Rommel - the most overrated general since Alexander the Grea

[Qvist]

Well, yeah. The Italians weren't there as tourists and spectators you know

I know, just clarifying.

Typically, doctrine demands that for an assault on a prepared defensive position the attacker needs at least 3:1 superiority. 8th Army had substantially less than that overall, and were actually at less than 1:1 in a couple of fairly important categories (incl mdm and hy artillery).

So in a simplistic match up - and let's face it; calling brustcan's analysis 'simplistic' would be generous - Rommel should have won easily.

Ah, right - I thought you were talking about Rommel's attack on the Alamein position!

Regarding the 3-1 rule, I've never seen anyone even try to validate it against any actual experience in world war 2, would regard it as little more than superstition and would like to point out that if it had applied in the desert campaign, Rommel would never had gotten out of Tripolitania. Then there are the factors Andreas points out, as well as the fact that once an operation reaches a certain scope and timeframe the essential division into "attacker" and "defender" tends to break down. But I take it this is more than a little tongue-in-cheek?

cheers

[JonS]

More than a little

Going back to the 3:1 thing, I don't know ... I think that Western Armies in WWII tried to plan for at least that ratio, certainly at the point of decision. That is the whole point behind the principles of war that talk about concentration (at the decisive point) on the one hand, and economy of effort (in non-critical areas) on the other. I don't know if doing a backwards analysis of WWII battles would be that fruitful (though maybe it would), I think you'd need to look at the planning documents and the assumptions and considerations that went into them.

Jon

[Kurfürst]

The figures I had in mind was something like 30 000 German and 50 000 Italians present in the battle - unfortunately I can't find the book atm where I've saw this. Regarding the figures of material, I think a bit more detailed data is needed, ie. guns are given as '3,7cm to 8,8cm', and it's including AA guns as well. Things like this kinda distort comparisons since for example 3,7cm Luftwaffe cannons would be also counted. Tank numbers also don't tell relative tank quality, Alamein was probably the last engagement in which the Allied forces actually had qualitative and quantitative advantage : Shermans and Grant/Lee were tough nuts to crack for anything less then the long 7,5cm gun. Few of those were available to Rommel, as Ken Ford notes : The Panzer IV tank was the best of the German armour and it was further improved in the summer of 1942 by the introduction of a new longerbarrelled 75mm gun to become Panzer IVF2 with almost twice the penetrative power of its predecessor. It was true that not many of these tanks were available to Rommel during his initial move into Egypt, but when they did put in an appearance, they proved to be extremely effective.

OTOH when one looks at the numbers it's quite striking that as far as tank went, the Allies had even greater superiority than numbers would suggest - I dare not to speak about the 'qualities' of Italian tank designs present.. they were simply inaduquate against the opposition.

According to Stephen Zaloga's article in Military Modelling the 8th Army's tank front line strength at the time of the battle was:

Crusader I (2 pounder) - 220
Crusader III (6 pounder) - 179
Valentine - 169
Stuart - 125
Grant - 179
Sherman - 252

Just a few points though. The main thing is that, as other put it far better than I could, Rommel was certainly not in an advantage, there were no '3-to-1' rule. History knows far too many exceptions from under this, ironically Alexander the Great mentioned in the title is one of them; Rommel's success in the Desert or Operation Merkur (paratroopers landing on an island without considerable heavy weapons, altough complete air support beating a force twice their size) are more recent examples for 1942.

Monty never having doubts about the outcome, nor wheter he had sufficiently overwhelming superiority in numbers for victory. I recall reading his book in which he put his concept of the battle pretty straightforward, something along the line that :'The enemy cannot sustain heavy losses - we can'

He fought with a rather simple concept at Alamein, a Verdun-like Materialschlacht. The tactics used also resambled the Great War much more so than the Blitzkrieg-era.

[JonS]

Oversimplistic. Evasive. Cherry-picking. Unconvincing. C-

Try harder next time.

[South]

Good morning Witko,

Re: "the 'cool' image";

The concept of = charisma = was studied by the psychologists at CIA in re Indonesia's Sukarno and his influence. The public report section is/was available and it's referenced in at least 1 book.

The study was prepared circa 1957 (I believe) gearing up for the US war against Sukarno and the PKI.

I've got the study and book out in the barn and will look for it depending on my schedule.

[brustcan]

[quote="JonS"]
Given the force ratios at El Alamein, Rommel should have been able to kick Montgomery all over the paddock. Instead he found himself going backwards for 1000 miles.[quote]

The force ratio just before Montgomery's attack at El Alamein:

PANZERARMEE AFRICA
104,000
(50,000 german 54,000 Italian)
Tanks: 489
(211 German 278 Italian)
(38 Mark IV's)
Guns of all types: 1,219
(68 - 88"s)
Aircraft: German 275(150 serviceable)
Italian 400(200 seviceable)

Shortages of ammunition, and
fuel( 3 day supply) none coming,
since last two tankers were sunk

8TH ARMY
195,000
Tanks: 1,029( 390 were Shermans
the best tank in the battle)
Guns of all types: 2,311
Aircraft: 750(530 serviceable)

Plentifully supplied with fuel and
ammunition


Given the resources the 8th Army had over the Panzerarmee, ...saying that
Rommel should have been able to kick Montgomery all over the paddock...
is quite comical.
brustcan

[JonS]

As I said, the British only had ~2:1, and Rommel had significant advantages in some categories.

[Michate]

Oh, and let's not forget the estimated 445,358 mines of all types the Germans had laid.

Half of them were actually laid by the Brits and captured later by Rommel.

Have a look at medium tanks - 123 against approx. 500.

Or have a look at ammunition supplies, and juydge yourself.

[JonS]

It makes me giggle the way you round up the British numbers and round down the German numbers. *teehehehehehe*

Does it matter who made the mines? A mine in the ground has few friends, and a mine in the ground is never your friend when you are attacking.

Ammo supplies have nothing to do with the infantile (and wildly inaccurate) comparisons that brustcan and kurfurst are trying to pass off as 'fact'.

[Kurfürst]

Have a look at medium tanks - 123 against approx. 500.

Another thing is quality. Rommel had only 38 Mark IV's (I am not sure if those are all the long gun versions..?) that could cope with the 431 Grants and Shermans. The rest, even Pz IIIs would be in big trouble, and could only fill the ranks and were hopelessly undergunned to cope with the heavily armored US designs..

Rommel was very specific about the threat and difficulties posed by the 'General Grant' and 'General Sherman' types as he put it. That's probably the last battle where the Axis were outclassed in armor quality in the West btw (and makes you think how bad affairs later have become with Tigers and Panthers, if you read that bad rep the Sherman got afterwards, when in 1942, it was a rather good tank indeed!)

[JonS]

*tehehehe* It just gets better. In a desperate attempt to salvage some pride we now get treated to a fine example of bait and switch

Oh, and a free clue: Tactics for Dummies 101: Tanks don't fight other tanks.
See: "A-Tk gun line"
See: "Destruction of 9th Armd Bde, 2nd Nov"

[Qvist]

Jon -

You've made a far-reaching conclusion here, and certainly a debatable one. Pertinent points can be raised against it, and are. If you want to stand by it, you are going to have to stop discussing by adjectives.

cheers

[Art]

Regarding the 3-1 rule, I've never seen anyone even try to validate it against any actual experience in world war 2, would regard it as little more than superstition

A hint: 3:1 rule pertains to the ratio of forces in the sector of atack.

[Gooner1]

Or have a look at ammunition supplies, and juydge yourself.

Last report from the Axis Tank-Army on the 19th October was enough fuel for 11 days at then current consumption and enough ammunition for 9 days fighting.

[JonS]

You've made a far-reaching conclusion here.

Not really. My main conclusion is that facile raw force ratios are highly misleading. Especially when those presenting the force ratios can't seem to count, and have to use magic-maths to push the ratio in a direction that suits their pre-conceptions.

Any honest force-ratio assessment between the British/CW forces and those of the Italo-Germans in Egypt in October 1942 will quickly come to the conclusion that the British had a roughly 2:1 advantage overall. That is substantially less than what is required to mount an attack into the teeth of a well prepared position. All else being equal, based on the force ratios Rommel should have won, and force ratios were the basis and extent of Brustcan and Kurfurst's 'analysis'.

What they missed were the force multipliers.

The British forces had better than 2:1 that in some categories, and also had better kit than the Italo-German forces in some categories. Used well, advantages in those categories could be leveraged over the whole force. OTOH, in other categories they had much worse than 2:1, and in some categories the British had no equivalent to the Italo-German weapons. Too, in some categories the Italo-Germans had the better kit. There is no reason to suppose that the Italo-Germans weren't furiously leveraging their own advantages as force multipliers in their favour.

There are other force multipliers too, of course. Logistics and intelligence stand out here - the British knew what they were doing in these areas and recognised their importance. The Italo-Germans ... less so. Those were, of course, unforced errors on the part of the Germans and Italians. There is no rule of nature or law of physics that states they must (comparatively) neglect log and intel.

Doctrine, too, has the potential to be a force multiplier. The Geramns, especially, had a more robust combined arms doctrine at El Alamein. That was to their advantage, although it didn't prevent them from impaling their armour on gunlines in futile attacks though (see: Snipe). However, other elements of their doctrine - especially that of artilery - was significantly less advanced than the British. Again, this is nothing to do with raw force ratios.

So, simply saying "wah, the British had 4:1 and they had better stuff so of course they won" is ... how to put this nicely? ... it's as naive as it is factually wrong.

War is complex - who knew? - and simplistic answers aren't much use.