Rommel - the most overrated general since Alexander the Grea

[Qvist]

Witko - I think we can do without agreeing with the concept of "cool" here. Especially as nobody has actually used it.

cheers

[Witko]

But it is my understanding that the possible overestimation of Rommel's abilities is due to contemporary propaganda, both German and British, as been pointed out in this thread. I'm sure you agree, Qvist, image of Rommel is the image of "cool"; well dressed, good looking, a bit rebellious, out at the front, etc (compare Marlon Brando in 'The Wild One' or any other popular icon of the 20th century); and that is of course not by accident.

Part of the "cool" image is the myth/truth that "the troops loved him, the staff hated him", etc.

Nonetheless, I don't understand your "I think we can to without agreeing with the concept of 'cool' here..." I'm not saying we agree on it, I'm taking part in a discussion. Surely that's ok. Oh, and I never said anybody used the "concept of cool". It was my invention.

[Qvist]

I agree Rommel is "cool"

Since, as we have both pointed out, nobody has used it, who are you agreeing with?

I'm sure you agree, Qvist, image of Rommel is the image of "cool"; well dressed, good looking, a bit rebellious, out at the front, etc (compare Marlon Brando in 'The Wild One' or any other popular icon of the 20th century);

No I don't actually, and even if you think so that is of no relevance here. You don't need the concept in order to discuss the role of contemporary propaganda. I am simply asking you nicely to not drag into this discussion concepts that are irrelevant and can only serve to lessen it's quality. This thread's lease on life depends on its ability to generate discussion of Rommel's military reputation compared to his actual military achievements, and if it starts being about coolness, it is going to have the same life expectancy as a Field Marshal who has just been invited to step into the back seat after having been implicated in a failed assasionation attempt.

cheers

[brustcan]

In static warfare (defense), Rommel never made a name for himself like Kesselring did. His desire to be on the move was demonstrated by his own movement. He was more apt to be in his Storch or a scout car than at his field HQ. It may be true that he was promoted one step too far (The Peter principal) as he was constantly reverting to a field officer versus a staff officer..

Hello!With Rommel's limited supplies, he built a defence line at El Alamein that was so
well constructred that Montgomery's Big Set Piece Atttack almost failed. Check out the
8th Army losses. The Normandy defence positions constructed by Rommel were
impressive. After Rommel captured Tobruk(33,000 prisioners!) had Hitler given him some
extra troops(like the ones wasted in Tunisia later) the 8th Army would have been defeated.

As for Kesselring, look at all the troops he got to defend Italy. And Kesselring did make a
name for himself.....the Italians wanted him after the war as a war crimminal, beause of all
the people being shot in rear areas under his control.
cheers brustcan

[JonS]

With Rommel's limited supplies, he built a defence line at El Alamein that was so well constructed that Montgomery's Big Set Piece Atttack almost failed.

Given the force ratios at El Alamein, Rommel should have been able to kick Montgomery all over the paddock. Instead he found himself going backwards for 1000 miles.

The Normandy defence positions constructed by Rommel were impressive.

"Impressive" in what sense? They might have looked darned sexy in wartime propaganda films, but when push came to shove those positions generally lasted for all of about 2 hours.

[Andreas]

I think one has to divide the Rommel argument into camps - those who served under him and those who served over him. Those who served under him enjoyed success, whether it be in France or North Africa. But to his superiors, Rommell was a major headache. If you were Rommell's supply officer, be it in France 1940 or North Africa 1941-42, you would have learned to hate him.

I suggest that this is a flawed breakdown. Just check what Generalmajor Streich of 15.PD had to say about him. Rommel was not particularly loved by some of the officers who served under him, while others thought he was the perfect man for Africa (e.g. von Mellenthin).

All the best

Andreas

[Epaminondas]

Compare Rommel's record while having Italian radio intercepts of Brits and Americans v. after that unit was lost.

A good chunk of Rommel's reputation rests on reading the enemy's mail. Once that stopped, he didn't win very many battles.

Rommel gets a good reputation for fighting the Western allies. If he was on the Eastern Front, and some other German General (call him Bob) was on the Africa campaign, Rommel would be little know in the West, and everyone would be talking about Bob being a great German general.

[Kurfürst]

Given the force ratios at El Alamein, Rommel should have been able to kick Montgomery all over the paddock. Instead he found himself going backwards for 1000 miles.

That speaks very lowly about the quality of British Commonwealth armies at El Alamein, since basically you say that British and CW troops were such a sad gang, that even with 3-4 times of superiority in menpower and material, they could have been easily 'kicked all over the paddock.'

The fact that Rommel eventaully lost in the face of such overwhelming enemy superiority in numbers and equipment doesn't tell much about his ability as a commander; the fact that he kept winning despite these circumstances beyond his control for so long does IMHO.

A good portition of Rommel's reputation was built up in Britain during and after the war, blessing him with almost superhuman abilities, to give an explanation why Rommel, with his tiny Africa Corps, so difficult to overcome. It still haunts the history books. Rommel of course was a very talented, charismatic and hugely resourceful middle-level army commander, who already showed his talents in WW1; but the popular image that lives on about him today is an excuse for Britain's repeated failures in the desert.

[JonS]

The thing is, you're wrong.

The British had a little less that 2:1 superiority in manpower.

[Qvist]

Including the Italians, I presume?

Anyway, out of genuine curiosity, how do you make this

Given the force ratios at El Alamein, Rommel should have been able to kick Montgomery all over the paddock.

work?

cheers

[JonS]

Including the Italians, I presume?

Well, yeah. The Italians weren't there as tourists and spectators you know

... out of genuine curiosity, how do you make this

Given the force ratios at El Alamein, Rommel should have been able to kick Montgomery all over the paddock.

work?

Typically, doctrine demands that for an assault on a prepared defensive position the attacker needs at least 3:1 superiority. 8th Army had substantially less than that overall, and were actually at less than 1:1 in a couple of fairly important categories (incl mdm and hy artillery).

So in a simplistic match up - and let's face it; calling brustcan's analysis 'simplistic' would be generous - Rommel should have won easily.

Regards
Jon

[Kurfürst]

Let's see some numbers. Including the reserves Monty got in Egypt...

[JonS]

Sure. Linky-poo

Against the Eighth Army's total on 23 October of 220,476 men under command (including 10,570 officers), the Panzer Army in the line could probably muster about 110,000, of whom slightly more than half were Italians.1 The British had as great a superiority in tanks, for just over 1000 of the 1348 Allied tanks held in the Middle East were in fighting trim in the forward areas while the Axis could muster 600 ‘runners’ at the most, of which only 129 were ‘heavies’ (German Mark III Special, Mark IV and Mark IV Special) to be pitted against the 430 British Grants and Shermans. The Eighth Army could also field more than 400 armoured cars against an Axis total of under 200.

– 250 –

For artillery the Eighth Army had approximately 900 medium and field guns, the majority 25-pounders, as well as 800 six-pounder and 550 two-pounder anti-tank guns, 48 3·7-inch and 700 Bofors anti-aircraft guns. With some 52 other weapons of assorted calibres, the British could man a grand total of 3050 guns.1 The Panzer Army, with 26 heavy guns for which the British had no equivalent, disposed of some 500 heavy, field, and medium weapons and 1000 anti-tank or dual purpose anti-tank/anti-aircraft guns of from 37- to 88-millimetre calibre. Of the notorious 88s, there were between fifty and sixty in the Alamein defences, with less than half the total sited in an anti-tank role. The Axis also had a quantity of guns of all types that could have been rapidly brought forward from the rear and coastal defence areas. ...

The figures for the Panzer Army fighting strength may be on the conservative side but there is no doubt that the Eighth Army had generally a two-to-one superiority. The course of military history shows that such a ratio is not sufficient on its own to ensure victory to the attackers.

1 The Panzer Army war diary carries entries to indicate that in the week before 23 October there were 237,000 Axis troops on the ration strength in North Africa. Of these, 91,000 were German Army, Navy and Air Force personnel, and 146,000 were Italians, divided into 84,000 in the rear and 62,000 in the forward areas. An equivalent ration state of British troops in the Middle East theatre has been estimated at over 500,000.

I.e., roughly 2:1 all over the place, regardless of how you count it or if you include reserves. Of the "900 medium and field guns" in 8th Army only some 48 were mediums of 4.5-in and 5.5-in, and combined with the heavies - for which 8th Army had no answer - the Italo-Germans had a distinct advantage in terms of artillery range and throw weight.

Oh, and let's not forget the estimated 445,358 mines of all types the Germans had laid.

[Andreas]

I am having some issues with that analysis, because it ignores the value of mobility as a force multiplyer, and the ability of the attacker to concentrate strength at the point of his choosing. It also ignores the very severe consequences of supply disruption and logistical cord length for the Axis forces.

All the best

Andreas

[JonS]

Yes, of course. That's because we aren't talking about force multipliers and logistics.

We're talking about Brustcan and Kurfurst's comic-book idea of warfare, and their quaint revisionist belief that the 8th Army had 4:1 superiority in manpower.