Given inadequate supply on his side, and eventually overwheling British superiority on the other, Rommel's achievements are very impressive. That said, he did too often overstretch himself, much like the British did. Though Rommel knew time was working against him, and he needed a miracle victory if he was not to be swamped by the British, hence his often "reckless" attempts to break British lines.
Gwynn
Desert Fox
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Nucleicacidman
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Ok let me give you an operation overview of both generals in a nutshell.ViKinG wrote:Maybe so, but I still don't see how Rommel's victories wouldn't compare. If you put him on the eastern front with the others, i'm sure his victories would have been similar. He did the best with what he had.
Viking
Fall Weiss - the Invasion of Poland
Rommel: Commanded Hitler's bodyguards, no real combat experience as a general.
Manstein: First to strike into Warsaw's suburbs, and when the remainder of the Polish army moved east closed off the kessel (encirclement) and was the main force in the brutal destruction of the encirclement. Considered his first mark of genius.
Fall Gelb - the Invasion of France
Rommel: First to reach the channel commanding the 7th Panzer Division. Utterly crushed adversaries across the Meuse and successfully defended against a British counter attack at Arras later on.
Manstein:No actual operational command..however, he did PLAN the thing...
Rommel Later...
Pushed across Libya and to Tobruk where he utterly failed to break through the Tobruk defenses and was forced to retreat after three unsuccessful British offensives. He then pushed to Egypt again the next year where he failed in his offensive at Alamein and was forced back into Libya after a wasteful British offensive at the same line.
He did successfully launch the Kasserine Pass offensive, which ultimately failed, however the same offensive was stopped cold by Montogomery with little loss to the British - Rommel had failed.
Manstein later...
Commanded the 56th Corps (?) at Leningrad destroying the 2nd Shock Army twice... was moved to Moscow..then back to Leningrad...and then finally given command of the 11th Army (?) in the Crimea where he took Sevastapol after a bloody siege (for both sides), earning him the Field Marshall Baton.
Then he took command of the Southern Army Group successfully getting through the Soviet encirclement, but later forced to failure when Paulus refused to break out.
After the loss of three armies and after crushing Soviet offensives he regained stability by defeating the Russians at several points and using the 2nd SS Panzer Corps to take Kharkov.
He was the one who did not want to go with Kursk but during the battle reached the farthest, and later pressed for the attack.
After another half year of successful defense he was sacked by Hitler because Hitler wanted to gain land..not defend land. Hitler lost one of his best generals.
I see Manstein as a much better commander...and he worked with a lot less than Rommel had.... Rommel had Hitler's utmost trust (until July 1944) and Hitler did the most he could to supply Rommel (although it failed with British Med. operations).
Re: Desert Fox
The generally accepted theory (among people versed in strategy, there is) says that Rommel's legend had been blown out of proportion to serve the propaganda interests of the parts involved.
Those being:
1. The Reich government itself (duh!)
2. The post-war government - as they needed a positive example to uphold the clean Wehrmacht idea.
3. The early-WWII British high command - as they needed a justification for being beaten and harassed for 2 years by a much smaller force.
4. The Cold War Anglophone governments - as they needed a justification for supporting the Federal Republic of Germany against a former ally.
5. The media
The unpleasant truths:
1. There is that tidbit with propaganda campaigns through time: they only work if they fall on a sweet spot. Which is, to tell what people wanted to hear.
2. War is a disgusting business for all those involved. Which kills people and ruins lives of those who survive, destroys, burns and pillages on giant scale, and can only be swallowed by the public with an appropriately giant amount of sugar.
It's a pretty hard job to challenge Erwin Rommel's personal talent as a military leader - even if he ultimately failed, even when he lost on strategic grounds, even if his entire campaign could be judged as a waste of material and human life and even if he had no purpose there.
This brings us to the Rommel paradox: his very talent made him both a war hero and a poor general officer, at the same time. His talent, not his incompetence in other fields. As the proverb says, gone horribly right.
Who is the public to which the propagandists speak? The number of age groups, professions, qualifications of people involved in the study of WWII is staggering. From that, extract those with partial knowledge of tactics, history, technology, and too much spare time on their hands: the geeks.
Geeks value inordinately the coolness. Elaborate design, color, music, innovation, sex, staging, technology, drama. What more conservative categories of the public dismiss as operatic, Hollywoodesque. They dislike to the point of hatred the dour, dull, bureaucratic, uncool types.
For a geeky approach, the dashing officer riding in the heat of battle, in a cool, sophisticated halftrack, running his troops from his radio, map in hand, loaded rifle nearby, is something to be admired, worshipped. Stuff of adventure novels and 1980s movies. Rambo before there was any Rambo. The story of espionage, interception and codebreaking falls right on the spot: it proves the campaign was a battle of individual wits, an outsmarting of poor commanders by a brilliant one, a duel at the scale of a continent.
Even if there was little purpose in the duel, the objectives set in Berlin were exceeded at the Marshal's own will, the line of supply got thin. And even if the ultimate objective set by himself, the capture of the Suez Canal, cutting the British Empire in two, would not push the British government into a truce or a separate peace, just ignite a furious response to win at all costs.
A less brave, less competent general was expected to stick to his mission because he was not required to do the impossible.
Rommel, because of his own talent, pushed men and machinery to do just that, the impossible. He was not fulfilling a military mission by that point. He was playing Sudden Strike in real life, with real men, 60 years before the damn Sudden Strike was written
Those being:
1. The Reich government itself (duh!)
2. The post-war government - as they needed a positive example to uphold the clean Wehrmacht idea.
3. The early-WWII British high command - as they needed a justification for being beaten and harassed for 2 years by a much smaller force.
4. The Cold War Anglophone governments - as they needed a justification for supporting the Federal Republic of Germany against a former ally.
5. The media
The unpleasant truths:
1. There is that tidbit with propaganda campaigns through time: they only work if they fall on a sweet spot. Which is, to tell what people wanted to hear.
2. War is a disgusting business for all those involved. Which kills people and ruins lives of those who survive, destroys, burns and pillages on giant scale, and can only be swallowed by the public with an appropriately giant amount of sugar.
It's a pretty hard job to challenge Erwin Rommel's personal talent as a military leader - even if he ultimately failed, even when he lost on strategic grounds, even if his entire campaign could be judged as a waste of material and human life and even if he had no purpose there.
This brings us to the Rommel paradox: his very talent made him both a war hero and a poor general officer, at the same time. His talent, not his incompetence in other fields. As the proverb says, gone horribly right.
Who is the public to which the propagandists speak? The number of age groups, professions, qualifications of people involved in the study of WWII is staggering. From that, extract those with partial knowledge of tactics, history, technology, and too much spare time on their hands: the geeks.
Geeks value inordinately the coolness. Elaborate design, color, music, innovation, sex, staging, technology, drama. What more conservative categories of the public dismiss as operatic, Hollywoodesque. They dislike to the point of hatred the dour, dull, bureaucratic, uncool types.
For a geeky approach, the dashing officer riding in the heat of battle, in a cool, sophisticated halftrack, running his troops from his radio, map in hand, loaded rifle nearby, is something to be admired, worshipped. Stuff of adventure novels and 1980s movies. Rambo before there was any Rambo. The story of espionage, interception and codebreaking falls right on the spot: it proves the campaign was a battle of individual wits, an outsmarting of poor commanders by a brilliant one, a duel at the scale of a continent.
Even if there was little purpose in the duel, the objectives set in Berlin were exceeded at the Marshal's own will, the line of supply got thin. And even if the ultimate objective set by himself, the capture of the Suez Canal, cutting the British Empire in two, would not push the British government into a truce or a separate peace, just ignite a furious response to win at all costs.
A less brave, less competent general was expected to stick to his mission because he was not required to do the impossible.
Rommel, because of his own talent, pushed men and machinery to do just that, the impossible. He was not fulfilling a military mission by that point. He was playing Sudden Strike in real life, with real men, 60 years before the damn Sudden Strike was written
Re: Desert Fox
Well, Keitel, Rundstedt, Guderian, Paulus, Geyr, Streich, Kirchheim, Prittwitz and many others surely would volunteer for that job.It's a pretty hard job to challenge Erwin Rommel's personal talent as a military leader
There are times in history when staying neutral means taking sides.
Re: Desert Fox
And Generaloberst Franz Halder. He said Rommel had gone mad. Which, at that time, was both true and false, as our old friend Schrödinger had said a few years before.
Re: Desert Fox
I can understand the others but Paulus and Keitel?askropp wrote:Well, Keitel, Rundstedt, Guderian, Paulus, Geyr, Streich, Kirchheim, Prittwitz and many others surely would volunteer for that job.It's a pretty hard job to challenge Erwin Rommel's personal talent as a military leader
Re: Desert Fox
What's the limit of historical revisionism? If people may think Rommel a bad general, what would stop them from thinking the universally despised and hated Keitel a good one? :roll:
Actually on which basis was Keitel thought to have been a miserable general? All stories around his supposed incompetence stem from the hatred his fellow generals had for being a hypocritical lackey to the Führer.
While, surprisingly, Erwin Rommel, who left himself drawn into the July 20 plot, always had a deep, worshipful admiration for Hitler personally. Which may appear paradoxical, as things run during turbulent times, but it fit his personality. As the man who ran "his personal war" (a definition which might have raised eyebrows in Moscow or Washington, DC...) like a corsair captain in the 16th century.
Actually on which basis was Keitel thought to have been a miserable general? All stories around his supposed incompetence stem from the hatred his fellow generals had for being a hypocritical lackey to the Führer.
While, surprisingly, Erwin Rommel, who left himself drawn into the July 20 plot, always had a deep, worshipful admiration for Hitler personally. Which may appear paradoxical, as things run during turbulent times, but it fit his personality. As the man who ran "his personal war" (a definition which might have raised eyebrows in Moscow or Washington, DC...) like a corsair captain in the 16th century.
Re: Desert Fox
Keitel was hated by the others not only because he was a Yes Man but he is also the man who let Hitler take over OKW.(As he was the Chief of it during the war)
It's wiki, but legit enough.According to Albert Speer's memoirs, nearly all of the field marshals and generals viewed him with scorn and disdain for succumbing to Hitler's influence and transforming himself from an "honorable, solidly respectable general" into a powerless yes-man with all the wrong instincts, whose only job was to allow Hitler to take control of the Army.
General Ludwig Beck complained that he was incapable of giving Hitler the reality of the situations and was an extremely poor tactician whose decisions were motivated more by ensuring his own survival rather than that of the troops. Marshal Paul Ludwig Ewald von Kleist labeled him as nothing more than a "stupid follower of Hitler", and most commanders went out of their way to ignore his orders, although von Kleist did admit that, had Hitler chosen a more competent commander (such as himself), he would have lasted only two weeks. His sycophancy was well known in the army, and he acquired the nickname 'Lakeitel', a pun on his name (in German, the word 'Lakai' means 'lackey').[10][11] Keitel accepted Hitler's directive for Operation Citadel in 1943, despite strong opposition from several field officers who argued that neither the troops nor the new tanks on which Hitler staked his hopes for victory were ready.
Re: Desert Fox
Rommel.
A brave commander
Excellent in small unit actions
Decorated for valour
Impetuous and emotional
Listens to his own council
Self Taught through experience and personal study
Aggressive
Limited in Operational Approach
Quick at seizing the initiative
Lacking in classical General Staff training
He was effectively the new every man rather than the traditional General Staff Officer.
Rommel prior to his leaving North Africa and being confronted with the Strategic dilemmas of Southern and North Western Europe, had slowly seen in microcosm the problems which would face German forces where ever they confronted the Allies, his response to this both existentially and operationally forms an important part of his career.
It should not be forgotten that he was then handed a heavy and difficult task on the French coastline, a task whose effective completion would surely stretch any Officer under the circumstances which German operations were carried out.
A brave commander
Excellent in small unit actions
Decorated for valour
Impetuous and emotional
Listens to his own council
Self Taught through experience and personal study
Aggressive
Limited in Operational Approach
Quick at seizing the initiative
Lacking in classical General Staff training
He was effectively the new every man rather than the traditional General Staff Officer.
Rommel prior to his leaving North Africa and being confronted with the Strategic dilemmas of Southern and North Western Europe, had slowly seen in microcosm the problems which would face German forces where ever they confronted the Allies, his response to this both existentially and operationally forms an important part of his career.
It should not be forgotten that he was then handed a heavy and difficult task on the French coastline, a task whose effective completion would surely stretch any Officer under the circumstances which German operations were carried out.