If you could travel back in time to Help Hitler win the war

[BillHermann]

I do however find the topic of this thread disturbing

[Graeme Sydney]

Airpower did not play a decisive role in WW2.

Consider your argument officially nuked

[Guaporense]

Yes they do count, if it wasn't for the air attacks in Normandy the outcome would have been different. Also I would suggest you google cobra and the casualties it inflicted as Michael pointed out. Also one can also cite air attacks on ground installations in the early years of the war.

But:

Normandy was not decisive. Eastern front was decisive, Normandy was lost anyway: if the Germans stopped the Allies for longer the Red Army would be approaching Berlin from the east, which would lead to a weakening of Normandy's divisions at some point due to transfer of forces to the East and hence allied breakthrough.

And the Allies had vast superiority on the ground anyway in the battles they won: Cobra was 4-1 numerical superiority in the ground.

Airpower's effects were mostly psychological as they did not represent a substantial fraction of casualties. Specially in the Eastern Front, the important front, did not have airpower's playing an important role. Airpower was important only to a couple of engagements in theaters without decisive importance like Cobra which would have the same outcome without it.

[Guaporense]

So googled cobra: 1,500 bombers dropping 4,400 tons of bobms inflicted a total of 700 casualties on the Germans. That's not quite that much: you need 6-7 tons of bombs to inflict 1 casualty. Well with the 2.5 million tons dropped over Europe by the WAllies in WW2 yield a potential figure of 400,000 casualties if all those bombs were dropped over combat formations, compare that to the 10 million casualties the Wehrmacht had in the war. Again, confirming the fact that airpower was not and could not be decisive.

[Graeme Sydney]

So googled cobra: 1,500 bombers dropping 4,400 tons of bobms inflicted a total of 700 casualties on the Germans. That's not quite that much: you need 6-7 tons of bombs to inflict 1 casualty. Well with the 2.5 million tons dropped over Europe by the WAllies in WW2 yield a potential figure of 400,000 casualties if all those bombs were dropped over combat formations, compare that to the 10 million casualties the Wehrmacht had in the war. Again, confirming the fact that airpower was not and could not be decisive.

Mr G, taking stats for one criteria and drawing a general conclusion is not valid nor logical. There is more to war winning than just causing cas and there is more to war making than personnel.

Air power effected events at the strategic, operational and tactical level. As to the allied air power effectiveness the best testimony comes from the Germans themselves. From General to private, during and after the war, the German soldier, sailor and airman whinged about Allied air superiority and the effect on their operations.

As one illustration look to the battle of the Bulge; cloud cover - the Germans advance; no cloud cover - the Germans blown off the battlefield.

[Michael Kenny]

So googled cobra: 1,500 bombers dropping 4,400 tons of bobms inflicted a total of 700 casualties on the Germans.

One only has to check the Allied casualties caused by short bombing to understand the real power of the bombing.
During GOODWOOD an entire German Division, sPzAbt 503 and the Pz IV's of 21 Pz Div were rendered combat innefective.

[Stiltzkin]

the best testimony comes from the Germans themselves

As shown there are examples of German officers who after the war stated that the allied air forces to a large extent caused the German losses. Some authors, like John Ellis, largely bases conclusions on such statements. Probably no German studies were made on the causes of their losses. No such studies have been found among the archival documents that have survived. On the other hand studies showing the causes of enemy losses have been found. It is not likely that the estimates given by German officers after the war are based on anything more than general impressions. Hence, it is important to consider the circumstances shaping their impressions.

Most of the officers who have given their views held higher positions. Even in the German army, despite its emphasis on commanding from the front, such persons were behind the front line to a much greater extent than riflemen and tankers. For men who spent much of the time in rear areas allied air power naturally made a greater impact compared to enemy ground forces. The men who served in the combat units probably had a different view.

To this must be added the fact that the extent of allied air superiority was a completely new experience for most German soldiers. It is quite natural that new threats are magnified compared to those experienced previously. Those officers and men who had served on the eastern front seem to have regarded the allied ground forces as less terrifying than the fighting against the Red Army.

Finally it can not be excluded that many of the German army officers had a certain "bias" when they presented their views after the war. The Luftwaffe was responsible for stopping the allied air forces. If allied air power was the main cause of defeat this meant that the responsibility for the failure was not on their shoulders. Even if such thinking were not explicit it can very well have clouded judgement unconsciously. There are also examples of documents produced by army staffs during the campaign in Normandy that explicitly state that the lack of own air power was the main cause of enemy success.

With this in mind it is not advisable to uncritically accept the statements of German officers concerning this issue. An example of this is Ellis assertion that "[heavy bombers] Š were not especially useful in attacks on static defences ; a saturation bombing of Caen prior to Operation Charnwood was as counter-productive as the flattening of Cassino monastery and town a few months earlier. Against armoured formations out in the open, however, even working with broad tolerances, the bombers often wreaked havoc." Ellis goes on by citing a report by von Kluge to Hitler on 22 July that concern Operation Goodwood:

"Whole armoured formations, allotted to the counter-attack, were caught in bomb-carpets of the greatest intensity, so that they could be extricated from the torn-up ground only by prolonged effort and in some cases only by dragging them out. The result was that they arrived too late. It is immaterial whether such a bomb carpet catches good troops or bad, they are more or less annihilated."

A few points must be noted here. First, there are in fact very few occasions when heavy bombers hit armoured formations. Probably operation Goodwood and operation Cobra are the only real examples. Thus it can not be said that bombers "often wreaked havoc". Second, during the example given by Ellis, Operation Goodwood, the bombers hit one armoured formation, the 503. s.Pz.Abt. This unit suffered losses, but it was far from annihilated, since most of it remained fighting in Normandy until the end of the campaign. It seems that von Kluge was exaggerating grossly. It is clear that the carpet-bombing prevented the battalion from immediately intervening in strength, but the bombers did not annihilate it, rather it was temporarily incapacitated.

Another example is Pz.Lehr during operation Cobra. Ellis cited Bayerlein who has stated that all his forward tanks were knocked out. Either a large part of his tanks were not in forward positions or he was simply exaggerating. On 1 August Pz.Lehr reported that it had 67 tanks and at least 10 assault guns, if vehicles in workshops are included. The number of operational tanks had shrunk from 31 on 23 July to 27 on 1 August.

[Guaporense]

By the way, in WW1, the British and French consumed over 10,000,000 tons of ammunition in the Western Front, that's about 8 million tons of artillery projectiles over the heads of the enemy. That's greater than the consumption of ammunition in any front in WW2 (even the Eastern front) and was 4 times the tonnage of bombs dropped by the WAllies in Europe (tactical and strategic). Artillery tends to be far more precise than bombers who drop bombs randomly from altitudes 8,000 meters high. Indeed they inflicted 4 million casualties on the Germans on the other side.

[Michael Kenny]

A few points must be noted here. First, there are in fact very few occasions when heavy bombers hit armoured formations. Probably operation Goodwood and operation Cobra are the only real examples.

Try Evrecy June 15 and 3/sSS PzAbt 101

First 3 photos from 1946 and third pic a different Tiger. .

Evrecy...... . (1).......jpg (67.71 KiB) Viewed 1821 times

and sSS PzAbt 102 near Hill 112 on 10/7/44.

Thus it can not be said that bombers "often wreaked havoc". Second, during the example given by Ellis, Operation Goodwood, the bombers hit one armoured formation, the 503. s.Pz.Abt. This unit suffered losses, but it was far from annihilated, since most of it remained fighting in Normandy until the end of the campaign.

It started with 45 Tigers. 'Most' of it would be 23 at least. After GOODWOOD it never had more that 20 in service at any one time for the next 10 days and afterwards no more than 15, Clearly something major happened to this unit on July 18. I wonder what it was?

[Stiltzkin]

http://www.alanhamby.com/unithist.shtml#SS102

1 June 1944 37 of 45 Tiger I's operational , they only have 37 operational, in the subsequent days there are breakdowns and further combat.

15 June 1944 5 Tigers are lost in action (4 by aircraft/bombing raid)

http://www.ss-panzer.de/Geschichte/geschichte.html

102

"Im Morgengrauen kommt es zu einem Fliegerangriff, zwei Tiger werden vernichtet.

Im Treffen mit dem 7th und 9th Royal Tank Regiments wird das „Wäldchen der halben Bäume" bei Höhe 112 genommen. Panzer „213" (Unterscharführer Piller) erhält Pak-Treffer und muss zurückfahren. Drei Feindpanzer und eine Pak werden abgeschossen. Der Kompaniechef ( Hauptsturmführer Endemann auf Panzer „221“ ) ist seitdem vermisst. Die l. Kompanie vernichtet mehrere Feindpanzer. Von der 3. Kompanie werden der „311" (Untersturmführer Streu, gefallen), „312" (Unterscharführer Richter, schwer verwundet ) abgeschossen."

Hill 112 July 1944 "Air strike in the dawn, two Tigers are destroyed"

Looks more like the Tiger strength is decreasing steadily, due to combat, defects and only few to air strikes.

[Michael Kenny]

All the above proves is you don't know SS 101 and SS 102 are different units.
Google can not an expert make.

[Stiltzkin]

I didn't say they were the same...

http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/ubb/Forum ... 050-2.html
Even 14 years later....

[Michael Kenny]

I didn't say they were the same..

You gave a link for SS 102 and then gave numbers that apply to SS 101

Here it is:

http://www.alanhamby.com/unithist.shtml#SS102

1 June 1944 37 of 45 Tiger I's operational , they only have 37 operational, in the subsequent days there are breakdowns and further combat.

15 June 1944 5 Tigers are lost in action (4 by aircraft/bombing raid)

Where do you say that the numbers are for SS 101?

The link is for sSS PzAbt 102.

The numbers are correct for sSS PzAbt 101 for June 1st (37 in service ) and June 15 (5 lost).

The SS 102 numbers for June 1st are 28 operationnal

Quite clearly you mixed them up and did not realise it. A simple error for someone with no real understanding other than that which can be obtained via Google.

[Stiltzkin]

Look, the first numbers refer to 101.... I didn't give numbers for 102, I was merely referring to your Hill 112 Air-raid. The link contains information on both, I am sure you are able to scroll? I did not mix up anything. You are just trying to nitpick. 101 (the link does not only contain 102 you know), then a German summary for 102 on the Hill (I assume you do not understand german).
However you are right, I am not an expert on this issue. Lets assume you are correct and the reporting systems are faulty (by considerable 1 tank in one unit and a few in others). Would this indicate that: 1. Hard targets/Tank formations were "regularly" annihilated by air strikes (though heavy bomber attacks seemed to be more effective than those conducted by Tiffis), considering they weren't that frequent? 2. Can you deduce or derive a common law from this that tanks losses were indeed very heavy, compromising the work of many researchers (neither Zetterling, Lawrence or Darrin seemed to believe you)?

With that said, did you write the book?
Keep in mind that this is not the right thread for this, you might want to open a new one (probably Ron Klages).

[Michael Kenny]

http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/ubb/Forum ... 050-2.html
Even 14 years later....

The 'dispute' centred on my challenging the statement (Zetterling, Normandy 1944' page 191) that 'no more than 4 (Tigers from sPzAbt 503) may have been lost during GOODWOOD.

Today no one disputes Tiger losses were 'greater than 4'.

Photos 6 Tigers destroyed 'during GOODWOOD'. They are all still in situ in the area where they were knocked out.

6 is 2 more than 4.


More Tigers were lost (up to 15 in total) but not photographed. See Rosen's statement 2 of his Tigers were hit and left burning just north of Cagny.

Can you deduce or derive a common law from this that tanks losses were indeed very heavy, compromising the work of many researchers

I say only that the attempts to downplay air-power are mistaken and I have produced the evidence to show more examples of bombing that appear to be unknown to the doubters.

neither Zetterling, Lawrence or Darrin seemed to believe you

It really does not matter who believes what. Evidence trumps belief every time. I had the evidence and that gave me the confidence to challenge the beliefs.