I think Rommel was an above average Divisional commander and understood the concept of Tank warfare better than the British did (at least initially).
IMO, his strengths would include :
- The ability to take the initiative and do things faster than his opponents.
- Great motivator of his men. And getting the enemy to fear you.
- An intuitive feel for how the battle was going tactially.
I think he was way out of his depth as a theatre commander in North Africa (though notionally he reported to Kesselring). When arriving in North Africa, his brief was to `defend his hill', not take the other man's hill. It was all very well to be the offensive, but to do so in complete disregard of the logistical reality of North Africa, is unforgivable.
His head of logistics was I believe, a Major. He should have chosen a Major general.
His victories can be attributed at least partly to British ineptness and his luck
( e.g Gazala.)
Given all the hype over him, I do feel he was grossly over-rated.
Rommel - the most overrated general since Alexander the Grea
How and what did Rommel do in the theory of panzer tactics that Guderian had not already produce? While Rommel was in charge of Hitler’s guard, Guderian was actually testing panzer techniques. During the campaigns in France, 1940, Rommel was a good leader with a very good unit, I don't see where his leadership changed and/or influenced any battles during France.limpypinky wrote:I don't agree with those who consider Rommel an overated general. He introduced during the WWI a new kind of warfare based on fast action and penetration behind enemy lines. This was the key of many successes of Wermacht during the WWII and let german win battles also when enemies were much more of german soldiers
His leadership in Afrika was at best above average, IMHO. With the weaknesses that the Brit leadership showed over & over with their tank tactics and with the logistical situation that the Afrika Corps was in, maybe Rommel did not have the ability to win battles that would keep the Brits on their heels vs. punching through their lines gaining great distances but having no ability to secure and maintain those gains’ again due to logistical restraints. In some ways I wonder if Hitler was so fond of Rommel that he sent him to Afrika as more of a means of keeping him out of Russia as a personal favor; of course without Rommel’s knowledge of such.
Imagine if von Manstein, Guderian, von Kluge or any number of other German Generals would have gone to Afika rather than Rommel. Would things have changed? I think not, but why Rommel, why was he sent to Afrika, what made him stand out tactically and strategically as a leader from the others?
I think there are a few things that are useful to remember in this eternal discussion. One, that what Rommel in fact is is the most famous of German WWII generals. Second, that this has much, much more to do with where he fought and against whom than how he fought - if he'd been a corps commander on the Eastern Front, which would have been an equivalent command to the one he had in Africa initially, nobody would have known who he was. Three, a cool assessment of his qualities as a general is frequently obstructed by his fame, which in some cases leads to an overstatement of his merits and in other creates an artificial standard against which he is then judged and found wanting. He was just an intermediary level operational commander who found himself exercising a more profound influence on a whole theater of war, mainly because that theater of war was so remote geographically and in terms of priority.
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Why would he need to stand out in some rxtraordinary way? This was just one of about 12 motorised corps commands in the German army, and arguably the least important one - not just was it a very small command, it also had a very limited mission in a theater seen as being of secondary importance, whereas all the other ones had key roles in the campaign seen as likely to conclude the war. I think it can probably be taken for granted that strategic leadership played no part whatsoever in the apointment, firstly because if it did, they would hardly have chosen Rommel who had no experience at all with strategic decision-making and secondly because the DAK commander was not in fact supposed to be involved in strategic decision-making. His mission was simple - prevent the British from taking Tripolitania and evicting the Italians from Africa. Kluge and Guderian were much too senior for the DAK command - they were both slated for important army commands in Barbarossa. When all's said and done, as plausible an explanation as any for Rommel getting it was that he was the most junior of the mot. corps commanders. And, let's not forget that he was not in fact the original designate - Thoma was, and Rommel only got it as a replacement when he fell ill.Imagine if von Manstein, Guderian, von Kluge or any number of other German Generals would have gone to Afika rather than Rommel. Would things have changed? I think not, but why Rommel, why was he sent to Afrika, what made him stand out tactically and strategically as a leader from the others?
cheers
Qvist:Qvist wrote:Why would he need to stand out in some rxtraordinary way? This was just one of about 12 motorised corps commands in the German army, and arguably the least important one - not just was it a very small command, it also had a very limited mission in a theater seen as being of secondary importance, whereas all the other ones had key roles in the campaign seen as likely to conclude the war. I think it can probably be taken for granted that strategic leadership played no part whatsoever in the apointment, firstly because if it did, they would hardly have chosen Rommel who had no experience at all with strategic decision-making and secondly because the DAK commander was not in fact supposed to be involved in strategic decision-making. His mission was simple - prevent the British from taking Tripolitania and evicting the Italians from Africa. Kluge and Guderian were much too senior for the DAK command - they were both slated for important army commands in Barbarossa. When all's said and done, as plausible an explanation as any for Rommel getting it was that he was the most junior of the mot. corps commanders. And, let's not forget that he was not in fact the original designate - Thoma was, and Rommel only got it as a replacement when he fell ill.Imagine if von Manstein, Guderian, von Kluge or any number of other German Generals would have gone to Afika rather than Rommel. Would things have changed? I think not, but why Rommel, why was he sent to Afrika, what made him stand out tactically and strategically as a leader from the others?
cheers
I agree with your thoughts on Rommel, the point I was trying to express is that I do not believe that any General was going to make a difference in Afrika due to its secondary nature to Hitler after the Barbarossa attack. Now, had a strategic General assumed command, they may have changed. I believe that Rommel was a fine General, but not the legend he was made out to be. His dedication to his service and troops is second to none, yet his health and political beliefs weighed heavily upon him. One must wonder a what if had Kesslering had strategic command, Rommel tactical command and a well supplied line of logistics with Halders buy in of beating the Brits and Allies in Afrika. The three of them together with mission in hand may have had the chance to convince a Hitler to defeat England in the desert, than into Russia, maybe.
Funnily enough Rommel kept winning his great victories because the US ambassador in Cairo was sending to Washington all the british plans that the british high command were supplying their american allies.
This US code was broken by the german signals intelligence and so Rommel had always known about the british "big picture" pretty much up to the time of El Alamein.
This US code was broken by the german signals intelligence and so Rommel had always known about the british "big picture" pretty much up to the time of El Alamein.
The Italians were able to read Fellers' messages from either September or December 1941 until June 1942. They passed the decrypts on to their German allies, but not information on how they cracked the Black Code. Possibly it was via ULTRA that the Allies learned that the Black Code had been compromised.timotheus wrote:...This US code was broken by the german signals intelligence and so Rommel had always known about the british "big picture" pretty much up to the time of El Alamein.
Rommel's radio intercept unit was a useful auxiliary to Fellers' decrypted telegrams - but Seeböhm's unit was captured in July 1942, causing a dual blow to Axis intelligence.
Also see this thread:
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?p=465803
I think it is rather simplistic to assume that Rommel just won because of the leak in Cairo. It was an important factor in his victories, but not the only one. If one were to make an assessment like that, then it would also be fair to say that Monty won his great victories because of Ultratimotheus wrote:Funnily enough Rommel kept winning his great victories because the US ambassador in Cairo was sending to Washington all the british plans that the british high command were supplying their american allies.
This US code was broken by the german signals intelligence and so Rommel had always known about the british "big picture" pretty much up to the time of El Alamein.
That's my point JonS. Timotheus seems to think that Feller's indiscretions were solely responsible for Rommel's victories. That's as untrue as saying Ultra was solely responsible for Monty's successes. Its just a simplistic explanation that rather demeans the achievements of two very capable military commanders.JonS wrote:Well, Imad, loads of people believe exactly that about Montgomery (or possibly because of ULTRA and material)
Excuse me for not using quotes but this post will be confused enough as is.
Interesting sub-debate on the motivation behind Rommel's appointment as commander of the DAK. I think Hitler was a good judge of a commander's strengths and realised that Rommel's talents would have been buried in the East. His maverick style of command and tendency to disregard orders would have got up the nose of all his superiors had he been posted to the USSR, but in the Western Desert he could only annoy the Italians.
Another poster mentioned that the DAK was often umderstrength and at times barely more than the equivalent of a reinforced division. I'm not sure this is true, at least in terms of being little more than a division although I suspect this might have been true at times. What is true is that Rommel's style of command lent itself to being in charge of a division and it was only the quality of his staff officers that allowed him to control the DAK as well as he did. It's undeniable that Rommel had more problems the further he was promoted although this may be down to circumstances - I don't subscribe to that pov but I know plenty who do. It certainly affected his health and may have affected his decision making - there are no examples of Rommel's 'touch' (apart from the odd small unit operation the formed part of Kasserine) once he takes command of an army.
My real criticism of Rommel is his decisions in the wake of Gazala and the Fall of Tobruk. I just can't see, given the supply constraints already mentioned, that the strike for Cairo and the Canal had any hope of success, especially given the intel he had about Commonwealth forces in the ME. The only way that a substantial force could have been maintained would have been the capture of supply dumps and that should have been a last resort for a desperate army, something Rommel's forces certainly weren't. I think that success and the image he had led him to believe his own PR and clouded his judgement.
To sum up my own opinion, Rommel was a talented tactician who lacked the ability to manage large formations. His reputation stems from the British who were looking to explain their own defeats and for them it was easier to praise the enemy commander rather than face the fact that their own battle-doctrine was grossly inferior to that of the Germans. If one looks at his achievements in WW2 and compares that with his reputation it just doesn't square.
Interesting sub-debate on the motivation behind Rommel's appointment as commander of the DAK. I think Hitler was a good judge of a commander's strengths and realised that Rommel's talents would have been buried in the East. His maverick style of command and tendency to disregard orders would have got up the nose of all his superiors had he been posted to the USSR, but in the Western Desert he could only annoy the Italians.
Another poster mentioned that the DAK was often umderstrength and at times barely more than the equivalent of a reinforced division. I'm not sure this is true, at least in terms of being little more than a division although I suspect this might have been true at times. What is true is that Rommel's style of command lent itself to being in charge of a division and it was only the quality of his staff officers that allowed him to control the DAK as well as he did. It's undeniable that Rommel had more problems the further he was promoted although this may be down to circumstances - I don't subscribe to that pov but I know plenty who do. It certainly affected his health and may have affected his decision making - there are no examples of Rommel's 'touch' (apart from the odd small unit operation the formed part of Kasserine) once he takes command of an army.
My real criticism of Rommel is his decisions in the wake of Gazala and the Fall of Tobruk. I just can't see, given the supply constraints already mentioned, that the strike for Cairo and the Canal had any hope of success, especially given the intel he had about Commonwealth forces in the ME. The only way that a substantial force could have been maintained would have been the capture of supply dumps and that should have been a last resort for a desperate army, something Rommel's forces certainly weren't. I think that success and the image he had led him to believe his own PR and clouded his judgement.
To sum up my own opinion, Rommel was a talented tactician who lacked the ability to manage large formations. His reputation stems from the British who were looking to explain their own defeats and for them it was easier to praise the enemy commander rather than face the fact that their own battle-doctrine was grossly inferior to that of the Germans. If one looks at his achievements in WW2 and compares that with his reputation it just doesn't square.
I believe Rommel's wild goose chase of Auchinleck towards the border and beyond was done against his better judgment. It was Rommel, after all, who had been pestering Hitler up till the fall of Tobruk to take care of the Malta problem. The fall of Tobruk may or may not have clouded his thinking but I seriously doubt he didn't know he was taking a reckless gamble in chasing the British to Egypt before taking care of his supply issue by getting Malta neutralized. This probably calls for a separate thread but I believe Hitler was just as much to blame for his temerity vis-a-vis Operation Hercules. The stinging casualties suffered by the Fallschirmers in Crete were not, IMHO, a valid reason for treating the Malta issue in such a cavalier fashion. A German or Italian occupation of the island would have paid enormous dividends in the long run (especially for the Afrika Korps) that would have justified the losses incurred.My real criticism of Rommel is his decisions in the wake of Gazala and the Fall of Tobruk. I just can't see, given the supply constraints already mentioned, that the strike for Cairo and the Canal had any hope of success, especially given the intel he had about Commonwealth forces in the ME. The only way that a substantial force could have been maintained would have been the capture of supply dumps and that should have been a last resort for a desperate army, something Rommel's forces certainly weren't. I think that success and the image he had led him to believe his own PR and clouded his judgement.
That is one explanation I have never been comfortable with. I actually don't know of any famous commander that didn't build his reputation by exploiting his enemies' weaknesses, doctrinal and otherwise. To use a more recent example, it's like saying the IDF only won it's formidable reputation because of the flaws in the Arabs' battle doctrine -technically probably true but does that mean the IDF does not deserve it's reputation?His reputation stems from the British who were looking to explain their own defeats and for them it was easier to praise the enemy commander rather than face the fact that their own battle-doctrine was grossly inferior to that of the Germans
Would it also be accurate to say that Mannstein did not deserve his reputation because of the flaws in the Allied OOB during Gelb or because the Russians overextended themselves in Kharkov in '43?
Hmmmmm, Van Creveld largely discounts Malta as a significant factor in Rommel's supply problems whilst engaged in his jaunt into Egypt citing the excessive distance between his supply ports (Tripoli and Benghazi) and the front.
As for Rommel's reputation, he repeatedly put his head into the proverbial lions mouth and repeatedly it failed to shut its jaws. Exploiting the weaknesses of your opponent is one thing (something Manstein and the IDF did well) but Rommel took it further so he almost relied on it to cover his mistakes. Don't get me wrong, it's not that I think Rommel was a poor commander but his reputation is not deserved when his achievements, and the methods by which he got them, are examined dispassionately (or as dispassionately as one can
). 
As for Rommel's reputation, he repeatedly put his head into the proverbial lions mouth and repeatedly it failed to shut its jaws. Exploiting the weaknesses of your opponent is one thing (something Manstein and the IDF did well) but Rommel took it further so he almost relied on it to cover his mistakes. Don't get me wrong, it's not that I think Rommel was a poor commander but his reputation is not deserved when his achievements, and the methods by which he got them, are examined dispassionately (or as dispassionately as one can
).