Barbarossa - what is more flawed?

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
Post Reply
User avatar
BDV
Member
Posts: 3704
Joined: 10 Apr 2009, 17:11

ArmeeGroup-Honcho and Panzer-Honcho Behavior

#316

Post by BDV » 29 Sep 2014, 17:12

Stugbit,

Your explanations clarify (to me) "the method to madness" for army group commanders and panzer army/corps comanders.

A quick, "lightning" victory was predicated on the quick crippling the Soviet State. And that would NOT be achieved by capturing 50,000 more unnutze esser (who'd have to be exterminated later, anyway - HimmelHerrGott, vat eine bother). Rather, if Moscau + Leningrad would fall within 6-10 weeks then the Soviet army would simply disintegrate in the field. OTOH, repeated breakout-encircle-destroy operations, of which a chain of 5-6 successful ones would be needed to get Moscau would not be possible within the 3 months of good weather. So there's one of the inherent contradictions of the Barbarossa Plan, destroying the Soviet Army in the field would take time and resources not allocated historically, and time, which Schickgruber's Reich, in its leaders' estimation, did not have.

So the relentless drive forward of the panzer spearheads was the only way to a quick victory (which the generals had promised Adolf). OTOH Soviet field armies did not roll over even when domed, the forward thrust of panzers failed, as Germans were forced to deal with flank threats, which they would have been well advised to do and plan for from the outset. As romans had it "Festina Lente".
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

steinmetz
Banned
Posts: 183
Joined: 18 Sep 2014, 06:16

Re: ArmeeGroup-Honcho and Panzer-Honcho Behavior

#317

Post by steinmetz » 29 Sep 2014, 18:48

BDV wrote:Stugbit,

Your explanations clarify (to me) "the method to madness" for army group commanders and panzer army/corps comanders.

A quick, "lightning" victory was predicated on the quick crippling the Soviet State. And that would NOT be achieved by capturing 50,000 more unnutze esser (who'd have to be exterminated later, anyway - HimmelHerrGott, vat eine bother). Rather, if Moscau + Leningrad would fall within 6-10 weeks then the Soviet army would simply disintegrate in the field. OTOH, repeated breakout-encircle-destroy operations, of which a chain of 5-6 successful ones would be needed to get Moscau would not be possible within the 3 months of good weather. So there's one of the inherent contradictions of the Barbarossa Plan, destroying the Soviet Army in the field would take time and resources not allocated historically, and time, which Schickgruber's Reich, in its leaders' estimation, did not have.

So the relentless drive forward of the panzer spearheads was the only way to a quick victory (which the generals had promised Adolf). OTOH Soviet field armies did not roll over even when domed, the forward thrust of panzers failed, as Germans were forced to deal with flank threats, which they would have been well advised to do and plan for from the outset. As romans had it "Festina Lente".
It seems impossible for you to talk in a normal rational fashion.


User avatar
Stugbit
Member
Posts: 246
Joined: 01 Sep 2013, 19:26
Location: Goiânia

Re: ArmeeGroup-Honcho and Panzer-Honcho Behavior

#318

Post by Stugbit » 29 Sep 2014, 20:27

BDV wrote:Stugbit,

Your explanations clarify (to me) "the method to madness" for army group commanders and panzer army/corps comanders.

A quick, "lightning" victory was predicated on the quick crippling the Soviet State. And that would NOT be achieved by capturing 50,000 more unnutze esser (who'd have to be exterminated later, anyway - HimmelHerrGott, vat eine bother). Rather, if Moscau + Leningrad would fall within 6-10 weeks then the Soviet army would simply disintegrate in the field. OTOH, repeated breakout-encircle-destroy operations, of which a chain of 5-6 successful ones would be needed to get Moscau would not be possible within the 3 months of good weather. So there's one of the inherent contradictions of the Barbarossa Plan, destroying the Soviet Army in the field would take time and resources not allocated historically, and time, which Schickgruber's Reich, in its leaders' estimation, did not have.

So the relentless drive forward of the panzer spearheads was the only way to a quick victory (which the generals had promised Adolf). OTOH Soviet field armies did not roll over even when domed, the forward thrust of panzers failed, as Germans were forced to deal with flank threats, which they would have been well advised to do and plan for from the outset. As romans had it "Festina Lente".
Dear BDV, the foward thrust of panzer spearheads you mean was the advance over Moscou and the East strategic points?

Because, before the war started, the plan had in consideration specific strategic points, as it was much proven here. Once started, the biggest contradiction would be leaving this plan, opting for any other kind of approach. Mainly because the Germans underestimated the Russians in number. So, as much as they penetrated Russia, the more it was proving that it have been a underestimation, and the commanders at the panzer divisions were the first to notice it.

We should have in mind that one of the reasons Hitler ordered for turning to Kiev was because of the presence of some Russian forces threatening their supplies lines. The first sense we have when we look through the victory over Kiev is that it was a sign of "happyness" for the Germans, but considering the hole thing, I think it was much more a sign of worry. They might be quite worried by then.

Well, I said the Germans had three underestimations. The first two were just revealed by the development of Barbarossa. At the time of their advance, the only one left was the third, about their military infrastructure. So, as much as they saw the complication they got into, the more they had to rely over their only illusion which have lasted.

And what do you think about the offensive over the Caucasus? Ijaw have doubts about it.

User avatar
Stugbit
Member
Posts: 246
Joined: 01 Sep 2013, 19:26
Location: Goiânia

Re: ArmeeGroup-Honcho and Panzer-Honcho Behavior

#319

Post by Stugbit » 29 Sep 2014, 20:40

Stugbit wrote:
BDV wrote:Stugbit,

Your explanations clarify (to me) "the method to madness" for army group commanders and panzer army/corps comanders.

A quick, "lightning" victory was predicated on the quick crippling the Soviet State. And that would NOT be achieved by capturing 50,000 more unnutze esser (who'd have to be exterminated later, anyway - HimmelHerrGott, vat eine bother). Rather, if Moscau + Leningrad would fall within 6-10 weeks then the Soviet army would simply disintegrate in the field. OTOH, repeated breakout-encircle-destroy operations, of which a chain of 5-6 successful ones would be needed to get Moscau would not be possible within the 3 months of good weather. So there's one of the inherent contradictions of the Barbarossa Plan, destroying the Soviet Army in the field would take time and resources not allocated historically, and time, which Schickgruber's Reich, in its leaders' estimation, did not have.

So the relentless drive forward of the panzer spearheads was the only way to a quick victory (which the generals had promised Adolf). OTOH Soviet field armies did not roll over even when domed, the forward thrust of panzers failed, as Germans were forced to deal with flank threats, which they would have been well advised to do and plan for from the outset. As romans had it "Festina Lente".
Dear BDV, the foward thrust of panzer spearheads you mean was the advance over Moscou and the East strategic points?

Because, before the war started, the plan had in consideration specific strategic points, as it was much proven here. Once started, the biggest contradiction would be leaving this plan, opting for any other kind of approach. Mainly because the Germans underestimated the Russians in number. So, as much as they penetrated Russia, the more it was proving that it have been a underestimation, and the commanders at the panzer divisions were the first to notice it.

We should have in mind that one of the reasons Hitler ordered for turning to Kiev was because of the presence of some Russian forces threatening their supplies lines. The first sense we have when we look through the victory over Kiev is that it was a sign of "happyness" for the Germans, but considering the hole thing, I think it was much more a sign of worry. They might be quite worried by then.

Well, I said the Germans had three underestimations. The first two were just revealed by the development of Barbarossa. At the time of their advance, the only one left was the third, about their military infrastructure. So, as much as they saw the complication they got into, the more they had to rely over their only illusion which have lasted.

And what do you think about the offensive over the Caucasus? Ijaw have doubts about it.

ljadw
Member
Posts: 15585
Joined: 13 Jul 2009, 18:50

Re: ArmeeGroup-Honcho and Panzer-Honcho Behavior

#320

Post by ljadw » 29 Sep 2014, 20:43

Stugbit wrote:
Because, before the war started, the plan had in consideration specific strategic points, as it was much proven here. On
No : there were no strategic points :simplified,the plan was to defeat the Soviet forces in the area west of the line Duna-Dnepr,this would result in the collaps of the Soviet state,and than,mobile divisions would go as far as possible to the Wolga (the A-A line),if there was still resistance, they later would advance to the Urals .

User avatar
Stugbit
Member
Posts: 246
Joined: 01 Sep 2013, 19:26
Location: Goiânia

Re: ArmeeGroup-Honcho and Panzer-Honcho Behavior

#321

Post by Stugbit » 29 Sep 2014, 21:09

ljadw wrote:
Stugbit wrote:
Because, before the war started, the plan had in consideration specific strategic points, as it was much proven here. On
No : there were no strategic points :simplified,the plan was to defeat the Soviet forces in the area west of the line Duna-Dnepr,this would result in the collaps of the Soviet state,and than,mobile divisions would go as far as possible to the Wolga (the A-A line),if there was still resistance, they later would advance to the Urals .
The plan wouldn't consider Murmansk if the Germans thought that they could destroy the Soviets that easy. They knew about the fact that the soviets had reserves, they just didn't know how many exactly and how they could be applied.

ljadw
Member
Posts: 15585
Joined: 13 Jul 2009, 18:50

Re: ArmeeGroup-Honcho and Panzer-Honcho Behavior

#322

Post by ljadw » 29 Sep 2014, 21:30

Stugbit wrote:
The plan wouldn't consider Murmansk if the Germans thought that they could destroy the Soviets that easy[/quote]

The plan did not consider Murmansk


Halder in june 1941: We must destroy the Red Army without pause over the Dnepr-Duna line .


Hitler : The most important objective is not allowing the Red Army an orderly withdrawal (5/12/1940)

Hitler did not say : the most important objective is Murmansk.


During the third phase of the wargame,it became evident that the German ground forces would hardly be sufficient strong to fan out across the tunnel-shaped Russian theater if the Red Army was capable to offer continuous resistance .(The German campaign in Russia :planning and operations PP19/20)

On 13/14 december 1940 there was a conference of the chiefs of staff of the AG's and ARmies .The conclusion was that the SU would be defeated in a campaign not exceeding 8/10 weeks duration .(Same source)

User avatar
LWD
Member
Posts: 8618
Joined: 21 Sep 2005, 22:46
Location: Michigan

Re: ArmeeGroup-Honcho and Panzer-Honcho Behavior

#323

Post by LWD » 29 Sep 2014, 23:17

A few brief comments.
ljadw wrote:
Stugbit wrote: There's no way to do anything without oil nowadays and the same was back in World War Two.
In WWII,all economies were essentially depending on coal,not on oil .
Not really. The US in particular was rather dependent on oil. However even if the economies were dependent on coal, planes, ships, and vehicles tended to be rather dependent on oil.
steinmetz wrote:
Stugbit wrote:And I didn't said deception was invented by the Soviets, I said it was better used by them!
No army is better at deception than any other army. They can all do it when necessary. The importance of its use by the red army is overrated.
They can all do it but some can clearly do it better than others and some do it more often than others. It's also done at different levels and the capabilities of various armies are not uniform across those levels. I've yet to see a good argument for the Soviet use of it being overrated.
ljadw wrote: No : there were no strategic points :simplified,the plan was to defeat the Soviet forces in the area west of the line Duna-Dnepr,this would result in the collaps of the Soviet state,and than,mobile divisions would go as far as possible to the Wolga (the A-A line),if there was still resistance, they later would advance to the Urals .
What you call the plan is actually the goal. It is nowhere close to what a military plan would look like and the latter would indeed consider various strategic points.

steinmetz
Banned
Posts: 183
Joined: 18 Sep 2014, 06:16

Re: Barbarossa - what is more flawed?

#324

Post by steinmetz » 30 Sep 2014, 13:47

The use of deception by the red army is overrated because it was not better at it than any other army in military history , the success of it was less than sometimes pretended and it also became a luxury at some point in the war when the red army could do without it.

ljadw
Member
Posts: 15585
Joined: 13 Jul 2009, 18:50

Re: ArmeeGroup-Honcho and Panzer-Honcho Behavior

#325

Post by ljadw » 30 Sep 2014, 14:32

LWD wrote: In WWII,all economies were essentially depending on coal,not on oil .
Not really. The US in particular was rather dependent on oil. However even if the economies were dependent on coal, planes, ships, and vehicles tended to be rather dependent on oil.
[/quote]


Us energy mix in 1940 (in %)

Wood 4

Coal 64

Hydro 4

Oil 16 (for the USSR : 18)

Gas 12


Both the US and the SU used relatively a lot of oil, but this lot of oil was minor compared to coal .

A diminution (in 1940) of the available amount of oil would hurt the US, but a diminution of the available amount of coal would hurt severely (and this is an euphemism)


US in 2011

Renewable 9

Nuclear 8

Coal 20

Gas 26

Oil 36

User avatar
Appleknocker27
Member
Posts: 648
Joined: 05 Jun 2007, 18:11
Location: US/Europe

Re: Barbarossa - what is more flawed?

#326

Post by Appleknocker27 » 30 Sep 2014, 15:12

ljadw wrote:
Appleknocker27 wrote:
So lets say FHO was more accurate: The OKH determines we will require 1000 replacements tanks, 2000 crews and replacement engines, transmissions, etc. for 30% of the existing force. We also need to expand plan Otto to accommodate the extra tonnage of capacity required. We will also require added construction assets to expand the rollbahn of each Army Group. Not a huge leap in personnel, equipment or time, but would have had a huge impact at critical operational junctures in July/August.

Let's not say this,because the OKH did not determine anything : there was no need for more replacements : the war would be won in the summer ,on the border .Losses and replacements were irrelevant :

Attrition was highly relevant and the projected losses were based upon enemy strength estimates, why is that not getting through to you? Supply stockpiles and personnel replacements were based upon the projected rate of loss. If FHO had accurately estimated Soviet strength and force generation then the Wehrmacht peronnel and logistical support/replacement plans would have been adjusted (not to perfection, but to the best that was practical).
if the war was won in august,there was no need for replacement ,not BEFORE august,and not after august .
Which is WHY I STATED A HYPOTHETICAL.....
In june and july,87 tanks were sent, in august 9.No more were sent because transport problems and because it was not needed .Would the US send replacements to Europe after 1 may 1945 ? Of course not . Well,it was the same situation .
Let's take the ammunition (the main part) :
Which only serves to drive my point home about the original intel estimates having a tangible effect on industrial decisions.... :roll:

consumption

june :11.864 ton

july :101.594

august :108.855

Do you see any indication of shortages . I don't
Yes, I see shortages in more detailed sources....not what you posted which doesn't demonstrate much.
And about the slack : Germany was producing more in 1941 than in 1940
On a single 8 hour shift.... Compare 1941 with the period after Stalingrad, clearly there was quite a bit of slack.

User avatar
Appleknocker27
Member
Posts: 648
Joined: 05 Jun 2007, 18:11
Location: US/Europe

Re: Barbarossa - what is more flawed?

#327

Post by Appleknocker27 » 30 Sep 2014, 15:38

steinmetz wrote:
Appleknocker27 wrote: So lets say FHO was more accurate: The OKH determines we will require 1000 replacements tanks, 2000 crews and replacement engines, transmissions, etc. for 30% of the existing force. We also need to expand plan Otto to accommodate the extra tonnage of capacity required. We will also require added construction assets to expand the rollbahn of each Army Group. Not a huge leap in personnel, equipment or time, but would have had a huge impact at critical operational junctures in July/August.
You are making a lot of assumptions here about the speed with which these things could be done.Once you get the conviction that the campaign is going to be much more complicated and lenghty, it is doubtful whether it will still be able to be started in 1941. "
True to large extent, but my point remains that even under the then current logistical systems that were in place, OKH would have prepared a better support plan if accurate information would have been presented initially. The Infantry divisions made up 80+ percent of the Wehrmacht's fighting edge during Barbarossa and were starved of replacements after July. The pool of replacements was based on the attrition rate determined from the enemy strength and force generation estimates from the original brief from FHO.

My hypothetical example was just a quick and very incomplete piece of the overall picture, changes to Barbarossa would have been comprehensive or as you stated possibly a cancellation (and change in policy toward the USSR?).

ljadw
Member
Posts: 15585
Joined: 13 Jul 2009, 18:50

Re: Barbarossa - what is more flawed?

#328

Post by ljadw » 30 Sep 2014, 16:46

Appleknocker27 wrote:

the projected losses were based upon enemy strength estimates,

Supply stockpiles and personnel replacements were based upon the projected rate of loss.

If FHO had accurately estimated Soviet strength and force generation then the Wehrmacht peronnel and logistical support/replacement plans would have been adjusted



Which only serves to drive my point home about the original intel estimates having a tangible effect on industrial decisions.... :roll:

1)Proof ?Were there any projected losses?

2)Idem

3)Do you think that Todt was as Mozes : that if FHO was bringing new estimates,Todt would strile the soil with a stick and that thousands of vehicles,aircraft,artillery and tanks would appear ?

4)Your point is a claim,which has not been proved and is unlikely to be proved :the German war production was limited by a number of structutal problems and it is not so that from today to tomorrow,this prod duction could be increased or could take an other direction .

Ex : it took a year to buil and make operational a U Boat.It took more than a year to build a new factory and make it productive .

Saying that there was slack in the German economy in 1940/41 is not only wrong but also of topic .The German economy produced what was possible,and if there was a shift of 8 hours only,the reason is that more shifts were not possible .

ljadw
Member
Posts: 15585
Joined: 13 Jul 2009, 18:50

Re: Barbarossa - what is more flawed?

#329

Post by ljadw » 30 Sep 2014, 16:51

Appleknocker27 wrote: The pool of replacements was based on the attrition rate determined from the enemy strength and force generation estimates from the original brief from FHO.

.
No,no,no :

1)The pool of replacements was based a) on the number of men the Ersatzheer could train b)on the number of men who would be available

2)There would be no attrition following the Germans: attrition would mean that the war was lost

3)Attrition rate can not be determined from the enemy strength

4)No one had any idea of the Soviet force generation,because there could only be a force generation if the SU could survive the German onslaught,simply ; if the regime would survive the summer,if yes,there would be an enormous force generation,independent of what Germany could do . If no:Germany had won .

One of the reasons that Barbarossa had been conceived as a short campaign,was that Fromm had said that the Ostheer could expect for 1941 no more than 500000 replacements .

5)The pool of replacements was also irrelevant for the outcome of the war :if the SU collapsed in the summer,the replacements would not be necessary ,if the SU did not collaps,the replacements could not save the situation .

It was the same in may/june 1940: 516 panzer were lost;and only 217 replacements arrived,simply: because no more were available, not because that the Germans had projected 217 or 516 losses .

steinmetz
Banned
Posts: 183
Joined: 18 Sep 2014, 06:16

Re: Barbarossa - what is more flawed?

#330

Post by steinmetz » 30 Sep 2014, 17:30

The fact that the German army never succeeded in replacing its losses during the course of the war is proof enough that there was no magical way of having a much higher capacity to replce its losses than it actually had in 1941. And one cannot at the same time say that Germany needed more units and also a higher capacity to replace losses because the more you use your manpower to set up new units, the less men are available to replace losses. And attition rate is not purely determined by the size of the enemy army. That is too simplistic.
If there really would have been the conviction that a long war of attrition was unavoidable then the obvious conclusion would be not to even start the whole adventure. A long term war of attrition would always work to the disadvantage of Germany. A victory in one campaign or at most two was necessary in which deep armored thrusts would be used to destroy the enemy army.

Post Reply

Return to “German Strategy & General German Military Discussion”