Is Hitler a military strategist?

[Alixanther]

You (all) don't seem to get it. Barbarossa was never a military plan. It was a political plan. Why? Because this:

The Soviet police state dictatorship most certainly produced avowed enemies, but it also had popular support.

is utterly and completely untrue.

Remember how many times NKVD stop-troops were needed to bolster the staying power of the Soviet formations. The relatively high morale of the Soviet troops and their determination has NOTHING to do with the Soviet police state. It only has to do with the Eastern Ortodox confession in which dying for the Emperor is almost synonimical to dying for Christ. (like in the Crusades)
That's why there are so many feats of so-called apathy and non-resistance of the Russian peasants during the Czar era and ever after, Stalin being perceived as a "new kind of Czar". The Church already provided them this mindset, it was a cultural trait, not a communist dogma. Hitler KNEW that. But he didn't know jack about Eastern Ortodoxy. (among lots of other things, of course)

Barbarossa hasn't been planned as a military move to destroy the armed forces of the Soviet Union. Almost all historians had (and I assume they still have) agreed it was an impossible task for the Wehrmacht, unless some catastrophic events unfold, in which the Red Army completely lose its fighting spirit.

So - if you really want to discuss about the "Hitler the Strategist" you might want to take into account "the Political Strategist" he was, not the military one. He used the Wehrmacht as a political tool (menace and extortion), not as a military one.

[Graeme Sydney]

He used the Wehrmacht as a political tool (menace and extortion), not as a military one.

That's one of the strangest interpretations of the German-Soviet War I've read. War is an extension of politics and has a political outcome but Op Barbarossa and all of the German-Soviet War was a military campaign with all the trappings, characteristics,tragedies and human cost. To make some sort of nick picking hair splitting argument otherwise is not helpful or insightful.

And if you think that the Soviet police state dictatorship was unable to whip up patriotic support without the blessing of the Eastern Orthodox church you are very much mistaken. Russian pride and patriotism was separate from both the church and the party. And if there is one thing the Russian hate more than a despot dictator is a jackbooted racist foreign despot dictator.

I think it was Karl Marx who said 'religion is the opium of the people' but in the Soviet era vodka became the opium of the people. And it is no doubt both vodka and the NKVD were often a strong influence in forcing reluctant troops into what could only be described as a hopeless suicidal attacks. But been force into a hopeless suicidal attacks by the NKVD does not mean the soldier weren't Russian patriots. It is just that they were rather gave up they lives in a situation more obviously to the benefit of Russia, but the man with the gun thought different.

[Graeme Sydney]

Given the economic resources the European Axis was boasting about on January 1st 1941, the flip argument is also fully supportable. How did Soviet Union even stand a chance? It can be reasonably concluded that only an inordinate amount of multilevel german and their auxiliaries' bungling .........

"Yes, if you give the best of everything to Germany, the best decisions, the best generals, the best weapons, the best of luck, then you might construe a win for Germany. But neither life nor war goes that way does it?"

It was Hitler's mistakes not the German people or mid-level or low level leadership/management.

Germany uses the french military industrial complex in place (S35s, D520s, H39s, Potez62s, self-propelled 155/194 tubes), Germany deploys more heavy artillery on the East front (is the "new soviet man" immune to 100 lb HE French shells?), Germany deploys more labor at fixing the Soviet Railsystem, Germany deploys the KM against the Soviet Navy, Germany sends UBoats to the Black Sea 18 months earlier and fast torpedo boats (italian and/or german), Germany avoids the Balkan miniwar and solves Malta instead, better intercountry industrial integration, yada yada yada. Not even going into the "jewish question" at this time.

"Yes, if you give the best of everything to Germany, the best decisions, the best generals, the best weapons, the best of luck, then you might construe a win for Germany. But neither life nor war goes that way does it?"

The ONLY reason Hitler/Germany achieved strategic and operational surprise in the first 3 months of the war was that Stalin was convinced that Hitler would not be mad enough to voluntarily start 'Germany's worst nightmare', the two front war. Stalin knew that the German-Soviet war was coming bur still signed the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact was to buy time and to allow the capitalist west 'knock itself out' in an imperialistic war.

In the meantime Stalin was more than happy to trade with German and sell all the war material Germany needed - the oil, cobalt, food etc.

With the changed conditions you outline it would have been blatantly obvious 6 months before op Barbarossa that the German-Soviet war Stalin knew was inevitable was close at hand. And therefor 6 months before op Barbarossa Russia stops the trade, orders fully mobilisation of both the military and industry, and prepares for war.

Stop that soviet trade in Jan '41 and by June Germany is effectively out of fuel (if not sooner). No fuel and not devastating initial Russian losses in the opening stages of op Barbarossa and you have the same outcome - a war Germany doesn't have the resource to win - right from the get go.

[BDV]

It was Hitler's mistakes not the German people or mid-level or low level leadership/management.

Hitler's and his gang of exterminators (military and civilian) and the likes of Horty-Antonescu. "It's all Hitler's fault" is simply garbage.

... if you give the best of everything to Germany, the best decisions, the best generals, the best weapons, the best of luck, then you might construe a win for Germany.

What's wrong with a competent leadership providing the attacking force has the best of the available weapons that the existing industrial base could provide? Neither Dewoitine 520s, Panhard 178s, Potez62s, SP GPFs, Somua 35s, or Hotchkiss 39s require ASB. Nothing but a bit of hard work and GERMAN sacrifice (like in providing French with proper allotment of coal, developing the tactics/doctrine adequate to the specifics of the french war materiel) is required of the NSDAP state and the Wehrmacht to ensure that the french industrial base is properly incorporated in the Axis warmachine.

Luck is made through hard work.

With the changed conditions you outline it would have been blatantly obvious 6 months before op Barbarossa that the German-Soviet war Stalin knew was inevitable was close at hand. And therefor 6 months before op Barbarossa Russia stops the trade, orders fully mobilisation of both the military and industry, and prepares for war.

So soviets weren't fully preparing for war in 1941? News to me. And I presume that the german "pacification" of the Balkans (including the military occupation of Romanian oilfields and the destruction of the premier Balkan client and hitman extraordinaire of Russia) was not blatant enough?

Stop that soviet trade in Jan '41 and by June Germany is effectively out of fuel (if not sooner). No fuel and not devastating initial Russian losses in the opening stages of op Barbarossa and you have the same outcome - a war Germany doesn't have the resource to win - right from the get go.

I guess both Romanian oilfields and the french stocks (the 1 time Nazi plunder) would sudenly disappear? Not to mention the incipient (but quickly growing) german synthetic production.

The "Nazi Germany din't have a chance" storyline is right there with the Nazi "kick the door and the bolshevik shack shall crumble" nonsense. The bolshevik shack WOULD have crumbled, but it would have required an effort slightly more involved from Germany's and auxiliaries' side than historical.

The Nazi logic as it transpired during 1941 was a prescription for disaster, and that's plenty clear with 20/20 hindsight. BUT, the historical actions of Mannerheim, Franco, Teleki, and even Horthy showed that the fatal flaws in the Nazi Germany's approach were visible even at the time.

[ljadw]

The German synthetic oil production was more than incipient :

1940 :crude : 1.46 million ton:synthetic:3.4 million ton;imports : from Romania : 1.3 million ,from the SU : 0.8 million

1941: crude : 1.5;synthetic: 4 ;import : 2.8

Since 1940,the synthetic oil production was more important than the import.

But still,a lot of people will claim that Germany was depending on the import .

[ChrisDR68]

The ONLY reason Hitler/Germany achieved strategic and operational surprise in the first 3 months of the war was that Stalin was convinced that Hitler would not be mad enough to voluntarily start 'Germany's worst nightmare', the two front war. Stalin knew that the German-Soviet war was coming bur still signed the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact was to buy time and to allow the capitalist west 'knock itself out' in an imperialistic war.

That last line strikes me as strange. Wasn't the Soviet Union an empire incorporating as it did the Balkan states, Belarus, Ukraine and other states that didn't particularily want to be within it and therefore didn't that make Stalin and his communist chums a bunch of imperialists too?

[LWD]

... But still,a lot of people will claim that Germany was depending on the import .

If you need 10 units of something and you get 6 domestically and import 3 you are obviously dependent on both domestic production and imports. This is even more obvously the case if the domestic production uses resources that you could use elsewhere.

[steverodgers801]

It requires oil to make synthetic oil.

[BDV]

It requires oil to make synthetic oil.

I though it requires a source of carbon, water, a source of heat, and adequate pressure vessels.

[LWD]

In particular the Germans used coal I believe for thier syn fuel.

[Graeme Sydney]

That last line strikes me as strange. Wasn't the Soviet Union an empire incorporating as it did the Balkan states, Belarus, Ukraine and other states that didn't particularily want to be within it and therefore didn't that make Stalin and his communist chums a bunch of imperialists too?

All true, but in this instance the words 'capitalist' and 'imperialist' are been used as jargon words according to Marxist theory. In Marxist theory imperialism is the last stage of capitalism before the inevitable collapse brought about by a revolution of the proletariat.

[Graeme Sydney]

... But still,a lot of people will claim that Germany was depending on the import .

If you need 10 units of something and you get 6 domestically and import 3 you are obviously dependent on both domestic production and imports. This is even more obvously the case if the domestic production uses resources that you could use elsewhere.

And it is all about critical mass. If you are running the economies of EUROPE on 70% (or whatever) of actual need by petrol rationing and going without, how ill you stockpile a reserve for the impending op Barbarossa?

The Russian imports were significant. Take away Russian oil imports into Germany in the first six months of '41 and the strategic choices change significantly.

[BDV]

The argument is missing some sort of measure of the dependency of Continental Europe economy on the supply of oil, and the presence/absence of mitigating factors (and the liberty of action to pursue them).

[steverodgers801]

It reminds me that Germany was not only supply oil for its self but Italy and the occupied countries. France was one of the biggest drains since they use to be able to import. does the figures include that factor??

[Graeme Sydney]

Hitler's and his gang of exterminators (military and civilian) and the likes of Horty-Antonescu. "It's all Hitler's fault" is simply garbage.

The thread is about Hitler as a strategist and since Hitler was the absolute military leader for the war and we are talking about mustering military and economic resources to the war effort, then the judgement is valid.

And that is not to say that the German people didn't have a share of the responsibility for the behaviour and excesses of the Nazis.

What's wrong with a competent leadership providing the attacking force has the best of the available weapons that the existing industrial base could provide? Neither Dewoitine 520s, Panhard 178s, Potez62s, SP GPFs, Somua 35s, or Hotchkiss 39s require ASB. Nothing but a bit of hard work and GERMAN sacrifice (like in providing French with proper allotment of coal, developing the tactics/doctrine adequate to the specifics of the french war materiel) is required of the NSDAP state and the Wehrmacht to ensure that the french industrial base is properly incorporated in the Axis warmachine.

Of course in an ideal world these things could have happened. But they didn't. And there's a reason they didn't.

But for the sake of argument I'll accept all of it. So now Germany has 2000 more fighting vehicles and 500 more combat planes. Now where does the fuel for these extras come from?

But I'll concede that as well. And now because of this additional fighting power Germany achieves the Leningrad - Moscow - Stalingrad line. But they still haven't won the war and they still haven't achieved the fuel they need. So the outcome is the same it just takes Russia longer and greater cas all round.

(And that's without your argument conceding perfect competence to the Russians as well. How about no military purges and no strategic or operational surprise. And because of that an even better Russian fighting withdrawal and the Leningrad - Moscow - Stalingrad line not achieved. Lets say 1 million Russian cas and nor 4.5 mil.)

I guess both Romanian oilfields and the french stocks (the 1 time Nazi plunder) would sudenly disappear? Not to mention the incipient (but quickly growing) german synthetic production.

Historically even these PLUS the Russian oil weren't enough to fuel op Barbarossa and occupied Europe. So take out 6 months of Russia oil imports and the German strategic choices change significantly.

The "Nazi Germany din't have a chance" storyline is right there with the Nazi "kick the door and the bolshevik shack shall crumble" nonsense. The bolshevik shack WOULD have crumbled, but it would have required an effort slightly more involved from Germany's and auxiliaries' side than historical.

That's a nonsense. How many of the alternatives have been tested here on various threads. The conclusion each time is that Germany loses, Russia wins. Unless of course you could name or point out an alternative.

The Nazi logic as it transpired during 1941 was a prescription for disaster, and that's plenty clear with 20/20 hindsight. BUT, the historical actions of Mannerheim, Franco, Teleki, and even Horthy showed that the fatal flaws in the Nazi Germany's approach were visible even at the time.

What do you mean by "The Nazi logic"? Is that Germany's war aims? Strategies? Ideology or what?