"Hitler got it right for Normandy 1944"

[doogal]

ljadw wrote :if they had a better appreciation of the capabilities and limitations of Allied amphibious forces,and if there were no intelligence failures,they still would have no adequate forces .

is the fact that they did not have adequate forces not another apparent sign of there own failures.??? Prior to the Normandy landings...
The Strategic failure of insufficient re-armament, lack of strength and depth in industry, war making policy and direction are factors which lead directly to operational failures ...

[ljadw]

ljadw wrote - This is the old theory (old : since : "The German generals are talking) which is saying that the Germans lost the war,because they were stupid .

I see nothing it what I wrote that says the Germans lost because they were stupid....

I wrote - The Germans got that much wrong that one could find scape-goats at every corner

Failure signifies that they got a lot wrong...... The war was won by Allied successes and it was lost through German failures.

ljadw wrote - the allies won the war,not because they were more clever,but because they were stronger

we are not talking about the the whole of WW2 but Normandy all be it not in isolation.

Strength on the Allied side does not explain German intelligence failures, nor does it explain the incorrect appreciation of the forth coming Allied operations.. Once ashore I agree it was the Allies strength which allowed continued success.

You said : the Germans got that much wrong,and also : Rommel and Speidel shared responsabilities,something which implies the presence of a lot of not clever persons on German side .

If you would replace Rommel at AGB by Manstein ( the genius ),or by Hitler,or by Montgomery,the situation would still be the same .

And,about the intelligence : if Stalin had believed the informations from the GRU before 22 june 1941,the initial results would be the same : a German success,if on 15 december 1944,the US had obtained a plan of Wacht am Rhein,there still would be an initial German succes .

Oster gave the Dutch before 10 may 1940 some very small informations about Fall Gelb,it did not help the Dutch;if he was giving more informations, it still would not help the Dutch .

I also disagree with the sentence :"it was lost through German failures",because this implies that it could be won without German failures .And this is not so .

That's why the OP "Hitler got it right for Normandy 1944" is not only wrong ,but also senseless and suspect :it implies : although Hitler got it right,the Germans lost,because some one (a stupid one /a traitor) spoiled the German chances .

There were no German chances,unless there was a miracle or a very stupid one at Shape.

The theory of the German failures was invented shortly after the war by the German generals who said that the war was lost by the failures of Hitler (a variant) and fortified by Basil Hart who said :if the Germans had done what I am saying they should have done,they would/could have won .

[ljadw]

ljadw wrote :if they had a better appreciation of the capabilities and limitations of Allied amphibious forces,and if there were no intelligence failures,they still would have no adequate forces .

is the fact that they did not have adequate forces not another apparent sign of there own failures.?.

That is starting from the assumption that they could have adequate forces :they were in the situation that the only solution was that Peter should rob Paul and Paul Peter .

[BDV]

I also disagree with the sentence :"it was lost through German failures", because this implies that it could be won without German failures. And this is not so .

This is so. Germany was acting much more than reacting. They signed the AG Naval treaty, they started the UBoat programme and Z-plan, they annexed Austria, they supported Franco, then shunned Finland, they annexed Bohemia-Moravia, they invaded Western Scandinavia, they signed MR agreement, they invaded Poland, they ordered the Blitz, they did the Barbarossa-monstrosity, etc. etc. etc.

Now what would be the result of alternative actions, and whether it would have been more beneficial to Germany/Europe/World it is a matter of hot WHIF debate. But German failures were there.

[sandeepmukherjee196]

.......The starting point was just an one liner....." Hitler had fingerspitzengefuhl....and his instinct was correct about the invasion coming to Normandy...." Period !

[Michael Kenny]

A stopped watch is right twice a day................

[sandeepmukherjee196]

Sandeep, you said the Germans sent troops to Holland, but I said to the front, Holland was not the front. I did not say they couldn't make it, I said they had a miserable time.

Hi Steve..

You wrote...

The German armies to the west of the salient were given a miserable time when they did try to move to the front and the supply lines were not intact. The allies made a concerted effort of dropping every bridge they could and were hitting trains every chance possible

This was in the context of a possible landing in the area Oostende / Zeebrugge and the vulnerability of the hanging - in - the -air salient.

In the actual event, the nearest scenario to the above hypotheses, was the front in the Dutch - Belgian sector that saw action in Sept - Oct 44. And the "German Armies to the west..." in this case, would be Von Zangen's 15 Armee.

They crossed over successfully and did two things ( pl don't get confused by a posting of Rich which makes it appear that the 15 couldn't contribute in any way east of the Scheldt) :

1. Gave a costly battle to the Canadians trying to clear the Antwerp port approaches.

2. Contributed troops to Student's phantom army on the Dutch border, which was being desperately put in place in early Sept.

Ciao
Sandeep

[ljadw]

The problem is that sandeep is proclaiming urbi et orbi a lot of one liners,things as fingerspitzengefuhl on which decisions are based,while decisions are based mostly on facts,and that the margin of manoeuvre is very limited, by reality .Fingerspitzengefuhl and wishful-thinking will always lose from reality .

And about 15 Army in the hypothesis of a landing on the Belgian coast :the biggest part of it would be cut of from the Scheldt :now it is on you to PROVE that 15 Army could retreat successfully and cross the Scheldt at the Antwerp port approaches,and that it would make any difference if if could do it .What sandeep fails to understand is that in the ATL (landing on the Belgian coast) it is possible /likely that the scebario of the OTL would not happen : would the Allies try to clear the Antwerp port Approaches ? Would there be big fighting on the Dutch border? Or would the Allies go to Brussels and than to the East ,to Germany ?

If you start a ATL,you must expect that the whole strategy would change.

And about the beloved one liners of sandeep :what you think of the follwing one liner :decisions,strategy, are based on and limited by facts and military leaders are not taking decisions based on fingerspitzengefuhl.

Sandeep will disagree (he wallows in fingerspitzengefuhl),but he will be unable to provide a decision of Hitler based on fingerspitzengefuhl .

[doogal]

ljadw wrote: You said : the Germans got that much wrong,and also : Rommel and Speidel shared responsabilities,something which implies the presence of a lot of not clever persons on German side .

Being wrong/incorrect/failing does not imply stupidity, neither does bearing responsibility suggest stupidity: I suggested nothing of the sort

ljadw wrote: If you would replace Rommel at AGB by Manstein ( the genius ),or by Hitler,or by Montgomery,the situation would still be the same .

When did suggest that that it would not have been.

ljadw wrote:I also disagree with the sentence :"it was lost through German failures",because this implies that it could be won without German failures .And this is not so .

Please don't quote half a sentence: Through Allied successes AND German failures is what I wrote:
Interplay of these successes and failures (for both sides creates the contextual narrative which is the history of this war: Again and I have said this before, i do not adhere to the idea that German failures cost them a war winning opportunity. But they were contributing factors over the course of the conflict as were there successes. This is true for the Allies to.........

ljadw wrote: That's why the OP "Hitler got it right for Normandy 1944" is not only wrong ,but also senseless and suspect :it implies although Hitler got it right,the Germans lost,because some one (a stupid one /a traitor) spoiled the German chances .

i do not think it implies that at all. As a statement it is incorrect and simply wrong but it implies only what you aggregate to it through your own assumptions...

[Cult Icon]

Any chance of German success in Normandy was predicated on winning the SU in 1941 or 42, and then shifting manpower & industry to focus on the war against the western allies (air and naval), thus being in a much stronger position once the landings were attempted. They would need a far stronger air position over France than they historically had.

[ljadw]

If the intelligence coup on the night of 5-6 June was acted upon seriously. If Rommel was himself present at his HQ during those fateful hours. If he had the panzers under him from the start. The outcome could have been different. These are not too much to ask for normally .. are they?



Ciao
Sandeep

Doogal,look at the following text from Sandeep :it says very clearly that IF the Germans had not made mistakes,the outcome could have been different (it implies that it would have been different) : I totally disagree:one can imagine a lot of (plausible ) ifs :they will not change the outcome .German failures (which is an euphemism for mistakes) did not prevent the Germans to win between 39/41,nor did they cause the German defeat between 43/45 .

For Overlord : on 6 june,the Allies succeeded to disembark 1000 tanks,more than the 3 PzD had .Thus, nothing what could have done Rommel or Speidel would have prevented the Allies of disembark these tanks .

[ljadw]

There is a regrettable tendency by the losers (on both sides) to deny the victors the laurels of victory and to say :you only won because some one on our side spoiled the whole thing,because,intrinsically, we were superior :Overlord,Typhoon,Stalingrad,Citadelle are well-known exemples on German side, Market Garden ,Singapore,Pearl Harbour are exemples on Allied side .

[doogal]

ljadw wrote: Doogal,look at the following text from Sandeep :it says very clearly that IF the Germans had not made mistakes,the outcome could have been different (it implies that it would have been different) : I totally disagree:one can imagine a lot of (plausible ) ifs :they will not change the outcome .German failures (which is an euphemism for mistakes) did not prevent the Germans to win between 39/41,nor did they cause the German defeat between 43/45 .

Dude!!! That's Sandeep and he does seem to adhere to such thoughts I do not So we are in agreement on that (I also think that the could in his sentence is important as it signifies and recognises that there is a positive/negative outcome of any such set of decisions.

German Failure is not a euphemism for anything. It is quite simply a statement of fact. If (X) is something characterised as a failure it does not automatically mean that it is a mistake as well. It is true that a failure can also be a mistake but the two are not co-dependant.
For example: Dieppe was a failure as an operation but in hindsight what was learnt from it meant that it was not a mistake even though it failed.

ljadw wrote:For Overlord : on 6 june,the Allies succeeded to disembark 1000 tanks,more than the 3 PzD had .Thus, nothing what could have done Rommel or Speidel would have prevented the Allies of disembark these tanks .

Again im not disagreeing with your thought track here at all.

ljadw wrote:There is a regrettable tendency by the losers (on both sides) to deny the victors the laurels of victory and to say :you only won because some one on our side spoiled the whole thing,because,intrinsically, we were superior :Overlord,Typhoon,Stalingrad,Citadelle are well-known exemples on German side, Market Garden ,Singapore,Pearl Harbour are exemples on Allied side .

I think you have a point !!!! balanced opinions by those who lose conflicts usually only appear decades after and even this depends on multifarious factors......

[sandeepmukherjee196]

The problem is that sandeep is proclaiming urbi et orbi a lot of one liners,things as fingerspitzengefuhl on which decisions are based,while decisions are based mostly on facts,and that the margin of manoeuvre is very limited, by reality .Fingerspitzengefuhl and wishful-thinking will always lose from reality .

What was my one liner again? That Hitler had Fingerspitzengefuhl? The rest ("fingerspitzengefuhl on which decisions are based") is YOUR kind contribution to the premise. So the next part : " while decisions are based mostly on facts,and that the margin of manoeuvre is very limited, by reality " has nothing to do with my "one liner" . Thats your extrapolation and hence I bear no responsibility for that premise.

I will repeat, I just said that Hitler had fingerspitzengefuhl and based on that he had talked about Normandy as the target for the allied invasion. There was noting said or implied on any "decision making" based on that.

On the contrary I had specifically said Hitler had, by this stage of the war, lost his elan and panache, and hence didnt have the necessary confidence to follow up on his instincts. So in fact, his fingerspitzengefuhl didnt reflect in his decision making . Rather his fatal decisions (hedging his bets on the Pas de Calais probability) were not based on fingerspitzengefuhl at all..

They were rather based on the "facts and reality" that you recommend so highly as a panacea for all ills. It was a "fact" that the Pas de Calais sector was much closer to England. And the facts as manufactured and manipulated by the allies, showed that an entire army led by Patton was waiting to land there.

At any point in time and space,"facts" and "reality" are what you see and perceive them to be. The Americans saw as "facts and reality" the huge force disparity between them and the Vietcong ... and we know what decisions and results emerged from that !

I am copying here the relevant bit from my original post since I am being continuously misquoted on this.... and projections are being made which dont follow from my original premise at all !

[Split from "Was Hitler really incompetent as the Supreme Commander"]

Hitler did in fact have strong Fingerspitzengefuhl...uncanny gut level instinct. The number of times he escaped assassination by last minute changes in schedule.. his getting it right on vital military matters in many instances.. which defied logic. Even for Normandy he had got it right. Only by that time he had lost his elan and didnt have the guts to follow his instincts !

...................................................

Ciao
Sandeep

And about the beloved one liners of sandeep :what you think of the follwing one liner :decisions,strategy, are based on and limited by facts and military leaders are not taking decisions based on fingerspitzengefuhl.

Sandeep will disagree (he wallows in fingerspitzengefuhl),but he will be unable to provide a decision of Hitler based on fingerspitzengefuhl .

This last part is not clear to me. Can you pl explain a bit more ?

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Sandeep,

Hitler's military instinct was never his particular strong point, and such as there was had largely deserted him by June 1944.

Hitler's instincts were sharpest on the political level in the 1930s, when he made massive gains almost bloodlessly by correctly judging the political limitations of his international opponents.

His military interventions after mid 1940 had far less consistent results.

His avoidance of assassination attempts before July 1944 was largely down to good fortune, over which he had little influence. Furthermore, such instincts, if they existed, are unrelated to the instincts required in Normandy in mid 1944.

Cheers,

Sid.