Is Hitler a military strategist?

[RichTO90]

Hey, I ain't a Naval Staff Officer - but I'm sure the figures will show that historically it was a very 'close run race'. IIRC Churchill said at one stage that Britain was down to 2-4 weeks in essential supplies such as oil and aviation fuel. (I'll look for a ref.)

Not even close I'm afraid Graeme, Churchill was writing for an audience and liked to play fast and loose with facts.

[ljadw]

We saw how close 57 subs ran Britain.)

This is not correct : at the end of 1940,Britain had gained more,much more GRT than it had lost by the U Boats .It had gained by its own production, by the aid from the Norwegian,Dutch and French merchant fleet,by the capture of a big part of the German and Italian merchant fleet (Afaics,Italy lost more than the half of its tankers when it declared war in june 1940).And, but I am not sure,after Cash and Carry was replaced by Lend-Lease,there was also a mass intervention from the US merchant fleet . After 1940,the Greek,Liberian and Panamese merchant fleets also became available .

[ljadw]

The following figures should be maybe interesting (source is : the Economy section,thread : oil tankers)

1)British oil imports

1940:11.381 million ton
1941:13.051 million
1942:10.232 million
1943:14.828
1944:20.176

2 )British dry-cargo imports:(source :German submarine blockade,overseas imports and British military production in WWII)

1940:41.9 million ton
1941:30.5 million
1942:22.9 million
1943:26.4 million
1944:25.1 million


3) World tanker fleet in 1940

UK :450 ships and 3.234 million ton

US:383 (2.824 million)

Norway : 262 (2.073 million)

Holland:107 (0.544 million)

Panama : 64 (0.555 million)

Germany + Italy :114 ships (0.694 million ton)


About Churchill and the 2 weeks supplies : Winston was an expert in meaningless statements (which he used to feed the hungry lions in the Commons).

2 weeks supplies, 3 weeks, 4 weeks,etc, does not indicate a critical situation : it would depend on how long this would last, what were the needs,and,what was the tendency : if on 1 september,there were supplies for 4 weeks,and on one october, for two weeks only ,there would be a problem .OTOH,it could be that on one september,a reserve of 2 weeks was essential,and that on one october 2 weeks would be sufficient .

A few weeks ago, I ordered fuel oil,not because the supplies were to low (they were sufficient for the whole summer,but not for one month of harsh winter),but because in september,the price will go up :as such,the amount of supplies was not forcing me to order fuel oil .

[RichTO90]

The following figures should be maybe interesting (source is : the Economy section,thread : oil tankers)

1)British oil imports

1940:11.381 million ton
1941:13.051 million
1942:10.232 million
1943:14.828
1944:20.176

They are, since they don't actually agree with the official figures on oil imports published by the UK Department of Energy.

1939 - 8.873
1940 - 10.161
1941 - 12.275
1942 - 9.942
1943 - 14.684
1944 - 19.891
1945 - 15.056

Oh, never mind, I see what happened, the above are oil "products" imports and does not include imported crude:

1939 - 2.201
1940 - 1.589
1941 - 0.992
1942 - 0.600
1943 - 0.535
1944 - 0.695
1945 - 0.964

There is still a slight discrepancy, but the figures you give appear to include domestic production:

1939 - 0.133
1940 - 0.145
1941 - 0.164
1942 - 0.235
1943 - 0.261
1944 - 0.233
1945 - 0.191

[steverodgers801]

There was not so much a problem with getting the supplies as paying for them. Lend lease was brought on because Britain had ran out of funds to but what it needed.

[ljadw]

Something which is misleading : Britain was running out of $,but not of £

[RichTO90]

Something which is misleading : Britain was running out of $,but not of £

No, I'm afraid they were "running out of" both, at least in terms of funds available to pay the U.S. for those supplies under Cash and Carry. The U.S. offered line of credit of $6.5 billion had been exhausted by January 1941 and virtually all British gold and dollar reserves and marketable securities had also been exhausted. Certainly Britain had Sterling in Britain, financing through massive debt accumulation and taxation, but they did not have foreign exchange available acceptable to the U.S. The end result was Lend-Lease.

You may wish to reference Richard S. Sayers, Financial Policy, 1939-45, London: HMSO, 1956.

[Urmel]

There is still a slight discrepancy, but the figures you give appear to include domestic production:

1939 - 0.133
1940 - 0.145
1941 - 0.164
1942 - 0.235
1943 - 0.261
1944 - 0.233
1945 - 0.191

Wow... In 1990 the UK produced about 91 million tonnes of crude and natural gas liquids... Today its still north of 50 million...

[RichTO90]

Wow... In 1990 the UK produced about 91 million tonnes of crude and natural gas liquids... Today its still north of 50 million...

Um, North Sea oil fields?

[Urmel]

Yeah of course, I just had never seen the pre-North Sea production figures.

[Gooner1]

There is still a slight discrepancy, but the figures you give appear to include domestic production:

1939 - 0.133
1940 - 0.145
1941 - 0.164
1942 - 0.235
1943 - 0.261
1944 - 0.233
1945 - 0.191

Hi Rich, are those figures just crude oil production?

Production from indigenous materials of petroleum products and substitutes , which I guess includes crude oil and synthetic oil production, were quite a bit higher.


Production from indigenous materials of petroleum products and substitutes:

1940 - 639
1941 - 765
1942 - 1,009
1943 - 1,113
1944 - 1,089
1945 - 1,002

Thousand tons. From Fighting with Figures.

[RichTO90]

Hi Rich, are those figures just crude oil production?

Its hard to say, since those are UK Department of Energy figures, which - like most modern governmental accounting figures (and not just British BTW) - lack a bit of transparency.

They are given simply as "indigenous production". Ahh! I just noticed it is given as "crude oil" so likely does not include the existing synthetic production by ICI or the alcohol-based fuel substitutes, which was an older program.

Also, the figures I gave are millions of tons, thus the decimal.

[ChrisDR68]

A year later and Barbarossa would have been stopped dead in its tracks. The Soviets were in a transition period and in 1942 would have had a lot more T34's, troops would have been better trained, leaders would have had more experience. Hitler was no strategist, he understood Chamberlain and the French very well, but he never grasped Churchill and that Britain would not concede Germany its position.

I agree the Russians would have been better equipped and organised in 1942 but they would still have been very inexperienced at mobile warfare. They would also have had a lot of dead wood in their military leadership at this time that only actual fighting would have exposed (as happened in the OTL). The Germans on the other hand were very experienced at mobile warfare after the victories over Poland, the low countries and France in 1939/40. The Luftwaffe was also equipped and trained as a tactical airforce supporting the army which it was operationally expert at by this time.

What Hitler needed to do when planning Barbarossa was to think in terms of two campaigns. If the end goal was the Ural Mountains (which would have been a formidable natural barrier which the Germans could have fortified had they got that far), then one campaign lasting 6 months was too short a timescale and unrealistic in respect to the distances involved and the likely determined Russian resistance.

The oft quoted A-A line had no natural barrier such as a large river or mountain range to build a fortified front line behind so it made little sense from a defensive point of view.