Erwin Rommel
Whereever you read a poll on the internet (in german or english) about Germany's greatest general of WW2, Rommel wins by a landslide.
Rommel did indeed achieve marvellous victories for someone whose talents don't exceed the operational level and who doesn't understand strategy.
Otherwise he would have understood that:
- troops which could be supplied over a distance of 2.500 km from Tripoli to the Suez canal, would be too small to beat the Brits.
- troops which could have achieved that task, couldn't have been supplied.
(compare: van Creveld, Supplying War, S. 181- 201)
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Rommel's sole task was to defend Tripoli. Despite numerical and logistical inferiority he defied the orders of the OKW (German High Command) and went all or nothing.
His genius on the tactical scope enabled him to achieve grandiose victories which in part were related to british stupidity.
The tank-rush, once established contact with enemy forces, immediate retreat, which resulted repeatedly in british armoured formations pursuing and getting butchered by the prepared 88mm-flak.
Even if Rommel would have taken Egypt and maybe even the Middle East.
What then?
Oil? NO!!!! Having oil wells and transporting oil to Germany are two completely different issues.
The Iraqi oil would have only been useful to supply the Africa Corps, nothing else.
While Britain's supply base reached as far back as South Africa, Rommel could have never achieved a deciding victory.
Instead he would have to defend a looooong frontier from Tripoli to Kuweit with the Brits being able to strike at any point at any time.
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Ironically he (the "best") would have needed the qualifications of Albert Kesselring (the most underrated) to judge the situation better and maybe hold establish a North-Italy like defence in North-Africa.
He was brilliant as a divisional tank commander (numerous examples from Poland over France to NA), but nothing more.
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Reasons why he is overrated:
1. German propaganda
2. British propaganda (easiest way to explain failure is the overrating of the opponent)
3. Simplifying of common people
Rommel - the most overrated general since Alexander the Grea
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drommarnas
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I could not agree more with your analyses of Rommel as there were other Generals who had greater success in other areas of the German fronts; Guderian, Balack, Manstein are three that come to my mind instantly
And yes, Kesselring has always been under-rated except to those who fought him. Kesselring established the Italian Front into exactly what it is designed to be; a defensive nightmare that eats up the attackers. German forces in Italy fought all the way into April/May of 1945 until they boot, pun intended, was given to them. Rommel had excellent ‘marketing’ from not only from the Nazis & Brits, but also from his own ego and marketing of himself.
And yes, Kesselring has always been under-rated except to those who fought him. Kesselring established the Italian Front into exactly what it is designed to be; a defensive nightmare that eats up the attackers. German forces in Italy fought all the way into April/May of 1945 until they boot, pun intended, was given to them. Rommel had excellent ‘marketing’ from not only from the Nazis & Brits, but also from his own ego and marketing of himself.
i totally agree, ny opinion as to why he has such a good rep is the fact that British historians write so many great things about him, due to the beatings he gave them in the desert, and his invlovement in the July Plot. Little is said of his early career, as Hitler's aide for example or his support for the regime in building up the armed forces. There isnt a British reference that does not have the phrase 'The Desert Fox' in it. I suppose building up Rommel puts the Eight Army's north african victory into a better context, the defeat over the Fox, et al
For me the Wehrmacht had much better generals in , Hoth, von Manstein, Guderian, von Manteuffel, Model, Dietl and so on. Rommel undoubtedly had his virutes but i strongly believe that British historians tend to go over the top in accentuating his generalship
For me the Wehrmacht had much better generals in , Hoth, von Manstein, Guderian, von Manteuffel, Model, Dietl and so on. Rommel undoubtedly had his virutes but i strongly believe that British historians tend to go over the top in accentuating his generalship
The Brits are funny in a way that is unique when it comes to battle/war losses; they have the ability to put the blame of the loss on the victor rather than on the Brit Generals/leadership at least in the historical sense. The Desert battles were not won so much by Rommel as they were lost by the Brits, as Rommel never had the logistical resources to fully exploit his victories and the British leadership went through the same hard lessons of warfare several times in N. Africa. My personal opinion about the African campaign was that it was a complete waste of Axis resources. How were the Germans going to maintain control of N. Africa when they would never control the Med itself? Without closing the Brits from the Med, it would be of little use to control N. Africa land itself.Polynike wrote:i totally agree, ny opinion as to why he has such a good rep is the fact that British historians write so many great things about him, due to the beatings he gave them in the desert, and his invlovement in the July Plot. Little is said of his early career, as Hitler's aide for example or his support for the regime in building up the armed forces. There isnt a British reference that does not have the phrase 'The Desert Fox' in it. I suppose building up Rommel puts the Eight Army's north african victory into a better context, the defeat over the Fox, et al
For me the Wehrmacht had much better generals in , Hoth, von Manstein, Guderian, von Manteuffel, Model, Dietl and so on. Rommel undoubtedly had his virutes but i strongly believe that British historians tend to go over the top in accentuating his generalship
It doesn't matter if his resources in N. Africa were over streched or not, his orders were to fight and not to ask questions.His problems started to mount since the moment he came to African. The British hade great numerical and logistical supiriority, and were becoming stronger every day.His only response was to attack them, before they would be almost imposible to overcome. Maybe it was just prolongation of El Alamein, but he could not chose what to do in the great picture.I think that puting a blame on Romel for the African adventure would not be fair.
On the other hand I must agree with you that there are no popular TV documentary's about,well, almost any other Axis General.
Maybe because they got too much beating from them. When considering those moments in war, ally's are just talking about great sacrifices their soldiers had to endure, and great moral and tactical victories they von despite the defete.Romel gave them pleasure of losing on both occasion (Africa and Normandy) despite his good fighting in the begining.
I also read somewhere (mayby here on forum) that the reason why the Africa corps was so much presented to the public in the post war years, was because it was almost the only one (and in the Western ally's case-the only one) hero corps that in its ranks didn't have an Waffen-SS unite.
On the other hand I must agree with you that there are no popular TV documentary's about,well, almost any other Axis General.
Maybe because they got too much beating from them. When considering those moments in war, ally's are just talking about great sacrifices their soldiers had to endure, and great moral and tactical victories they von despite the defete.Romel gave them pleasure of losing on both occasion (Africa and Normandy) despite his good fighting in the begining.
I also read somewhere (mayby here on forum) that the reason why the Africa corps was so much presented to the public in the post war years, was because it was almost the only one (and in the Western ally's case-the only one) hero corps that in its ranks didn't have an Waffen-SS unite.
Yes, Rommel was a soldier and he took orders however; let us not be too naive in regards to his 'snapping to'. Rommel and many other front line commanders had little problem standing up to the OKW/OKH command. My point about resources is that Rommel was hamstrung due to which is not necessarily his fault, but the battles at El Alamein, showed that Rommel had fallen for the very strength of what the Afrika Corps had been doing to the Brit forces, feeding them into anti-tank emplacements.papa wrote:It doesn't matter if his resources in N. Africa were over streched or not, his orders were to fight and not to ask questions.His problems started to mount since the moment he came to African. The British hade great numerical and logistical supiriority, and were becoming stronger every day.His only response was to attack them, before they would be almost imposible to overcome. Maybe it was just prolongation of El Alamein, but he could not chose what to do in the great picture.I think that puting a blame on Romel for the African adventure would not be fair.
On the other hand I must agree with you that there are no popular TV documentary's about,well, almost any other Axis General.
Maybe because they got too much beating from them. When considering those moments in war, ally's are just talking about great sacrifices their soldiers had to endure, and great moral and tactical victories they von despite the defete.Romel gave them pleasure of losing on both occasion (Africa and Normandy) despite his good fighting in the begining.
I also read somewhere (mayby here on forum) that the reason why the Africa corps was so much presented to the public in the post war years, was because it was almost the only one (and in the Western ally's case-the only one) hero corps that in its ranks didn't have an Waffen-SS unite.
Your point about “…why the Africa corps was so much presented to the public…” is true as the Afrika Corps was the only German Infantry/Panzer unit to face the Allies after the Fall of France and until Sicily in ’43. Thus, the Afrika Corps was the face of the enemy. Rommel was a fine General and his troops and Lieutenants would fight for him bar-none however; my opinion is that the German General Staff could have provided a variety of Generals who could have become the ‘Desert Fox’.
my opinion is that the German General Staff could have provided a variety of Generals who could have become the ‘Desert Fox
[spacer][spacer]It is interesting that Rommel himself, after feeling ill, made suggestion to Berlin, that because of his dismissal from the Eastern Front,
Heinz Guderian would be a good choise for the commander of the Africa Corps. Rommel him self thought that his illness would not permit him to
go back to Africa. Of course Guderian was not in a good position after Barbarosa fiasko, so Stumme stepped in.
[spacer][spacer]By my opinion he was not up to the challenge of commanding such theater...But it would be more than interesting to see how
Guderian would do in Africa. I am sure that he wouldent fail to impres. Like every gentleman, Guderian said that if
Stumme could not stopped the Brit's, that he probably wouldent do better him self. I don't belive it, after all he
was one of the kind military genius, the creator of war doctrines of the future, and extreamely expirienced front leader.
[spacer] [spacer]Brit's were very relieved when they heard that Rommel was gone. I would like to see Montgomery's face, when he would
realise that instead of Rommel-the Desert Fox, he got him self a Blitzkrieg Giant whose
tactics were not nearly coping of other peoples ideas, but creating a new and far
reaching strategy which Brit's in those days were only beginning to understand. I don't belive that he could change the
cors of the African war on the big scale (I don't thing that Napoleon could), they were simply too weak, unorganised
and almost left to themselves by the higher command. But I do think that he would give them hell before they would prevail.
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ChristopherPerrien
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Re: Rommel - the most overrated general since Alexander the
Well it is the nature of propaganda to over-rate things.drommarnas wrote:Erwin Rommel
Whereever you read a poll on the internet (in german or english) about Germany's greatest general of WW2, Rommel wins by a landslide.
Rommel did indeed achieve marvellous victories for someone whose talents don't exceed the operational level and who doesn't understand strategy.
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Reasons why he is overrated:
1. German propaganda
2. British propaganda (easiest way to explain failure is the overrating of the opponent)
3. Simplifying of common people
If you know about Rommell , you see that this has nothing to do with his "abilities", rather he was put at a level of command "over his head". He never went to staff school so it should not be suprising he made errors on the logistical side and also by being promoted to a corps/army level of command. Rommell was a great commander at lower levels, he won the Blue Max in WWI as a company commander and his leadership as a division commander during the invasion of France was key to the quick German victory.
The position he was put in North Africa was "no win", it is useless to argue if he did the right things or not; either way staying on the defence or attacking as he did, was doomed , because of the overall Axis Med . theater logistical situation, which he certainly had no control over. But as a tactical/ battlefield commander of troops Rommell cannot really be over-rated , he was one of the best that there has been.
I think Rommell is an example of the "peter principle", that is a person will eventually be promoted in an organization to a job or level they cannot do. Or in short "people rise to their level of incompetence".
Chris
One thing that Africa points out to a degree is how the German military system was designed to work. Unlike other countries a great deal of power is given to relatively junior staff officers. Depending on the disposition of the commander they are working under, they may really do a great deal of the work, while the nominal "leader spends a great deal of time at the front inspiring the troops. This dates back to the Napoleanic times, in order to allow nobility to maintian high command but to give them more educated professionals to guide them. In WW1 Captain Hoffman of the 8th Army staff was already drawing up the plans for Tannenberg before Hindenberg and Ludendorf arrived. Evetually, those Ludendorf was to become the main staff officer for the Army, but he always had a lot of taletned staff officers around him.
If you want to compare him to someone, remember that as bad as one might consider Rommel, Sepp Dietrich was commander of the 6th SS Panzer army. I am sure that he leaned even more heavily on his chief of staff then the typical german commander.
I think Rommel was a very classic commander in the sense that if he had a good staff to work with, he was excellent at inspiring the troops under him. But he had little or no appreication for staff work. Had he gotten the light rail from Tripoli to cut several hundred miles off the truck routes supplying his army, he might have kept the British pinned back in Egypt until 1943 without all the see-sawing back and forth.
I also don't necessarily think there is anything all that special about Rommel in the sense that Africa really was a tacticians paradise. I don't think there is any doubt that other German commanders who had similar styles (which many panzer and light infantry commanders did) would have enjoyed similar success. The British system of having a strong central leader detached far from the troops so they could command from a far was not a very good system for Africa. Not that many of the British commanders had the sort of personality or background to go running around among the field troops inspiring them where they are needed, but if they had had someone like that backed by a strong staff officer running the show at HQ, they might have made better use of their numerical superiority much sooner.
If you want to compare him to someone, remember that as bad as one might consider Rommel, Sepp Dietrich was commander of the 6th SS Panzer army. I am sure that he leaned even more heavily on his chief of staff then the typical german commander.
I think Rommel was a very classic commander in the sense that if he had a good staff to work with, he was excellent at inspiring the troops under him. But he had little or no appreication for staff work. Had he gotten the light rail from Tripoli to cut several hundred miles off the truck routes supplying his army, he might have kept the British pinned back in Egypt until 1943 without all the see-sawing back and forth.
I also don't necessarily think there is anything all that special about Rommel in the sense that Africa really was a tacticians paradise. I don't think there is any doubt that other German commanders who had similar styles (which many panzer and light infantry commanders did) would have enjoyed similar success. The British system of having a strong central leader detached far from the troops so they could command from a far was not a very good system for Africa. Not that many of the British commanders had the sort of personality or background to go running around among the field troops inspiring them where they are needed, but if they had had someone like that backed by a strong staff officer running the show at HQ, they might have made better use of their numerical superiority much sooner.
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schjertzer
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I would offer that what made Rommel unique wasn't his military genius as much as his philosophy of "Move. Don't sit." In this he was unique amongst German generals as he outran the thought of OKW. If Rommel had fuel he was on the move. If the enemy was retreating, he made them retreat farther than they planned by advancing further than anticipated (even by his own commanders). If the enemy was attacking then so was he.
In static warfare (defense), Rommel never made a name for himself like Kesselring did. His desire to be on the move was demonstrated by his own movement. He was more apt to be in his Storch or a scout car than at his field HQ. It may be true that he was promoted one step too far (The Peter principal) as he was constantly reverting to a field officer versus a staff officer.
I would say his strategy of "Move. Don't sit." was as much a headache to the German High Command as it was to the Allies.
In static warfare (defense), Rommel never made a name for himself like Kesselring did. His desire to be on the move was demonstrated by his own movement. He was more apt to be in his Storch or a scout car than at his field HQ. It may be true that he was promoted one step too far (The Peter principal) as he was constantly reverting to a field officer versus a staff officer.
I would say his strategy of "Move. Don't sit." was as much a headache to the German High Command as it was to the Allies.
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allsirgarnet
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HelloLkefct wrote:One thing that Africa points out to a degree is how the German military system was designed to work. Unlike other countries a great deal of power is given to relatively junior staff officers. Depending on the disposition of the commander they are working under, they may really do a great deal of the work, while the nominal "leader spends a great deal of time at the front inspiring the troops. This dates back to the Napoleanic times, in order to allow nobility to maintian high command but to give them more educated professionals to guide them. In WW1 Captain Hoffman of the 8th Army staff was already drawing up the plans for Tannenberg before Hindenberg and Ludendorf arrived. Evetually, those Ludendorf was to become the main staff officer for the Army, but he always had a lot of taletned staff officers around him.
If you want to compare him to someone, remember that as bad as one might consider Rommel, Sepp Dietrich was commander of the 6th SS Panzer army. I am sure that he leaned even more heavily on his chief of staff then the typical german commander.
I think Rommel was a very classic commander in the sense that if he had a good staff to work with, he was excellent at inspiring the troops under him. But he had little or no appreication for staff work. Had he gotten the light rail from Tripoli to cut several hundred miles off the truck routes supplying his army, he might have kept the British pinned back in Egypt until 1943 without all the see-sawing back and forth.
I also don't necessarily think there is anything all that special about Rommel in the sense that Africa really was a tacticians paradise. I don't think there is any doubt that other German commanders who had similar styles (which many panzer and light infantry commanders did) would have enjoyed similar success. The British system of having a strong central leader detached far from the troops so they could command from a far was not a very good system for Africa. Not that many of the British commanders had the sort of personality or background to go running around among the field troops inspiring them where they are needed, but if they had had someone like that backed by a strong staff officer running the show at HQ, they might have made better use of their numerical superiority much sooner.
Regarding the last paragraph of your reply, the situation in August/September 1942 when Gen Montgomery took over command of 8th Army paints a slightly different picture.
Before the takeover...
ME Commander Gen Auchinleck
8th Army Commander Gen Auchinleck
8th Army CoS Brig De Guingand.
General Auchinleck had taken command of 8th Army in addition to his proper role as ME theatre commander, in an attempt to inspire 8th Army troops by his own personal example. 8th Army main HQ was at the time within range of frontline German artillery and HQ staff (including Auchenleck) slept and ate in the open without tents. Brig De Guingand although CoS acted as did most British officers in his position as a 'super-staff officer', with no effective authority outside army HQ.
After the takeover...
ME Commander Gen Alexander
8th Army Commander Gen Montgomery
8th Army CoS Brig De Guingand.
On assuming command (3 days early) Montgomery made significant changes to the former regime within 8th Army. First he gave Brig De Guingand full powers of command as his deputy, with the authority of Montgomery himself if he was absent, thus freeing up Montgomery to exercise command on the battlefield. Second he moved 8th Army HQ back out of the battle area and provided comfortable living conditions for its staff. Third he created a mobile TAC HQ which was designed to accompany formations into battle at the point of contact. This created great flexibility of command within 8th Army, and allowed its commander to concentrate on strategy instead of red tape.
Lastly on the day he assumed command, after giving a short 'policy' address to HQ Staff, both Montgomery and his CoS left the HQ. Montgomery visiting all the frontline divisions and De Guingand preparing the new HQ site.
Hopefully the above shows that the problems within 8th Army stemmed not from any defect of system or 'junior commanders' (for these remained virtually unchanged), but instead came from how its commander EXERCISED that command. Infact Rommels 'style' of command was as has been mentioned more divisional than of an army commander, and this flaw was infact hidden by the poor quality of British commanders facing him.
If you study the first battle between Rommel and Monty at Alam Halfa, these factors become quite clear. Both commanders were 'in the thick of the action', but only Monty was able to pull back mentally and view the big picture of the battle as a whole. So used to a certain style of British Command, Rommel was at a loss once 8th Army forces acted other than he hoped/predicted. Take the position after DAK had moved clear of the minefields and into the southern 8th Army area, where it halted to await the normal armoured counter attacks. When no attacks came Rommel was at a loss and was forced to change his plans, thus passing the initiative to Monty.
ASG
One thing to consider is that Rommel rarely had anywhere near what would resemble a Corp. His troops where so badly depleeted most of the time, he really was commanding a divisional sized group. Also, in France, he commanded what ammounted to a Corp sized formation when he took cotnrol of the 5th Pz Divsions tanks since they where forced to move through his bridgehead over the Muese.
The british style of command in the second world war evolved. I can remember where I read it, but Gen Horrocks (of XXX Corp fame) wrote that they had made a deliberate effort to try try and emulate that to stay more in touch with the men. If you consider that the British tradition is that many the officers where really just encouraged to set a good example and if they where killed leading their men, then they had done a good job. British jr officers suffered quite a bit until the british came up with much more realistic traning for their junior officers. German jr officers where given much more authority and latitude which really played it out in the desert, but in other theaters as well. It was a major factor in helping the badly depleeted German forces from completely collapsing in numerbous occasions.
In any case, there is not that much unusual in the case of Rommel never being at his command post. If you care to read Panzer Battles, Mellenthin mentions that the german system encourages it, and he makes similar references to his Corp commanders in Russia. they did meet and communicate more often then Rommel, who is perhaps an extreme case. Knobeldorf, Balack and even Choltitz spent a lot of their time at the front while commanding 48 Panzer Korp, as well as Guderian and the Hoth as high up as being Panzergroup (panzer army) commanders. Only the excesive period without checking in with their HQ is probably unusual, Although Nehring mentioned that Guderian NEVER set foot in his own Pz Korp/Gruppe HQ during France. I think the biggest difference might be, as you said, that Rommel did not have the staff training and he often got sidetracked away from the big picture. But clearly many other German commanders where able to overcome that.
One thing that is also apparent is that the Allies (all of them as far as I can tell) are much more comfortable with set piece operations. They where never as comfortable with the improvisiation and letting the junior officers run the show. A lot of that may be the military tradition in Germany was stronger, and it is also clear that these junior officers got much better as the war went on. The criticism of Monty was that he may have spent a lot of time at the front, but he didn't lead from it and later on he was never able to take advantage of the oppurtunities that presented themselves. El Alemain was a very set peice battle, as where most of the operations in Normady and Sicily. I know that Monty was a key element in getting the troops back into shape, but I would hesitate to think of him leading form the front, but rather going to the front to keep in touch with the men.
The british style of command in the second world war evolved. I can remember where I read it, but Gen Horrocks (of XXX Corp fame) wrote that they had made a deliberate effort to try try and emulate that to stay more in touch with the men. If you consider that the British tradition is that many the officers where really just encouraged to set a good example and if they where killed leading their men, then they had done a good job. British jr officers suffered quite a bit until the british came up with much more realistic traning for their junior officers. German jr officers where given much more authority and latitude which really played it out in the desert, but in other theaters as well. It was a major factor in helping the badly depleeted German forces from completely collapsing in numerbous occasions.
In any case, there is not that much unusual in the case of Rommel never being at his command post. If you care to read Panzer Battles, Mellenthin mentions that the german system encourages it, and he makes similar references to his Corp commanders in Russia. they did meet and communicate more often then Rommel, who is perhaps an extreme case. Knobeldorf, Balack and even Choltitz spent a lot of their time at the front while commanding 48 Panzer Korp, as well as Guderian and the Hoth as high up as being Panzergroup (panzer army) commanders. Only the excesive period without checking in with their HQ is probably unusual, Although Nehring mentioned that Guderian NEVER set foot in his own Pz Korp/Gruppe HQ during France. I think the biggest difference might be, as you said, that Rommel did not have the staff training and he often got sidetracked away from the big picture. But clearly many other German commanders where able to overcome that.
One thing that is also apparent is that the Allies (all of them as far as I can tell) are much more comfortable with set piece operations. They where never as comfortable with the improvisiation and letting the junior officers run the show. A lot of that may be the military tradition in Germany was stronger, and it is also clear that these junior officers got much better as the war went on. The criticism of Monty was that he may have spent a lot of time at the front, but he didn't lead from it and later on he was never able to take advantage of the oppurtunities that presented themselves. El Alemain was a very set peice battle, as where most of the operations in Normady and Sicily. I know that Monty was a key element in getting the troops back into shape, but I would hesitate to think of him leading form the front, but rather going to the front to keep in touch with the men.
Rommel had a quality rare in Generals. Improvisation. Model Had it, Guderian, Balck, Heinrici... Manstein definetely had it. But its a rare quality. The mark for rating a Good General is his performance on the defense. Rommel on the defense was tough as nails and it was hard to distinguish where offense ended and defense began. He was sloppy, yes. But he understood the battlefield and had gonads of steel. He was willing to put his career and his very life on the line to acheive victory.. thats been proven many times. Overrated yes.. But I challenge you to UNDERATE him.
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limpypinky
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I don't agree with those who consider Rommel an overated general. He introduced during the WWI a new kind of warfare based on fast action and penetration behind enemy lines. This was the key of many successes of Wermacht during the WWII and let german win battles also when enemies were much more of german soldiers