webmill wrote:
Would Hitler invade Spain, after the fall of France 1940 and prior to the June 1941 Invasion of the Soviet Union and by doing so, force Spains position to be an Axis Ally--as far as now being in a state of war against Britain the remants of France,Poland and the British Allies as existed in 1940?
First aspect for Hitler strategy was that Hitler wanted , required a surprise attack on the Soviet Union in either May or June of 1941. A surpise attack would greatly assist the success of Luftwaffe counter airfields attacks in the beginning stages of Barbarossa, important bridges and communication could be cut early on and the striking effect of Panzer forces in Blitzkrieg method; all this meaning fewer casualties to the German infantry and greater chances of faster encirclements of the Soviet Frontier Armies as planned.
If Hitler overran Spain to force the issue with Spain in say late 1940, there would be a worry that this would be a trigger to the Soviet Union, who might see the German Invasion of Spain, and the additional Spainsh Axis troops, (along with the reduction of British power in the Med with the loss of Gibraltar)as the first step in a Nazi betrayal and doublecross of the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 which enabled the rapid conquest of Poland.
If the Russian Communists see the German invasion of Spain this way, and Hitler most likely did, the predicted Soviet reaction can be 1) an immediate break of the Nazi-Soviet Pact and a Soviet tank overrun into Romania, with the aim of knocking out Romanians as a potential Axis Ally and getting the Polesti Oilfieds before the Germans use it more.
The Russian Communists would gamble that the British would persaude the US to join the European war soon after; as the opportunity to defeat Nazi Germany in a two front war and reverse Nazi military success so far including an early liberation of France ,which would be a major US goal
Although I had said Hitler required a surprise attack on the USSR in May/June 1941, and I still think this is the case, I suspect there may be a more military technical aspect to Hitlers' decline to invade or overrun Spain in Jan.1941, for example.
Hitler in the initial Barbarossa attack, would want all the firepower advantages the German Army can keep, better yet a monopoly for as long as possible, if the Russian Campaign is expected to be over in 8 weeks.
The priniciple area of advantage I would think would be the Stuka divebomber Ju-87, tested in the Spanish Civil War against the Spanish opposition including Communists. Hitlers worry that Communist reporters to Moscow warned about the Ju-87 and its accuracy.is possible.
The state of the Soviet Air Force before Barbarossa was that the Germans could not see a finished accomplished divebomber on the Russian side, I speculate. Soviet attack planes or fighters would be Certainly behind to the Ju-87 BAZ-1 divebomb sight and divebrakes.according to the Germans. However,German informers and reconaissance, not to exclude air reconaissance over the Soviet Union- now at truce according to the Nazi-Soviet Pact, would reveal worrisome Soviet Aircraft, I believe, such the SU-2, looking suspiciously like a US divebomber, even a Japanese one, and the Su-2 was deployed in 1940.and capable of an 800 lb bomb carry. How many numbers of SU-2 in the secretive Soviet Army of 1941? If its bombsight and technique were inferior to the Ju-87, Hitler and the German Army would want to keep that way throughout 1940 and early 1941.
Most likely unknown to Hitler Stalin had order a prominent Soviet aircraft designer, in prison actually, to turn the present Soviet Air Force of 1940 close support aircraft into a divebomber and by Dec. 1940 a prototype was complete and the first of the famous Pe-2 divebombers
An attack on Spain might trigger early cooperation between the US and the Soviet Union on divebomber techniques, that go further than the SU-2. But if Hitler believes it, Hitler will not invade Spain in Jan.1941.
A German invasion of Spain earlier after the Fall of France and Jan.1941? I would think it would be basically the same situation, if Hitler hesitated after the German victory in France, then came across by various means Soviet Air force potential and developments in divebombers, a change of mind by Hitler on the conquest of Spain would happen, and no Operation Felix again
Another firepower edge for the Stuka was its capacity to drop a 1,800 kg bomb to destroy fortresses. A Luftwaffe attack on Gibraltar would be the time and use of 1,800 kg bomb on the Fortress defenders to capitulate the British there. Previously Hitler had used the 1,800 kg bombs against the French fortresses toughest gun emplacement copulas
From an interview between Hitler and Spanish Minister of the Interior Serrano Suner; 17. Sept 1940, on the subject of Gibraltar:
"The superioirity of the Stukas as compared to heavy artillery is shown by the following figures: a great long barreled gun could fire 200 rounds without repair while a Stuka squadron of 36 machines in use thrice daily could drop 120 bombs of 1,000 kilograms each, every one of which contained the appropiate amount of high powered explosives, while a 38 centimeter shell contained only 70 to 75 kilograms of explosives."
The Pe-2 was improved to the Pe-2I before it could carry a 1,000 kg bomb but, I suspect, not at the time of Barbarossa were any deployed for effect, although Russian WWII documents are what have to be relied on here for this, I would think.and still behind a 1,800 kg bomb of the Ju-87. Although if Luftwaffe reconnaissance picked an early Pe-2 model the Germans would speculate it could carry a 1,000 kg bomb in potential, and another reason to catch the Soviet airfields, as many as possible by first strike counterair and surprise
