Is Hitler a military strategist?

[TheContemplator]

I'd like to throw topic of discussion of whether Hitler is a real clever military strategist or not?

Hitler only succeeded in acquiring lands through clever negotations such as Austria and Czechoslovakia. Therefore, he is a great politician.

France and other territories was won by Hitler's generals such as Guderian and the German Wehrmacht.

When Hitler began to distrust his generals and took over the job, things got bad. Hitler wouldn't listen to advices. How many times has the scenerio repeated: "Hold the land to the last man," said Hitler and the generals disobeyed the order.

Therefore, Hitler was no military strategist?

[Scott Smith]

France and other territories was won by Hitler's generals such as Guderian and the German Wehrmacht.

Actually, Hitler was the driving force behind the conquest of France in 1940 using an innovative plan suggested by von Manstein. When the General Staff heard about the Manstein Plan they transferred him and tried to prevent Hitler from considering the idea. But it was too late. Hitler liked it. Case Yellow was a stunning success except near the end when British forces got away at Dunkirk and Italy attacked France at the last minute, thus destroying any possibility of a peace agreement.

Therefore, Hitler was no military strategist?

No, Hitler was certainly no worse than his opponents and his Generalissimos. Even his two most competent critics, Guderian and Manstein had serious faults. And I don't even place Rommel in the top-ten category of German generals. Hitler was a much better strategist most of the time, especially considering what Germany was up-against. The fact that Germany lasted so long is a miracle.

[Scott Smith]

His problem was that he was too nit-picky. Roosevelt's great quality was that he didn't care about the little stuff...

There's some truth to this. The reason for the dysfunctional command relationship, which continued to worsen as Germany's fortunes dwindled, was due to Hitler not trusting the judgment of his generals on key details, and their refusal as members of an exclusive military caste to accept the political and military leadership of a former enlisted man.

Jets and tanks all had Hitler's patronage, however, not the reverse.

[Ken]

Hitler’s orders in invading the Soviet Union were very incoherent and too optimistic:

“Taking the Russian capital before winter came was not enough. He gave orders that Field Marshal von Leeb in the north was at the same time to capture Leningrad, make contact with the Finns beyond the city and drive on and cut the Murmansk railway. Also, at the same time, Rundstedt was to clear the Black Sea coast, take Rostov, seize the maikop oil fields and push forward to Stalingrad on the Volga, thus severing Stalin’s last link with the Caucasus".

- The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich by William L. Shirer. Vol. 2. 1959, pg 859

His generals opposed such plans, but Hitler refused to listen to them. I know of many instances like that, from production of planes in the Luftwaffe to big campaigns like Barbarossa.

[Gwynn Compton]

Barbarossa was a huge gamble, that is true, but as John Keegan suggests, had it not been for Hitler's interference in matters which he did not completely understand, then the Wehrmacht may have succeeded where so many had failed before.

The 'nineteen-day interregnum' (4-24 August) which may well have spared Stalin defeat in 1941, was characterised not only by slow German progress on all fronts but also by a succession of changes of mind. On 7 August, OKW and OKH conferred, and Jodl and Halder were able to persuade Hitler of the need to resume the advance on Moscow, which resulted in Fuhrer Directive No. 34A. Three days later he took fright at renewed resistance on the Leningrad front and insisted that Hoth's tanks depart immediately to Leeb's assistance. The Fuhrer, Jodl told Colonel Afold Heusinger, the OKW operations officer, 'has an intuitive aversion from treading the same path as Napoleon; Moscow gives him a sinister feeling.'.... Halder nevertheless felt that 'history will level at uis the gravest accusation that can be made of a high command, namely that for fear of undue risk we did not exploit the attacking impetus of our troops.' Bock in his diary, echoed his frustration: 'I don't want to "capture Moscow". I want to destroy the enemy's army and the bulk of that army is in front of me.'....

-John Keegan, The Second World War

Thus the master gambler Hitler opted for the safer path of helping the flanking Army Groups North and South, rather than the gamble of taking Moscow, which was a major part of the strategic logic that made up Barbarossa. Infact, the original Barbarossa plan had focussed the main striking power of the Ostheer at Moscow.

Stalin's answer to a thrust on Moscow during August would be undoubtedly the same as that he showed during October and November of that year, and then the following year in the battle for Stalingrad, and once again at Kursk. All Soviet reserves would be rushed to defend Moscow from the German onslaught, and in doing so, as Bock commented, and Guderian firmly believed, they would draw the Red Army into a furnace and utterly destroy their ability to conduct a counter attack during the Winter, and possibly to even win the win.

It had been Hitler's strategic sense that had dictated the change of plan during Barbarossa itself, but also from the final plan from OKW which called for a primary thrust to Moscow, a secondary thrust to Kiev, and subsidary operations towards Leningrad, mainly to pin down Red Army units that could constitute a threat to the German flank. It was Hitler's idea for the full on 3 thrust attack, with Leningrad and Kiev on equal footing as Moscow.

In Stalingrad, Antony Beevor comes to a similiar conclusion about Hitler's strategic sense and the flaw in Hitler's logic for his version of Barbarossa.

By mid-July, the Wehrmacht had lost its initial momentum. It was simply not strong enough to mount offensives in three different directions at once.

-Antony Beevor, Stalingrad.

And of Hitler's qualities, or lack of, as a strategist...

Hitler in the Wolfsschanze used to gaze at the operations map showing the huge areas notionally controlled by his forces. For a visionary who had achieved total power in a country possessing the best-trained army in the world, the sight induced a sense of invincibility. This armchair strategist never possessed the qualities for true generalship, because he ignored practical problems. During the brief campaigns in Poland, Scandinavia, France and the Balkans, resupply had at times been difficult, but never an insuperable problem. In Russia, however, logistics would be as decisive a factor as firepower, manpower, mobility and morale. Hitler's fundamental irresponsibility - a psychologically interesting defiance of fate - had been to launch the most ambitious invasion in history while refusing to gear the German economy and industry for all-out war. In hindsight, it seems more like the act of a compulsive gambler, subconsciously striving to increase the odds. The horrific consequences for millions of people seemed only to strength his megalomania.

-Antony Beevor, Stalingrad.

I'd wager that had Hitler followed the advice of his Generals, who were obviously more competent than he, Germany would have won the war.

Hitler the strategist? No, not even slightly.

Gwynn

[Scott Smith]

I'd wager that had Hitler followed the advice of his Generals, who were obviously more competent than he, Germany would have won the war.

I disagree. Germany would have lost the war no later than 1940 as the Allies strangled her economically with blockade and build their air and land forces for a war-of-attrition and starvation. Soviet trade would have become more and more costly. If the war had somehow lasted longer, then the Soviets certainly would have attacked, crushing and seizing a prostrate Germany before the Allies could do anything to stop them. Only by taking a vast cordon sanitaire and gaining access to these resources and markets could Germany break the British starvation-blockade. The people of occupied Denmark, for example, were employed feeding Germany while Germans were at war and in the armaments industries. Had Germany not seized such territories, any fledgling neutrals would have been on an Allied ration-system themselves and unable to ship or trade surplus foodstuffs to Germany, as in the First World War, let alone contraband like iron ore. And Britain, not having to protect her empire elsewhere, with France Allied and Italy neutral, could have put much greater emphasis upon Bomber Command.

Hitler the strategist? No, not even slightly.

The traditional view, coming from the apologue generals' memoirs themselves, is that taking Moscow would have won the war. That is extremely unlikely without taking Leningrad and Kiev as well. But nothing prevented Stalin from moving his headquarters back to the Urals. The German General Staff even determined that to win they would need to take the Archangel-Astrakhan line, completely unachievable in 1941 unless the Soviets surrendered. Yet the generals blame the Hitler-order to encircle Ukraine as costing them the war. Poppycock.

[TheContemplator]

Thanks for all of your insights, and yeah I agree with the point of Hitler's obsession of being concerned with little details of the military.

It seems that everyone is not sure whether if the capture of Moscow in Operation Barbarossa would have helped in deciding the war for Germany?

So, let's talk about that.

What were Germany's strength and the USSR's? (I am under the impression that USSR had "unlimited manpower.")

What value did Moscow have for Germany? Why was it critical for Hitler to take over Moscow while most factories were in other places? (I know one obvious reason is political and morale blow to the Communism pride, but anything else?)

[Scott Smith]

This is an excellent article:

CLICK! OPERATION BARBAROSSA: The Case Against Moscow, by Gary Komar.

[Senilo]

Roosevelt concerned himself with the politics and left fighting the war to Marshall.

Hitler did things his generals adviced against, and was proven right. That made him distrust his generals.

Churchill tried to intervene almost as much as Hitler did, but had a Chief of Staff who stood up to him.

No, Hitler was not a good strategist, and the world should be thankful for it.

[Topspeed]

Hi,

I recently read one autobiografy of Marchal C.G.E.Mannerheim where he was being interviewed after the war against USSR. There a scholar mr. Ruutu asked him basic questions concerning the war that ended in hard peaceterms with USSR.

Mannerheim was convinced that with Germany they could have won the war if the army had been operated by generals instead of Hitler. He considered Hitler a madman at that stage in the end part of 1944.

I think nazis underestimated the power of USSR in June 22 1941. Hitler later used term "powerful beast" of the soviets when he visited finns in June 4th 1942. It consumes a lot of material and men to attack in an unknown territory and Germany was only half size in manpower compared to USSR where also women fought in the army. Long distances and a hard winter where the germans were not accustomed took its toll soon.

I think Hitler was a strategist, but being half mad and not a professional soldier he couldn't do the right decicions. He mastered well many other fields like economy of things, but for instance his hatred of jews was waste of energy. He could have used them in combat instead of slaying them in large numbers. Ideals were too far from anything sacred and lasting. Empire based on conquering other nations have never lasted for ever and with new means of warfare it was bound to be short lived against enemies like UK, USA, USSR and finally rest of the world.

My 2 cents on the subject,

Juke T

[Arbeiter]

I often read about Hiltler's policy of standing until the last man as proof of his madness. However, reading about leningrad (which was the subject that brought me to this forum) led me to the conclusion that that was exacltly Stalin's strategy and it was that (along with 20 million russian lives) that won the war.

I am strating to thinkl that what hitler wanted from his general and population was precisely that. As a consequence of not getting the same posture as Stalin's generals and population, he evtualy gave the "Nero order".

Following this line of thought brought me to two conclusions:

1 - Had been anyone else at the comand of USSR but Stalin, germany might have won the war.
2 - Stalin was way more ruthless when it came to his own population that Hitler.

Love to hear comments on this.

[Ziv]

"Hold the land to the last man," said Hitler and the generals disobeyed the order."



I think that hitler liked the hold on to the last man tactic because he knew if germany would of held out abit longer in ww1 , then the other side would of given up.

I note there was a disscussion about it by some professioanl historrians , who did mention they also thought if the germans held on that little bit longer then they could of won.


again hitlers decision at stalingrad would be considered by some to be quite wise , that is to fight to the end, because he knew that the majority who survived would go through bad hardship and most would die , which is exactly what happened.

[lancelot_zx1986]

though hitler is a blooded evil man ,we have to accept that he is a military strategist.He is the one who make the final decision.On the contrary,many of his general can only be fit for an operation,not a whole war.
However ,Hitler has his own fault,for example ,in Russia he said fight untill the last man,but compared to his sucess ,this is nothing

[egon]

His problem was that he was too nit-picky. Roosevelt's great quality was that he didn't care about the little stuff...

There's some truth to this. The reason for the dysfunctional command relationship, which continued to worsen as Germany's fortunes dwindled, was due to Hitler not trusting the judgment of his generals on key details, and their refusal as members of an exclusive military caste to accept the political and military leadership of a former enlisted man.

Jets and tanks all had Hitler's patronage, however, not the reverse.

But his intervention in Kursk with the Panther seriously hurt the operation. The designers of the StG had to smuggle the thing in under an MP designation so that he would approve it. And the Me262 would've fared better without his intervention.

Logan Hartke

This is a separate area really, in relation to the fundamental question. The weapons development and production are more economic planning than strategy, though they are related.

Hitler was a brilliant military/political strategist. Possibly unmatched in modern history. One can argue that his gains were more political than military, but the fact that so much was attained for so little conflict shocked even the General Staff, which is how Hitler was able to gain so much dominance over them. They began to believe that he was the vanguard of a new military doctrine, and gave way to his calls. Despite the catastrophic shifts of the Panzer Armies in Barbarossa, which the generals suspected would destroy their chances, his call to hold the line during the 1st Soviet winter offensive saved the Wehrmacht from a total rout. He was unconventional, and the Generals grudgingly acknowledged that he was capable of "thinking outside the box".

The problem with Hitler's genius for military/political strategy, is that he lost the plot completely. In overall strategy he was in his element. But with the success came an arrogant belief in his destiny, which led to his increasing involvement in Operational and even Tactical planning. This ended up clouding his otherwise sound Strategic instincts. If Hilter had stuck to the big picture, and responded to Operational and Tactical challenges in only Strategic terms, the Wehrmacht may have ended the War in a more favourable position. Hitler made the error of planning Strategy around Operational factors.

This is reflected in the "Cornerpost" and "Festungs" directives. Self-destructive policy that robbed the Wehrmacht of any chance of establishing an "Eastwall". Also the economic and production decisions. Hitler would not focus on the Strategic direction for the Luftwaffe, for example. He starved Fighter production, in favour of Bomber. He neglected the development of Strategic Heavy Bombers in favour of Medium. Because of the fixation on "Blitzkrieg", and Tactical air support. Basically he would not focus on defensive needs. All projects that were inclined to emphasize Germany under Siege were hindered or cancelled. Everything had to be about Attack- Operational and Tactical success, rather than Strategic success.

The economic factor played it's part in distracting Hitler from his strengths. Germany only ever planned to wage a short War. It's industry and weapons productions were geared up for this. It is ironic that many less in depth sources proclaim that Hitler was constantly "wrecking" the German industry with "new pet projects". This is not really the case. He would be initially very enthusiastic, and devote much money and resources to development, but when the crunch came, and new designs were needed, he would delay, and hinder. Or limit production. Because Speer, who History would have us believe, was a genius, had his ear, and constantly reminded Hitler that changing tank production from Pz-4 to Pz-5 and Pz-6, would lower monthly output drastically, and even when in full production more Mk-3's and Mk-4's could be made than Tigers or Panthers. Speer even lied to Hitler and declared that the Panzertruppen- "wanted lighter, faster tanks, like Shermans". (Speer was a fan of the T-34 and M4, as they were cheap and easily mass produced. He was aware of Hitler's obsession with high production figures). This happened across the board- the BF-109 was never replaced by the far superior FW-190, the Type-7 U-Boat was never replaced by the better Type-9, and the excellent Type-21 was delayed and hindered no end due to it's production leading to a short term halt in immediate monthly figures. With the STG-44, Hitler again looked only at immediate results, and the stockpiles of 98K ammunition that would be "wasted". Some argue that Germany's tendency towards "superior technolgy" rather than "mass produced". cost it the war. Not so. Germany needed the technological edge. It was of little use to the Wehrmacht to produce 20,000 mediocre performance, medium tanks, with only around 2,000 crews to man them. Germany required to keep it's experienced troops alive, and capable of training replacements. This goes for aircraft, and U-boots also. The losses deprived the pazer, fighter, and U-boot arm of the crews to fight the war. What was not needed were masses of substandard weapons, which could only be manned by raw recruits, if at all, but the timely introduction of superior designs that would allow a vastly outnumbered Wehrmacht to face the waves of mass produced designs, which had plenty of Allied crews in reserve.


In short, Hitler moved out of Strategy, where he could shine, and confused Operations and Tactics with overall Planning. Hitler continued to attempt to fight a short Blitzkrieg War, long after it became an extended Siege. If Hitler had stuck to grand Strategy, he may have succeeded in saving the Reich, and being remembered as a Genius. Stalin was the opposite. He began the War attempting to interfere in Operations and Tactics. When failure was apparent, he listend to his Generals, and stuck to Strategy.

[Der Weisse Wolf]

I think Hitler well qualifies as a military strategist(and not just a raving maniac), but whether he was a poor, medicore or even rather good one, I've not yet decided. It's hard to compare AH to his generals because he as a dictator had supreme policitical power, and thus overloaded responsibility, about so many issues (production stuff etc.).