Appleknocker27 wrote:What mistakes exactly? ... As for the decisions of July, the Wehrmacht completed the objectives as outlined in the -original- plan and did so efficiently and on time.
No, they did not. Let's use Directive 21 as starting point:
The southern group of these two Army Groups—the center of the entire front—will be given the task of annihilating the forces of the enemy in White Russia by advancing from the region around and north of Warsaw with especially strong armored and motorized units. The possibility of switching strong mobile units to the North must thereby be created in order, in cooperation with the Northern Army Group operating from East Prussia in the general direction of Leningrad, to annihilate the enemy forces fighting in the Baltic (n.ed. 1!). Only after having accomplished this most important task (n.ed.!), which must be followed by the occupation of Leningrad and Kronstadt (n.ed. 2!), are the offensive operations aimed at the occupation of the important traffic and armament center of Moscow to be pursued.
Only a surprisingly fast collapse of Russian resistance could justify aiming at both objectives simultaneously.
Unfortunately, Adolf's minions got blinded by the shiny objective of Leningrad, leading to the triple defensive Soviet victories of Luga River, Emajogi River, and Pustoshka Marshes, and the dramatic German defeat at Soltsy on the Shelon, after which the 56th Panzer Corps ceased to exist as a motorized unit.
All things considered, this was a highly successful operation and set up Typhoon which was initially also a highly successful operation. Had the Germans stopped there in mid October and subsequently smashed the Soviet counter-offensive then Barbarossa would have been far more effective.
But generals went once again for smash and grab, some talking about parading through Moscow on November 7!?!! Again, a great opportunity for encirclement and destruction of Soviet armies at Rzhev was wasted in a stupendously silly dash for Kalinin (present day Tver).
That idea has to be taken in the context of: No matter how you replay and second guess the decisions of 1941, the Wehrmacht as planned and deployed for Barbarossa lacked sufficient combat capability/mass to fulfill its mission of destroying the USSR in 1941 (simply not possible without more troops, equipment, etc.).
Sure, that's why I regard execution only as mediocre, as opposed to planning which was bad, and preparation (IMO, after this thread's argumentations) which was atrocious.
BDV wrote:
Neither do they teach grand stratigery in the seminary...
As to Hitler, his mistakes were made before July. The mistakes in July squarely belong to lowlifes like Manstein and other junker fibbers of Wehrmacht.
Given that Manstein was just a corps commander at the time, this does not make much sense.
His mishandling of the situation on the Shelon, a glorious Soviet victory, but Hoepner and VLeeb do have equal shares of blame for sticking the 56th Corps, striped of Totenkopf in that mess. 3rd Panzer, for sending the 19th Panzer out on a limb to VLuki, from where it barely escaped the fate of 8th Panzer. I have not dug up enough on Guderian and his exploits
And it seems to me that Hitler made a very important and disputable decision in august.
No dice because the 39th Panzer and the 41st panzer were stuck attacking Leningrad, not to mention the logistical questions. If you understand the folly of November 1941 german armor-only attacks (logistic strain and lack of infantry support), apply the same logik to armor-only attacks on Moscow in September. Also, contemplate Kleist's fate at Rostov.