Barbarossa - what is more flawed?

[pugsville]

French industry prewar imported a lot of it's raw materials from overseas. It was in the main short of stuff the Germans were short of. To supply French industry with raw materials would mean German industry would go short. Also the French transport system was pretty much operating at very low % of capacity (10% of the prewar fuel, much of the rolling stock for the railways was taken by Germany as they were also critically short of rolling stock).

[BDV]

While Wallies did use national flag as fig leaf in course of their flipping operations, neither Soviets and nor later Germans did such things as such. Therefore while a political national fig leaf is preferable, for reasons of expediency it is nor immediately nor universally required. Although things cannot be allowed to fester, obviously, and some sort of Quisling government needs to be set up, especially in the Baltics and Western Ukraine, that would be a question for 1943-1944, not 1941-1942.

UPA and the Forrest Brothers show that folks fought against bolshevik thugs even in more dire conditions than elbow to elbow with the strongest (at the time) military machine. So it is a question of planning and preparation, returning to the original question.

[Zart Arn]

Although things cannot be allowed to fester, obviously, and some sort of Quisling government needs to be set up, especially in the Baltics and Western Ukraine, that would be a question for 1943-1944, not 1941-1942.

From my point or view, there was hardly anyone in the course of WW2 who could have discredited the very idea of a puppet state more, than Quisling. In Norway he managed to rally some 15.000 to the German cause... out of more than 3-million-strong population.

My line of argument boils down to the conclusion, that colonial management is an art in itself. An art by no means inferior in its sophistication, than an art of war. Historically, being exceptionally strong in the later, the Germans showed weakness in the former. During WW2 German planners perfectly realized that and never tried to enter the realm, where the advantage was not on their side.

[BDV]

My line of argument boils down to the conclusion, that colonial management is an art in itself. An art by no means inferior in its sophistication, than an art of war. Historically, being exceptionally strong in the later, the Germans showed weakness in the former. During WW2 German planners perfectly realized that and never tried to enter the realm, where the advantage was not on their side.

A lazy, unwise and in final analysis indefensible choice (guilty as I may be, in retrospect, of 20/20ism).

[Konig_pilsner]

In this thread me and BDV have argued over the issue of conscripting Russian POW's. I asked him to back up his claim, which in his defence he did attempt, however in the end his arguement was pretty weak.

However since I am more concerned with the truth than being right, I wanted to share this for those that might be interested.

October 4th, 1943 Heinrich Himmler made a speech at Posen. While this speech is best known for its clear reference to the Holocaust, the fate of European Jewry wasn't all that was discussed.

Heinrich Himmler on Barbarossa

In 1941, the Führer attacked Russia. That was, as we may well say today, shortly, perhaps a quarter or half year before Stalin's enveloping movement prior to his great thrust into Central and Western Europe. I can sketch out this first year with very brief strokes. The attack was effective. The Russian army was driven together into great pockets, destroyed, taken prisoner. We did not then value the mass man as we do now, as raw material, as manpower. Which is not a shame in the end, if one thinks in terms of generations, but it is regrettable today due to the loss of manpower: the prisoners died by the tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands from exhaustion, from hunger.

(my emphasis in bold)

It would seem that BDV and Himmler share the same brain on this issue.

For those interested in the entire speech, here is where I found it.
http://www.cwporter.com/posen.htm
Unfortunatley this is a wack-job site so if anyone has a better link to the full speech I would appreciate it. I tend to doubt for the purpose of this topic anything was alltered, but I wouldn't be surpised at the same time.

Cheers,

KP

[David1819]

Which was worse, the Barbarossa concept (yanking bear's tail), or the execution (the dispersion of focus, the risible lack of cooperation with/arming of Reich's auxilliaries).

It was not a concept of yanking the bear's tail considering the Soviets military's poor performance against the Finish military the Soviet military was considered a Joke and Stalin knew it.

It was the execution that was flawed

This illustration shows how the Wehrmacht planned (Plan Otto) and anticipated the operation to unfold as such.
AGS and AGC with part of AGN would meet at Moscow and deliver the knock out blow



However Hitler as expected thought he knew better and this is how he planned it and mostly how it actually unfolded. as shown below



It was execution that was flawed. Such as Hitler sending AGS to find Oil and not focusing on the prime target that is Moscow

[ljadw]

This is not correct : plan and execution were good .
But,you are falling in the usual trap of ignoring the enemy : there were millions of opponents,you know .

The conditio sine qua non for victory was that the Soviets would collaps very quickly .and this was independent from what the Germans could do .

The SU was a colossos,whom it was impossible for Germany to defeat, unless ....unless he was a giant with feet on clay .

If he was a giant with feet of clay, a little push would be enough and he would fall and not get up . If he had feet of steel,he would not fall,or,if he did, he would get up .

[hms2011]

The conditio sine qua non for victory was that the Soviets would collaps very quickly .and this was independent from what the Germans could do .

Nothing is independent. Soviet reactions dependend on German actions. And vice versa.

The Germans certainly could have increased their chances of getting into a winnable position by the end of the year by making better decisions prior to and during the campaign.

[ljadw]

No :the Germans knew that a "short" time after 22 june 1941,millions of Soviets would arrive at the front,and than,the dies were cast . The only possibility for the Germans was if the regime collapsed before the mobilisation could bear fruit = before these millions would arrive at the front .Germany OTOH had only punch for a few weeks,afterwards,it could continue the war,but without hope of winning .The longer the war,the weaker Germany and the stronger the SU .

[LWD]

No :the Germans knew that a "short" time after 22 june 1941,millions of Soviets would arrive at the front,and than,the dies were cast .

Sources please.

The only possibility for the Germans was if the regime collapsed before the mobilisation could bear fruit = before these millions would arrive at the front .Germany OTOH had only punch for a few weeks,afterwards,it could continue the war,but without hope of winning .The longer the war,the weaker Germany and the stronger the SU .

You keep stating things like this but have never proved or even supported them very well. Certainly Germany hoped for a short war but this doesn't mean that it was the only way for them to win.

[hms2011]

Dealing with certainties in something as complex and uncertain as war seems counterproductive.

Regardless, a big failing in Barbarossa was the fact that a major portion of Southwestern and Southern Front survived the initial blow.
If that doesnt happen, the Soviets might be in trouble.

Now, Germany could probably have improved their chances of delivering a more crushing blow against these forces in the first few weeks.
In some scenarios, that might be enough to force the Soviets into a very uncomfortable position come mid-July.

[ljadw]

Now, Germany could probably have improved their chances of delivering a more crushing blow against these forces in the first few weeks.
.

Maybe they could, but the conditio sine qua non (or the result) would be : a weaker AGC.As the forces for Barbarossa could not be increased,a stronger AGS means : a weaker AGC .

And the final result would be the same .

Besides : the Soviet forces facing AGS were stronger than those facing AGC.

[ljadw]

No :the Germans knew that a "short" time after 22 june 1941,millions of Soviets would arrive at the front,and than,the dies were cast .

Sources please.

The only possibility for the Germans was if the regime collapsed before the mobilisation could bear fruit = before these millions would arrive at the front .Germany OTOH had only punch for a few weeks,afterwards,it could continue the war,but without hope of winning .The longer the war,the weaker Germany and the stronger the SU .

You keep stating things like this but have never proved or even supported them very well. Certainly Germany hoped for a short war but this doesn't mean that it was the only way for them to win.

A little child would know it, we know it,the Germans knew it : On 22 june,Germany (which had mobilised 9 % of its population) attacked the SU,which had mobilised 3 % of its population :this means that the SU still could mobilise 6 additional % of its population = some 12 million .
In the OTL, the SU sent monthly 1 million men to the front in 1941 (which means it was mobilising more than 1 million every month),while Germany had for 1941 500000 replacements available for the Ostheer : compare 6 million with 500000,and you will understand why the first weeks were essential .If the Red Army was not eliminated on the border in the summer,why could it be eliminated in the autumn 1000 km east of the border ?

[hms2011]

Maybe they could, but the conditio sine qua non (or the result) would be : a weaker AGC.As the forces for Barbarossa could not be increased,a stronger AGS means : a weaker AGC .

Why do you believe the forces for Barbarossa could not be increased?
Germany had significant air, infantry and panzer units not allocated to Barbarossa.
Furthermore, they could have made different production priorities benefitting the army in the year before the attack.

Such decisions would come at the expense of the war against Britain, and might also face Soviet countermeasures.

But there is a chance that they would be able to destroy a major portion of SW and S Front in the first few weeks given these different preconditions.

[LWD]

... A little child would know it, we know it,the Germans knew it : On 22 june,Germany (which had mobilised 9 % of its population) attacked the SU,which had mobilised 3 % of its population :this means that the SU still could mobilise 6 additional % of its population = some 12 million .

Not really we don't know it, nor is it clear the Germans "knew it". The Russian Empire was defeated in WW1 after several years of war why could the Soviets not be similarly defeated? We all know you believe it but you have yet to make a convincing fact and logic based argument for it.