Barbarossa - what is more flawed?

[Appleknocker27]

Until now you have not succeeded in coming up with any data concerning what according to you would be required as socalled minimum and what was actually present. Should not be too difficult as you are so sure of yourself. And implying that the OKH did not really know what was needed in spite of the experience of july is not really credible.

Do you have van Creveld's "Supplying war"? Just read the chapter "Russian Roulette" if you want specific numbers for AGC, they are there for you. von Bock clearly stated in August that AGC required 30 trains daily in order to meet current consumption and stockpile for an offensive, Gercke promised 24 and never delivered more than 18 on any given day. The fighting in and around Smolensk had consumed all ammunition as it was recieved, supply of which was prioritized over fuel and subsistence to the point that that AGC lived off the land and was without any fuel reserves (aka supply crisis).

Do you expect me to present you with specifc numbers of consumption and supply needs of equipment by type, by division, by army, what railhead and truck supply capacity was? .

Toppe gave all the numbers in manuscript P 190 :
"10 August : The heavy truck transport - since 4 august no longer employed for hauling supplies from Sub-districts 1 and 2 -was capable of covering a total distance of about 250 miles, which was roughly the milieage between the railheads and Moscow.
During the months of August and September the Dnjepr supply district was further expanded so that it developed into an efficient base section.The depots were distributed over an area of approximately 250 miles.The supplies stored in this area were needed to feed the autumn offensive. By the beginning of august the Dnjepr Supply District depots contained , POL for 45 miles, and four days rations.
The two Panzer Groups had the following at their disposal:
1) Second Panzer Group - 50 percent the basic load of ammunition , POL for about 155 miles and four days rations;
2) Third Panzer Group - 133 percent of the basic load of ammunition , POL for about 110 miles , and fourteen days rations.
By mid august the over-all supply of ammunition for the entire Army Group was increased to 133 percent of the basic load.
September : The Gomel and Roslavl depots , which were closest to the front , were given priority for supplies arriving within the Army Group area. At the same time every effort was made to expand the Smolensk supply district.
10 September : On 10 september , the armies , including the Panzer Groups , had at their disposal , on the average, more than 75 percent of the basic load of ammunition and four consumption units of POL , good for a distance of approximately 185 miles.
The Army Group Center average, including GHQ units and reserves , was 133 percent of the basic load of ammunition and one consumption unit of POL, ennough to cover of approximately 45 miles."

PGR2 had it's own railhead at Gomel for the Kiev operation, as I told you many pages back. Curious, did you gloss over pg 66 of the Toppe report? Or perhaps pg 25 also? Pg 25 states the attack to take Gomel: "Because of the shortage of ammunition the start of the main offensive had to be delayed 5 to 12 August".

Now lets look at that for a moment, why the postponement for ammunition? Should we suppose they had absolutely no ammunition at all? Or is it more likely the commander went through his planning procedures, produced his estimate of the situation based on the mission assigned, identified his miniumum requirements to execute the mission, transmitted requisitions/requests, recieved a "no can do" from higher and was forced to wait until he received what he needed? Hmmmmm......

There was enough there to start an offensive towards the end of august which is the reason why socalled prohibitive suplly issues never came up during the discussions on what to do. If things had been as bad as you pretend, PGR 2 could not have executed an offensive towards the south and units of PGR3 could not have moved north

No, there was not and that remains only your opinion and not the opinion of authors such as Glantz, House, Schuler, etc. The numbers you posted for the PzGruppen are barely enough for another encirclement of the 70+ divisions facing AGC in late August, or do you expect them to drive straight to Moscow while the Infantry Armies march and fight along with no POL for the GTR that is supposed to sustain them?(thus no supply at all) Interesting ideas you have. The PzGruppen recieved priority, 2nd, 4th and 9th Armies did not and were not in a state to start offensive operations nor was the logistical base to support them yet available (as it more or less says in Toppes report, Glantz' summary, Schuler's, etc.)
Pg 141 of Glantz' "Barbarossa Derailed" http://books.google.com/books?id=SDfInc ... &q&f=false

[ljadw]

Sorry, but you seem to be the one focused on "winter" being a calendar concept only.

Winter is a calender concept :it is the only one possible : it is 1 december till 28 february or 21 december /21 march.In some countries,the winter period starts earlier (in the European part of the SU between 20 november and 1 december),but snow on 1 november does not mean winter,it means autumn:why should autumn not be allowed to have snow.Sunday we will have 22 C,but that does not mean summer,it means :autumn with summer temperatures .

it is the same for frost :last year there was no frost in december,but that does not mean that it was autumn .

[RichTO90]

Winter is a calender concept :it is the only one possible : it is 1 december till 28 february or 21 december /21 march.In some countries,the winter period starts earlier (in the European part of the SU between 20 november and 1 december),but snow on 1 november does not mean winter,it means autumn:why should autumn not be allowed to have snow.Sunday we will have 22 C,but that does not mean summer,it means :autumn with summer temperatures .

it is the same for frost :last year there was no frost in december,but that does not mean that it was autumn .

Thank you for demonstrating how fixated you are on "winter" as a calendar concept rather than on the weather, which has rather a bit more impact on military operations. "Snow" and "icy cold" are weather phenomena that often happen in winter, but less often in fall or spring, and rarely in summer. It is the phenomena and when they occur to impact operations that is important; not whether or not the weather impacts within the calendar delimitation of "winter".

[steinmetz]

Until now you have not succeeded in coming up with any data concerning what according to you would be required as socalled minimum and what was actually present. Should not be too difficult as you are so sure of yourself. And implying that the OKH did not really know what was needed in spite of the experience of july is not really credible.

Do you have van Creveld's "Supplying war"? Just read the chapter "Russian Roulette" if you want specific numbers for AGC, they are there for you. von Bock clearly stated in August that AGC required 30 trains daily in order to meet current consumption and stockpile for an offensive, Gercke promised 24 and never delivered more than 18 on any given day. The fighting in and around Smolensk had consumed all ammunition as it was recieved, supply of which was prioritized over fuel and subsistence to the point that that AGC lived off the land and was without any fuel reserves (aka supply crisis).

Do you expect me to present you with specifc numbers of consumption and supply needs of equipment by type, by division, by army, what railhead and truck supply capacity was? .

Toppe gave all the numbers in manuscript P 190 :
"10 August : The heavy truck transport - since 4 august no longer employed for hauling supplies from Sub-districts 1 and 2 -was capable of covering a total distance of about 250 miles, which was roughly the milieage between the railheads and Moscow.
During the months of August and September the Dnjepr supply district was further expanded so that it developed into an efficient base section.The depots were distributed over an area of approximately 250 miles.The supplies stored in this area were needed to feed the autumn offensive. By the beginning of august the Dnjepr Supply District depots contained , POL for 45 miles, and four days rations.
The two Panzer Groups had the following at their disposal:
1) Second Panzer Group - 50 percent the basic load of ammunition , POL for about 155 miles and four days rations;
2) Third Panzer Group - 133 percent of the basic load of ammunition , POL for about 110 miles , and fourteen days rations.
By mid august the over-all supply of ammunition for the entire Army Group was increased to 133 percent of the basic load.
September : The Gomel and Roslavl depots , which were closest to the front , were given priority for supplies arriving within the Army Group area. At the same time every effort was made to expand the Smolensk supply district.
10 September : On 10 september , the armies , including the Panzer Groups , had at their disposal , on the average, more than 75 percent of the basic load of ammunition and four consumption units of POL , good for a distance of approximately 185 miles.
The Army Group Center average, including GHQ units and reserves , was 133 percent of the basic load of ammunition and one consumption unit of POL, ennough to cover of approximately 45 miles."

PGR2 had it's own railhead at Gomel for the Kiev operation, as I told you many pages back. Curious, did you gloss over pg 66 of the Toppe report? Or perhaps pg 25 also? Pg 25 states the attack to take Gomel: "Because of the shortage of ammunition the start of the main offensive had to be delayed 5 to 12 August".

Now lets look at that for a moment, why the postponement for ammunition? Should we suppose they had absolutely no ammunition at all? Or is it more likely the commander went through his planning procedures, produced his estimate of the situation based on the mission assigned, identified his miniumum requirements to execute the mission, transmitted requisitions/requests, recieved a "no can do" from higher and was forced to wait until he received what he needed? Hmmmmm......

There was enough there to start an offensive towards the end of august which is the reason why socalled prohibitive suplly issues never came up during the discussions on what to do. If things had been as bad as you pretend, PGR 2 could not have executed an offensive towards the south and units of PGR3 could not have moved north

No, there was not and that remains only your opinion and not the opinion of authors such as Glantz, House, Schuler, etc. The numbers you posted for the PzGruppen are barely enough for another encirclement of the 70+ divisions facing AGC in late August, or do you expect them to drive straight to Moscow while the Infantry Armies march and fight along with no POL for the GTR that is supposed to sustain them?(thus no supply at all) Interesting ideas you have. The PzGruppen recieved priority, 2nd, 4th and 9th Armies did not and were not in a state to start offensive operations nor was the logistical base to support them yet available (as it more or less says in Toppes report, Glantz' summary, Schuler's, etc.)

Toppes numbers clearly contradict you as he he gives the general average concerning ammo and fuel available on several dates. No sign there of largely insuffient quantities of ammo and fuel. And then suddenly, beginning october things alledgedly jumped from largely insufficient to suffient .Not credible. This would be an evolving situation so it is not credible to state that one absolutely had to wait until the beginning of october when Taifun actually started .
And it can only be repeated that waiting until october because of alleged logistical problems is not really smart as you are then on the verge of even greater logistical issues which would be really prohibitive.So, the OKH was right in planning an attack towards the end of august.

[Appleknocker27]

Toppes numbers clearly contradict you as he he gives the general average concerning ammo and fuel available on several dates.

No, they don't. Only your limited perception of them and a complete refusal to acknowledge or accept the professional opinion of Phd academic analysis of the entire situation. There are no authors out there aside from Stolfi ( ) which share or even remotely support your ideas.

No sign there of largely insuffient quantities of ammo and fuel. And then suddenly, beginning october things alledgedly jumped from largely insufficient to suffient .Not credible.

Well thats a bit uninformed eh? What exactly happend with the Soviet attacks against AGC throughout August and then September? What happend to the supply base and railheads during the same time? Seems like basic economics, no? Supply was rising, demand fell and what was a deficit became a surplus. Hmmmm :roll:

This would be an evolving situation so it is not credible to state that one absolutely had to wait until the beginning of october when Taifun actually started .

Not unless you wanted to employ ALL of AGC, which is what the situation required.

And it can only be repeated that waiting until october because of alleged logistical problems is not really smart as you are then on the verge of even greater logistical issues which would be really prohibitive.So, the OKH was right in planning an attack towards the end of august.

I agree, they were right (Although late August wasn't possible, as noted in DA Pam 20-261a. It was Sep 2). Then again it's hard to argue with the success of the Kiev operation and first few weeks of Typhoon. Either way, no ultimate victory was possible no matter what decisions you try to change.

BTW- no comment about PzGruppe 2, Kiev and Gomel railhead depot?

[ljadw]

Winter is a calender concept :it is the only one possible : it is 1 december till 28 february or 21 december /21 march.In some countries,the winter period starts earlier (in the European part of the SU between 20 november and 1 december),but snow on 1 november does not mean winter,it means autumn:why should autumn not be allowed to have snow.Sunday we will have 22 C,but that does not mean summer,it means :autumn with summer temperatures .

it is the same for frost :last year there was no frost in december,but that does not mean that it was autumn .

Thank you for demonstrating how fixated you are on "winter" as a calendar concept rather than on the weather, which has rather a bit more impact on military operations. "Snow" and "icy cold" are weather phenomena that often happen in winter, but less often in fall or spring, and rarely in summer. It is the phenomena and when they occur to impact operations that is important; not whether or not the weather impacts within the calendar delimitation of "winter".

The discusion was not about the impact of the weather,but about the impact of the winter .

Someone claimed that the winter arrived earlier than normal .

[RichTO90]

The discusion was not about the impact of the weather,but about the impact of the winter .

Someone claimed that the winter arrived earlier than normal .

I see, so you are only interested in the semantics rather than the facts. It is unimportant - and thus ":garbage" - to you that to an English-speaking author and reader "winter arrived early" is not in fact meant to convey the rather idiotic (in the sense that anyone in their right mind would not think so) idea that somehow the date upon which winter arrives on the calender suddenly and inexplicably changed. Rather, it is an idiomatic expression that indicates a sudden and unexpected change in the weather.
In the same way, we refer to "spring came late", meaning winter weather conditions prevailed into calendar spring. Or, occasionally, we refer to the opposite, "spring came early", which means that spring-like weather arrived early during calendar winter.

But if it suits your purpose to pretend that an academic, published by the U.S. Army Command and General Staff School, is ignorant of the calendar seasons, by all means go ahead, but please expect the ridicule and scorn such an attitude deserves.

[RichTO90]

Toppe gave all the numbers in manuscript P 190 :
The two Panzer Groups had the following at their disposal:
1) Second Panzer Group - 50 percent the basic load of ammunition , POL for about 155 miles and four days rations;
2) Third Panzer Group - 133 percent of the basic load of ammunition , POL for about 110 miles , and fourteen days rations.
By mid august the over-all supply of ammunition for the entire Army Group was increased to 133 percent of the basic load.
September : The Gomel and Roslavl depots , which were closest to the front , were given priority for supplies arriving within the Army Group area. At the same time every effort was made to expand the Smolensk supply district.
10 September : On 10 september , the armies , including the Panzer Groups , had at their disposal , on the average, more than 75 percent of the basic load of ammunition and four consumption units of POL , good for a distance of approximately 185 miles.
The Army Group Center average, including GHQ units and reserves , was 133 percent of the basic load of ammunition and one consumption unit of POL, ennough to cover of approximately 45 miles."

Its amusing that he's finally gone after being outed, since it always astonishes me that people have facts, but simply can't seem to reason with them. For example, PzGrp 2, with 50% Erste Munie-Ausstattung at the beginning of August, means that its five PzD, three ID (mot), KavD, and odds and ends, had about 3,225 tons of munitions. And PzGrp 3 with three PzD and three ID (mot), had a whopping 5,147 tons of munitions. And HG-Mitte at 133% had all of 30,763 tons. And c. 17,348 around 10 September...a decrease of roughly 60% of what the divisions were supposed to maintain at all times. Or to look at it another way, they started with roughly a ten-day supply and ended with about a six-day supply given then average consumption.

Not a comfortable situation to be in on the eve of a major offensive.

[Appleknocker27]

I've observed him on multiple forums attempt to make the same odd argument and am still left wondering as to what the point is? It appears to be a deliberate misunderstanding/misrepresentation of the facts to support some fanatsy of a Nazi victory. I say Nazi because that appears to be implied in the overall body of his posts. The overall presentation of his position seems that of a wishful apologist or even a fanbois (which I had previously thought were extinct :roll: )....


I agree about the state of the Armies of AGC as of late Aug/early Sep, not enviable at all. I feel some genuine pity for von Bock, he tried to run a clean campaign (protested Nazi policies, did not enforce the Commissar order, had appropriate ideas on how to treat the populace to mitigate partisans, etc.) but was given bad Intel at every critical decision, had quarreling subordinates and a meddlesome higher HQ. Its unfortunate he died before the end of the war and never had a chance to complete his memoirs.

[JustinYT]

ljadw, if you would of posted the full quote or knew the history you would know that Napoleon left Russia himself with some of his army earlier than the rest since there was an attempted coup in France that required his immediate return. The remainder of his Army crossed in mid to late December

[RichTO90]

I've observed him on multiple forums attempt to make the same odd argument and am still left wondering as to what the point is? It appears to be a deliberate misunderstanding/misrepresentation of the facts to support some fanatsy of a Nazi victory. I say Nazi because that appears to be implied in the overall body of his posts. The overall presentation of his position seems that of a wishful apologist or even a fanbois (which I had previously thought were extinct :roll: )....

Actually, no, He Who Shall Not Be Named is not overtly a Nazi apologist fanbois. If you look at the multiple aliases of HWSNBN you notice he is actually a German general fanbois. And he is fairly ecumenical about it, since he includes II Reich and non-Reich generals as well.

I agree about the state of the Armies of AGC as of late Aug/early Sep, not enviable at all. I feel some genuine pity for von Bock, he tried to run a clean campaign (protested Nazi policies, did not enforce the Commissar order, had appropriate ideas on how to treat the populace to mitigate partisans, etc.) but was given bad Intel at every critical decision, had quarreling subordinates and a meddlesome higher HQ. Its unfortunate he died before the end of the war and never had a chance to complete his memoirs.

Yeah. The log problem of HG-Mitte in late summer and early fall actually reminds me of that the Western Allies faced during the same period in 1944. Damned if you do and damned if you don't. The NEPTUNE planners established phase lines based upon what they understood the expectations were and planned accordingly. The problem is the Germans did not conduct a delaying action to more defensible terrain in France (the Seine or ultimately to the German frontier) because their assessment was different from ours (can you say "mirror-imaging"? ) So it turned out that too much fuel was being shipped into the beachhead and not enough ammo - the army wasn't moving much, but was fighting a lot. So ammo got re-prioritized. Then, when things came apart for the Germans, there was too much ammo stockpiled on the Continent and not enough fuel, and since nobody was moving and consumption was down, nobody - except for the Gasoline Companies - paid attention to recycling Jerrycans (nevermind noticing their manufacturer in the States had been discontinued). So even when POL was re-emphasized, the primary containers for decanting to the forward users was now in short supply, which led to merry scavenger hunts about the Norman countryside. And because fuel consumption had been minimal, nobody enforced reporting standards or modified them based on actual experience, which led Third Army to become Patton's 40 Thieves when it came to POL supply.

The problem for HG-Mitte was that standing down for a logistic pause reduced fuel consumption, but reduction in ammo consumption and stockpiling required Soviet co-operation. Instead, the Soviets chose to hammer their heads against the Germans, which bloodied themselves for little gain in terms of casualties...except it kept the Germans from assembling a stockpile. Consumption didn't go up, but neither did it go down the way the Germans probably hoped. Getting from a roughly 95% level in the two Panzergruppen (assuming stock leveling) in mid-August to 75% in mid-September was not an accomplishment - it was a shortfall. Having 75% of a basic issue at army-level and another 58% of a basic level in army group stocks was not an accomplishment - it was a shortfall. For any commander worth his salt those were gigantic red flags (pun not intended) that his ability to conduct offensive operations was problematic - at best and potentially disastrously compromised at worst.

[RichTO90]

ljadw, if you would of posted the full quote or knew the history you would know that Napoleon left Russia himself with some of his army earlier than the rest since there was an attempted coup in France that required his immediate return. The remainder of his Army crossed in mid to late December

Actually, he abandoned the Grand Armee on 18 December 1812, taking only a personnel escort, so technically I suppose "some of his army". OTOH, there were so many holes in ljadw's precis of the campaign I just didn't know where to start.

[steverodgers801]

Due to the roads being so poor, the estimated consumption for fuel and oil in planning were so far off as to be all but useless, combined with the breakdowns and lack of repairs of trucks that were also way beyond planned and you have a reliance on horse drawn vehicles that greatly slowed down the ability of the infantry to keep up with the Panzers

[ljadw]

ljadw, if you would of posted the full quote or knew the history you would know that Napoleon left Russia himself with some of his army earlier than the rest since there was an attempted coup in France that required his immediate return. The remainder of his Army crossed in mid to late December

I know the story of Malet,but,this is irrelevant,as the majority of the army of Bonaparte had disappeared before the winter as snow in the summer . His army invaded Russia while it was already infected by typhus .

[ljadw]

ljadw, if you would of posted the full quote or knew the history you would know that Napoleon left Russia himself with some of his army earlier than the rest since there was an attempted coup in France that required his immediate return. The remainder of his Army crossed in mid to late December

Actually, he abandoned the Grand Armee on 18 December 1812, taking only a personnel escort, so technically I suppose "some of his army". OTOH, there were so many holes in ljadw's precis of the campaign I just didn't know where to start.

No,he was in Paris on 18 december,in Dresden on 14 december,in Kutno (a Polish city) at 11 december .

And,the "Malet coup" happened on 23 october,and Napoleon knew about on 6 november .Thus,if the Malet vaudeville required the immediate return of Napoleon, he would have left his army on 6 november .