Hitler 's Wehrmacht or Kaiser 's Imperial army better ?

[stg 44]

I think the Germany Army of WWI was no better than anyone else in 1914. Where they start to take a lead is in the evolving defensive and offensive tactics of the 1915-17 period. Where the Allies were turning to massed guns and tanks, the Germans were solving trench deadlock with improved tactics and that gave them a qualitative edge (IMHO) until the end of the 1918 offensives when the best they had was gone.

Beg pardon, but the German army of 1914 was most certainly, as a whole, much better than everyone else n the world at that time. By 1918 The British were probably the best, but that's because they were the most experienced, intact force remaining. It wasn't that the German soldiers were better, man for man the Russians were tougher and wilier, but rather the whole system was the best. The general staff, the officers, the NCOs (more per man than any other army), high education standards, lavishly equipped, well trained; in just about every category the Germans functioned better than other armies, which is what allowed them to adapt to trench warfare so well. Now their government was shit, which is a whole other story...

I would disagree.

Large numbers of reservists shovelled into uniform, inconsistent tactical doctrine, issues with the battle plan. The key planks of what would become German combat superiority were still in the future.

Are you referring to the Kindermord? That was situational and resulted from a specific choice by the general staff to utilize unready formations to possibly win a total victory in the West. The system was not to blame, rather the general, Falkenhayn, for his gamble. And can you honestly say the every other army didn't do the same or worse? The Somme, Carpathian campaign, just about every Russian battle, and just about the same with the French. Let's not start on the Italians!

[The IronDuke]

I think the Germany Army of WWI was no better than anyone else in 1914. Where they start to take a lead is in the evolving defensive and offensive tactics of the 1915-17 period. Where the Allies were turning to massed guns and tanks, the Germans were solving trench deadlock with improved tactics and that gave them a qualitative edge (IMHO) until the end of the 1918 offensives when the best they had was gone.

Beg pardon, but the German army of 1914 was most certainly, as a whole, much better than everyone else n the world at that time. By 1918 The British were probably the best, but that's because they were the most experienced, intact force remaining. It wasn't that the German soldiers were better, man for man the Russians were tougher and wilier, but rather the whole system was the best. The general staff, the officers, the NCOs (more per man than any other army), high education standards, lavishly equipped, well trained; in just about every category the Germans functioned better than other armies, which is what allowed them to adapt to trench warfare so well. Now their government was shit, which is a whole other story...

I would disagree.

Large numbers of reservists shovelled into uniform, inconsistent tactical doctrine, issues with the battle plan. The key planks of what would become German combat superiority were still in the future.

Are you referring to the Kindermord? That was situational and resulted from a specific choice by the general staff to utilize unready formations to possibly win a total victory in the West. The system was not to blame, rather the general, Falkenhayn, for his gamble. And can you honestly say the every other army didn't do the same or worse? The Somme, Carpathian campaign, just about every Russian battle, and just about the same with the French. Let's not start on the Italians!

But now your argument seems to be "The imperial Army were better than the Wehrmacht, except where they weren't."

You remove the reservists, and I'll ask that the Imperial Army be compared to only the following types of Wehrmacht formations.

FJ
Mechanised formations
The first (say) 6 waves of infantry divisions

From 1940 onwards, the Wehrmacht was creating infantry formations unfit for offensive duties because of lack of equipment.

From 1942 onwards, they were classifying divisions as unfit for offensive operations because of personnel as well as equipment deficiencies.

By 1943, they are creating static formations fit only for defence of fortifications.

By 1944, they are shovelling the bottom of the barrel into the Volksgrenadier units.

You won't get very far comparing the cream of one Army with the cream of another.

Therefore, I tend to look at other stuff. The Wehrmacht of 1940 achieved more than the imperial army did. Their tactical doctrines were based upon the imperial Army's late war doctrines, their Senior officer Corp was far more gifted and they led the world in a way the Imperial Army only did for the period late 1917 to mid 1918.

As I've said, the original Imperial Army had uncertain tactical doctrines, a patchy Officer Corp and an operational doctrine that was (through no fault of their own) now obselete.

The Wehrmacht suffered from none of these issues, at least before the casualties started piling up.

Regards,
ID

[stg 44]

Nice ad hominem argument. I never said take out all the reservists. The Imperial army has nothing but excellent examples of reservists fighting in the front lines from 1914 to the very end. I'm saying one specific instance (Kindermord) of untrained new recruits, NOT reservists, as they were not in the reserves prewar, nor had military training prior to August 1914, being thrown into battle before they were finished forming. Its not fair to compare these units with what the Wehrmacht produced before 1944, just as its not fair to compare Volkssturm to the Imperial Guard divisions. The 'reserve corps' used at Ypern were not reservists, but newly inducted recruits!

Also the Wehrmacht had better technology, better mobility, the benefit of hindsight after the experiences of WW1, and luck (the French walked into the Sedan trap and the Russians were in the middle of reforming the army AND had just purged their officers in 1941), which gave them abilities the Kaiserliche Heer did not have.
Also the Imperial troops beat the best of the French, Russian and British troops in frontal battles in 1914, the Wehrmacht shunned those battles in 1940 and 1941, losing when they fought the best of the French head on (Gembloux Gap) or running away from the Poles in bayonet charges. Hell Fritsch even admitted that in 1939 the Wehrmacht was less well trained than the Impetial army! Compare the 1914 army to the 1939 Wehrmacht. After that the Wehrmacht got a break to retrain and resupply before picking the time and place of their next fight. After France they did the same. Meanwhile the Imperial army was engaged from 1914-1918 with no breaks. They stood up to the very end,

[The IronDuke]

Nice ad hominem argument. I never said take out all the reservists.

I didn't think it was ad hominem. German infantry in 1914 suffered horrendously (like most did). Tactical doctrine was poor and British markmanship did the rest on a number of occasions. I don;t see anything particularly special. The Imperial Army was better in 1916 than it was in 1914. Better doctrine, better arms, better tactics, better training.

The Imperial army has nothing but excellent examples of reservists fighting in the front lines from 1914 to the very end.

I doubt they were fighting particuarly well towards the very end. I also don't dispute you can find excellent examples, but you can find indifferent ones as well.

I'm saying one specific instance (Kindermord) of untrained new recruits, NOT reservists, as they were not in the reserves prewar, nor had military training prior to August 1914, being thrown into battle before they were finished forming.

Volksgrenadier by another name.

Its not fair to compare these units with what the Wehrmacht produced before 1944, just as its not fair to compare Volkssturm to the Imperial Guard divisions. The 'reserve corps' used at Ypern were not reservists, but newly inducted recruits!

Happy with this. So, what are you actually comparing then?

Also the Wehrmacht had better technology, better mobility,

Irrelevant since so did their opponents. Put another way, your remark is equally valid if phrased "The Imperial Army never had to face ground support aircraft in the hundreds, massed heavy bombing, T34s, IS-IIs and a hopelessly interdicted supply situation.

I also think the mobility point hides more than it illuminates. Take out the 30-40 motorised or mechanised formations, and the majority of the Wehrmacht was no more mobile than the Imperial Army. Most German soldiers walked into battle during the second world war, with thousands of horses lugging their artillery and supplies.

the benefit of hindsight after the experiences of WW1,

This hindsight was also a benefit to the British and French, but neither learned it quite so well. Hindsight is useful only if you saw correctly. It was a mark of institutional excellence that the Germans fashioned doctrine so well in the inter war period.

and luck (the French walked into the Sedan trap and the Russians were in the middle of reforming the army AND had just purged their officers in 1941), which gave them abilities the Kaiserliche Heer did not have. Also the Imperial troops beat the best of the French, Russian and British troops in frontal battles in 1914, the Wehrmacht shunned those battles in 1940 and 1941,

But you seem to praise the Imperial Army for losing (for that's what ultimately happened to them in 1914), but then criticise the Wehrmacht for winning. How does that work? Again, it was a mark of a well made battle plan that the French walked into it. Manstein correctly foresaw Allied intentions and took advantage. To me, the campaign in France in 1940 is right up there with Austerlitz and Cannae as examples of the military art. The right hook of 1914 is not so impressive from a planning point of view.

As alluded to above, the frontal battles were frequently pyrrhic. Weight of numbers carried the Imperial Army through, but they were then outmanouvred and forced back.

the Wehrmacht shunned those battles in 1940 and 1941, losing when they fought the best of the French head on (Gembloux Gap)

They lost on the first day against better equipped forces. On the second day, they broke through and Prioux went into headlong retreat.

or running away from the Poles in bayonet charges.

I'd need a reference for this one. I'd also suggest that one example from a veteran's memoirs does not an argument make.

Hell Fritsch even admitted that in 1939 the Wehrmacht was less well trained than the Impetial army! Compare the 1914 army to the 1939 Wehrmacht. After that the Wehrmacht got a break to retrain and resupply before picking the time and place of their next fight. After France they did the same. Meanwhile the Imperial army was engaged from 1914-1918 with no breaks. They stood up to the very end,

The imperial Army was better in 1917 than it was in 1914, and the Wehrmacht was better in 1941 than it was in 1939. Such is life. Armies evolve and improve, green unseasoned troopos become combat veterans etc. As I said earlier, it was a mark of institutional excellence that the wehrmacht so thoroughly improved itself in the autumn, winter and spring of 1939/40. The imperial Army required deadlock before it so reformed.

As I said earlier. The imperial Army of 1914 was tactically outdated. It learned and improved. The Wehrmacht of 1939 was tactically sound, but read the lessons correctly, deciding Officers had not displayed enough forward Leadership and troops had not displayed sufficient aggression. It learned and improved.

Many of it's better features (infiltration tactics; Junior Officer initiative etc) took time to perfect, but then such was the same with the Imperial Army. It also held off its enemies longer, with more disadvantages than the Imperial Army managed.

Regards,
ID

[stg 44]

Nice ad hominem argument. I never said take out all the reservists.

I didn't think it was ad hominem. German infantry in 1914 suffered horrendously (like most did). Tactical doctrine was poor and British markmanship did the rest on a number of occasions. I don;t see anything particularly special. The Imperial Army was better in 1916 than it was in 1914. Better doctrine, better arms, better tactics, better training.

The Germans bested all of their foes with a very favorable casualty rate until the French recovered and massed more men against them. For 1914 German doctrine was quite advanced, but was unevenly applied. Had the Imperial army the mobility of the Wehrmacht the French would not have had time to recover and would have been encircled. The Germans outfought them and inflicted far worse losses on the French in August and September, but couldn't operationally exploit their victories, which allowed the French to recover. If the Wehrmacht of 1940 had to fight with 1914 technology they wouldn't and couldn't have done better and probably would do worse because of limited numbers of trained soldiers and inadequately trained soldiers. If the Imperial army had enough trucks and Panzers they could have done just as well or better even with 1914 tactics and organization.

Also remember that the Imperial army got better over time, while the Wehrmacht dropped in quality. Also it was the Imperial army that produced vast doctrine shift and incorporated new technologies superbly into their system in WW1, while the Wehrmacht struggled to properly utilize or produce what was needed to stay relevant.

The Imperial army has nothing but excellent examples of reservists fighting in the front lines from 1914 to the very end.

I doubt they were fighting particuarly well towards the very end. I also don't dispute you can find excellent examples, but you can find indifferent ones as well.

Granted, but the quality of reserve divisions increased over the course of the war from their already superior level in 1914. This is in contrast to the untrained recruits that were employed at Ypres, which was the point I was making: that reservists and untrained recruits were not one and the same, which you claimed.

I'm saying one specific instance (Kindermord) of untrained new recruits, NOT reservists, as they were not in the reserves prewar, nor had military training prior to August 1914, being thrown into battle before they were finished forming.

Volksgrenadier by another name.

Not really, because the Volksgrenadier were a last-ditch formation that were not used just one in a tight spot, but rather were part of the Wehrmacht's regular OOB, which the scratch recruit formations of Ypres were not. In fact the Imperial army never again used unfinished new formations with obsolete/no equipment in combat during the rest of WW1 based on that experience, while the Volksgrenadier were given the very latest equipment to balance their lack of quality and were used from 1944 on as fully formed units. Not the same at all.

Its not fair to compare these units with what the Wehrmacht produced before 1944, just as its not fair to compare Volkssturm to the Imperial Guard divisions. The 'reserve corps' used at Ypern were not reservists, but newly inducted recruits!

Happy with this. So, what are you actually comparing then?

Like I said, compare 1939 to 1914, 1940 to 1915, 1941-3 with 1916, and 1944-5 with 1917-18

Also the Wehrmacht had better technology, better mobility,

Irrelevant since so did their opponents. Put another way, your remark is equally valid if phrased "The Imperial Army never had to face ground support aircraft in the hundreds, massed heavy bombing, T34s, IS-IIs and a hopelessly interdicted supply situation.

I also think the mobility point hides more than it illuminates. Take out the 30-40 motorised or mechanised formations, and the majority of the Wehrmacht was no more mobile than the Imperial Army. Most German soldiers walked into battle during the second world war, with thousands of horses lugging their artillery and supplies.

Not irrelevant at all. When the Wehrmacht beat their enemy by striking his weakest reservists and exploiting the gap with their mobile troops, the Imperial army took on the best of the French head on, beating them, but had to chase them on foot while the French used their rail roads to outmaneuver the Germans. Compared to their foes in 1914 the German army was superior and proved it in head on clashes. The Wehrmacht got lucky in 1939 because they could focus their entire army on the Polish, who were not fully mobilized in September to appease the Germans. Then again in 1940 the French walked into a trap and the Germans used technology not available to the Imperial army to quickly exploit their flank and not let them recover. Had the Imperial army the means to exploit a gap the way the Werhmacht was able, August 1914 would have looked like May 1940. Also it was the Panzer and motorized divisions that decided things in May 1940, not the foot infantry, who were often checked or beaten by the French. Not so in 1914 when the Germans defeated the French army all the way across the line, throwing them into full retreat. Alas no trucks or Panzers meant the Germans couldn't outrun their enemy.

the benefit of hindsight after the experiences of WW1,

This hindsight was also a benefit to the British and French, but neither learned it quite so well. Hindsight is useful only if you saw correctly. It was a mark of institutional excellence that the Germans fashioned doctrine so well in the inter war period.

Doctrine of the interwar was just a refinement of the WW1 doctrine developed during the conflict.

and luck (the French walked into the Sedan trap and the Russians were in the middle of reforming the army AND had just purged their officers in 1941), which gave them abilities the Kaiserliche Heer did not have. Also the Imperial troops beat the best of the French, Russian and British troops in frontal battles in 1914, the Wehrmacht shunned those battles in 1940 and 1941,

But you seem to praise the Imperial Army for losing (for that's what ultimately happened to them in 1914), but then criticise the Wehrmacht for winning. How does that work? Again, it was a mark of a well made battle plan that the French walked into it. Manstein correctly foresaw Allied intentions and took advantage. To me, the campaign in France in 1940 is right up there with Austerlitz and Cannae as examples of the military art. The right hook of 1914 is not so impressive from a planning point of view.

As alluded to above, the frontal battles were frequently pyrrhic. Weight of numbers carried the Imperial Army through, but they were then outmanouvred and forced back.

They only were stalemated because the French had greater mobility than the Imperial army, thanks to fighting on their own soil and having working rail lines. The Germans had to march everywhere, although they defeated the French and inflicted better than 3:1 losses on them until the Marne. From a tactical point of view the Imperial army of 1914 succeeded brilliantly. Operationally they didn't have the mobility to translate that into operational or strategic victory, a problem NO ONE solved until WW2 when technology finally allowed for tactical victories to be exploited.

the Wehrmacht shunned those battles in 1940 and 1941, losing when they fought the best of the French head on (Gembloux Gap)

They lost on the first day against better equipped forces. On the second day, they broke through and Prioux went into headlong retreat.

The French retreated because of the breakthrough at Sedan.

or running away from the Poles in bayonet charges.

I'd need a reference for this one. I'd also suggest that one example from a veteran's memoirs does not an argument make.

I'll have to look through my materials, but IIRC Robert Cinto (http://www.amazon.com/Path-Blitzkrieg-D ... 742&sr=1-5) mentions that after the invasion of Poland the Wehrmacht instituted an army wide training program to deal with major tactical, morale, and training deficiencies discovered in Poland, such as soldiers not following officers into battle, men, such as the SS running away from Polish bayonet charges, and poor infantry/artillery/luftwaffe/panzer coordination.

Hell Fritsch even admitted that in 1939 the Wehrmacht was less well trained than the Impetial army! Compare the 1914 army to the 1939 Wehrmacht. After that the Wehrmacht got a break to retrain and resupply before picking the time and place of their next fight. After France they did the same. Meanwhile the Imperial army was engaged from 1914-1918 with no breaks. They stood up to the very end,

The imperial Army was better in 1917 than it was in 1914, and the Wehrmacht was better in 1941 than it was in 1939. Such is life. Armies evolve and improve, green unseasoned troopos become combat veterans etc. As I said earlier, it was a mark of institutional excellence that the wehrmacht so thoroughly improved itself in the autumn, winter and spring of 1939/40. The imperial Army required deadlock before it so reformed.

As I said earlier. The imperial Army of 1914 was tactically outdated. It learned and improved. The Wehrmacht of 1939 was tactically sound, but read the lessons correctly, deciding Officers had not displayed enough forward Leadership and troops had not displayed sufficient aggression. It learned and improved.

Many of it's better features (infiltration tactics; Junior Officer initiative etc) took time to perfect, but then such was the same with the Imperial Army. It also held off its enemies longer, with more disadvantages than the Imperial Army managed.

Regards,
ID

The Wehrmacht was not ready for war in 1939 and it showed in the Polish campaign, which is why there was a massive effort at training to ready the army for the French campaign. The Wehrmacht improved, but it was still deficient in technical competencies like indirect machine gun firing and night combat. It improved, but overall the system was weaker IMHO than the Imperial army overall, despite the Wehrmacht being an improvement over the Imperial army in some areas.

[Appleknocker27]

I agree with a few of the posters here that the Kaiser's Army was qualitatively superior to the Heer of WWII when taken in context with it's respective timeframe and peers. I think you can make an argument for the sake of argument for the Heer of WWII, but the fact that the Kaiser's Army was victorious in the East after 3 years of war and was still capable if not close to overall strategic victory right up until 6 months before the war ended speaks for itself. The Heer of WWII was doomed after December of 1941. The highest man for man quality the WWII Heer had was in June 1941, after Barbarossa ended it was never the same in overall quality and that is indicative of its lack of depth in trained personnel and equipment that met standard (an aspect the Kaiser's Heer was far better by comparison). The Heer of WWII won quick knockouts for the most part on unprepared enemies and ultimately did not do as well as the Kaiser's Heer against those prepared to meet them on equal or better terms.

[bengaltigerakakingtiger]

The back and forth on this topic was great to read. My own take on this subject is this is comparing apples and oranges. World War I and World War II were different types of war fought under different circumstances. Both the German Armies of their respective wars were the most interesting and in my view the best, in spite of having not won those wars. The most striking difference was that the Kaiserheer went all out from the start of the war until the end. Hitler's Heer did not go all out until May 1940, and that was around 6 weeks in duration. After a year of expansion, the next all out was against the USSR in 1941. From that point on for nearly 4 years, the Heer was in action all over the well known areas of land conflict in North Africa and Europe. As far as great military personalities go, due to the German habit of really publicizing their military heroes in the Second World War compared to the First World War, much more is known about personalities and fighting formations and units of the Wehrmacht as a whole compared to the what went before. This is a subject which has yet to be exhausted.
Steve

[stg 44]

The back and forth on this topic was great to read. My own take on this subject is this is comparing apples and oranges. World War I and World War II were different types of war fought under different circumstances. Both the German Armies of their respective wars were the most interesting and in my view the best, in spite of having not won those wars. The most striking difference was that the Kaiserheer went all out from the start of the war until the end. Hitler's Heer did not go all out until May 1940, and that was around 6 weeks in duration. After a year of expansion, the next all out was against the USSR in 1941. From that point on for nearly 4 years, the Heer was in action all over the well known areas of land conflict in North Africa and Europe. As far as great military personalities go, due to the German habit of really publicizing their military heroes in the Second World War compared to the First World War, much more is known about personalities and fighting formations and units of the Wehrmacht as a whole compared to the what went before. This is a subject which has yet to be exhausted.
Steve

It should also be noted that much of the German WW1 archives were wiped out in 1945 in an Allied bombing raid, so lots of critical information for historians to accurately assess what was going on was destroyed.

[Appleknocker27]

The back and forth on this topic was great to read. My own take on this subject is this is comparing apples and oranges. World War I and World War II were different types of war fought under different circumstances. Both the German Armies of their respective wars were the most interesting and in my view the best, in spite of having not won those wars. The most striking difference was that the Kaiserheer went all out from the start of the war until the end. Hitler's Heer did not go all out until May 1940, and that was around 6 weeks in duration. After a year of expansion, the next all out was against the USSR in 1941. From that point on for nearly 4 years, the Heer was in action all over the well known areas of land conflict in North Africa and Europe. As far as great military personalities go, due to the German habit of really publicizing their military heroes in the Second World War compared to the First World War, much more is known about personalities and fighting formations and units of the Wehrmacht as a whole compared to the what went before. This is a subject which has yet to be exhausted.
Steve

Great point about the differing levels of operational comittment. I agree that the comparison is apples to oranges because of the technology, but there is still room for comparison when looking at the quality and depth of the respective formations and in comparison to their peers in each era.

[ljadw]

In 1914,the Germans had 40 classes of reservists,in 1939 :5
IMHO,this explains a lot .

[ljadw]

One also could make a comparison of casualties:
On 1 janury 1916,the Germans had lost on the Western Front only:950.000 dead and missing and 1.6 million wounded
On 1 september 1940,total German losses were :220.000
I don't think that the Germans could afford 2.5 million losses on 1 september 1940

[The IronDuke]

Nice ad hominem argument. I never said take out all the reservists.

I didn't think it was ad hominem. German infantry in 1914 suffered horrendously (like most did). Tactical doctrine was poor and British markmanship did the rest on a number of occasions. I don;t see anything particularly special. The Imperial Army was better in 1916 than it was in 1914. Better doctrine, better arms, better tactics, better training.

The Germans bested all of their foes with a very favorable casualty rate until the French recovered and massed more men against them.

As they did during WWII.

For 1914 German doctrine was quite advanced, but was unevenly applied.

Which it was in 1939.

Had the Imperial army the mobility of the Wehrmacht the French would not have had time to recover and would have been encircled.

But the French Army of 1940 was far more mobile than the French Army of 1914. This evens this one out.

The Germans outfought them and inflicted far worse losses on the French in August and September, but couldn't operationally exploit their victories, which allowed the French to recover.

The Germans struggled to exploit any operational successes throughout the war on the western front. Look at the operational mess that was the 1918 offensives. operational success, is however, one factor that can be used to measure an Army's quality. You can't take all the negatives about 1914 (poor operational ability; defeat) and ignore them.

If the Wehrmacht of 1940 had to fight with 1914 technology they wouldn't and couldn't have done better and probably would do worse because of limited numbers of trained soldiers and inadequately trained soldiers.

And the Army of 1914 wouldn't and couldn't have done better than the Wehrmacht of 1940 had they been able to fight with 1940 technology. I don't see any mileage in this particular argument. Give the cave men M16s and they'ed defeat the Army of Northern Virginia.

If the Imperial army had enough trucks and Panzers they could have done just as well or better even with 1914 tactics and organization.

Again, give them a nuclear weapon and they'ed have won in ten minutes. I don't see where this argument gets us. If WWII allied armies had only been as mobile as WWI Allied armies, the Wehrmacht would have won every campaign it entered.

Also remember that the Imperial army got better over time, while the Wehrmacht dropped in quality.

By the fourth year of war, the imperial Army was shot and was comprehensively defeated by the BEF in it's fourth year of war.

In 1943, in it's fourth year of war, the Wehrmacht was still capable of operational successes in Southern Russia, more than capable of holding the Allies back in Italy and still capable of affecting large scale offensive action.

Also it was the Imperial army that produced vast doctrine shift and incorporated new technologies superbly into their system in WW1, while the Wehrmacht struggled to properly utilize or produce what was needed to stay relevant.

Being unable to produce is not a valid criticism of the Wehrmacht, but of German industry. Additionally, Wehrmacht doctrine did not require a complete rewrite as it did in 1916.

The Imperial army has nothing but excellent examples of reservists fighting in the front lines from 1914 to the very end.

I doubt they were fighting particuarly well towards the very end. I also don't dispute you can find excellent examples, but you can find indifferent ones as well.

Granted, but the quality of reserve divisions increased over the course of the war from their already superior level in 1914. This is in contrast to the untrained recruits that were employed at Ypres, which was the point I was making: that reservists and untrained recruits were not one and the same, which you claimed.

No, my point was that they shovelled lots of men into uniform and overwhelmed Western Allied forces with a series of bloody victories before getting into an operational mess and being forced to retreat. I don't see any difference between your kindermord and my Volksgrenadiers. Emergency measures all.

I'm saying one specific instance (Kindermord) of untrained new recruits, NOT reservists, as they were not in the reserves prewar, nor had military training prior to August 1914, being thrown into battle before they were finished forming.

Volksgrenadier by another name.

Not really, because the Volksgrenadier were a last-ditch formation that were not used just one in a tight spot, but rather were part of the Wehrmacht's regular OOB, which the scratch recruit formations of Ypres were not. In fact the Imperial army never again used unfinished new formations with obsolete/no equipment in combat during the rest of WW1 based on that experience, while the Volksgrenadier were given the very latest equipment to balance their lack of quality and were used from 1944 on as fully formed units. Not the same at all.

They were part of th regular OOB because the Whermacht lacked the resources to fully integrate them. The only latest equipment they got was automatic weapons, and that compensated for a deficit in artillery and other heavy weapons. It was an emergency measure. You can't excuse the Kindermord but then go after the volksgrenadier.

Its not fair to compare these units with what the Wehrmacht produced before 1944, just as its not fair to compare Volkssturm to the Imperial Guard divisions. The 'reserve corps' used at Ypern were not reservists, but newly inducted recruits!

Happy with this. So, what are you actually comparing then?

Like I said, compare 1939 to 1914, 1940 to 1915, 1941-3 with 1916, and 1944-5 with 1917-18

OK. 1914 - 1939 - Imperial Win (tactically, Wehrmacht win operationally).

1915 - 1940 - Wehrmacht win.

1916 - 1941/43 - Wehrmacht win.

1944/5 - 1917/18 - Draw.

Wehrmacht win on points...

Also the Wehrmacht had better technology, better mobility,

Irrelevant since so did their opponents. Put another way, your remark is equally valid if phrased "The Imperial Army never had to face ground support aircraft in the hundreds, massed heavy bombing, T34s, IS-IIs and a hopelessly interdicted supply situation.

I also think the mobility point hides more than it illuminates. Take out the 30-40 motorised or mechanised formations, and the majority of the Wehrmacht was no more mobile than the Imperial Army. Most German soldiers walked into battle during the second world war, with thousands of horses lugging their artillery and supplies.

Not irrelevant at all. When the Wehrmacht beat their enemy by striking his weakest reservists and exploiting the gap with their mobile troops, the Imperial army took on the best of the French head on, beating them, but had to chase them on foot while the French used their rail roads to outmaneuver the Germans.

As I said, whenever the 1940's vintage do anything notable, there is an excuse as to why it doesn;t count. Whenever the 1914 vintage do something poorly, there is an excuse as to why it doesn't count.

As I said, the Imperial Army won a series of bloody victories with out of date tactics before losing their nerve in front of Paris attempting to execute (poorly) a debateable battle plan.

The Wehrmacht swept forces as large as their own into a huge pocket, chasing the BEF off the continent for four years and doing in six weeks what the imperial Army signally failed to do in four years.

It can't simply be explained away.

Compared to their foes in 1914 the German army was superior and proved it in head on clashes. The Wehrmacht got lucky in 1939 because they could focus their entire army on the Polish, who were not fully mobilized in September to appease the Germans. Then again in 1940 the French walked into a trap and the Germans used technology not available to the Imperial army to quickly exploit their flank and not let them recover.

But a trap is by definition a device of your enemy's planning. You seem to be criticising the Wehrmacht Leadership for coming up with a plan that was brilliant and criticising the rank and file for executing it perfectly.

Let me put this another way.

What exactly (in your opinion) would the Wehrmacht have had to have done in 1940 against the Western allies to be judged superior?

Had the Imperial army the means to exploit a gap the way the Werhmacht was able, August 1914 would have looked like May 1940.

No it wouldn't. The Allies would have been similiarly more mobile under this what if and might have driven the Germans back more forcefully, or retreated more quickly.

Also it was the Panzer and motorized divisions that decided things in May 1940, not the foot infantry, who were often checked or beaten by the French.

Checked yes, beaten no. But so what, some of the British Army's defensive battles in 1914 "checked" the imperial Army.

Not so in 1914 when the Germans defeated the French army all the way across the line, throwing them into full retreat. Alas no trucks or Panzers meant the Germans couldn't outrun their enemy.

But the French didn't have superior mobility in 1914. The Wehrmacht was better led and more mobile. However, it was not comparably more mobile, since the French of 1940 were as equally more mobile than the French of 1914.

the benefit of hindsight after the experiences of WW1,

This hindsight was also a benefit to the British and French, but neither learned it quite so well. Hindsight is useful only if you saw correctly. It was a mark of institutional excellence that the Germans fashioned doctrine so well in the inter war period.

Doctrine of the interwar was just a refinement of the WW1 doctrine developed during the conflict.

Tactical doctrine was. Operational doctrine was a refinement of what the Germans had been attempting for centuries.

and luck (the French walked into the Sedan trap and the Russians were in the middle of reforming the army AND had just purged their officers in 1941), which gave them abilities the Kaiserliche Heer did not have. Also the Imperial troops beat the best of the French, Russian and British troops in frontal battles in 1914, the Wehrmacht shunned those battles in 1940 and 1941,

But you seem to praise the Imperial Army for losing (for that's what ultimately happened to them in 1914), but then criticise the Wehrmacht for winning. How does that work? Again, it was a mark of a well made battle plan that the French walked into it. Manstein correctly foresaw Allied intentions and took advantage. To me, the campaign in France in 1940 is right up there with Austerlitz and Cannae as examples of the military art. The right hook of 1914 is not so impressive from a planning point of view.

As alluded to above, the frontal battles were frequently pyrrhic. Weight of numbers carried the Imperial Army through, but they were then outmanouvred and forced back.

They only were stalemated because the French had greater mobility than the Imperial army, thanks to fighting on their own soil and having working rail lines. The Germans had to march everywhere, although they defeated the French and inflicted better than 3:1 losses on them until the Marne. From a tactical point of view the Imperial army of 1914 succeeded brilliantly. Operationally they didn't have the mobility to translate that into operational or strategic victory, a problem NO ONE solved until WW2 when technology finally allowed for tactical victories to be exploited.

Again, I fail to see why the imperial Army are lauded for tactical success, but the Wehrmacht denied such plaudits despite being equally successful.

Likewise, operationally, the imperial Army get a pass for failing, the Wehrmacht no credit for succeeding. It doesn't add up for me.

the Wehrmacht shunned those battles in 1940 and 1941, losing when they fought the best of the French head on (Gembloux Gap)

They lost on the first day against better equipped forces. On the second day, they broke through and Prioux went into headlong retreat.

The French retreated because of the breakthrough at Sedan.

No, they didn't.

Prioux was in full retreat after day two of the battle on 13th May. Guderian did not begin his assault crossing of the Meuse until 1600 on the same day - 13th May. The assault crossing itself was in doubt for 24 hours after that point. Prioux retreated because he was beaten, not because of an event at Sedan that had not yet taken place when he ordered the retreat.

or running away from the Poles in bayonet charges.

I'd need a reference for this one. I'd also suggest that one example from a veteran's memoirs does not an argument make.

I'll have to look through my materials, but IIRC Robert Cinto (http://www.amazon.com/Path-Blitzkrieg-D ... 742&sr=1-5) mentions that after the invasion of Poland the Wehrmacht instituted an army wide training program to deal with major tactical, morale, and training deficiencies discovered in Poland, such as soldiers not following officers into battle, men, such as the SS running away from Polish bayonet charges, and poor infantry/artillery/luftwaffe/panzer coordination.

This much is correct (bayonet charges excepted - no idea on this one). The main thrust of the self criticism was that troops lacked enough aggression and Commanders were not far enough forward. It is a mark of the Wehrmacht's institutional excellence that despite winning in poland, they still instituted an honest feedback process and acted vigorously on the findings in the time they had before their next campaign.

Hell Fritsch even admitted that in 1939 the Wehrmacht was less well trained than the Impetial army! Compare the 1914 army to the 1939 Wehrmacht. After that the Wehrmacht got a break to retrain and resupply before picking the time and place of their next fight. After France they did the same. Meanwhile the Imperial army was engaged from 1914-1918 with no breaks. They stood up to the very end,

As did the Wehrmacht that fought for longer against a more numerous foe.

The imperial Army was better in 1917 than it was in 1914, and the Wehrmacht was better in 1941 than it was in 1939. Such is life. Armies evolve and improve, green unseasoned troopos become combat veterans etc. As I said earlier, it was a mark of institutional excellence that the wehrmacht so thoroughly improved itself in the autumn, winter and spring of 1939/40. The imperial Army required deadlock before it so reformed.

As I said earlier. The imperial Army of 1914 was tactically outdated. It learned and improved. The Wehrmacht of 1939 was tactically sound, but read the lessons correctly, deciding Officers had not displayed enough forward Leadership and troops had not displayed sufficient aggression. It learned and improved.

Many of it's better features (infiltration tactics; Junior Officer initiative etc) took time to perfect, but then such was the same with the Imperial Army. It also held off its enemies longer, with more disadvantages than the Imperial Army managed.

Regards,
ID

The Wehrmacht was not ready for war in 1939 and it showed in the Polish campaign, which is why there was a massive effort at training to ready the army for the French campaign. The Wehrmacht improved, but it was still deficient in technical competencies like indirect machine gun firing and night combat. It improved, but overall the system was weaker IMHO than the Imperial army overall, despite the Wehrmacht being an improvement over the Imperial army in some areas.

I think the system was much stronger. The Wehrmacht won in 1939, but came out stronger the next time just a few months later (many victorious Armies don't change at all). In 1914 the Imperial Army lost, but took another couple of years to change it's tactical schemes in both defence and attack to suit the new realities.

Good debate.

regards,
ID

[Appleknocker27]

I have to disagree about the longevity of the Wehrmacht compared to the Kaiser's Heer. In the last 2.5 years of WWII it was clear as day that the German Army was beaten and long term total defeat was totally inevitable. The Kaiser's Army was capable of winning the war right up until the last 6 months. Also, you've mentioned the success of the Wehrmacht in France 1940 and the Army of 1914's failure, so what of the German victory in the East in WWI as opposed to the catastrophic failure of WWII?
I would also contend that the French Army of 1914 was a qualitatively better opponent in 1914 than it was in 1940, thus giving the German Army of 1914 a greater enemy to overcome.

[stg 44]

Nice ad hominem argument. I never said take out all the reservists.

I didn't think it was ad hominem. German infantry in 1914 suffered horrendously (like most did). Tactical doctrine was poor and British markmanship did the rest on a number of occasions. I don;t see anything particularly special. The Imperial Army was better in 1916 than it was in 1914. Better doctrine, better arms, better tactics, better training.

The Germans bested all of their foes with a very favorable casualty rate until the French recovered and massed more men against them.

As they did during WWII.

Except the Wehrmacht got a trial run to correct its deficiencies against a weaker, partly mobilized enemy on one front before picking the time and place of their next campaign when the army was ready. The Reichsheer had no experience to draw on from any recent conflict, unlike the Wehrmacht, did not get a trial run, and still managed to get things right from the beginning. They made it further and faster into France and Belgium than the Wehrmacht did despite marching on foot, not riding on trucks or tanks.

Had the Wehrmacht tried to fight France in 1939 they would have had a very different experience.

Had the Imperial army the mobility of the Wehrmacht the French would not have had time to recover and would have been encircled.

But the French Army of 1940 was far more mobile than the French Army of 1914. This evens this one out.

Not really. Give the French 1914 army the same mobility and the outcome would still be a German win. The attacker lacked operational mobility in 1914, while the defender had it thanks to rail movement. Tannenberg is the prime example of this, as is the Marne. The French then had greater operational mobility than the Germans in 1914, because the war was fought on their soil, they had access to rail transport for the maneuver of reserves, while the Germans were denied use of rail due to sabotage by the Belgians and French of soon-to-be-captured rail lines/tunnels/bridges.

Tactically both the Wehrmacht and Reichsheer were able to win, but operationally it was meaningless for the Reichsheer because they couldn't exploit their victories. The take away the Wehrmacht's mechanical mobility (and that of their foe, just to be fair) and it would experience the same problems that the Reichsheer had throughout the Great War. During WW1 no side ever solved the operational exploitation problem. The Allies only won in 1918 due to attrition and overwhelming numbers.

What I'm saying is that even with 1940 mobility to the French and Germans in 1914, the ability of the attacker to have the ability to operationally exploit a tactical victory as quickly as the defender can to react to the defeat changed the game. WW1 and WW2 were different wars because the attacker didn't have to attrit his foe to operational exploit a tactical victory to win a strategic victory.

The Germans outfought them and inflicted far worse losses on the French in August and September, but couldn't operationally exploit their victories, which allowed the French to recover.

The Germans struggled to exploit any operational successes throughout the war on the western front. Look at the operational mess that was the 1918 offensives. operational success, is however, one factor that can be used to measure an Army's quality. You can't take all the negatives about 1914 (poor operational ability; defeat) and ignore them.

Yes, because they lacked the technological means to move anywhere near as fast as the defender who had access to rail transport. It wasn't operational ability, it was operational means of exploitation! Notice that even with massive mobility and numbers advantage of the Allies in 1918 (4x as many trucks, 2.5x as many soldiers, who were of higher quality for a variety of reasons), they couldn't operationally exploit their victories either. The Germans could always fall back quicker than the Allies could advance. Technology needed to catch up with technique.

If the Wehrmacht of 1940 had to fight with 1914 technology they wouldn't and couldn't have done better and probably would do worse because of limited numbers of trained soldiers and inadequately trained soldiers.

And the Army of 1914 wouldn't and couldn't have done better than the Wehrmacht of 1940 had they been able to fight with 1940 technology. I don't see any mileage in this particular argument. Give the cave men M16s and they'ed defeat the Army of Northern Virginia.

I'm not arguing that the Germans be given anything their enemy doesn't already possess. Give the French trucks too. As it was in 1914 the defender had means of mobility denied to the attacker, which is why the French were able to win at the Marne: they could concentrate more men, guns, and supplies in a sector thanks to rail than the Germans, who had to march everything. Give both sides trucks and the situation evens itself out. The Germans could have maintained their advance, just as the Wehrmacht did after winning its initial tactical victories.

There was no unique operation technique that the Wehrmacht had that the Reichsheer did not; all the Wehrmacht had was operational mobility thanks to mechanical technology improvements.

If the Imperial army had enough trucks and Panzers they could have done just as well or better even with 1914 tactics and organization.

Again, give them a nuclear weapon and they'ed have won in ten minutes. I don't see where this argument gets us. If WWII allied armies had only been as mobile as WWI Allied armies, the Wehrmacht would have won every campaign it entered.

Give the French the same mobility as the Reichsheer! The problem was that in 1914 the French had greater mobility thanks to having access to rail lines. The Germans were much less mobile than their foe as a result, yet the Germans won despite being over 100 miles from their nearest rail heads repeatedly until the Marne. Once the French managed to assemble and mobilize enough men they were finally able to stop the Germans, who at that point were already more than 100 miles from their supply lines and had marched 300+ miles. Still they won tactical victories at the Marne and only retreated because a general staffer showed up and panicked.

Had the Reichsheer (and French!) trucks the situation would have been vastly different. Look at what happened when the French were able to mobilize the Parisian taxis to obtain operational mobility with their 6th army at the Marne. Mobility the Reichsheer lacked at that time.

Also remember that the Imperial army got better over time, while the Wehrmacht dropped in quality.

By the fourth year of war, the imperial Army was shot and was comprehensively defeated by the BEF in it's fourth year of war.

In 1943, in it's fourth year of war, the Wehrmacht was still capable of operational successes in Southern Russia, more than capable of holding the Allies back in Italy and still capable of affecting large scale offensive action.

Because the Reichsheer didn't have breaks in fighting like the Wehrmacht had in 1939-1940 and then from 1940-1941. The Reichsheer fought on two and latter 4 fronts continuously for 4.5 years. 1943 wasn't the 4th year of the Wehrmacht's war, it was 2.5 years into the Russian campaign, which makes your comparison spurious. 2.5 years into WW1 was
1916, where the Germans fought at the Somme, Verdun, and the Brusilov offensive simultaneously.

Also it was the Imperial army that produced vast doctrine shift and incorporated new technologies superbly into their system in WW1, while the Wehrmacht struggled to properly utilize or produce what was needed to stay relevant.

Being unable to produce is not a valid criticism of the Wehrmacht, but of German industry. Additionally, Wehrmacht doctrine did not require a complete rewrite as it did in 1916.

The Reichsheer did not require a complete rewrite either. It adapted to the lessons learned in battle, just like the Wehrmacht did in 1939, 1940, and throughout the Russian campaign...except the Reichsheer didn't get time off to institute those changes.

Given that the Wehrmacht was heavily involved in production in WW2, just as the Reichsheer was in WW1, it does speak to the nature of the system that the Wehrmacht failed to stay as technologically relevant as was necessary or indeed possible. Its a joke what passed for organization in the technological department in the Wehrmacht.

The Imperial army has nothing but excellent examples of reservists fighting in the front lines from 1914 to the very end.

I doubt they were fighting particuarly well towards the very end. I also don't dispute you can find excellent examples, but you can find indifferent ones as well.

Granted, but the quality of reserve divisions increased over the course of the war from their already superior level in 1914. This is in contrast to the untrained recruits that were employed at Ypres, which was the point I was making: that reservists and untrained recruits were not one and the same, which you claimed.

No, my point was that they shovelled lots of men into uniform and overwhelmed Western Allied forces with a series of bloody victories before getting into an operational mess and being forced to retreat. I don't see any difference between your kindermord and my Volksgrenadiers. Emergency measures all.

The Reichsheer didn't have to retreat after Ypres, it held the ground it gained. The lesson learned was don't gamble on untrained recruits to win victories, which the Reichsheer learned and applied. The Volksgrenadiers and Volkssturm were instead expanded and made part of the OOB rather than phased out.

I'm saying one specific instance (Kindermord) of untrained new recruits, NOT reservists, as they were not in the reserves prewar, nor had military training prior to August 1914, being thrown into battle before they were finished forming.

Volksgrenadier by another name.

Not really, because the Volksgrenadier were a last-ditch formation that were not used just one in a tight spot, but rather were part of the Wehrmacht's regular OOB, which the scratch recruit formations of Ypres were not. In fact the Imperial army never again used unfinished new formations with obsolete/no equipment in combat during the rest of WW1 based on that experience, while the Volksgrenadier were given the very latest equipment to balance their lack of quality and were used from 1944 on as fully formed units. Not the same at all.

They were part of th regular OOB because the Whermacht lacked the resources to fully integrate them. The only latest equipment they got was automatic weapons, and that compensated for a deficit in artillery and other heavy weapons. It was an emergency measure. You can't excuse the Kindermord but then go after the volksgrenadier.

I can because they were used for different reasons in different situations. One cannot compare the two because they were too different to compare. The Volksgrenadier have more in common with the trench and landwehr divisions of 1918 than with the 1914 reserve corps. If you'd like to compare those, that'd be totally fair. In that case neither army comes out well.

Its not fair to compare these units with what the Wehrmacht produced before 1944, just as its not fair to compare Volkssturm to the Imperial Guard divisions. The 'reserve corps' used at Ypern were not reservists, but newly inducted recruits!

Happy with this. So, what are you actually comparing then?

Like I said, compare 1939 to 1914, 1940 to 1915, 1941-3 with 1916, and 1944-5 with 1917-18

See Below.

OK. 1914 - 1939 - Imperial Win (tactically, Wehrmacht win operationally).

Agreed.

1915 - 1940 - Wehrmacht win.

Again, why? The Germans broke the Russians in a massive campaign, slaughtered the French and British in brilliant defensive battles, and rescued their broken ally.
The Wehrmacht got lucky and the French and British walked into a trade and surrendered after a few weeks of fighting.

1916 - 1941/43 - Wehrmacht win.

Based on what? The Germans had to fight the British, French, and Russians virtually by themselves simultaneously and held all of them off. The Germans sucker-punched the Russians and still lost the war by 1943.

1944/5 - 1917/18 - Draw.

I'd give that to the Imperial army, who held together much better in their late war than the Wehrmacht did; in fact the Reichsheer could still have won up until May-June 1918.

Wehrmacht win on points...

In your analysis, which has no rubric to grade either side on.

Also the Wehrmacht had better technology, better mobility,

Irrelevant since so did their opponents. Put another way, your remark is equally valid if phrased "The Imperial Army never had to face ground support aircraft in the hundreds, massed heavy bombing, T34s, IS-IIs and a hopelessly interdicted supply situation.

I also think the mobility point hides more than it illuminates. Take out the 30-40 motorised or mechanised formations, and the majority of the Wehrmacht was no more mobile than the Imperial Army. Most German soldiers walked into battle during the second world war, with thousands of horses lugging their artillery and supplies.

Not irrelevant at all. When the Wehrmacht beat their enemy by striking his weakest reservists and exploiting the gap with their mobile troops, the Imperial army took on the best of the French head on, beating them, but had to chase them on foot while the French used their rail roads to outmaneuver the Germans.

As I said, whenever the 1940's vintage do anything notable, there is an excuse as to why it doesn;t count. Whenever the 1914 vintage do something poorly, there is an excuse as to why it doesn't count.

As I said, the Imperial Army won a series of bloody victories with out of date tactics before losing their nerve in front of Paris attempting to execute (poorly) a debateable battle plan.

The Wehrmacht swept forces as large as their own into a huge pocket, chasing the BEF off the continent for four years and doing in six weeks what the imperial Army signally failed to do in four years.

It can't simply be explained away.

The Wehrmacht did not sweep anyone into a pocket, the French, British, and Belgians walked in. The Germans just slammed the door shut. They used their technology to do so to end the campaign quickly, before the Allies could react.
In 1914 the Reichsheer did not that the ability to move more quickly or even as quickly as their foe. The French had access to rail lines and maneuvered large formations by those rail lines, while the Germans had to march 300+ miles to the final battle field and fight far beyond their supply lines and exhausted.
I'd agree that the strategic plan was questionable, but the Reichheer won all of their battles leading up to the Marne; ultimately they had to retreat because they were outmaneuvered once. It actually speaks more to the Reichsheer's abilities that they walked into a trap and fought their way out all while fighting on two fronts. When the Entente tried to break the Germans after their retreat, they got a bloody nose and nearly lost the race to the sea...but again the superior Entente mobility saved them, as they brought up their reserves by rail, while the Germans had to march over 100+ miles to get to the battlefield.

Point: the Wehrmacht had victory handed to them, the Reichsheer had to grab it. The Wehrmacht had equal mobility to their foe, the Reichsheer had far less. Still, the Reichsheer won just about every engagement they found in 1914, all except for two major ones, which were actually draws. Had they won the war would have been over. Had they trucks (which let's say the French and British had too for fairness sake) they would have been able to win operational victories and win the war.

Compared to their foes in 1914 the German army was superior and proved it in head on clashes. The Wehrmacht got lucky in 1939 because they could focus their entire army on the Polish, who were not fully mobilized in September to appease the Germans. Then again in 1940 the French walked into a trap and the Germans used technology not available to the Imperial army to quickly exploit their flank and not let them recover.

But a trap is by definition a device of your enemy's planning. You seem to be criticising the Wehrmacht Leadership for coming up with a plan that was brilliant and criticising the rank and file for executing it perfectly.

Let me put this another way.

What exactly (in your opinion) would the Wehrmacht have had to have done in 1940 against the Western allies to be judged superior?

Inflict a steady string of defeats in head on battles on the British and French. As it was the French and British walked in to a trap and lost before the first shot was fired; this was a good strategy, but it says more about the French and British decision making than German skill. Its hard to compare the Wehrmacht of 1940 to the Reichsheer of 1914 because the circumstances were so different. The Reichsheer had to fight frontal engagements and win, while the Wehrmacht got to launch blitzes against weak reserve formations that didn't want to fight. Had the Wehrmacht fought and beat the French army in major force-on-force engagements in a mobile campaign, then I'd say we have an apt comparison; as it was this mostly did not happen, as the first few that did take place were minor enough and ambiguous enough to not give us an answer. As it was the Wehrmacht's best were fighting though the Ardennes instead of on the Dyle river. Had they been there and defeated the French, the way the Reichsheer beat the French colonial corps in the Ardennes, then I'd say yeah, the Wehrmacht were just as good if not better.

As it is, the 1940 campaign was just too different to truly make that comparison. I guess the better comparison would be the Brusilov Campaign with the 1943 Ukraine campaign.

Had the Imperial army the means to exploit a gap the way the Werhmacht was able, August 1914 would have looked like May 1940.

No it wouldn't. The Allies would have been similiarly more mobile under this what if and might have driven the Germans back more forcefully, or retreated more quickly.

Perhaps, but at least the attacker would have had operational mobility and the potential to achieve what their 1940 counterparts did. Regardless the 1914 would have been completely different if the means of operational exploitation existed. It might have meant the war of 1914 instead of the Great War.

Also it was the Panzer and motorized divisions that decided things in May 1940, not the foot infantry, who were often checked or beaten by the French.

Checked yes, beaten no. But so what, some of the British Army's defensive battles in 1914 "checked" the imperial Army.

Checked? Delayed. The British retreated. In fact they retreated so fast and far that they outpaced the French army. The BEF threw away their ammunition to be able to run faster! They were so far south that at that Marne they were too tired to even beat a depleted cavalry corps and win the war in 1914 when they actually showed up to help the French. That goes to show the drubbing the British got in 1914.

Not so in 1914 when the Germans defeated the French army all the way across the line, throwing them into full retreat. Alas no trucks or Panzers meant the Germans couldn't outrun their enemy.

But the French didn't have superior mobility in 1914. The Wehrmacht was better led and more mobile. However, it was not comparably more mobile, since the French of 1940 were as equally more mobile than the French of 1914.

In fact the French were much more mobile in 1914 due to their rail lines. Troops moved from Lorraine to Paris took 3 days to redeploy. German troops from Lorraine took 3-4 weeks to show up at the Aisne river, nearly 100 miles north of Paris.
This shows the major advantage the French had in 1914, especially at the Marne.

the benefit of hindsight after the experiences of WW1,

This hindsight was also a benefit to the British and French, but neither learned it quite so well. Hindsight is useful only if you saw correctly. It was a mark of institutional excellence that the Germans fashioned doctrine so well in the inter war period.

Doctrine of the interwar was just a refinement of the WW1 doctrine developed during the conflict.

Tactical doctrine was. Operational doctrine was a refinement of what the Germans had been attempting for centuries.

Correct. Operational doctrine was the same in WW1 and WW2. All that was different was the tools to achieve that doctrine.

and luck (the French walked into the Sedan trap and the Russians were in the middle of reforming the army AND had just purged their officers in 1941), which gave them abilities the Kaiserliche Heer did not have. Also the Imperial troops beat the best of the French, Russian and British troops in frontal battles in 1914, the Wehrmacht shunned those battles in 1940 and 1941,

But you seem to praise the Imperial Army for losing (for that's what ultimately happened to them in 1914), but then criticise the Wehrmacht for winning. How does that work? Again, it was a mark of a well made battle plan that the French walked into it. Manstein correctly foresaw Allied intentions and took advantage. To me, the campaign in France in 1940 is right up there with Austerlitz and Cannae as examples of the military art. The right hook of 1914 is not so impressive from a planning point of view.

As alluded to above, the frontal battles were frequently pyrrhic. Weight of numbers carried the Imperial Army through, but they were then outmanouvred and forced back.

They only were stalemated because the French had greater mobility than the Imperial army, thanks to fighting on their own soil and having working rail lines. The Germans had to march everywhere, although they defeated the French and inflicted better than 3:1 losses on them until the Marne. From a tactical point of view the Imperial army of 1914 succeeded brilliantly. Operationally they didn't have the mobility to translate that into operational or strategic victory, a problem NO ONE solved until WW2 when technology finally allowed for tactical victories to be exploited.

Again, I fail to see why the imperial Army are lauded for tactical success, but the Wehrmacht denied such plaudits despite being equally successful.

Likewise, operationally, the imperial Army get a pass for failing, the Wehrmacht no credit for succeeding. It doesn't add up for me.

The Wehrmacht does not have the tactical successes early in the war against a comparable opponent to compare to the Reichsheer of 1914. Operationally the Wehrmacht was hugely successful because the French and British fell into a trap in 1940. However they could have extradited themselves from that trap if both sides were forced to rely on 1914 technology. To point is that the Wehrmacht didn't achieve that success as much as have it handed to them when the Allies walked into a pocket and left their flank hanging open with a single reserve division of under-trained and -motivated 40+ year olds. Had the Wehrmacht lost it would have been an upset. So its hard to credit the Wehrmacht with operational or tactical virtuosity when the French literally did everything the Germans wanted them to do. Hell, Guderian didn't even have to write up new orders when he was advancing on the Meuse because the French had literally done exactly what the Germans rehearsed them doing on training leading up to the 1940 campaign! All he did was change the dates and times on his training orders!

Meanwhile the Reichsheer was confronted with an unplanned situation, walked into a trap and fought their way out of it. All while killing and wounding far more French and British than the Germans lost. Yes, strategically and operationally the Reichsheer deserves criticism for its plans and conduct, but at the same time the Wehrmacht doesn't deserve the same praise for taking advantage of their enemy walking into an ambush and winning. Its much more that the French lost than the Wehrmacht won.

The situations were very different and aren't easily compared, but just because one side won and another lost (really fought to a draw) doesn't mean the winner was better than the loser. The circumstances need to be taken into account. If nuance isn't something you can easily deal with, discussing history is probably not a subject you should engage in.

or running away from the Poles in bayonet charges.

I'd need a reference for this one. I'd also suggest that one example from a veteran's memoirs does not an argument make.

Hell Fritsch even admitted that in 1939 the Wehrmacht was less well trained than the Impetial army! Compare the 1914 army to the 1939 Wehrmacht. After that the Wehrmacht got a break to retrain and resupply before picking the time and place of their next fight. After France they did the same. Meanwhile the Imperial army was engaged from 1914-1918 with no breaks. They stood up to the very end,

As did the Wehrmacht that fought for longer against a more numerous foe.

With breaks between campaigns to rest, refit, retrain, and analyze their conduct in peace. Ultimately the Wehrmacht had more allies than the Reichsheer and Germany fought the same enemies in both conflicts, though Imperial Germany had to fight Italy and Romania too, while also helping the Turks. I question whether Nazi Germany fought more numerous foes relative to her strength. If anything Imperial Germany had to fight more foes herself, because Japan and Italy drew off large forces that Germany had to fight in WW1. Relative to her strength Imperial Germany probably had it harder in that regard.

The imperial Army was better in 1917 than it was in 1914, and the Wehrmacht was better in 1941 than it was in 1939. Such is life. Armies evolve and improve, green unseasoned troopos become combat veterans etc. As I said earlier, it was a mark of institutional excellence that the wehrmacht so thoroughly improved itself in the autumn, winter and spring of 1939/40. The imperial Army required deadlock before it so reformed.

As I said earlier. The imperial Army of 1914 was tactically outdated. It learned and improved. The Wehrmacht of 1939 was tactically sound, but read the lessons correctly, deciding Officers had not displayed enough forward Leadership and troops had not displayed sufficient aggression. It learned and improved.

Many of it's better features (infiltration tactics; Junior Officer initiative etc) took time to perfect, but then such was the same with the Imperial Army. It also held off its enemies longer, with more disadvantages than the Imperial Army managed.

Regards,
ID

The Wehrmacht was not ready for war in 1939 and it showed in the Polish campaign, which is why there was a massive effort at training to ready the army for the French campaign. The Wehrmacht improved, but it was still deficient in technical competencies like indirect machine gun firing and night combat. It improved, but overall the system was weaker IMHO than the Imperial army overall, despite the Wehrmacht being an improvement over the Imperial army in some areas.

I think the system was much stronger. The Wehrmacht won in 1939, but came out stronger the next time just a few months later (many victorious Armies don't change at all). In 1914 the Imperial Army lost, but took another couple of years to change it's tactical schemes in both defence and attack to suit the new realities.

Good debate.

regards,
ID

Not true at all, the Reichsheer began updating it doctrine in September 1914. As technology improved and weight of fire increased, doctrine needed to adjust to changing battlefield conditions. Some of the more dramatic changes occurred in 1916 due to a change in leadership, which the Wehrmacht never experienced to the same degree, but much of this is overblown in history, because Ludendorff and his cronies turned the historical section of the Reichsheer into their personal grudge machine and slandered the efforts of Falkenhayn. In fact Ludendorf just gave complete freedom to Falkenhayn's old tactical specialists to continue their work. Von Lossberg made changes to Reichsheer defensive doctrine after the battle of the Somme, which he would have anyway even with Falkenhayn still in command, but Ludendorff took credit for the doctrinal shift and made it seem like he was the one that made a major shift in doctrine, though the shift was really incremental.

Infiltration tactics started in mid-1915 with Rohr's demonstration unit being set up and the early version of the tactics was used in the 1915 Vosges campaign.

[Terry Duncan]

The two armies are not easy to compare, as the army of 1939 had as its officer corps many veterans of the Kaisers army, especially the higher ranks. The army of 1914 did not have the benefit of motorized units or direct air support, both of which were critical in 1939-40, and if the army of 1914 had such units the war would have been very different.

The quality of the other armies also has to be taken into account, especially the French army. In 1914 is was possibly as good as the German army in all aspects except heavy artillery - Moltke's verdict - and it certainly proved willing and able to fight and take huge losses. The French army of 1939-40 was a pale shadow of its former self, although it did possess some very high quality units it also had some of very poor quality, and its morale was far worse. The Russian army in 1914 went to war with shortages of ammunition and far too many illiterate officers. In 1941 the Russian army went to war with almost its entire officer corps having just been put into their roles after the purge of officers, but with a far stronger and more ruthless government system than the ailing Tsarist regime.

There is also the matter of the two armies composition when war began. In 1914 the German army was a long standing force that had a regular intake of personel that enabled it to build up a huge reserve that would be able to be recalled at short notice in wartime. In effect this meant the army would have access to over 2 million men that all had at least three years service as soon as war broke out, and crucially it had experienced NCO's in large numbers from the peacetime army. In 1939 the army had expanded very quickly from the 100,000 allowed under the Versailles Treaty, and had managed this very well. It did not have such a vast body of experience to fall back on as the Kaisers army. A key point has already been raised - could the German army of 1939 have taken the losses the army of 1914 did and still been able to fight as effectively after one year? To my mind the answer is no.

With regards to outdated doctrines and equipment, both forces were far from ideal with hindsight.

Like I said, compare 1939 to 1914, 1940 to 1915, 1941-3 with 1916, and 1944-5 with 1917-18

1914-1939 = The Kaisers army.

1915-1940 = The Kaisers army, though possibly closer.

1916-1941/43 = This is where Hitlers army could have been slightly better. Impressive gains of land, but a long way from victory none the less.

1917/18-1944/45 = The Kaisers army. It held together under great strain, and despite great losses managed to keep the war off German soil.

Both armies fought very hard over their respective wars, and both were very hard to defeat. The army of 1914 probably came closer to winning the war than the army of 1939 did, for all its impressive gains of land. Although the army of 1914 has some charges of atrocities against it, the army of 1939 has far more - and if the SS are included the record becomes fairly appalling - though in both cases these acts were not carried out by all.