Barbarossa - what is more flawed?

[AJFFM]

The twin german defeats of Luga-Soltsy involved the entirety of 4th Panzer army.

First time I read someone calling Luga a defeat. Soltsy involved elements of one division that was part of a three division strong corps. It didn't affect the performance or advance of the remaining two divisions and it was, like all previous soviet successes, local, temporary and without major effect on the overall situation operationally or strategically.

At Leningrad the german defeat was their failure to take the city.

The Germans reached Leningrad right about on schedule as Directive 33 and its supplement directed. Directive 35 (Operation Typhoon) changed all that. Halder himself on the 5th of September wrote that Leningrad's fall was a matter of time. Imagine his surprise the next day when Hitler yet again changed objectives stripping AGN from its armour in his directive for the attack on Moscow, Directive 35.

Field commanders had no control over the situation and if Kiev, a city more spread geographically with a lot more defenders easily fell how Leningrad could be so different?

The last statement is typical teutonic sour grapes. Soldiers used to blockade the city can be deployed somewhere else, not to mention the advantages of linking up with the finns and occupying Russia's largest port for AGN supply.

Hitler had overall control and Hitler decided not to storm the city not his commanders. His armies stormed Kiev, Minsk, Dniepertovsk and Warsaw all as large and with just as complex a geography as Leningrad. His failure to storm the city was his and his alone. Facts are facts.

Dunkirk was not a failure.

From "The War in France and Flanders" by L.F.Ellis:

Army Group A ceased from now on to have any responsibility for the attack on Dunkirk; Rundstedt had got his wish. He had regarded his real task as accomplished when his forces reached the coast, cut British communications and seized the channel ports. Thereafter it was his policy (confirmed by Hitler though disliked both by the Commander-in-Chief, Brauchitsch, and at first by his own subordinate commanders) to husband his armoured formations for the coming offensive southwards. and though it is clear that he missed an opportunity by not attacking the Canal Line in rear of the British Expeditionary Force before Lord Gort could move back divisions for its defence, it was a sound and soldierly policy not to use his armour afterwards for an attack on Dunkirk. As already pointed out (page 178) the beditched ground is unsuited to the use of armour. In less than a week, moreover, Rundstedt had to be ready to attack southwards over the Somme–Aisne line. There, as he believed, a major part of the French Army had still to be brought to battle. The German forces must break and defeat this army if they were to conquer France.[11] They had proved that for such a task the quick-thrusting armoured divisions were the most effective weapon, and already Rundstedt had lost nearly fifty percent of his armoured strength (page 151). To waste more in attacks on Dunkirk would have shown bad judgement.

Read Frieser's book, he listed all the reasons for the halt order historians invented and debunked them one by one including Ellis's if I am not mistaken.

[ljadw]

This is a wrong interpretation

[steverodgers801]

Cimon, the time table fell apart at the end of July. Hitler made a decision based on what his generals had told him.
If Rundstedt had known the British could evacuate so many troops would he have wanted a stop still.

[flakbait]

Pardon if find comparing the morality differences of Stalinist Soviet Russia and Hitler`s Third Reich a futile exercise...both were utterly morally bankrupt and simply bent upon world domination by any means necessary...there literally was NO "moral high ground" either could convincingly argue. Quite the opposite actually...and the body count they left strewn in their wake PROVES that beyond ANY documented doubt.

[BDV]

Read Frieser's book, he listed all the reasons for the halt order historians invented and debunked them one by one including Ellis's if I am not mistaken.

Can you illustrate with some illuminating paragraphs?

Historically, more than a number of times unsupported armored dashes turned into disasters and near-disasters. Soltsy, Kalinin, Tikhvin, Rostov. And for the oponent too, e.g. Kharkov '43. So, I'd like some argumented justification as to the stop order - we can have that part of the Discussion in the WHIF sub-Forum.

[ljadw]

It is also totally of topic :Frieser lists a number of possible reasons for the halt order and than debunks them,at the end he is saying that Hitler's reason was to tell the OKH that he was the chief . (which is more than questionable:Frieser is wrong),but,we are discussing the reasons of Rundstedt,not those of Hitler.

[BDV]

First time I read someone calling Luga a defeat.

So germans continued to advance on the Luga-Leningrad direction?

Soltsy involved elements of one division that was part of a three division strong corps. It didn't affect the performance or advance of the remaining two divisions and it was, like all previous soviet successes, local, temporary and without major effect on the overall situation operationally or strategically.

I'm sorry, I must've missed the part where Panzer troops triumphantly pose atop Nevsky Bridge.

The Germans reached Leningrad right about on schedule as Directive 33 and its supplement directed. Directive 35 (Operation Typhoon) changed all that. Halder himself on the 5th of September wrote that Leningrad's fall was a matter of time. Imagine his surprise the next day when Hitler yet again changed objectives stripping AGN from its armour in his directive for the attack on Moscow, Directive 35.

AKA cutting your losses. Or the results of Taifun, at approximately 12 PM on October 12, do not justify GROFAZ decision?

Field commanders had no control over the situation and if Kiev, a city more spread geographically with a lot more defenders easily fell how Leningrad could be so different?

They can control the situation by achieving their military objectives. If Zhukov can resign when orders exceed the boundaries of silliness, so can any junker.

Hitler had overall control and Hitler decided not to storm the city not his commanders. His armies stormed Kiev, Minsk, Dniepertovsk and Warsaw all as large and with just as complex a geography as Leningrad. His failure to storm the city was his and his alone. Facts are facts.

Not quite. Adolf refused to delay more critical operations, and sacrifice more soldiers just to accommodate his incompetent field generals. For this, he deserves credit, not blame.

[AJFFM]

It is also totally of topic :Frieser lists a number of possible reasons for the halt order and than debunks them,at the end he is saying that Hitler's reason was to tell the OKH that he was the chief . (which is more than questionable:Frieser is wrong),but,we are discussing the reasons of Rundstedt,not those of Hitler.

It is not off topic. Certain members (including you) think that assigning part of the blame to Hitler as blasphemy not because they like him or anything, on the contrary they are mostly just as anti-fascists as you and me. They think that blaming Hitler and the decision making process somewhat tarnishes the victory over the Germans. That is not true and that is why I quoted Frieser. His entire book was about how lucky the Germans were (who had faulty decision making processes) and how awful the decision making process among the Allies was. His analysis of the Halt order explains how in this one instance the Allies not the Germans were the lucky ones.

[AJFFM]

So germans continued to advance on the Luga-Leningrad direction?

So just because they stopped for a week after covering +400 Kms. in 3 weeks it means they were defeated? Interesting perspective.

Again did they give up land in the Luga-Leningrad axis or not?

I'm sorry, I must've missed the part where Panzer troops triumphantly pose atop Nevsky Bridge.

I have no idea what you are talking about but I pose the same question yet again. Did this localised defeat affect the over all operational or strategic positioning as other bigger and more important actions like Rokossovsky's counter offensive in Smolensk did?

AKA cutting your losses. Or the results of Taifun, at approximately 12 PM on October 12, do not justify GROFAZ decision?

Taifun (Read Directive 35 issued on Sep. 6th, 41) involved bigger forces and covered a larger area and expected more casualties than any storming of Leningrad would have cost. Hitler had enough forces present for the attack and decided not to. Go ask him why. This was not the first time he intervened nor the last.

They can control the situation by achieving their military objectives. If Zhukov can resign when orders exceed the boundaries of silliness, so can any junker.

And they did. They reached Leningrad right on time, they took Smolensk and were 300 Km away from Moscow even ahead of time. They faced problems in Kiev direction but succeeded in creating one of the greatest victories in history (with help from Stalin of course, Hitler wasn't alone in making bad decisions against the best advice of his good generals).

As for resignations, they offered to resign or asked to be relieved of duty several times throughout the war and indeed when refused to follow orders were court marshalled or fired.

Not quite. Adolf refused to delay more critical operations, and sacrifice more soldiers just to accommodate his incompetent field generals. For this, he deserves credit, not blame.

So Hitler's interventions saved the day not the Generals who planned and executed the operations? Interesting.

[ljadw]

It is also totally of topic :Frieser lists a number of possible reasons for the halt order and than debunks them,at the end he is saying that Hitler's reason was to tell the OKH that he was the chief . (which is more than questionable:Frieser is wrong),but,we are discussing the reasons of Rundstedt,not those of Hitler.

It is not off topic. Certain members (including you) think that assigning part of the blame to Hitler as blasphemy not because they like him or anything, on the contrary they are mostly just as anti-fascists as you and me. They think that blaming Hitler and the decision making process somewhat tarnishes the victory over the Germans. That is not true and that is why I quoted Frieser. His entire book was about how lucky the Germans were (who had faulty decision making processes) and how awful the decision making process among the Allies was. His analysis of the Halt order explains how in this one instance the Allies not the Germans were the lucky ones.

Well,every discussion about Dunkirk is a mixture of a) why was Hitler supprting Rundstedt in his discussion with Halder b)was his decision justified (c is never discussed :why were 190000 British soldiersand 140000 mainly French soldiers able to escape to Britain:every one is starting from the POV :Hitler was responsible,everyone is refusing to even imagine that the outcome could be decided by the Allies).

Now,very concisely : the facts

1) for a number of reasons,Rundstedt issued a halt order

2) for an other number of reasons,Halder annulled this order and took away the mobile divisions from Rundstedt and gave them to Bock .Without the knowledge and permission of Hitler.

3) A pissed Hitler annulled the order of Halder,resulting that one was going back to case 1.

4) A few days later,Hitler changed his decision: one went back to case 2.

For a number of reasons,Frieser is saying

a)that Hitler's first decision was wrong

b) that the reason for this decision was that his ego was hurt.


Why is Frieser saying this ? Essentially,because of the ruling PC climate in Germany :if Frieser had said a) Hitler's decision was right and b) it was founded on military considerations,the result would be that he would be tarred and feathered as a neonazi and would suffer social suicide /boycott.

I disagree with Frieser : there is no proof that Hitler's decision was wrong and that it was taken to rub his injured ego : a lot of indications are suggesting the opposite

[steverodgers801]

The problem with operations after Smolensk is that there weren't suppose to be any. All Soviet troops were suppose to be destroyed and there weren't suppose to be any new ones. Even if the there hadn't been a drive south it would be mid September before the Germans could move again, taking an average of a month to destroy the front before them it would now be mud season. So it would be November before the Germans can start their drive on Moscow. The dilemma is do the Germans try to surround Moscow in their weakened state or assault Moscow directly and there is still a very long flank that needs to be defended.
Finally there is no guarantee that taking Moscow will win the war. So if the Soviets still fight the Germans do not have the additional resources from taking the Donbas and western Ukraine.

[BDV]

So just because they stopped for a week after covering +400 Kms. in 3 weeks it means they were defeated? Interesting perspective.

Germans stopped at Pskov. They WERE stopped at Luga.

Again did they give up land in the Luga-Leningrad axis or not?

So what was the german objective and did Germans accomplish their objective?

I have no idea what you are talking about but I pose the same question yet again. Did this localised defeat affect the over all operational or strategic positioning as other bigger and more important actions like Rokossovsky's counter offensive in Smolensk did?

Look up Nevsky Bridge. Did AGN capture Leningrad? So German defeat it was, and German general lies matter not as AGN had failed to conquer Leningrad in 3 months of fighting, even with extra resources at their disposal.

Taifun (Read Directive 35 issued on Sep. 6th, 41) involved bigger forces and covered a larger area and expected more casualties than any storming of Leningrad would have cost. Hitler had enough forces present for the attack and decided not to. Go ask him why. This was not the first time he intervened nor the last.

Yes, so armor which AGN was misusing to make up for commander incompetence and infantry impotence was used extremely fruitfully (at least during the first 3 weeks) in another theater.

And they did. They reached Leningrad right on time,

No, they did not. The ontime part included CAPTURING Leningrad, which was, obviously never accomplished.

they took Smolensk and were 300 Km away from Moscow even ahead of time. They faced problems in Kiev direction but succeeded in creating one of the greatest victories in history (with help from Stalin of course, Hitler wasn't alone in making bad decisions against the best advice of his good generals).

Or good decisions (Kiev) against the advice of his shamelessly self promoting generals.

So Hitler's interventions saved the day not the Generals who planned and executed the operations? Interesting.

Kiev, Taifun. And the ones who "executed" we're the troops. Once the quality edge was lost and Soviets acquired a modicum of operational ability, the generals of the Nazi Wehrmacht were exposed for the imbeciles they had been all along.

[steverodgers801]

So if the order is given then that means the objective is accomplished. Hitler stopped before Leningrad because there were not enough troops to guard the flanks and mount an assault. Taifun failed because the supply situation was horrible; tanks, artillery and such could not move due to the weather and lack of fuel and supplies. Without their support the Germans were on an equal basis with the Soviets. The stop at Smolensk was for three weeks and even with the stop the German supply could only provide half or so of what was needed

[Alixanther]

Once the quality edge was lost and Soviets acquired a modicum of operational ability, the generals of the Nazi Wehrmacht were exposed for the imbeciles they had been all along.

You keep repeating this "Nazi Wehrmacht" as if the Wehrmacht had been trained and versed in NSDAP thinking and tactics. While there were people who range from anti-national-socialistic to international-socialistic to anti-socialistic inside Wehrmacht you cannot rule out the fact that Wehrmact, as a whole, was the main reason the NSDAP got and stayed into power. Without von Blomberg there's no double coup against both left (social-democrat) and right (traditional rightist and pro-clerical parties) of the Weimar political spectrum.
About the generals, I agree they were imbeciles, however they inherited the imbecilic trait long time ago, while serving the Kaiser.

[AJFFM]

So what was the german objective and did Germans accomplish their objective?

Regrouping for once, Panzer units were at least 3 days ahead of Infantry. Both AGC and AGS regrouped and stopped their advance around the same time and no one called those "defeats".

Look up Nevsky Bridge. Did AGN capture Leningrad? So German defeat it was, and German general lies matter not as AGN had failed to conquer Leningrad in 3 months of fighting, even with extra resources at their disposal.

You are mixing things up deliberately. AGN was ordered not to. This was the exclusive meaning of Directive 35. Disobeying Orders meant death by firing squad.

Yes, so armor which AGN was misusing to make up for commander incompetence and infantry impotence was used extremely fruitfully (at least during the first 3 weeks) in another theater.

Of all three AGs AGN had the lowest overall casualty rate by September. They were the only AG to achieve their objectives and with minimal reversals. How is this "incompetence"?

No, they did not. The ontime part included CAPTURING Leningrad, which was, obviously never accomplished.

Until Hitler changed it. There was nothing stopping the Germans from Storming Leningrad in September, they had the city virtually surrounded and effectively blockaded any Soviet forces from helping the city. Indeed they even began to penetrate deep into the hinterland in the direction of Tikhvin.

Hitler changed all that in Directive 35 as I mentioned above but you keep ignoring.

Or good decisions (Kiev) against the advice of his shamelessly self promoting generals.

Kiev wasn't a good decision, it was a horrible one. With Moscow exposed, the weather still good and Kiev already semi-encircled (and its defense toothless and useless) with forces at hand the choice was obvious. He decided to go for the grandiose victory instead of the strategic one. It cost him dearly because the 1 month delay was actually 3 due to the rasputitsa and reorganisation of Moscow defense.

Kiev, Taifun. And the ones who "executed" we're the troops. Once the quality edge was lost and Soviets acquired a modicum of operational ability, the generals of the Nazi Wehrmacht were exposed for the imbeciles they had been all along.

So after all these victories against superior forces that continued till the very last months of the war with many superb manoeuvres that amazed everyone German generals are incompetent imbeciles? Interesting.

Please tell me how would you rank the generals from the other side who suffered massive defeats at the hands of these imbeciles.

I know that truth hurts but the war ended 70 years ago, get over it. Admitting Germans were good is actually a complement to the guys who beat the masters on their own game.