19th Panzer out on a limb to VLuki, from where it barely escaped the fate of 8th Panzer. I have not dug up enough on Guderian and his exploits .
No mishandling there by Manstein who did not agree with the decsion to stick 56 Panzercorps where it was. It got itself out of trouble so there was no glorious Soviet victory either.

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