Horses in the Wehrmacht

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
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Jon G.
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#61

Post by Jon G. » 21 Jul 2007, 12:02

MicMac wrote:But which moves better in snow hey? a horse or a motor vehicle? My money is on the horse moving considerably faster through snow, so perhaps the seemingly excessive use of horses does not symbolise the speed they wanter, perhaps it shows that the Germans knew they would end up fighting in Russia during winter, and bringing suitable transport was their way of preparing. Remember the Blitzkrieg did not just rely on defeating enemies quickly, it also relied on moving very quickly. Look at the size of Russia, it was always going to take a very long time to conquer, moving quickly around it was key to capturing it. It just turns out that this was not enough.
Horses are better than wheeled motor vehicles in a few special circumstances - namely in very hilly/mountainous country. Heavily motorized Allied armies used horses in Burma and Italy, for example. When gasoline is short, horses can be the only alternative. But the Wehrmacht didn't invade the Soviet Union with thousands of horses because it thought they were superior to motor vehicles.

Standard issue heavy German draft horses had problems with mud and snow as well. Here's an interesting little blurb about German use of panje horses in the east.

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#62

Post by Jon G. » 21 Jul 2007, 14:59

Lots of links have been given in previous posts on this thread. As a service to new readers, and in order to give an overview of the many directions this thread has gone in, I've compiled all links in this post.

Andreas' link to the BA-MA page about horses started this whole thread.

Links to threads and posts on this forum

# of horses with the Heer on the eve of Barbarossa
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 06#1065606

The Einheitsdiesel
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 992#724992

The expansion of the Grosstransportraum
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=108967

1938 European food autharchy according to Institut für Konjunkturforschung
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 260#754260

German ammunition stocks, 21 June 1941
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=68895

Tabulation (administrativia)
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 621#903621

Franco's price for joining the Axis
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 71#1083971

Strategic minerals and their global distribution
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=119231

Deutsche Reichsbahn
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=82145

Calories per day
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?p=750630

Kit Carson on the Bf-109 (locked, for reference only)
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=97075

Links to external sites

Monthly German sitreps from occupied France

Wiki on horse mange

Intelligence bulletin about German horse cavalry and transport

Horses in the 1812 peninsula campaign

USSBS rubber industry report

USSBS aircraft industry report

DiNardo's book on Amazon

DiNardo's book from Greenwood

Statistical Yearbook of the League of Nations

Paper about German motorisation in the 1930s

The US QM remount service in Italy

The role of synthetic fuel in WW2 Germany

Panje horses in the east

Downloads

Williamson Murray: Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe, 1933-1945


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Zebedee
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#63

Post by Zebedee » 23 Jul 2007, 13:47

Hi Jon,
One day I will manage to post a table which doesn’t make people’s eyes bleed…
I’m gradually working my way through linked references and flame wars! 
As ever forgive the wanton snippage caused, in my case, by a disorderly mind ;)
However, my argument that Nov 1 1941 represents a low point in German vehicle strength on the East Front does not really endorse that point of view - I don't think Glantz has much time for German generals' memoirs (but correct me if I'm wrong!); he has just chosen a point in time when German strength was at its lowest since Barbarossa began. The German logistics services also lost vehicles at alarming rates in largely non-muddy France, Belgium and Holland in 1940. The main difference is not one of weather, but rather one of time, because the Russian campaign dragged on for longer than Wehrmacht planners had allowed for.
That’s an excellent point on Glantz’s choice of dates which I hadn’t considered. I think very few modern historians are willing to take von Manstein, Guderian etc at face value any more. Although not many go as far as Glantz, who makes snide little notes referencing Guderian’s memoirs. However, it is interesting on how much emphasis Glantz places on the unpublished review of the campaign by Heinrici, even if he disagrees with some parts of it (most notably the decision of August being the root cause of German failure). I’ll quote it at length at the end of this post because it does seem to be unpublished, which is an absolute travesty if the conclusions cited by Glantz are anything to go on.
Your point on the time factor is well made as is the issue of tank losses reflecting intensity of combat. However, I’m trying to establish some kind of underlying cause (eg the very nature of mechanical warfare leads to gradual attrition) which cannot just be explained away by weather or nature of the opposition. Both obviously played a role in attrition of the number of motor vehicles, but the repeated nature of the attrition to German motor vehicles in WW2 in every theatre seems to point to some more fundamental issue.

Well yes, but the 30% of trucks assumed to be out of operations applied at all times as I understand it from van Creveld, under all circumstances - so no time frame element in the calculation as I understand it. But perhaps I've read too much into the 30%

Regarding your second point, yes, the Luftwaffe cooked the books by cutting back on spares production in order to increase apparent strength. There are some insights to be gained from the USSBS aircraft industry report I recall a similar point being made about German tanks. On a related note, it's important to remember that the greatly increasing German aircraft production in 1943/1944 is overwhelmingly made up of single-engined types measured by weight or by number of engines the Luftwaffe production increase isn't as impressive as it may appear at first glance.
In fairness, I’m adopting the stance of something approaching Devil’s advocate. I’ve not read Van Creveld for some time so it might be useful for me to review his work. It just strikes me as very odd that in almost every campaign there is an issue with motor vehicles and attrition despite the 30% being assumed.
I drew the Luftwaffe comparison to see whether it would hold true for motor vehicles in general. It’s interesting you remember something similar being true for tanks (I recall the issue of new engines in 1941 being difficult because Hitler wanted to keep them for new tanks and not use them as replacements). Could there be a more fundamental underlying cause or causes which have been overlooked in favour of more simple explanations?
Well, the ~1175 vehicles per division correspond rather well with early Wellen German division vehicle establishments. The vehicle to horse relationship seems to have improved greatly by the time of Barbarossa, no doubt due to vehicle requisitions from occupied Europe.
Absolutely, but what is intriguing is the concentration of those vehicles in the motorised and armoured units while despite the expansion which has occurred in the number of infantry units, no similar expansion is present in the number of horses.


Some digging in Hans Potgiesser's book Die deutsche Reichsbahn im Ostfeldzug yielded these numbers: (brilliant source work snipped)
Absolutely superb – thank you! For what little it’s worth, I’d read the phrase in question as ‘daily number of wagonloads’ but my Oma always said that I understood less than I read with my German ;)
The document Qvist provided and you’ve posted is amazing. It is interesting that Glantz places a large part of the blame on the failure of German logistics on their inability to capture Soviet rolling stock.
Glantz’s figures could just be wrong, or perhaps mis-stated. I’ve been flicking through the ‘soviet perspective’ works primarily to draw comparisons with German logistical arrangements rather than establishing firm facts on the German arrangements themselves. Without reading Glantz’s source it’s hard to tell how the figures have been obtained.

It’s amazing that the Germans managed to find so many horses in the captured areas of SU. I’m presuming that a fair amount must have come from the Soviet army itself but surely that can’t explain away such a big number? The figure is also astonishingly similar to a rough ballpark figure of horses needed by the 88 cavalry divisions (at 3500 horses each) raised by the SU from June to December 1941.

Andreas very rightly points out that it’s an exceptionally flawed argument to say that the Heer relied on horses because they could cope with bad weather better, but there is a glimmer of truth in such an argument being made for the Red Army cavalry units if Glantz is correct that they were intended as long-range guerilla units. Even so, one wonders whether quite so many would have been raised if the SU had the requisite amount of motor vehicles which its pre-war ToE called for.



Well, Franco has his apologists too, and Hitler may have had his own reasons for over-stating Franco's price for entering the war as an active belligerent on the Axis side. But the LoN harvest figures which I posted earlier seem to support Tooze's point - the 1940 Spanish harvest is lower than both the 1939 and 1941 harvests.
True. Although if the evidence supports such a requirement one may have to dismiss the idea that it was purely Hitler overstating the cost of the Franco alliance.
It's worth noting that daily calories as expressed by what people would be entitled to with their ration cards do not
necessarily reflect actual calorie intake - wherever there is rationing, there is a black market too. In turn, if food stocks are relatively abundant, the black market will usually trade in food stamps, whereas the black market will trade in the commodities themselves if food is scarcer than expressed in daily calorie rations.
Sure, although I do agree with many of the points raised in the posts previous to this on how rationing would more severely hit urban areas (even without the measures which the Germans undertook to separate Polish cities from the countryside). I’m reminded of the British attempts to destabilise the German ration system by dropping fake ration cards which had some small success and led to increasingly harsh punishments on those who were discovered to use them (mentioned in Holt’s The Deceivers).

While taking onboard the points about general ration levels, one has to bear in mind that certain categories of people would be far more ‘visible’ (for lack of a better word) and thus less able to access the black market. The Jewish Ghettos perhaps provide the best example of this. The amount of requisitions made by the Wehrmacht in any area would also lead to a problem of absolute scarcity which would in turn reduce the supply into the black market.

Rationing may well represent a ‘guaranteed’ minimum intake but, taking all the factors mentioned in this thread so far, I don't believe that the surplus of food making its way into the black market would have been enough to significantly improve the diets of the majority of the European Grossraum population.

Interesting point on black market trade. It’s an area in which I should really improve my knowledge.
I believe there are also some Speer quotes around to the effect that if the USAAF had carried on bombing German ball bearing factories (the Schweinfurt raids, which also incurred heavy losses on the USAAF), then Germany's war effort would soon have been doomed. But then both Speer and Tooze, in agreement for once, go on to critisize the Allied air forces' failure to keep up the pressure, instead moving on to other targets.
I can’t decide whether this is because the Speer statements come from a time when he was being relatively honest or not ;)

Well, I think that Milch cut a number of corners in order to increase aircraft production, which by the way is quite congruent with the reduced production of spares, addressed above. The He-177 heavy bomber held little promise in 1941, with many technical faults to iron out. The Me-210 had proven to be an expensive failure because a year had been cut off its development time, a risk that had paid off with the Ju-88 according to Tooze. I think Milch simply settled for good enough aircraft in great numbers next year, instead of a new generation of aircraft several years down the pipeline, irrespective of how the air war against Britain and the USA might develop.
I can definitely see your point. But I’m wondering how that then squares with the need for increased production? Obviously the decisions to mass-produce certain planes were taken before the winter 1941 crisis (and even before Udet’s suicide), which leads to the question on why would Germany need to respond to US production figures to such an extent if the air war was not to be fought over the Grossraum/Reich? As far as I can see, the only real alternative is that Germany planned to repeat the attempt to bomb Britain to the negotiating table but I can’t quite see how that would work. Obviously the next generation planes were not ready for mass production in mid-to late 1941, but they did eventually come good, so the question has to be asked why was it so vital to make a decision at that point?
There is a thread about Col. Carson's evaluation of the Bf-109 here http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=97075 unfortunately that thread turned too hot for comfort so it is now locked, but it's still useful as a reference.
That’s a fun little thread. Much can be explained by comparing the dates when the various evaluations cited were done. For me, Carson’s claims do need to be taken seriously. Which leads on to the question of why the FW-190 wasn’t pursued as a real option. But the answer to that will probably lie in the relative political clout of the various design teams.


I mentioned a study on the Russian campaign by Heinrici which Glantz cites (sometimes at length). It does seem to be genuinely unpublished in either German or in translation. So I’ll just put what Glantz cites down here.

Gotthard Heinrici, The Campaign in Russia, Volume 1, Washington DC, US Army G-2,1954. Translation by Joseph Welch.

‘The goal set for the Eastern Campaign was not achieved. The enemy’s armed forces were defeated, but the Russian State structure did not collapse. The threat of a two-front war stood at the door. The attack on Russia did not prevent this from happening; on the contrary, it conjured up its possibility.

The basis of failure rested on the following:

1. Politically, Hitler had underestimated the inner stability of the Bolshevik system. It proved to be tenacious and consolidated. The spirit within the Russians to defend ‘Mother Russia’ was stronger than their rejection of the Communist dictatorship. The improper treatment of the population in the occupied areas, above all, in the Ukraine and the Baltic States, only increased this feeling.
2. Economically, Russia was also better established than Hitler was willing to admit.
3. Militarily, the Russian armed forces were surprisingly capable. They often defended with a stubborn tenacity, and they had an astounding ability to improvise, even in the technical arena. These qualities consistently made up for the inability of the senior Russian leadership. However, all of this does not explain away the failure. German negligence and omission may make it easier to understand.
4. Most decisive was the operational decision of August 1941, which shifted the main emphasis of the operation from Army Group Centre to Army Group South and, in part, to the north. This forfeited the best chance to conduct a decisive battle with the enemy during a direct attack on Moscow. I stress ‘best chance’, because there has been no evidence to the contrary.
5. The motorized problem must also be considered. The German Army did not have the necessary motorized units and air transport formations or the required fuel reserves for a campaign in an area with the depth of Russia. The result was the necessity of having to stop the panzer formations until the infantry could catch up, instead of exploiting the opportunity to attack into the depth. Secondly, complete dependence on the railroads for supply, with all of the ensuing problems, was no way to tackle the East.
6. The width and depth of Russia had a decisive significance. After the rapid defeat of the Russian armed forces was not accomplished, the German Army was still faced by these two factors and they did not have the means to overcome them.
7. The Russian climate and terrain also complicated matters. The effect of the mud period was surprising in its significance. The coming of the Russian winter did not correspond with German expectations. And the difficulty of the terrain, with its wide marshes and impassible regions, the great primeval-like forests complexes, the few good roads and the wide, unregulated river courses may not have stopped the offensive, but they did cause considerable delays.
8. Therefore, the Germans had to fight a constant battle with time. The end of June start time, in conjunction with the time lost during the battle of Kiev, took bitter revenge upon the Germans. If the incorrect decision of August 1941 were not made, the time left before the beginning of the mud period would have been sufficient for a decisive success. However, it would still have been very close.

In summary, it can be established that the decisive factor in the failure of the operation was the August 1941 decision. In addition, however, there was also the underestimation of the enemy, German weakness, above all in the realm of motorization, the depth of the area, the climate, the terrain and the time factors.

With this in mind, the efforts made by the German soldiers takes on special significance.’

I’d really like to see whether or not Heinrici expands upon points 5 through 7 prior to drawing his conclusions.

All the best,

Zeb

Jon G.
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#64

Post by Jon G. » 23 Jul 2007, 19:53

Hi Zeb, I hope to be able to address your other points in another point later. For now, I will try and stay with the horsey stuff.
Zebedee wrote:...
It’s amazing that the Germans managed to find so many horses in the captured areas of SU. I’m presuming that a fair amount must have come from the Soviet army itself but surely that can’t explain away such a big number? The figure is also astonishingly similar to a rough ballpark figure of horses needed by the 88 cavalry divisions (at 3500 horses each) raised by the SU from June to December 1941.
I wonder how much of the Generalplan Ost can be read into the number of looted horses? The 235,239 horses captured from June 22 to Nov 1 1941 represent a far higher number than were captured from occupied France and Benelux over similar timespans.

From the Lageberichte I linked to earlier:
Dec 1940-Jan 1941 sitrep...Infolge der Abnahmeschwierigkeiten im Reich wurde am 15.12. bis zum 15.1. der Abtransport militaerischer Beute nach dem Reich gesperrt. Wirtschaftsbeute wurde auch weiterhin als Wirtschaftsgut gefahren. Mitte Januar setzte der Abtransport der Pferde aus Frankreich, Belgien und Holland mit insgesamt mehr als 100 000 St[ü]ck. wieder ein...
I read that as more than 100,000 horses so far, i.e. the 100k horses is the cumulative figure, although I am happy to stand corrected on this.

Somewhat unclearly, the April-May 1941 sitrep continues:
April-May 1941 Lagebericht...Die Pferdetransporte nach dem Reich waren am 10. April beendet. Insgesamt (d.h. aus Frankreich, Belgien und Holland) wurden seit 15.11.40 101 000 Pferde abtransportiert...
So, 101,000 horses transported from occupied France and Benelux by April 10 1941, although it is not clear as glass to me whether it's the same 100k horses, or if the number given in the April-May '41 sitrep is wholly or partially additional to the 'more than 100,000' mentioned in the Dec-Jan report because the timespans overlap.

Now compare the stated numbers of requisitioned horses with this table from DiNardo, which I'll repost here for clarity

Image
DiNardo sources his table to a work by Burchardt Müller-Hildebrandt entitled Horses in the German Army 1941-45, Office of the Chief of Military History, Manuscript #P-090, 1952.

...in other words, the number DiNardo gives for 1941 horse requisitionings looks a bit on the low side - unless outright loot and more orderly requisitionings should somehow be distinct from one another, which is not likely since both the Lageberichte and the document scan which I posted above use the term 'Beute'

All but 46,761 horses requisitioned in 1941 would have come from the east if DiNardo's table is to be believed - and obviously there would have been no Soviet horses to confiscate prior to June 22.

I think we can read into the figure of Soviet loot that the Wehrmacht paid less attention to the needs of the civilian population in the east than they did in the west - which is not to say that life in occupied France and Benelux was all wine and roses, just that the occupied areas of the USSR were a lot worse off.

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#65

Post by JonS » 23 Jul 2007, 23:20

Hi Zeb,
I'm only going to address one of the points you made, not because I think the others are wrong, or not interesting, but simply because this is the only one I think I can add to :(
Zebedee wrote:Your point on the time factor is well made as is the issue of tank losses reflecting intensity of combat. However, I’m trying to establish some kind of underlying cause (eg the very nature of mechanical warfare leads to gradual attrition) which cannot just be explained away by weather or nature of the opposition. Both obviously played a role in attrition of the number of motor vehicles, but the repeated nature of the attrition to German motor vehicles in WW2 in every theatre seems to point to some more fundamental issue.

Well yes, but the 30% of trucks assumed to be out of operations applied at all times as I understand it from van Creveld, under all circumstances - so no time frame element in the calculation as I understand it. But perhaps I've read too much into the 30%

Regarding your second point, yes, the Luftwaffe cooked the books by cutting back on spares production in order to increase apparent strength. There are some insights to be gained from the USSBS aircraft industry report I recall a similar point being made about German tanks. On a related note, it's important to remember that the greatly increasing German aircraft production in 1943/1944 is overwhelmingly made up of single-engined types measured by weight or by number of engines the Luftwaffe production increase isn't as impressive as it may appear at first glance.
In fairness, I’m adopting the stance of something approaching Devil’s advocate. I’ve not read Van Creveld for some time so it might be useful for me to review his work. It just strikes me as very odd that in almost every campaign there is an issue with motor vehicles and attrition despite the 30% being assumed.
I drew the Luftwaffe comparison to see whether it would hold true for motor vehicles in general. It’s interesting you remember something similar being true for tanks (I recall the issue of new engines in 1941 being difficult because Hitler wanted to keep them for new tanks and not use them as replacements). Could there be a more fundamental underlying cause or causes which have been overlooked in favour of more simple explanations?
If I may, I think you are focussing too much on the 'German' aspect of this question of vehicle attrition, and perhaps casting the net wider might provide some insight. I've already said that - for a number of reasons - I think that as a fleet the US and UK military trucks were more robust than their German equivalents. However, they still broke down, and presumably in large numbers.

The difference, however, is that the US and the UK seemed to treat all logistics issues as a matter of flow, while the Germans looked at it as a matter of surge (or, taking somewhat simplistic alternate interpretations: long war vs. short war, or attrition vs. manoeuvre). This obviously applies to consumables like ammunition, POL, food, and men, but also to capital items like tanks, aircraft and - of particular relevance here - trucks. We have seen numerous other cases where the German approach to logistics favoured stacking to shop window for short term effect rather than ensuring depth for an extended campaign.

This can perhaps most clearly be seen in a couple of counter-examples. I'm going to primarily use the UK since I'm most familiar with them.

1) The BEF lost a massive proportion of the total vehicles available to the British Army during the retreat from and evacuation of the Continent. However, baring a short period around June -Sept 1940 the British Army doesn't seem to have suffered a pervasive shortage of mechanised transport, certainly not enough to affect operations.

2) Throughout the North Africa campaign of 1941-42 the British lost massive numbers of trucks to the Germans - enough that British trucks made up a significant fraction of the German transport fleet. This was particularly the case after the Gazala battles in May 1942. However, again the British operations were not affected by a shortage of trucks. There were always enough trucks available in the pipeline to replace losses to the enemy and mechanical attrition.

3) The one example I can think of where shortage of trucks did affect operations was post-breakout from Normandy, and the infamous 1,400 3-tonners sidelined due to faulty piston rings. That kind of event is so far outside the normal scope of losses to the enemy and mechanical attrition that it's knock on effect isn't surprising.

4) Finally, a US example. The Red Ball express the US developed in the post-breakout period (and the equivalent Red Lion route the British used) placed a great emphasis on maintaining the route. Speeds and daily distances were strictly controlled, and great numbers of servicing and maintenance facilities were provided to ensure that the trucks kept rolling. If the US had simply viewed the RBE as a short-term surge problem, they could have carried a far greater tonnage in the initial period, but the quantity shifted would have plummeted after about 7-10 days due to lack of sustainability.

So, anyway, 30% attrition over three months (10% / month, 0.3% per day) doesn't strike me as excessive. It also wouldn't surprise me if the Western Allies suffered from similar attrition rates in their transport fleets. The difference, of course, is that they planned and allowed for that scale of attrition so it had little to no effect on them. And because it had little-to-no effect on operations all the histories naturally tend to gloss over it. The Germans didn't plan for it, at least not to the same scale, so their suffered an ever more frequent series of logistics crises which were overcome - to greater or lesser degrees - by increasingly heroic improvisations or were the cause of clear and obvious operational defeats/failures. These heroic improvisations and operational defeats/failures stand out, so we hear about them (very much like, I expect, the British 3-tonner saga).

Regards
JonS

the other Jon ;)

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#66

Post by Andreas » 24 Jul 2007, 10:48

Jon G. wrote:Somewhat unclearly, the April-May 1941 sitrep continues:
April-May 1941 Lagebericht...Die Pferdetransporte nach dem Reich waren am 10. April beendet. Insgesamt (d.h. aus Frankreich, Belgien und Holland) wurden seit 15.11.40 101 000 Pferde abtransportiert...
.
To me this is quite clear. Between 15.11.40-10.04.41 101,000 horses were transported. I don't think this number is additional.

Regarding the "tägliche Wagenstellung" - how would this capture waggons that are moving as part of loaded trains already? So I do not think it is the daily number of wagonloads, but it could be the daily number of available wagons, i.e. wagons that are not already committed with load as part of a train. Or it could be the daily number of newly loaded wagons.

I have a friend who works for Deutsche Bahn and will see if he can help.

All the best

Andreas

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Zebedee
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#67

Post by Zebedee » 25 Jul 2007, 12:37

Hi JonS,

just a very brief reply for the moment. Longer reply to follow when I have had time to fully digest all the posts made :)
JonS wrote:3) The one example I can think of where shortage of trucks did affect operations was post-breakout from Normandy, and the infamous 1,400 3-tonners sidelined due to faulty piston rings. That kind of event is so far outside the normal scope of losses to the enemy and mechanical attrition that it's knock on effect isn't surprising.
Monty also stripped X Corps of trucks after El Alamein as Benghazi was hit by gales and he couldn't get enough supplies by sea to continue the advance and didn't have enough land transport otherwise.

On point 4, hasn't there been substantial criticism of US logistics in France? I seem to recall reading some pretty horrid stuff about how things were being run.

Just a fly-by to download the page for later perusal,

All the best,

Zeb

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#68

Post by JonS » 26 Jul 2007, 00:20

Zebedee wrote:Monty also stripped X Corps of trucks after El Alamein as Benghazi was hit by gales and he couldn't get enough supplies by sea to continue the advance and didn't have enough land transport otherwise.
Not to pooh-pooh the example, but isn't that an act of god, rather than a fundamental and predictable weakness? What I mean is that 8th Army had a robust log chain in place, but the chain broke when the gales hit. Sort of similar to the gales in the English Channel on 18-20 June 1944, perhaps?

I suppose there may be an interesting discussion to be had around what fundamental difference there is between a gale in the Med and the mud and snow of the Eastern Front, or another discussion around the robustness of a log plan that failed when a single port was temporarily unavailable. I'm not au fait enough with either the Benghazi incident or the intracacies of the German log system on the Eastern Front to be the one to have that discussion.
On point 4, hasn't there been substantial criticism of US logistics in France? I seem to recall reading some pretty horrid stuff about how things were being run.
Yes there has, but the key phrase is "how things were run". The US didn't have a completely predictable shortage of stuff, they had a completely unpredictable prima-donna setting borked priorities. Link. Also, despite Lee's preening, the supplies continued to flow.

Regards
Jon

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Zebedee
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#69

Post by Zebedee » 26 Jul 2007, 10:31

Hi Jon,
I wonder how much of the Generalplan Ost can be read into the number of looted horses? The 235,239 horses captured from June 22 to Nov 1 1941 represent a far higher number than were captured from occupied France and Benelux over similar timespans.
To play devil's advocate, it could be that there just weren't the same number of horses available in the west due to motorisation or one could make a case that the population of western Europe is roughly similar to that of the parts of the SU overrun by November 1941 and so the number of horses would be roughly similar too, taking into account that western Europe is far more urban and the nature of much of the SU overrun. But I do believe that you are correct.
So, 101,000 horses transported from occupied France and Benelux by April 10 1941, although it is not clear as glass to me whether it's the same 100k horses, or if the number given in the April-May '41 sitrep is wholly or partially additional to the 'more than 100,000' mentioned in the Dec-Jan report because the timespans overlap.
I read the documents as meaning it was roughly the same number. It might not include any requistions which were retained by units remaining in France and there are the months prior to November 40 and after April 41 which aren't considered. (I think I'm in agreement with Andreas on this judging by what his post says). Also, it may be worth considering that DiNardo's numbers also include requisitions from Germany itself.
All but 46,761 horses requisitioned in 1941 would have come from the east if DiNardo's table is to be believed - and obviously there would have been no Soviet horses to confiscate prior to June 22.

I think we can read into the figure of Soviet loot that the Wehrmacht paid less attention to the needs of the civilian population in the east than they did in the west - which is not to say that life in occupied France and Benelux was all wine and roses, just that the occupied areas of the USSR were a lot worse off.
It's on a catatrophic scale, especially when considering that the amount of horses requisitioned by the Red Army from that area has also to be added in and this is taking place shortly before or during harvest. Are these horses definitely being taken from civilians or is there an element of booty from the Red Army present? (Strangely, I've never yet seen a citation of a German after-action report which mentions the number of horses captured - are they just being ignored by historians in favour of more glamorous items or is this reflected in the primary documents?). Were losses of horses in the Heer exceptionally high in the first few months? Or are the horses being used to replace motor transport and extend supply lines as units get further away from supply depots?
As a rough rule of thumb, 5375 horses require 50 tons of feed per day (using figures from Heer infantry divisions) and theoretically those horses could fit out 40 infantry divisions. So those horses add an extra 2188 tons per day to the requirements of the Heer. Or (assuming 20 tons of fuel is sufficient to run 1000 motor vehicles) the same logistical requirement as 109400 motor vehicles. On the plus side, the feed can presumably be looted, on the downside this also means that substantial manpower will have to be diverted to this end. I had a sudden flashback to all those Napoleonic comparisons which could be made...

Your source work and orderly approach is very much appreciated,

All the best,

Zeb

-----------

Trying to avoid double-posting, so hello to 'the other' Jon ;)

edit: sadly written away from internet so it doesn't address your most recent post : :oops:
If I may, I think you are focussing too much on the 'German' aspect of this question of vehicle attrition, and perhaps casting the net wider might provide some insight. I've already said that - for a number of reasons - I think that as a fleet the US and UK military trucks were more robust than their German equivalents. However, they still broke down, and presumably in large numbers.
You're right to point this out as treating German use of motor vehicles in isolation can be problematic.
Are Anglo-American rates of attrition similar to those of German forces?
The difference, however, is that the US and the UK seemed to treat all logistics issues as a matter of flow, while the Germans looked at it as a matter of surge (or, taking somewhat simplistic alternate interpretations: long war vs. short war, or attrition vs. manoeuvre). This obviously applies to consumables like ammunition, POL, food, and men, but also to capital items like tanks, aircraft and - of particular relevance here - trucks. We have seen numerous other cases where the German approach to logistics favoured stacking to shop window for short term effect rather than ensuring depth for an extended campaign.
Could you recommend any reading on this aspect of logistics ie surge vs flow? There does seem to be very little about, I've reordered Van Crefeld as it's been some time since I last read it, but it does seem odd to be relying on a work which is now something like 30 years old. If you have the time to undertake some basic education on this subject, it would be very much appreciated. I'm especially interested in whether differences are a result of need or choice.
One aspect specifically with regards to trucks which may be of some importance is that the War Office pretty much standardised British truck production for the army in the mid-1930s, whereas German attempts at standardisation only really began in 1939. This would naturally play a role in the figure of 2400 trucks per quarter being lost through attrition in peacetime which places Halder's figure of 1000 trucks per quarter in context.
snipping your counter-examples as I'm fully in agreement with your points here
One could also comment on the difference in approaches to logistics in general between Germany (and also Soviet) and Anglo-American armies. I'm thinking especially of the 'divisional slice' which is overwhelmingly larger for the Anglo-Americans which results in bigger tails and fewer teeth. I briefly mentioned Monty stripping X Corps of its trucks to maintain the advance after El Alamein, but in fairness this was some 800 miles from his main supply depots and only undertaken after storm damage trashed Benghazi for his sea transport; one could compare this with Guderian in the SU for an interesting counter-example (I'm wary of making too much of any comparisons with Rommel due to the nature of air-power and sea-power on Rommel's supply lines).

Thanks for the thought-provoking post,

Zeb

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#70

Post by JonS » 26 Jul 2007, 23:13

Hi Zeb,
Just some quick responses to your questions.
Zebedee wrote:Are Anglo-American rates of attrition similar to those of German forces?
I don't know. Based on various reading I suspect that Western Allied - and especially US - vehicles were generally more reliable than their German equivalents (eg, Panther vice Sherman), but can't point to anything specific which says that.
Could you recommend any reading on this aspect of logistics ie surge vs flow?
Again, no. A quick check of the 'logistics' tag at my LibraryThing throws up three titles:

* Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present (History and Warfare) John A. Lynn (ed) Westview Pr (Short Disc) (1993), Hardcover U168 .F44 May 2, 2007
* The Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflict Julian Thompson Brassey's (UK) Ltd (1991), Edition: 1st English Ed, Hardcover U168 .T48 May 2, 2007 8
* Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton Martin van Creveld Cambridge University Press (1979), Paperback U168 .V36 May 2, 2007

Creveld you are familiar with. Lynn's book has a series of essays by various authors, including one on the development of the US 'duece-and-a-half" between WWI and WWII, but very little else on WWII. Thompson's book is very good in general, if a little spotty, and has quite a lot on WWII, although mainly Western focussed, IIRC. Not surprisingly, though, his chapter on the Falklands is very enlightening.

I also have copies of numerous related journal articles that I’ve collected from various sources.

None of them, however, specifically talk about 'surge' vs 'flow'. That construct is all my own work :) based on various examples from the German approach to WWII. For example - they built up massively before each of their large campaigns (for example Poland 1939, France 1940, BARBAROSSA 1941, BLUE 1942, Kursk 1943, Ardennes 1944) but don't seem to have been able to sustain those forces once they became engaged, either in terms of consumables or in terms of capital items. Now, obviously they did have a flow going on, bring food, ammunition, etc, forward, but it doesn't ever seem to have been on the scale necessary for the forces involved. Other evidence for this point of view is the German approach to a/c manufacturing, pilot training, and spare parts provisioning generally.

Naturally the Western Allies also built up their resources before any major offensive, but their sustainment logistics also generally seem to have been scaled to sustain the operations they had in mind, rather than assuming/hoping that what they started with would be sufficient.

However, even pre-war the WA focus on sustainment can be seen in - for example - the war the RAF was strengthened and modernised with the latest fighters. The importance they placed on always have a ?50%? reserve of aircraft made them appear weak compared to Germany - who had almost all their aircraft in operational squadrons - but once push came to shove over southern England in July-Sept 1940 the ability of the RAF to maintain and even increase in strength while the GAF steadily declined, despite comparable losses on both sides, was one of the key factors in the RAF's victory.

The tooth-tail ratios you talk about are more evidence of this different approach.

I wonder if the German General Staff's penchant for quick battles of annihilation were one of the underpinning reasons for this approach. No point preparing for a long campaign if it’s all supposed to be over in a couple of weeks.

Well, maybe not so quick :)

Regards
JonS

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#71

Post by Andreas » 27 Jul 2007, 09:52

JonS wrote:I wonder if the German General Staff's penchant for quick battles of annihilation were one of the underpinning reasons for this approach. No point preparing for a long campaign if it’s all supposed to be over in a couple of weeks.
van Creveld thinks it was the other way round. They could not sustain a long campaign, so they planned for quick battles of annihilation. On being faced with the logistical problems in planning Barbarossa, he remarks (from memory): "It appears that at this point, the German general staff abandoned rational thought completely."

All the best

Andreas

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#72

Post by Jon G. » 27 Jul 2007, 18:11

Hi again Zeb. I've been fiddling around with some numbers whilst still only concentrating on the horse-relevant parts of our discussion for now.
Zebedee wrote:Hi Jon,
I wonder how much of the Generalplan Ost can be read into the number of looted horses? The 235,239 horses captured from June 22 to Nov 1 1941 represent a far higher number than were captured from occupied France and Benelux over similar timespans.
To play devil's advocate, it could be that there just weren't the same number of horses available in the west due to motorisation or one could make a case that the population of western Europe is roughly similar to that of the parts of the SU overrun by November 1941 and so the number of horses would be roughly similar too, taking into account that western Europe is far more urban and the nature of much of the SU overrun. But I do believe that you are correct.
Well, there are some numbers for some countries' horse populations in this post of mine http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 73#1065973

Taking the numbers from DiNardo and comparing them against individual countries' populations from the League of Nations statistics pages I linked to above, I've come up with these rough calculations on horse populations relative to actual populations.

According to DiNardo, The Netherlands had 326,000 horses employed in agriculture in 1940. The population count was about 8.83 million as of December 31st 1939 according to the League of Nations. That gives about 34 horses per 1,000 inhabitants. In comparison, 1929 Belgium at 266,433 and 7.99 million respectively comes out with about 33 horses per 1,000 humans. It would be really interesting to know the horse pop. figures for France and Germany; for this post Belgium and the Netherlands must stand as representative for western Europe.

Now let's compare those figures to the Soviet figures. DiNardo gives a clearly rounded figure of 21 million horses in 1940 USSR. At the risk of warping this thread in yet another direction (gasp!), I've posted figures from the January 1939 Soviet census here:

Image

Now, DiNardo gives a 1940 figure for the Soviet horse population. We have to add the 1939-1940 population increase from the territories ceded to the Soviet Union by various means in the wake of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. That's a substantial 22.2 million people as per this table:

Image

...dividing horses by population gives 121 horses per 1,000 inhabitants in the 1940 Soviet Union. Also with some precautions, that is enough of a difference to establish that the Soviet Union had a larger number of horses, also in relative terms. DiNardo explicitly states that the Dutch/Belgian equine populations he states are for horses employed in agriculture only, whereas the Soviet figures presumably include all horses - and at any rate the line between public property kolkhoz horses and public property military horses is probably a little blurry.

DiNardo further states that there were 11.6 million horses in the Soviet territory which was occupied by the Germans - I haven't made the sub-calculation, but the implication appears to be that western USSR probably had an even larger concentration of horses per capita than the Soviet Union as a whole because the Germans captured areas with more than half of the USSR's horses, but probably a good deal less than half of the USSR's population cf. the table of population distribution above.

So I may have to backtrack a bit and state that the Germans didn't confiscate proportionally more horses in occupied USSR according to the Beute des Heeres document which I posted above - but then DiNardo very unprecisely states that of the 11.6 million horses in occupied territory, 7 million were killed or taken away. Perhaps the Soviets succeeded at evacuating lots of horses east before the Wehrmacht came, or the document I posted only gives a tiny fraction of total German horse captures in the east. *Sigh* I probably have to pony up (sorry) an arm and a leg for DiNardo's book in order to illuminate the point further.

It strikes me as one of the very few advantages of state organized farm collectivism that it is probably easier to evacuate farm animals and machinery from kolkhozes than it would be to evacuate assets from individually owned farms. Does Glantz have anything to say about that?
So, 101,000 horses transported from occupied France and Benelux by April 10 1941, although it is not clear as glass to me whether it's the same 100k horses, or if the number given in the April-May '41 sitrep is wholly or partially additional to the 'more than 100,000' mentioned in the Dec-Jan report because the timespans overlap.
I read the documents as meaning it was roughly the same number. It might not include any requistions which were retained by units remaining in France and there are the months prior to November 40 and after April 41 which aren't considered. (I think I'm in agreement with Andreas on this judging by what his post says). Also, it may be worth considering that DiNardo's numbers also include requisitions from Germany itself...
Read in isolation the two Lageberichte which I quoted from are unambiguous enough. My problem is simply that they both talk about 100k horses while being several months apart in time. Good point that horses requisitioned by Wehrmacht units which stayed in France probably aren't included in the number stated.

Yes, DiNardo's figures include horses requisitioned from all of occupied Europe, plus greater Germany itself. With the 101,000 French and Benelux horses in mind, that makes his 1940 figure appear low.
...
It's on a catatrophic scale, especially when considering that the amount of horses requisitioned by the Red Army from that area has also to be added in and this is taking place shortly before or during harvest. Are these horses definitely being taken from civilians or is there an element of booty from the Red Army present?...
Well, in extension of my point above, it is probably hard to distinguish precisely between public property kolkhoz horses and public property military horses? Also, considering that Stalin was quite willing to subject Ukraine to mass starvation in order to force mass collectivization through, perhaps the needs of the civilian population remaining in occupied territories weren't a very high priority.

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#73

Post by Zebedee » 30 Jul 2007, 18:43

Hi JonS,
* Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present (History and Warfare) John A. Lynn (ed) Westview Pr (Short Disc) (1993), Hardcover U168 .F44 May 2, 2007
* The Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflict Julian Thompson Brassey's (UK) Ltd (1991), Edition: 1st English Ed, Hardcover U168 .T48 May 2, 2007 8
* Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton Martin van Creveld Cambridge University Press (1979), Paperback U168 .V36 May 2, 2007

Creveld you are familiar with. Lynn's book has a series of essays by various authors, including one on the development of the US 'duece-and-a-half" between WWI and WWII, but very little else on WWII. Thompson's book is very good in general, if a little spotty, and has quite a lot on WWII, although mainly Western focussed, IIRC. Not surprisingly, though, his chapter on the Falklands is very enlightening.

I also have copies of numerous related journal articles that I’ve collected from various sources.
Thanks for the two recommendations. I’ll place an order for them as soon as my backlog clears up a little. It’s amazing at how little there actually is on logistics considering the amount of study time which has been devoted to WW2.
None of them, however, specifically talk about 'surge' vs 'flow'. That construct is all my own work based on various examples from the German approach to WWII. For example - they built up massively before each of their large campaigns (for example Poland 1939, France 1940, BARBAROSSA 1941, BLUE 1942, Kursk 1943, Ardennes 1944) but don't seem to have been able to sustain those forces once they became engaged, either in terms of consumables or in terms of capital items. Now, obviously they did have a flow going on, bring food, ammunition, etc, forward, but it doesn't ever seem to have been on the scale necessary for the forces involved. Other evidence for this point of view is the German approach to a/c manufacturing, pilot training, and spare parts provisioning generally.
My problem with the ‘surge’ vs ‘flow’ argument is that it implies a conscious, premeditated choice rather than one forced by practical necessity upon the logistical arm. While I think that there could well be a good case for this in terms of front-line strength (Keitel comments on how one of Hitler’s favourite themes was on how too many men were being out of the frontline – although in fairness, this was also one of Churchill’s favourite tunes ;) ), I’m not certain on how well it stands up to scrutiny in terms of actually supplying operations. As a counterexample, one could point to Halder sending Paulus over to Rommel to try and teach the Desert Fox some basic fundamentals of logistical requirements for sustained operations. Andreas raises a crucial point from Van Creveld about the dislocation of logistical requirements and operational planning. If one starts from the premise that every major operation of the Heer was intended to be of very limited duration (eg SU was meant to fall by the time the Dvina/Dniepr line was reached – and Stalin certainly offered some form of peace terms at this point), then perhaps the sustainability of operations becomes something of a moot point.
Naturally the Western Allies also built up their resources before any major offensive, but their sustainment logistics also generally seem to have been scaled to sustain the operations they had in mind, rather than assuming/hoping that what they started with would be sufficient.
Perhaps part of this is that both of the major western Allies still in the war post-1940 were, to all intents and purposes, sea-powers with some understanding of projecting power across thousands of miles. The British certainly learnt much, albeit slowly, from leaving regiments posted to some colonial hellhole for decades at a time ;)
However, even pre-war the WA focus on sustainment can be seen in - for example - the war the RAF was strengthened and modernised with the latest fighters. The importance they placed on always have a ?50%? reserve of aircraft made them appear weak compared to Germany - who had almost all their aircraft in operational squadrons - but once push came to shove over southern England in July-Sept 1940 the ability of the RAF to maintain and even increase in strength while the GAF steadily declined, despite comparable losses on both sides, was one of the key factors in the RAF's victory.

The tooth-tail ratios you talk about are more evidence of this different approach.
Good point about Battle of Britain, and one could actually add to that the French campaign where German air superiority was gained because they did not maintain any reserves, whereas both Britain and France held a significant portion of their planes back.
I wonder if the German General Staff's penchant for quick battles of annihilation were one of the underpinning reasons for this approach. No point preparing for a long campaign if it’s all supposed to be over in a couple of weeks.

Well, maybe not so quick
I’m trying to recall a recent book I read (it was a criticism of modern history studies by a British academic) which made a similar point but actually took it back to the specialisation of the German staff in the C19th. However, I’m still not certain whether which came first – limited means to sustain a war or an approach to war pervading the General Staff. Or even a synthesis of the two. But I think we should draw a distinction between supplying an operation with ammunition, fuel and food and maintaining frontline strength of units. It’s perhaps something of a messy distinction, but I think that there is one to be made.

All the best,

Zeb




Hi JonG,

Thanks for the interesting numbers. I’ll try to stick to horses in this thread. Perhaps we should have another thread to discuss wider economic/strategic/logistical planning?
dividing horses by population gives 121 horses per 1,000 inhabitants in the 1940 Soviet Union. Also with some precautions, that is enough of a difference to establish that the Soviet Union had a larger number of horses, also in relative terms. DiNardo explicitly states that the Dutch/Belgian equine populations he states are for horses employed in agriculture only, whereas the Soviet figures presumably include all horses - and at any rate the line between public property kolkhoz horses and public property military horses is probably a little blurry.
Certainly the mobilisation plans of the Red Army in 1940/41 implied that most of the motor transport would come from civilian sources. One would assume that the same would hold true for horses due to the way in which Soviet forces were intended to be ‘fleshed out’ by reservists. How great this demand from civilian sources was, and indeed how many horses were already with their units in 1941 is something which I’ve not seen cited by either Erickson or Glantz, although in fairness, they both do say that documentation for 1941 is somewhat thin on the ground.
DiNardo further states that there were 11.6 million horses in the Soviet territory which was occupied by the Germans - I haven't made the sub-calculation, but the implication appears to be that western USSR probably had an even larger concentration of horses per capita than the Soviet Union as a whole because the Germans captured areas with more than half of the USSR's horses, but probably a good deal less than half of the USSR's population cf. the table of population distribution above.
Good point. Tooze mentions that the surplus of the Ukraine effectively fed the large cities of the western SU, and if the Hunger Plan is a guide, then this would include Moscow and Leningrad as well as smaller cities such as Minsk.

As a rough, ballpark figure for Germany, I’d estimate something like 2.8 million horses in agriculture. This is from 700000 farm estates (22% of the total number of farms) of between 20 hectares and 125 hectares which would be able to sustain more than 1 horse and I've guesstimated 4 horses per estate. My maths is pretty shaky, but I think this comes out at something like 41 horses per 1000 population which isn’t too crazy as a rough guesstimate and is probably an underguesstimation. How's that for some horseplay? ;) Sorry. It's your fault for starting the punning.. :P
So I may have to backtrack a bit and state that the Germans didn't confiscate proportionally more horses in occupied USSR according to the Beute des Heeres document which I posted above - but then DiNardo very unprecisely states that of the 11.6 million horses in occupied territory, 7 million were killed or taken away. Perhaps the Soviets succeeded at evacuating lots of horses east before the Wehrmacht came, or the document I posted only gives a tiny fraction of total German horse captures in the east. *Sigh* I probably have to pony up (sorry) an arm and a leg for DiNardo's book in order to illuminate the point further.

It strikes me as one of the very few advantages of state organized farm collectivism that it is probably easier to evacuate farm animals and machinery from kolkhozes than it would be to evacuate assets from individually owned farms. Does Glantz have anything to say about that?
Sadly Glantz (in the one work of his I’ve currently got) says nothing about horses other than 88 cavalry ‘divisions’ were raised by the end of 1941 (c220 000 horses required). At most one could imply that the scorched earth tactics would mean that areas futher east would have been stripped of their horses, and that the difficulty in requisitioning sufficient motor transport to keep motorised infantry units mobile enough to keep up with their tanks would imply that similar difficulties would be encountered trying to round up horses. Glantz comments that much of the records from 1940/41 were ‘lost’, and suggests that this was due to a conscious decision to suppress anything which would show the reasons behind the catastrophic logistical situation of the Red Army. Erickson is similarly reticent on the subject of horses, although he does provide the one afteraction report, that I’ve seen at least, to describe horses being captured as part of a battle – Stalingrad, and some 18000 horses being taken by the Red Army.

I’ve ordered DiNardo from the British library but it will be several months before I get hold of it. That’s unless the kind librarian adds it onto the huge list of books I demand she buys ;)
Read in isolation the two Lageberichte which I quoted from are unambiguous enough. My problem is simply that they both talk about 100k horses while being several months apart in time. Good point that horses requisitioned by Wehrmacht units which stayed in France probably aren't included in the number stated.

Yes, DiNardo's figures include horses requisitioned from all of occupied Europe, plus greater Germany itself. With the 101,000 French and Benelux horses in mind, that makes his 1940 figure appear low.
If my understanding of the Lageberichte is correct, isn’t the 101000 figure just the horses which have made it back to Germany? Is this over and above any requisitions which have gone directly to military units? It seems like a daft question to ask, but it’s been gnawing away at me.

I can understand the problem with reconciling the figures. It does seem a little unusual in light of DiNardo’s figures. Naturally, one would assume DiNardo’s figures to be perhaps understatements of reality but it would imply either a conscious policy decision (recorded perhaps?) to restrain requisitioning in western Europe or DiNardo’s numbers are out by a significant factor. Another factor could be that the requisitions of 1940/early 41 were only necessary to replace losses and equip newly raised units. 100000 horses is perhaps 20 infantry divisions, with another 40000 giving a further 8. There is, after all, not much point in requisitioning hundreds of thousands of horses unless there is need for them.
Well, in extension of my point above, it is probably hard to distinguish precisely between public property kolkhoz horses and public property military horses? Also, considering that Stalin was quite willing to subject Ukraine to mass starvation in order to force mass collectivization through, perhaps the needs of the civilian population remaining in occupied territories weren't a very high priority.
True about it not being certain who owns what in a system where everybody owns everything…

I was just wondering whether the actual amount of horses requisitioned is perhaps a proportion of those actually lost to civilian use. One has essentially three demands being placed on the civilian horse population – direct German, Red Army units closeby (which would then contribute to German requisitions minus losses) and ‘scorched earth’/new Red Army units needs. Between those three drains, I wonder just how many horses would actually be available for farming? Or even for the Germans to loot after the other two sources of requisitioning had first pick of the local horse population? Which ties in with the point you made earlier about evacuations to the east.

All the best,

Zeb

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#74

Post by JonS » 30 Jul 2007, 23:37

Hi Zeb, you've given me an excellent opportunity to use a groan-inducing pun, which will convieniently bring us back full circle to the nominal subject of this thread, and I have no intetion of letting that slip :)
It’s amazing at how little there actually is on logistics considering the amount of study time which has been devoted to WW2.
Indeed, although as is so normal once you start digging you tend to find more - for example Waddell's book on US Logisitics in NWE (of no use in this discussion ... except perhaps for some iunfo about US truck breakdown rates), and the references in the books listed.
My problem with the ‘surge’ vs ‘flow’ argument is that it implies a conscious, premeditated choice rather than one forced by practical necessity upon the logistical arm.
Wait for it, wait for it ... Yes; trying to figure out which is the horse, which is the cart, and which one goes first is tricky :D

Whether log was driving strategy, or strategy was driving log is an important question. However, it's clear that there was a tight link between the two. It's also clear - to me anyway - that the Germans would readily cast sound logistic planning aside when they thought they could get away with it (examples above) in order to attempt operations which they krew they had no means to support logistically.
I’m not certain on how well [surge vs flow] stands up to scrutiny in terms of actually supplying operations.
Examples/evidence that quickly comes to mind is the straits the Germans found themselves in with regards to trucks in France, 1940, after only a few weeks of operations, and BARBAROSSA. In both cases they had reasonable log support initially, but that quickly tapered off to barely sufficient, then inadequate, after quite short elapsed times.
As a counterexample, one could point to Halder sending Paulus over to Rommel to try and teach the Desert Fox some basic fundamentals of logistical requirements for sustained operations.
Yep, there will always be examples in both directions. Although, even in that case the mere fact that someone had to be sent over to try and sort out the log aspects is itself instructive.

Clearly the Germans weren't terrible at logistics - they fought for six years after all, so some supplies must have always been getting through. I just don't think they were very good at it.
If one starts from the premise that every major operation of the Heer was intended to be of very limited duration ... then perhaps the sustainability of operations becomes something of a moot point.
Sure. But is it a sound premise? I think not. Germany enjoyed a string of exceptions from Sept 1939 - Jun 1941, although, as noted, even those exceptions revealed weaknesses in the premise.
I’m trying to recall a recent book I read (it was a criticism of modern history studies by a British academic) which made a similar point but actually took it back to the specialisation of the German staff in the C19th.
The German Way Of War, or sumfink?

Regards
Jon

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#75

Post by Zebedee » 01 Aug 2007, 14:52

Hi JonS,
Hi Zeb, you've given me an excellent opportunity to use a groan-inducing pun, which will convieniently bring us back full circle to the nominal subject of this thread, and I have no intetion of letting that slip
I blame the moderators on this forum for setting a bad example ;)
Indeed, although as is so normal once you start digging you tend to find more - for example Waddell's book on US Logisitics in NWE (of no use in this discussion ... except perhaps for some iunfo about US truck breakdown rates), and the references in the books listed.
True. Although this is one area where I think there is a great deal of room for a historical work solely concerning logistical arrangements in WW2. I’ve even been using Len Deighton’s Blitzkrieg as reading on the subject because, despite not sourcing anything, he does provide figures which I’ve not seen elsewhere. In fairness, Deighton does make some perceptive points which are at odds with much of the standard history works from the late 1970s.
Wait for it, wait for it ... Yes; trying to figure out which is the horse, which is the cart, and which one goes first is tricky
In terms of this thread, I feel we should substitute panje wagon for the cart ;)
Whether log was driving strategy, or strategy was driving log is an important question. However, it's clear that there was a tight link between the two. It's also clear - to me anyway - that the Germans would readily cast sound logistic planning aside when they thought they could get away with it (examples above) in order to attempt operations which they krew they had no means to support logistically.
I can definitely see the co-relation between the two. The main difference, for me, boils down to whether or not something doesn’t arrive because the logistical arrangements are messed up or whether there is an issue of absolute scarcity. One could take the issue of truck spare parts here – was the number of German breakdowns because the logistical arrangements meant they weren’t getting to the frontline repair depots/units or because there just weren’t enough spare parts being made?

There’s definitely an issue with German planning verging on the optimistic side of unreality. But then one could always point to how Hitler was exactly right about the French campaign and was very nearly right about the Russian campaign. If he’d agreed to Stalin’s peaceterms in July, would the mythology of WW2 now include the error of invading the SU? It’s hard to place the blame solely on the general staff when the political demands were the pre-eminent concern. Although, that leads one to the complicity of the General Staff with the Nazi regime. Bernd Freytag von Loringhoven (In the Bunker with Hitler) argues that the apolitical soldier demanded by the Weimar Republic was out of his depth when trying to match the political wiles of the Nazi regime. That does seem to ignore a lot of the events of the 1930s but may be true in a general sense.
Examples/evidence that quickly comes to mind is the straits the Germans found themselves in with regards to trucks in France, 1940, after only a few weeks of operations, and BARBAROSSA. In both cases they had reasonable log support initially, but that quickly tapered off to barely sufficient, then inadequate, after quite short elapsed times.
It does seem that the Heer was reliant to a great degree (at least judging by stated tonnage per day requirements) on obtaining at least food from local sources. I’m wondering whether the problem was essentially one of distance from the railhead and that the demands of modern warfare overwhelmed a German economy which had not achieved sufficient motorisation to support operations beyond the range of their limited fleet of trucks? Tooze highlights that the ‘tipping point’ was essentially the 300 mile distance from the railhead/supply depot (2 x 150 miles) beyond which motorised transport became inefficient for the Heer.
Yep, there will always be examples in both directions. Although, even in that case the mere fact that someone had to be sent over to try and sort out the log aspects is itself instructive.

Clearly the Germans weren't terrible at logistics - they fought for six years after all, so some supplies must have always been getting through. I just don't think they were very good at it.
In the case of Rommel, I think it provides a very good example of a ‘bad’ general. Certainly the impression one gets from Halder’s diary is that Rommel was shielded from reality by his political connections and that this had gone to his head. In many ways, I wonder how he is actually a counter-example to a product of the general staff school? One could point to Guderian digging in around Smolensk and waiting for the infantry and logistical support to catch up and contrast that with Rommel’s feeble thrust prior to El Alamein. Even in the SU, one could point to how the logistical staff were providing plans for getting winter equipment to the troops but these were set aside due to the political demands to press on.

I’d also disagree that the Germans weren’t too good at logistics. For me, the lesson is that the staff officers were fantastic (certain caveats having been made at this point – primarily those to do with war crimes). I seem to recall Halder’s diary giving some details of a meeting of these staff where Halder acknowledged that the logistical problems were in spite of their fantastic work.
Sure. But is it a sound premise? I think not. Germany enjoyed a string of exceptions from Sept 1939 - Jun 1941, although, as noted, even those exceptions revealed weaknesses in the premise.
I think that ultimately that’s the conclusion which has to be reached and takes us back to the quote from Van Creveld Andreas mentioned. Defeating an unassisted Poland was to be expected but the fall of France was something which really masked the actual extent of German military/economic power. What’s that quote from Galbraith – “Germany should never have lost the war”? ;)
The German Way Of War, or sumfink?
No, it was far more general and concerned with all modern history writing and the flaws in it. I’ll check my lending list when I get chance. It’s an interesting work solely because it highlights the problems of much of the recent work done on eg WW1 and WW2.

All the best,

Zeb

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