Hello all,
Background: when commenting on the collapse of the Western Front in the Rhineland in February-March 1945, many German generals claim that it would have been better to give up the Siegfried Line and defend the Rhine river. The same generals also underline that no plan for the defense of the East bank of the Rhine was ever made, because high command (OKH, Hitler) fordabe so, and that it was not their fault if they lost the war etc.
I am asking myself what an effective line of defense of the Rhine would have meant. My working assumption is that only defending the East bank, even with stronger forces than historical, would not have changed much. The Allies proved capable of crossing the Channel on a front of 60km+, they would have been able of crossing a 500m wide river if given an opportunity to regroup.
Hence I believe any realistic plan to make the Rhine a defense line would have required holding bridgeheads on the West bank. The urban areas are natural spots for this purpose: Neuss, Cologne, Bonn, Koblenz. You could imagine turning each of them into Stalingrad-equivalent, with supply and reinforcement pouring from the East side. Some planners may consider them enough of a threat to insist on their reduction before any full fledge Rhine crossing elsewhere.
Have anyone heard / read anything along these lines? If not, why hasn't such an option been considered?
Crossing the Rhine in 1945 - did they ever plan to fight in the cities?
Re: Crossing the Rhine in 1945 - did they ever plan to fight in the cities?
AFAIK the area between Meuse and Rhine cost USofA something like 25% of the USofA casualties for the ENTIRE war.
So such claims are bunk.
OTOH, transforming cities into fortresses was countered by US commitment to medium and heavy artillery, (an under-appreciated aspect of US war effort).
So such claims are bunk.
OTOH, transforming cities into fortresses was countered by US commitment to medium and heavy artillery, (an under-appreciated aspect of US war effort).
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion
Re: Crossing the Rhine in 1945 - did they ever plan to fight in the cities?
One other thing to consider about a fortress strategy is it robs the German army of hundreds of thousands of men which could be used more profitably. This fact became clear first at Cherbourg and later during the breakout. One by one the garrisons of Brest, Le Havre and along the channel coast all went into the POW camps, with very little to show for their efforts.
The gods do not deduct from a man's allotted span the hours spent in fishing.
~Babylonian Proverb
~Babylonian Proverb