Is Hitler a military strategist?
Re: Is Hitler a military strategist?
[quote="steverodgers801" Germany had no production fields of its own.
NO:already before WWI ,Germany produced in the NW region small but not negligible amounts of crude oil:
1918:89.000 ton
1919:37000
1920:35000
1921:38000
1922:42000
1923:50000
1924:59000
1925:70000
1926:95000
1927:92000
1928:92000
1929:103000
1930:173000
1931:228000
1932:229000
1933:0.238 million ton
1934:0.314
1935:0.429
1936:0.444
1937:0.453
1938:0.532
And,for the same years,the German oil imports from the SU
1933:O.5 million
1934:0.46
1935:0.49
1936:0.36
1937:0.30
1938:0.08
NO:already before WWI ,Germany produced in the NW region small but not negligible amounts of crude oil:
1918:89.000 ton
1919:37000
1920:35000
1921:38000
1922:42000
1923:50000
1924:59000
1925:70000
1926:95000
1927:92000
1928:92000
1929:103000
1930:173000
1931:228000
1932:229000
1933:0.238 million ton
1934:0.314
1935:0.429
1936:0.444
1937:0.453
1938:0.532
And,for the same years,the German oil imports from the SU
1933:O.5 million
1934:0.46
1935:0.49
1936:0.36
1937:0.30
1938:0.08
Re: Is Hitler a military strategist?
I would guess importation from Mexico to the East and West coast - it was probably cheaper to move it by boat from Mexico to say Seattle than to ship it by train from Texas through the Rockies.ljadw wrote:In 1936,the US produced 148 million ton of oil,while in 1935 (I have no figures for 1936),the US exported 6.935 million ton and imported 4.366 milion ton (more than Germany and Japan)
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion
Re: Is Hitler a military strategist?
Lots of info on the Mexican oil situation in the late 30's at:
http://books.google.com/books?id=mNIUAA ... 36&f=false
and US imports at:
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHa ... rimus1&f=m
And the production of various countries at:
http://www.paradoxian.org/hoi2wiki/inde ... _1936-1948
Note Venezuela is producing several times as much oil in 1936 as Mexico. I think a lot of the oil the US imported was crude oil. Exports included a fair amount of refined product I believe, no firm sources at hand right now though.
http://books.google.com/books?id=mNIUAA ... 36&f=false
and US imports at:
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHa ... rimus1&f=m
And the production of various countries at:
http://www.paradoxian.org/hoi2wiki/inde ... _1936-1948
Note Venezuela is producing several times as much oil in 1936 as Mexico. I think a lot of the oil the US imported was crude oil. Exports included a fair amount of refined product I believe, no firm sources at hand right now though.
Re: Is Hitler a military strategist?
Exports of crude oil in 1937
US:9.07 million tonnes
Mexico: 1.13
Iraq:3.93
Columbia: 2.5
Peru: 1.51
Venezuela : 22 million (1936)
Imports of crude in 1937 (rough figures)
France : 6 million tonnes
Canada : 5.5
US:3.9
UK: 2.1
Italy :0.9
Germany:O.7
US:9.07 million tonnes
Mexico: 1.13
Iraq:3.93
Columbia: 2.5
Peru: 1.51
Venezuela : 22 million (1936)
Imports of crude in 1937 (rough figures)
France : 6 million tonnes
Canada : 5.5
US:3.9
UK: 2.1
Italy :0.9
Germany:O.7
- Webdragon2013
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Re: Is Hitler a military strategist?
Hitler as any head of state conducted the GRAND STRATEGY.
He left the details to his generals, of course until this changed when he started micro-managing.
The question is how is he as a strategist in terms of his grand strategy?
Personally I don't think Hitler was extremely good strategist in that respect, particularly because he listened to his general staff and other parties too much, despite what people say.
I give an example.
Poland. He invaded it mostly because Ribbentrop convinced him of it. He assured Hitler France & UK would not declare war on Germany. But they did. From then on, Germany was forced into a world war.
Second major move is the invasion of USSR.
Again Hitler based this on German intelligence, most of which was either bad intelligence, or potentially wrong intel fed by traitors in the Abwehr.
This was cause of failure of Barbarossa, despite the valiant efforts of the Wehrmacht.
You can also see the failure to save Stalingrad troops.
Again someone convinced Hitler a breakout was not necessary: Hermann Goering.
So you see...Many big decisions he relied on people who generally did not give him proper advice.
Hitler was no different than Obama or Bush or any other president. He relies on advice from "experts" then makes decision.
He left the details to his generals, of course until this changed when he started micro-managing.
The question is how is he as a strategist in terms of his grand strategy?
Personally I don't think Hitler was extremely good strategist in that respect, particularly because he listened to his general staff and other parties too much, despite what people say.
I give an example.
Poland. He invaded it mostly because Ribbentrop convinced him of it. He assured Hitler France & UK would not declare war on Germany. But they did. From then on, Germany was forced into a world war.
Second major move is the invasion of USSR.
Again Hitler based this on German intelligence, most of which was either bad intelligence, or potentially wrong intel fed by traitors in the Abwehr.
This was cause of failure of Barbarossa, despite the valiant efforts of the Wehrmacht.
You can also see the failure to save Stalingrad troops.
Again someone convinced Hitler a breakout was not necessary: Hermann Goering.
So you see...Many big decisions he relied on people who generally did not give him proper advice.
Hitler was no different than Obama or Bush or any other president. He relies on advice from "experts" then makes decision.
Re: Is Hitler a military strategist?
Essentially Hitler was an aggressive gambler. Indeed you could describe him as a reckless gambler.
Given the state of the Polish armed forces compared to the German in September 1939 plus the geographic difficulties in defending their country effectively it's not a big surprise Germany conquered Poland in a short campaign.
Possibly the biggest single event of WWII in terms of one country defeating another was Germany's conquest of France in May and June 1940. Three things determined this campaign. The Luftwaffe's superiority over the French air force, French armoured doctrine which dictated that their tanks were for infantry support and almost nothing else and the fact that General Gamelin sent his strategic reserve north to guard the threat to Holland leaving his centre around the Ardennes region vulnerable to attack.
Everything fell into place for a quick German victory as the strategy adopted by the Reich exactly matched German strength with French weakness. Hitler was lucky in this regard.
At the height of his powers he then made strategic mistake after strategic mistake:
1. He shouldn't have launched the Battle Of Britain as Operation Sealion was a non-starter from an operational point of view.
2. The u-boat war was a strategic error as it made the entry of the United States into the war much, much more likely.
3. Operation Barbarossa was launched a year too early dooming the whole enterprise from the start.
His three biggest blunders listed above were probably the result of over confidence and hubris. Understandable in a way given the seeming invincibility of the German armed forces from 1939-1941.
By the time he declared war on the United States in December 1941 Germany had already lost the war.
Given the state of the Polish armed forces compared to the German in September 1939 plus the geographic difficulties in defending their country effectively it's not a big surprise Germany conquered Poland in a short campaign.
Possibly the biggest single event of WWII in terms of one country defeating another was Germany's conquest of France in May and June 1940. Three things determined this campaign. The Luftwaffe's superiority over the French air force, French armoured doctrine which dictated that their tanks were for infantry support and almost nothing else and the fact that General Gamelin sent his strategic reserve north to guard the threat to Holland leaving his centre around the Ardennes region vulnerable to attack.
Everything fell into place for a quick German victory as the strategy adopted by the Reich exactly matched German strength with French weakness. Hitler was lucky in this regard.
At the height of his powers he then made strategic mistake after strategic mistake:
1. He shouldn't have launched the Battle Of Britain as Operation Sealion was a non-starter from an operational point of view.
2. The u-boat war was a strategic error as it made the entry of the United States into the war much, much more likely.
3. Operation Barbarossa was launched a year too early dooming the whole enterprise from the start.
His three biggest blunders listed above were probably the result of over confidence and hubris. Understandable in a way given the seeming invincibility of the German armed forces from 1939-1941.
By the time he declared war on the United States in December 1941 Germany had already lost the war.
- Mauser K98k
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Re: Is Hitler a military strategist?
As a "strategist", Hitler did well as long as he had the overwhelming military advantage facing hesitant opponents.
I think his single biggest general failing was runaway hubris, to continually bite off more than he could chew, which was one result of his delusional inability to deal with reality. Declaring war on the US is the most obvious example, although it probably seemed inconsequential at the time. Sending the Afrika Korps to bail out Mussolini's blunders is another. (Imagine how much those troops, equipment and logistics wasted in Africa could have helped during Barbarossa)
His attempt to micro-manage in Russia while delusional about the real situations ultimately doomed Germany. This problem culminated with his cowering in The Bunker, issuing impossible orders to non-existent armies as the few loyalists still with him quietly rolled their eyes.
I think his single biggest general failing was runaway hubris, to continually bite off more than he could chew, which was one result of his delusional inability to deal with reality. Declaring war on the US is the most obvious example, although it probably seemed inconsequential at the time. Sending the Afrika Korps to bail out Mussolini's blunders is another. (Imagine how much those troops, equipment and logistics wasted in Africa could have helped during Barbarossa)
His attempt to micro-manage in Russia while delusional about the real situations ultimately doomed Germany. This problem culminated with his cowering in The Bunker, issuing impossible orders to non-existent armies as the few loyalists still with him quietly rolled their eyes.
Re: Is Hitler a military strategist?
ChrisDR68 wrote:French weakness. Hitler was lucky in this regard.
At the height of his powers he then made strategic mistake after strategic mistake:
1. He shouldn't have launched the Battle Of Britain as Operation Sealion was a non-starter from an operational point of view.
2. The u-boat war was a strategic error as it made the entry of the United States into the war much, much more likely.
3. Operation Barbarossa was launched a year too early dooming the whole enterprise from the start.
His three biggest blunders listed above were probably the result of over confidence and hubris. Understandable in a way given the seeming invincibility of the German armed forces from 1939-1941.
By the time he declared war on the United States in December 1941 Germany had already lost the war.
And,what should he have done in the place of these 3 points ?
Re: Is Hitler a military strategist?
1. Well I guess it depends on what Hitler was trying to achieve in starting the Battle Of Britain. If it was genuinely an attempt to win air superiority as a prelude to a seaborne invasion then it was a waste of time. The Royal Navy and the RAF were simply too strong for the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe to ward off and if a landing had been made the German troops there would likely have been forced to surrender after a few weeks due to lack of resupply.ljadw wrote:ChrisDR68 wrote:French weakness. Hitler was lucky in this regard.
At the height of his powers he then made strategic mistake after strategic mistake:
1. He shouldn't have launched the Battle Of Britain as Operation Sealion was a non-starter from an operational point of view.
2. The u-boat war was a strategic error as it made the entry of the United States into the war much, much more likely.
3. Operation Barbarossa was launched a year too early dooming the whole enterprise from the start.
His three biggest blunders listed above were probably the result of over confidence and hubris. Understandable in a way given the seeming invincibility of the German armed forces from 1939-1941.
By the time he declared war on the United States in December 1941 Germany had already lost the war.
And,what should he have done in the place of these 3 points ?
If on the other hand he was trying to frighten the British government into seeking peace terms because they saw their country's position as economically and financially hopeless then it makes more sense. Once Churchill became PM and he won this very argument over the wishes of Lord Halifax and others then the British were always going to see things through to the bitter end whichever way the war went. Churchill's views were also pretty much the views of the average Briton which shouldn't be forgotten.
So whether Hitler launched the Battle Of Britain or not he wasn't going to get the outcome he wanted so he may as well have saved the Luftwaffe's resources in the first place.
2. In respect of the u-boat war again Hitler was in a no win situation. In the original timeline the u-boat war cost the British over 17 million tonnes of lost shipping but it never came particularly close to starving the UK into submission. Germany should have kept in mind what happened during WW1 regarding the difficulties of defeating the British in this way.
The gamble and downside to this strategy is that it increased the chances of the United States getting involved in the war as an active belligerent. Given the probability of the u-boat campaign failing to defeat Britain it was a strategic error to attempt to do so given the economic and industrial power of the United States coming in on the side of the Allies.
The UK with a population of 48 million was no threat to Germany with her population of 77 million in military terms. Hitler would have been best served with a wholly defensive posture towards Britain. So long as the US stayed out of the war his western flank was relatively secure.
3. I've already given my scenario for Operation Barbarossa in the What If? section and also in the Could Germany Have Won? thread in this part of the forum
Re: Is Hitler a military strategist?
According to Wikipedia, Uboats only sank 14.7 of the 20.5 millions of tons allied shipping sunk. The sunk tonnage of ~13,000 tons per launched UBoat seems borderline at best - even worse considering opportunity cost for ships (many already built, minimal opportunity cost, replaced by inexpensive, assembly line mass produced Liberty/Victory ships) and UBoats (built during the war, demanding in materials and specialized labor), and the opportunity costs for the personnel.ChrisDR68 wrote:2. In respect of the u-boat war again Hitler was in a no win situation. In the original timeline the u-boat war cost the British over 17 million tonnes of lost shipping but it never came particularly close to starving the UK into submission. Germany should have kept in mind what happened during WW1 regarding the difficulties of defeating the British in this way.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion
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Re: Is Hitler a military strategist?
A year later and Barbarossa would have been stopped dead in its tracks. The Soviets were in a transition period and in 1942 would have had a lot more T34's, troops would have been better trained, leaders would have had more experience. Hitler was no strategist, he understood Chamberlain and the French very well, but he never grasped Churchill and that Britain would not concede Germany its position.
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Re: Is Hitler a military strategist?
Strange, whilst I think Germany could never have won WW2 militarily I do believe they could have defeated Britain, and I believe their best chance was with subs.
Given the situation as it was in early 1940 (occupied Norway and France) if Germany started the unrestricted submarine warfare to strangle Britain with 250 subs (ZPlan or near that number) rather than 57, Germany probably would quickly succeeded (within 3 months - you can argue the difference) and Britain would have been defeated or neutralized, and probably completed the defeat before America could have effectively intervened.
Of course to have done this would have required strategic planning for a sub force 5 or more years before hand. If that was the case then Germany would have needed to keep the preparations secret or near-secret (exact details, capabilities, tactics and strategies not known or been able to be guessed at). I think given the small size of subs, sub infrastructure, the natural subterfuge nature of subs and the small sub force (training, barracks etc) this was achievable.
I believe Germany was also capable of defeating France and invading Britain, but again the planning needed to start 5+ years in advance.
I think also Germany would need to choose between these two strategies 5 years before hand - either invade and secure the Norwegian coastline for sub bases and ensure sub passage to the Atlantic, or save the air force, navy assets and military effort for invasion of France and Britain.
The fact that Hitler didn't think/plan/act like this is clear evidence of his lack of strategic thinking.
Conversely, I think if the Germany military had been left to its expertise it might have worked cooperatively and worked through the issues to identify the strategic needs in the classic strategic appreciation model and worked out a much better strategy, doctrine and re-armament program to achieve the defeat or neutralization of Britain.
Given the situation as it was in early 1940 (occupied Norway and France) if Germany started the unrestricted submarine warfare to strangle Britain with 250 subs (ZPlan or near that number) rather than 57, Germany probably would quickly succeeded (within 3 months - you can argue the difference) and Britain would have been defeated or neutralized, and probably completed the defeat before America could have effectively intervened.
Of course to have done this would have required strategic planning for a sub force 5 or more years before hand. If that was the case then Germany would have needed to keep the preparations secret or near-secret (exact details, capabilities, tactics and strategies not known or been able to be guessed at). I think given the small size of subs, sub infrastructure, the natural subterfuge nature of subs and the small sub force (training, barracks etc) this was achievable.
I believe Germany was also capable of defeating France and invading Britain, but again the planning needed to start 5+ years in advance.
I think also Germany would need to choose between these two strategies 5 years before hand - either invade and secure the Norwegian coastline for sub bases and ensure sub passage to the Atlantic, or save the air force, navy assets and military effort for invasion of France and Britain.
The fact that Hitler didn't think/plan/act like this is clear evidence of his lack of strategic thinking.
Conversely, I think if the Germany military had been left to its expertise it might have worked cooperatively and worked through the issues to identify the strategic needs in the classic strategic appreciation model and worked out a much better strategy, doctrine and re-armament program to achieve the defeat or neutralization of Britain.
Re: Is Hitler a military strategist?
I am not convinced
Re: Is Hitler a military strategist?
I see several flaws in the post of GS,as
1) that it would have been possible for Germany to have 250 U Boats and their crews in 1940
2) that 250 U Boats would mean 250 operational U Boats : on 1 january 1942,Germany had 249 U Boats,of which 158 were tied by training;of the remainder 91,only 55 were available for the Atlantic,of which 22(ONLY 22 ) were on patrol .
3) that more operational U Boats would mean bigger sinkings: one can argue that more operational U Boats would result in the loss of more U Boats
4) that the capacity of the existing U Boat harbours would be sufficient to repair and supply more U Boats
5) that (and this is the biggest flaw) that the loss of more GRT would force Britain to give up :that's ignoring the unknown factor X:how much GRT did Britain need to survive ?
The big question is not : how much was sunk/could be sunk.It is also not : how much was arriving,but,it is : how much GRT needed to arrive (and to leave )
1) that it would have been possible for Germany to have 250 U Boats and their crews in 1940
2) that 250 U Boats would mean 250 operational U Boats : on 1 january 1942,Germany had 249 U Boats,of which 158 were tied by training;of the remainder 91,only 55 were available for the Atlantic,of which 22(ONLY 22 ) were on patrol .
3) that more operational U Boats would mean bigger sinkings: one can argue that more operational U Boats would result in the loss of more U Boats
4) that the capacity of the existing U Boat harbours would be sufficient to repair and supply more U Boats
5) that (and this is the biggest flaw) that the loss of more GRT would force Britain to give up :that's ignoring the unknown factor X:how much GRT did Britain need to survive ?
The big question is not : how much was sunk/could be sunk.It is also not : how much was arriving,but,it is : how much GRT needed to arrive (and to leave )
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Re: Is Hitler a military strategist?
What as an alternative or as a successful alternative?ljadw wrote:I see several flaws in the post of GS,as .....
It doesn't have to be 250 although there was talk of 250 (by the Commerce Raider school of doctrine within the Reichsmarine and the Kriegsmarine.) We saw how close 57 subs ran Britain.ljadw wrote:1) that it would have been possible for Germany to have 250 U Boats and their crews in 1940
As I said, it would need a 5+ years lead time. If 22 effective subs brought Britain close to the edge what would 40 do?ljadw wrote: 2) that 250 U Boats would mean 250 operational U Boats : on 1 january 1942,Germany had 249 U Boats,of which 158 were tied by training;of the remainder 91,only 55 were available for the Atlantic,of which 22(ONLY 22 ) were on patrol .
It was effective counter measures and not a mathematical formula that caused losses. IOW if 20 subs stretched the defenses to the limit 40 subs would have overwhelmed the defense - the sinking would more likely to become exponential rather than the sinkings become exponential.ljadw wrote:3) that more operational U Boats would mean bigger sinkings: one can argue that more operational U Boats would result in the loss of more U Boats
A 3 months or 6 months campaign wouldn't require major repairs or replacement. Which is the whole point. the campaign had to be short sharp, snappy and successful. The Battle of the Atlantic ebbed to and fro because the attack became effective but not overwhelming, the defense got the upper hand but not overwhelming. Hence the need for surprise and secrecy in the lead up.ljadw wrote: 4) that the capacity of the existing U Boat harbours would be sufficient to repair and supply more U Boats
Hey, I ain't a Naval Staff Officer - but I'm sure the figures will show that historically it was a very 'close run race'. IIRC Churchill said at one stage that Britain was down to 2-4 weeks in essential supplies such as oil and aviation fuel. (I'll look for a ref.)ljadw wrote:5) that (and this is the biggest flaw) that the loss of more GRT would force Britain to give up :that's ignoring the unknown factor X:how much GRT did Britain need to survive ?
The big question is not : how much was sunk/could be sunk.It is also not : how much was arriving,but,it is : how much GRT needed to arrive (and to leave )