Are these two "What If" theories overly simplistic?

[Torretta13]

....hi guys, I have been away from the board for awhile. I apologize for my absence. Anyway, I would grately appreciate any input or information, which ya'll might have on these two statements. Are they necessarily true, as the authors implied they were? Or are there legitimate reasons to believe that even if Germany had pursued these strategies, they should would have lost the war? Once again, I would appreciate any input. Thanks.

1-In countless works (including William Shirer's The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, the author stated that IF Göring had realized the vital importance of the British radar stations, and had, at the outset of the Battle of Britian, focused all of the Luftwaffe's resources on permanently disabling these stations, the Germans would have been able to gain air superiority. Is this necessarily true? Would there have been anyway for the RAF to successfully fend off the Luftwaffe is the radar stations were destroyed?

2-I read an essay by John Keegan, which stated that IF Hitler had redirected his focus from Russia to the attacking the British Empire throughout the Middle East, the Germans would have easily won the war. If Hitler had utilized ALL of the resources which he devoted to Barbarossa in a Middle East Campaign, is there ANY way that the British could have fended off the Wehrmacht's advance? It seems to me with that the Wehrmacht would have easily expelled the British from the African continent, and driven through Iraq, Palestine, etc. Am I too optimistic here?

[phylo_roadking]

1-In countless works (including William Shirer's The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, the author stated that IF Göring had realized the vital importance of the British radar stations, and had, at the outset of the Battle of Britian, focused all of the Luftwaffe's resources on permanently disabling these stations, the Germans would have been able to gain air superiority. Is this necessarily true? Would there have been anyway for the RAF to successfully fend off the Luftwaffe is the radar stations were destroyed?

Radar was essentially a "force multiplier" in 1940; it allowed the RAF to attack LW bombers etc. on the way IN to targets...instead of EITHER merely reacting and attacking them on the way out again, or happening to encounter them by flying a regular pattern of Combat Air Patrols over the UK.

Thus the RAF could

A/ do the SAME or more damage to attackers with fewer aircraft/pilots...by hitting them earlier.

B/ Conserve its strength and the energy of its pilots by by relying on the specific, managed "ground vectoring" of RAF fighters onto incoming attackers, rather than have Fighter Command suffer the high-wear-and-tear on men AND machines of flting patrols all over the UK.

Now - remove Radar from the equation...and you STILL have an aerial war of attrition as envisaged before 1935-36

Once the LW passed over the Chain Home/Chain Home Low radar picket line on the coast - tracking of raids OVER England was still done by ground-based listening and observation posts of the volunteer Royal Observer Corps. This didn't give either the length of warning OR the up-to-the-second data to allow "forward interception", out over the Channel or coast of Kent and Sussex, or allow ground-vectoring of defending aircraft onto attackers by Sector control rooms...but it STILL gave the RAF a considerable adavantage over tracking raids and outgoing aircraft

Remove radar and the following happens -

1/ the vast majority of targets are actually hit by the LW before they can be attacked by the defenders. Therefore the war becomes one of how long the "Home Base" can continue providing the aircraft, men and materiel the defenders needed;

2/ The RAF has to maintain far more aircraft in the air on the "as-and-when" basis of Combat Air Patrols. Period fighter aircraft (and bombers) were very high-performance aircraft requiring a very high level of maintenance - and flying a high level of regular patrolling...simply to be there for an attacker to run into!...will rapidly use up the flying hours between mandated major intervals and thus lead to a much higher level of aircraft unserviceability.

BUT...set against THIS -

The Luftwaffe had suffered considerable losses during the previous months of intense operations in Norway, the Low Countries and France. And German aircraft production rates were lower than British; in the six weeks or so between the Fall of Fance and the "official" start or ramping-up of LW activities in August Fighter Command replaced all the fighter aircraft lost in or over France and Dunkirk, whereas the LW units received reaplcements at a far slower rate.

To THIS add the major advantages Britain had in getting aircraft into the air; the first of the "shadow" factories up the country were starting to produce fighter types, while Beaverbrook's "Forward Repair Depots" did a fantastic job at keeping current-mark aircraft built up from wrecks and severely damaged aircraft flowing back to units.

So - if removing Radar from the equation returned the Battle of Britain to an "earlier" level of attrition battle - arguably the RAF were in as good as position to fight that as the Luftwaffe...if not actually better.

[glenn239]

How does taking Iraq prevent B-29's from gutting Germany?

[Torretta13]

Phylo, thanks for the well thought out response. Really made me think, I appreciate it. You brought up some outstanding points.

COme on guys, can we please get some more responses? I would appreciate it. Thanks!

[nota]

I do not think the germans had the ability to move and supply too many more troops in to Africa
now if they didnot have all the Italians there esp their small tanks
and less then german quality aircraft but useing supply at the same rates
then they could of had more of their own troops and tanks and airpower
but it was the italians area and their war to start with
so I guess they were stuck with them

I do agree staying out of war with russia is a key
as is to not declare war on the USA

and if the germans are not tied down and bled white in russia
the B-29 would be eazy targets for the me-262 esp if they have mid easter oil supply in mass

[PeterOT]

2-I read an essay by John Keegan, which stated that IF Hitler had redirected his focus from Russia to the attacking the British Empire throughout the Middle East, the Germans would have easily won the war. If Hitler had utilized ALL of the resources which he devoted to Barbarossa in a Middle East Campaign, is there ANY way that the British could have fended off the Wehrmacht's advance? It seems to me with that the Wehrmacht would have easily expelled the British from the African continent, and driven through Iraq, Palestine, etc. Am I too optimistic here?Torretta13

Torretta,

I haven't read what Keegan proposed, so it is hard to know precisely what I am esponding to, but I'll give it my best.

The big problem for Germany in advancing on the Middle East was quite simple - how do you get the troops there & keep them supplied? The forces that staged Barbarossa were land forces & air forces. They would be of limited assistance in crossing the Med. Unfortunately, so is the Italian navy. By The end of 1940 the Reggia Marina was badly damaged. By March 1941 it was crippled beyond the point where it was an effective force. This all took place at a time when the Luftwaffe was supposed to be providing land-based air cover.

So, problem one is that the Royal Navy controls the Eastern Med. Then there is problem two - supplying the land forces necessary to take Alexandria & Suez. As long as the Brits control these there is no Middle East campaign. With Italian Red Sea naval forces out of the picture early the British can supply this part of Egypt from the Indian ocean of necessary - very hard to interrupt those supply lines. The Germans would be relying on several very small & poorly equipped ports in Nth Africa that are a LONG way from each other & from Alexandria. Keep in mind that Even when he took Tobruk, Rommel couldn't keep his forces supplied. It is often believed that this was due to Allied naval forces, but that is only one part of the picture.

They would have to construct a long & vulnerable rail line to even begin to supply the sort of forces necessary to take Alexandria - the ports & such roads as there were won't cut it. All of this takes time, during which the British can choose their defensive ground & make it damned near impossible to take.

One more point - the Allies were breaking Axis codes, so they would have had a good idea what was coming, when & where. You only have to sink the right convoy to decimate an invading force or cripple its supply.

To recap - the Germans can't get their troops, equipment & supplies across the Med in the right place & they can't supply what is there. It may be possible to construct a scenario in which the Germans can take Alexandria, but I suspect it involves major monkeying with actual events.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Toretta,

I would suggest that the difficulties of mounting an invasion of the UK were too great for just the knocking out of British radar to have swung the issue Germany's way. It would require several other factors to shift as well to give Germany a reasonable prospect of success.

However, I think the second proposition is very plausible. In the entire war the only bit of British territory to fall under German control was the Channel Islands. This did not threaten any fundamental British interests. Only a threat to the UK itself or to Britain's hold over its Empire could have brought Britain to the negotiating table. Neither ever materialised.

However, Germany's massive army preponderance, its ability to gain air superiority over anywhere except the UK itself and the Italian fleet in the Mediterranean made a German move there in 1940 very threatening.

Cheers,

Sid.

[LWD]

As far as taking out the radars go. My understanding is that they were not easy targets especially to take out permanently. If this is the case and the Germans concentrated on them then the British could concentrate thier AA there as well and the LW would end up taking signifcantly worse losses to AA fire. Also I remember reading that the British deployed some mobile radars fairly quickly not sure on the exact timing but once these get into play life again becomes very difficult for the LW. They have to fly fairly low to even spot them and this may make them vulnerable to AA as well as British fighters with superior position.

As for the Germans taking the Mid East. Even if they take Egypt they still have a major problem. The British hold terretory to the East and to the South in Africa. British naval transport can move units back and forth from the Mid East and Africa and reinforce from India. A major push into the Mid East could thus be disrupted by a British counter attack into northern Egypt and visa versa. Given that the Axis had a hard time supplying the force that was there it is hard to imagine them supplying a much larger force and they need to hold the western desert, Egypt, and the Middle east while attacking in at least one of them. Certainly calls for a much larger force than the Africa Corp.

[Zebedee]

Over the past few years, there has been a slight move towards questioning Watson-Watt's assessment of the efficacy of radar and that its efficacy may have been overstated a tad in his attempts to obtain further funding. I also vaguely recall it being posited that the LW ceased its attacks on radar stations primarily on a cost/benefit analysis rather than a lack of understanding, however I've been unable to locate the source which put forward this idea (Overy perhaps although I can't find it in his works at the moment?).

Van Creveld (Supplying War) covers in fair detail the logistical problems of the Afrika Korps. Even reaching Alexandria in and of itself is not something which will achieve much - I recall reading the words of the general officer planning the British move into Egypt in 1956 (conducted in far more favourable conditions than the Italian military and Afrika Korps had to operate under) upon being asked if taking Alexandria was possible - "Of course it's possible. But then what do we do?".

[phylo_roadking]

Over the past few years, there has been a slight move towards questioning Watson-Watt's assessment of the efficacy of radar and that its efficacy may have been overstated a tad in his attempts to obtain further funding.

The majority of data entering Fighter Command's command-and-control system AFTER LW aircraft passed over the coast came from ground listening stations and observers. In the mid-1930's Britain was VERY advanced in the long-range audio detection of incoming aircraft approaching the coast of the UK; the various concrete "sound lens" forms built for the experiments still exist. (Occasionally documentaries plonk a boffin, a presenter a camera and a micorphone in front of one, and they still perform excellently, giving audio warning of approaching light aircraft out to 20 miles in good conditions.)

The moral of the story is that the REAL advantage Fighter Command was how it integrated ALL this incoming location data into their two-layer command-and-control system; Fighter Command "Group" level saw the incoming data on approaching raids and aircraft, and tasked squadrons and flights...then handed actual ground direction of the fighters, the "ground vectoring" right to their targets, off to Sector level inside the Group. This meant there was a constant through-put of management effort, instead of one big central body geting bogged down doing BOTH tasking AND directing

And like it or not - radar returns were JUST one set of data that entered the system BUT it was the NEED to integrate this new data stream into a command-and-control system that led Fighter Command to develop all its new processes. So radar was vital THAT way; if it hadn't appeared, Fighter Command's way of actually doing business wouldn't have been rejigged in the years leading up to the Battle of Britain.

I also vaguely recall it being posited that the LW ceased its attacks on radar stations primarily on a cost/benefit analysis rather than a lack of understanding

This Im not sure of; remember, that "understanding" was being done by the "legendary" Beppo Schmitt!!! He had the potential to screw up ANY analysis

My understanding is that they were not easy targets especially to take out permanently.

The Chain Home station was nothing more than a set of tall metal towers, and a set of wooden ones, with an array of cables strung between them, and of course the wooden huts of the station itself. Metal towers like that were very hard to damage, the wooden ones very easy to replace, a carpenter could do that. Cables too aren't hard to string, nor the equipment in the huts hard to replace and tune if damaged. IIRC on one day during the BoB a three-station hole was knocked in Chain Home....but by the next day two of those had been brought back into operation.

One advantage to this sort of rapid repair was that the RAF had the hours of darkness to make repairs, ferry new and repaired aircraft to squadrons etc. - together with quite a few days that bad weather halted operations by BOTH sides during the Battle. I can't remember the exact percentage (it's buried inn Joh Ray somewhere) but it was far higher than I expected, remembering tales of the legendary good summer of 1940. But those days plus the hours of darkness meant the RAF had time for a LOT of "establishment" activity

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Zebedee,

Take Alexandria and you cut the British fleet off from the Eastern Mediterranean (or trap it there). The nearest bases that could support it were then in India.

What then? Pour more forces across the Mediterranean unopposed and push on to take the oil fields in the Gulf. This was the source of almost all British fuel used in the entire Indian Ocean theatre. The nearest alternative sources were in the Caribbean.

Some or all of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan might then very possibly have entered the war on the Axis side. It is not widely known that the British fortified the Khyber Pass and stationed substantial Indian Army units on the Afghan border for fear of just such an eventuality.

What price the British being able to hold down India if threatened from both directions? As it was, they had to make political compromises that guaranteed post-war independence.

I would suggest that Britain's position in the Middle East and Indian Ocean was tenuous in 1940-41 and strong pressure there might plausibly have wrung a compromise peace from her. Churchill faced a vote of confidence in Parliament after the comparitively limited defeats in the Western Desert. It is difficult to see his administration surviving the loss of the entire region.

If there was a right course for Hitler to take in the second half of 1940, the Mediterranean looks to be it.

Cheers,

Sid.

[LWD]

...What then? Pour more forces across the Mediterranean unopposed and push on to take the oil fields in the Gulf. ....

You make it sound easy. The log structure on the way to the oil fields is worse even than the Germans found in the Soviet Union. Wagon trains crossing a desert are not real efficient ways to move supplies.

[bf109 emil]

How does Germany take control over the Med from the Italians whom where still in command as well as the use of Italian ships for German gains? IMHO i don't think Germany would have sacrificed it's economy and logistics to fund a war where once having achieved a victory they relent command or control to the Italians anymore then Italy saying here use our Navy, ports, men, equipment for free cause we have an alliance or are axis partners in a sense and in the end any gains are for Germany

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Bf109E,

The key factor preventing Germany acting more forcefully in the Mediterranean in 1940 was that it continued to recognise Italian primacy there. This was the first obstacle that had to be overcome. My post above presumes, of course, that the Italians were compliant.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi LWD,

Short posts necessarily lack detail.

If Germany takes Alexandria, it presupposes the defeat of the handful of divisions that Britain had in the theatre. There were no substantial British forces in Palestine (and those often cavalry), Syria and Lebanon were under Vichy control and Iraq and Iran were independent. As it was, Germany got a small air unit into Iraq via the Vichy territories. Iraq was German-leaning and Iran was definitely not pro-British. In 1941 British units proved that it was perfectly possible to send expeditionary forces from Palestine into a hostile Iraq, so it is difficult to see the Germans hqaving a problem sending an expeditionary frorce from Palestine to a friendly Iraq. Thereafter the Gulf Oil fields are in easy bombing range.

As for the overall logistics ballance - I would suggest that it might have been easier for Germany to sustain an army in the Middle East across a passive Mediterranean (Germany's Mediterranean planning included the seizure of Gibraltar) than it would be for Britain around the Cape of Good Hope.

By the way, my earlier claim that almost all British oil used in the Indian Ocean came from the Gulf was only true after Japan entered the war. In 1940 Burma was still a significant oil contributor to the British.

Cheers,

Sid.