At what point did Germany lose WW2?

[Alixanther]

This is bypassing the fact that the Soviet Army (as the other armies) did not need to move its food supplies forward when it advanced :as the other armies, it lived of the land ,only using canned meat when there was nothing else to eat .

BTW: every soldier got 10 ounces a day,only 10 ounces .

"lived of the land"? Only an invading army lives of the land. Civilians live of the land. A home army uses supplies already in military deposits. I've never heard RKKA requesting civilian support regarding food or requisitioning food assets in order to survive. If any, it was the State agents - gubernatorial representatives, NKVD staff and personnel and so on and so forth - who were doing such stuff. Red Army only got what they received from the State.

Second, attack rations for shock divisions were not (and still are not) disclosed. We know from hearsay they gobbled a ton of vodka but I doubt it was the only incentive. As I previously said, I took into account OFFENSIVE operations and troops, not your average defensive Soviet grunt - who might have not been a RKKA soldier at all - like "patriotic guards" in sieged cities and so on. You may be right but I personally doubt that Group Popov - for instance - ate the same stuff as a defensive infantry division.

[ljadw]

Source : The Bread of Affliction PP 113-134

The Red Army had 3 sources of food:

1) LL Food : totally inadequate: 10 ounces a day for 4.468.000 tons

2) State deliveries : inadequate


3) What the armed forces produced themselves and took from the land : the most important

In the 42/43 winter an army that was moving through a liberated region fulfilled its monthly food needs to the following extent (in %)

Flour : 54

Vegetables : 97

Meat : 108

Hay : 140

Oats : 68

[randwick]

.
that's grossly inaccurate ,the Soviet Army had as much need to provide commissary support as any other army
beside the fact that the retreating Germans didn't leave any food behind , both as practice and as policy .

the Soviet forces were on very short rations , some scavenging from German troops might have happened
but it would have been an occasional godsend rather than a common practice ,
anyway it would only have concerned some of the front line troops and not the bulk of the Army personnel

[ljadw]

Tell William Moskoff that he is wrong .

[randwick]

.
I recommend you to read the Lizzie Collingham book " the taste of war "
it is concerned with the food supply as a major motivator for WW2 and the carefully situation in each belligerent countries
It is deeply researched ,facts are plentiful ......definitely a must read !

[pugsville]

Finished Collingham book " the taste of war " it's a good read and recommend it. Though it covers a lot of ground, so less detail than I would like. But different than normal focus.

[Dave-the-Rave66]

I must say, operation blue for me- this was the chance for the chance for the Wehrmacht to regain the initiative and cut off the red army from there oil and raw materials- although It was a partial success, it needed to be 100% effective, which it wasn't. plus, it didn't secure hitler the oil he needed so badly

[randwick]

.
I would tend to agree that the failure of case blue created a point of non return .
the Soviet Stavka was very concerned with a German winning move , for them that was the worst case
a hook from the South toward Moscow with a frontal pressure from Army group Center ,
their counter-move was to keep as much of their ( depleted) reserves around the city ,
since it was the very hub of their Rail network , forces could be dispatched wherever from their strategic center
if the German did the hook , al the Soviet forces located South would be on the wrong side , condemned to bloody counterattacks
on German covering lines
the opening effort was a breach at Voronezh , which gave the Germans plenty of options and was not conclusive as to their intentions
only when it was clear the Germans were moving South did they partially redeploy

[ljadw]

I must say, operation blue for me- this was the chance for the chance for the Wehrmacht to regain the initiative and cut off the red army from there oil and raw materials- although It was a partial success, it needed to be 100% effective, which it wasn't. plus, it didn't secure hitler the oil he needed so badly

It would not secure Hitler the oil he needed so badly,even if it was succesfull(besides,he did NOT need the oil so badly) .

[Dave-the-Rave66]

he did though- the pact he signed with Stalin prior to Barbarossa guaranteed the Wehrmacht the oil it needed- the invasion of Russia was a gamble, which would only succeed if army group South could secure the oil fields of the Caucasus

[Paul D]

Dave-the rave66,

The treaty with stalin guaranteed hitler the oil he wanted, but the wehrmacht was not dependent on it, those supplies ended in 1941 but germany still managed to fight on.
Barbarossa, the invasion of russia was a gamble yes but it did not fail because of its failure to take the Caucasus. Case blue failed in that respect.

I would agree with you however the opportunity to win the war (if there ever was one) was lost with case blue, not because it failed but because it was hugely over optimistic in the first place.

Its opbjectives were never to provide germany with oil but to deny it to russia

Regards

Paul

[Dave-the-Rave66]

ah i see, so how could have Germany secured the Caucasus? and also, if they had, would this have put them in a position to win the eastern war?

[steverodgers801]

Not true Paul, as long as the Soviets controlled the oil they could always shut Germany off. Hitler wanted the oil for German production. A lack of fuel was a tremendous burden of Germany, it prevented the training of air crews, especially bomber and limited the use of motorized vehicles

[Dave-the-Rave66]

that's what I thought! the fact that Caucasus supplies were so important for both sides was what made me think how important army group souths effort was- also shows how much sense it would have made for hitler to secure Middle East oil with the Africa korps first, THEN attack Russia!:)

[ljadw]

The Caucasus supplies were NOT so important for both sides : you make the classic mistake of looking at the production of the Caucasus and not at the amount of oil the SU needed