Germany winning on the Eastern Front

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BDV
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Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front

#271

Post by BDV » 28 May 2014, 22:26

steverodgers801 wrote:A huge advantage the Germans had was the surprise Stalin allowed.
Largely a myth.

Few units were close to readiness.
Manstein must've been even more incompetent that I thoght!

... and if you are counting on the Romanian army to be of help you are sadly mistaken.
Could you ellaborate?
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Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front

#272

Post by Zart Arn » 31 May 2014, 02:21

steverodgers801 wrote:What is the point of having the Soviets invading so Germany can lose territory??
Well, if such questions are being asked, it means, that I have not made my point sufficiently clear. Let us have a look at what happened in 1941 in the reality. In the reality some 3,5 million Soviet servicemen were lost in the first six month of the conflict. Those, who don't believe in the official post-Soviet data, use higher figures. In some cases the words "five million" are being pronounced.
Though these figures look very high, they are dwarfed by the general Soviet mobilization potential, that surpassed 30 million men by the outbreak of the war. The idea behind "Schlieffen plan" for the Soviet Union is to inflict heavier casualties, than were inflicted on the Soviets in the reality. How can it be achieved? By allowing the Soviets to concentrate very heavy masses of troops on the border, so that their destruction would lead to the loss of more men and equipment, than in the actual scenario.
Additionally, "Schlieffen scenario" would allow to capture the major Soviet political centers (Moscow, Leningrad), which was not achieved in the reality as well.
Finally, the plan, if carried out correctly, would break the Soviet command and control system. The railway system would be shaken to the foundation as well.

steverodgers801 wrote:The objective is to get territory.
No. In the reality the loss of territory contracted the Soviet potential, but did not break the system as the whole. The objective is to shut down the system by taking over its key points.

LWD wrote:If the forces involved are small then there is little incentive for the Red Army to attack.
Agree. That's a week point of the plan. Hence, an effort should be made, to force them into believing, that a large force is being deployed in the West. "Sea Lion" required some 30 divisions for the invasion only. Some divisions are to kept in reserve, some should guard the cost. Eventually, the invasion plan can envisage heavy casualties at sea, which would call for a much larger invasion force. So, some 60 divisions can be sent to the English channel.

LWD wrote:And again the Red army wasn't ready for an offensive vs Germany in 1940 in any case.
Depends on numbers. If the Soviets manage to marshal some 300 divisions against 80 on the German side (the rest is busy with "Sea Lion"), it will be at least worse trying. There are 3 strategic factors (other than Britain), that motivate the Soviets to invade:
1. Reduction of the frontline length. European continent grows wider in the East. A frontline running from Leningrad to Crimea would be some 50% longer, than an alternative frontline running from Konigsberg to Black sea costs. The Soviets have many slow infantry divisions and rather weak mobile units. Hence their interest in short frontlines with high concentration of forces.
2. Polish railway system (built under Russian empire) is compatible with the Soviet.
3. Invading Romania, one can cut Germany's oil supply.
So, a temptation to move some 100 miles to the West and fight a large scale battle there would be hard to resist.

LWD wrote:NO. If they can't overcome the RN then Sea Lion isn't going to go.
Royal Navy can be checked by German air force. A suicidal scenario, in which only a half of German forces reaches Britain (the other half destroyed en rout) is still an option. An option to be fed to the Soviet intelligence, of course.

LWD wrote:In any case moving a division is not something that you can do "immediately" it's going to take days at least.
In terms of the operation, that we are planning, "days" is "immediately". The plan does not calls for the Soviets to be stopped at the border. They are to march some 100 miles inland. This will take the some days.
I'll visit the thread on German railroads. My gratitude for having indicated it to me.


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Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front

#273

Post by LWD » 04 Jun 2014, 16:17

Zart Arn wrote: ...
LWD wrote:If the forces involved are small then there is little incentive for the Red Army to attack.
Agree. That's a week point of the plan. Hence, an effort should be made, to force them into believing, that a large force is being deployed in the West. "Sea Lion" required some 30 divisions for the invasion only. Some divisions are to kept in reserve, some should guard the cost. Eventually, the invasion plan can envisage heavy casualties at sea, which would call for a much larger invasion force. So, some 60 divisions can be sent to the English channel.
I see 22 divisions listed at http://www.axishistory.com/other-aspect ... we-sealion furthermore it is clear that the Germans didn't have the sea lift for all of them. Indeed the first wave "divisions" weren't full divisions. The Soviets had a pretty decent idea on just what the lift requirements were for a division. If they see far more committed than the lift capability warrents that rather brings the whole operation to question does it not? Also heavy losses at sea would mean that the lift capablilty is reduced even more.
LWD wrote:And again the Red army wasn't ready for an offensive vs Germany in 1940 in any case.
Depends on numbers. If the Soviets manage to marshal some 300 divisions against 80 on the German side (the rest is busy with "Sea Lion"), it will be at least worse trying.
Would it? Using the conventional numbers you want a 3:1 advantage when you attack. The above indicates you have that however German divisions were about 20% larger than Soviet ones which leaves you pretty much right at 3:1 but when you look at the quality and mobility of the German divisions the Red Army especially in light of their performance vs Finland and it becomes somewhat questionable. Massing 300 divisions in Poland would also be something of a give away would it not?
There are 3 strategic factors (other than Britain), that motivate the Soviets to invade:
1. Reduction of the frontline length. European continent grows wider in the East. A frontline running from Leningrad to Crimea would be some 50% longer, than an alternative frontline running from Konigsberg to Black sea costs. The Soviets have many slow infantry divisions and rather weak mobile units. Hence their interest in short frontlines with high concentration of forces.
In general longer front lines are of greater advantage to the larger force.
2. Polish railway system (built under Russian empire) is compatible with the Soviet.
The Soviet controlled part of it may have been but it was also a rather constrained system (sea the thread on German railways in the East). Furthermore the Germans had converted at least parts of the Polish system to their guage.
...
So, a temptation to move some 100 miles to the West and fight a large scale battle there would be hard to resist.
If it was believable perhaps but perhaps not. Indeed with Stalin in command the latter is more likely IMO.
LWD wrote:NO. If they can't overcome the RN then Sea Lion isn't going to go.
Royal Navy can be checked by German air force.[/quote]
No. Indeed the evidence up to that point in the war is rather clear on that.
A suicidal scenario, in which only a half of German forces reaches Britain (the other half destroyed en rout) is still an option. An option to be fed to the Soviet intelligence, of course.
IfSuch a scenario is almost unthinkable. The Germans don't have the lift to move even 30 divisions in a wave or even two. The heaviest lossses would be expected in the first wave. A heavy loss of transport would be enough to cancel the invasion and cut the losses. If things go bad like they almost assuredly would one could expect to loose essentially all the first wave but that's about it.

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Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front

#274

Post by Zart Arn » 08 Jun 2014, 11:09

Well... Primarily, it has been implied, that the action takes place in the summer of 1941, which denies validity to the objections based on the actual lack of tonnage in the autumn of 1940, since in our reality Germany has nearly a year to build an invasion fleet. The matter is not about ocean-going transports capable of crossing the Atlantic. The matter is only about mass produced landing barges.
Additionally, the number of German divisions intended for "Sea Lion" in 1940 does not have much to do with a size of a hypothetic invasion force of 1941. In a year the British home army has grown. Hence, the force destined to land in Britain should grow accordingly.

LWD wrote:Would it? Using the conventional numbers you want a 3:1 advantage when you attack.
Let us see. For a German planner it will be better not to show any sign of overconfidence in enemy's weakness. Consequently, it will be unwise to position the remaining divisions (left to protect the eastern frontier of the Reich) too close to the border. Hence, they are to be moved some 100 miles inland, leaving the border area, that we (as planners) want the Soviets to occupy, unprotected. The Soviets would see the opportunity of advancing 100 miles inland unmolested (the rational behind this action has already been explained).

LWD wrote:In general longer front lines are of greater advantage to the larger force.
Only in general, when all other factor are neutralized, which is not our case. Yes, when units on both sides enjoy the same speed, a numerically superior player can outflank an inferior one. The trouble is, that some German units (tank and mechanized infantry divisions) boast a much higher speed, than the rest. In chess terms it's about a huge force of pawns (the Soviet side) versus a much smaller force of pawns, backed by queens and rooks. The "pawn" player should take precautions, not to allow enemy queens into his rear. Hence, a shorter front line is preferred.

LWD wrote:The Soviet controlled part of it may have been but it was also a rather constrained system (sea the thread on German railways in the East).

Generally, railway network density depends on population density. The more towns per certain amount of square miles there are, the larger these town are, the better incentives a government (or a private company) would have to build railways. It's clear, that railway network in Germany is better developed than in Poland. The polish network is superior to the network in Western Russia. Considering all said above, an army, advancing from Germany to the east faces constant deterioration of railway network. On the contrary, an army, that marches from the USSR to the west will see railway network around it miraculously improve.

Zart Arn wrote:No. Indeed the evidence up to that point in the war is rather clear on that.
There were different scenarios. A narrow corridor, protected by mine fields was also considered.

Zart Arn wrote:IfSuch a scenario is almost unthinkable. The Germans don't have the lift to move even 30 divisions in a wave or even two.
As it has already been said, so was the situation in 1940. In our scenario the state of affairs will be different, since Germany is building barges. Moreover, neither the Soviets, nor the British can be perfectly sure about the size of this barge fleet. For the purpose of the plan, that we are discussing, Germany is interested to mislead its adversaries into believing, that it has a larger invasion fleet, than it could really count upon. So, why not to try a trick with fake barges in addition to real ones?

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Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front

#275

Post by LWD » 09 Jun 2014, 15:44

Zart Arn wrote:Well... Primarily, it has been implied, that the action takes place in the summer of 1941, which denies validity to the objections based on the actual lack of tonnage in the autumn of 1940, since in our reality Germany has nearly a year to build an invasion fleet.
Agreed if Germany devotes the resources to it starting in say July of 1940 they can have a pretty decent amount of sea lift although some of it may still be dependent on river barges and multiple trips. The problem of course is at that point the British defences have been strengthened to a great extent. The LW no longer has any significant edge over the RAF and indeed operating over Britain and the channel is likely inferior. The KM likewise is probably in an even worse possition and there's no shortage of troops in Britain. The impication is that making a believable attempt at Sea Lion is going to be difficult. It's also going to require some very serious sacrafices of men and material then there's the question of what happens if the USSR doesn't take the bait. Since a failed Sea Lion will still see the British and the Germans at war and the British in a stronger position why shouldn't the Soviets wait longer when they will be even stronger and the Germans weaker.
LWD wrote:In general longer front lines are of greater advantage to the larger force.
Only in general, when all other factor are neutralized, which is not our case.[/quote]
NO. It is possible for the "other factors" to out weigh this general rule but it is far from clear that they do so in this case.
Yes, when units on both sides enjoy the same speed, a numerically superior player can outflank an inferior one.
If there is a front it is not a matter of out flanking. The larger force can concentrate at more points and stress the defense of the weaker with greater ease.
Generally, railway network density depends on population density.
Population is one factor but there are several others.
... The polish network is superior to the network in Western Russia.
It's not clear to me that that is the case especially in the period under discussion. The Soviet system for instance was run in a very different way from other European systems. It is also not clear to me that the Polish system in Eastern Poland was merged completely with the Soviet railsystem. That produces some interface problems.

One thing you haven't addressed is what happens if the German access to Romanian oil gets cut off by the initial advance by the way.

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Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front

#276

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 14 Jun 2014, 19:31

The polish network is superior to the network in Western Russia. Considering all said above, an army, advancing from Germany to the east faces constant deterioration of railway network. On the contrary, an army, that marches from the USSR to the west will see railway network around it miraculously improve.
This is only true from a German perspective and from the point of view of German railway operating practices.
The Soviet network was run very differently and used operating practices not seen outside the USA and could gain large amounts of traffic from quite modest networks.

For instance if you compare the rate at which the Red Army planned to mobilise their troops to the border through the Western zone with what the Germans thought they could achieve initially around 75 trains a day and what they thought they could achieve after a massive reconstruction programme around 250 trains a day, you will see that the Soviets get more out of the same network that the Germans.

All invaders suffer from disruption and destruction of railways Germany's invasion of France in 1940 shows this. But a sustained campaign requires both a rapid re-building of the railways and an ability to operate a maximum service on modest strength track. Germany could have done better had she prepared in advance for this. But her soldiers thinking was that the campaign would be won before railways were needed as in France.

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Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front

#277

Post by Zart Arn » 16 Jun 2014, 01:00

LWD wrote:The KM likewise is probably in an even worse possition and there's no shortage of troops in Britain. The impication is that making a believable attempt at Sea Lion is going to be difficult.
Agree, that's the difficult part. Not being perfectly able to hone this part of the plan myself, I'll willingly enlist the assistance on behalf of the readers. As I've stated earlier, the plan is not mine. The original design (it was proposed by a certain war gamer) was, however, much more complicated and even more risky. It provided for a diversion by Kriegsmarine against Iceland, which would have lured some surface elements of the Royal Navy away from home waters, which in its own terms had been preceded by Italian attack on Malta, intended to draw another portion British battleships into the Mediterranean.

LWD wrote: It's also going to require some very serious sacrafices of men and material then there's the question of what happens if the USSR doesn't take the bait.
Generally speaking, the flotilla built for the invasion will be useful in more than one scenario. Suppose, the Soviets do not react. In this case the German side can either keep sending more troops across the Channel (until the Soviets do take the bait), or call off the assault and build even more barges to try a real invasion of Britain several month later. Anyway, a scenario, in which there is no German-Soviet war, is rather favorable for Germany, since the mass of resources dedicated in the reality to the war in the East, will be used against Britain.

LWD wrote:If there is a front it is not a matter of out flanking. The larger force can concentrate at more points and stress the defense of the weaker with greater ease.
I see your point, it is quiet valid. However, I keep insisting, that the new reality does outweigh the advantage you are talking about. Historically, the German mechanized groups were the nemesis of the Red Army. Wherever a gap in Soviet formations was accidently formed, such a gap would be used as an entry portal for German mobile divisions, which would exploit the opportunity to rush into the Soviet rear. The high density of troops will make the gaps less likely. Moreover, the Soviet army can march in several echelons, so that when the first one is breached, the second will be ready to stop a German mechanized group, trying to get through.

LWD wrote:The Soviet system for instance was run in a very different way from other European systems.
Der Alte Fritz wrote:The Soviet network was run very differently and used operating practices not seen outside the USA and could gain large amounts of traffic from quite modest networks.
Arguably, I can defend my point. But the very fact, that it requires heavy defense, removes this argument from a hypothetic list of highly obvious reasons, that should motivate the Soviets to strike first. Consequently, I abandon this subject, which leaves me with only 2 stimuli for the Soviets: shorter frontline and Rumanian oil.

LWD wrote:One thing you haven't addressed is what happens if the German access to Romanian oil gets cut off by the initial advance by the way.
That's a bait. No, not "a bait". I should say "the bait". The Soviets should move in and take Romanian oil fields. If the general plan succeeds, their loss will have no time to affect the course of war. If it fails, the German side will mount a tactical offensive to retake them. The output of several month (perhaps of a year) will be lost. That's the price for the risk.

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Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front

#278

Post by doogal » 04 Jan 2015, 15:43

So instead of attacking in 1941 dear Adolf decides to sit on his haunches and wait for 1942, (why) firstly to bring all his newly raised Panzer divisions (from his existing ones already established) up to established levels with German equipment and German motorisation, and get rid of any foreign equipment: Next he deploys in the East at the new border established along the demarcation line in 1939 in a defensive posture only.
At this point he would have been receiving train loads of goods from Stalin for an extra year, the quantities over 12 months would have been significant. Going completely against his character he adopts a defensive offensive strategy in the east, and a)waits or b) provokes Stalin into an attack in Autumn of that year: At this point he does not have to worry about a cross channel invasion or an invasion of North Africa(why) well due to the fact he did not invade USSR Stalin has not been clamouring for a second front: in fact there will have been no contact between the Soviets the US and the British at this point.
Germany has had enough time to study the two campaigns she has fought (an intrinsic part of life in the German General Staff)many of the all arms co-ordination problems and problems between commands can be looked at in this extra year and ironed out. Waiting at least a year would have been a great boon for Hitler. His premise that every one will get stronger and we will not was inherently incorrect:
Tactically the Red Army would have had to fight a very different kind of war that it lacked experience in fighting, Germany using what would have been superior tactical experience would have nullified and defeated any attack: After this it is anybodys guess as to how Germany would proceed to win a conflict outright but defeating encircling decisively soviet forces on the borders was a pre-requisite to the 1941`s Barbarossa: so achieveing it in a defensive offensive posture had far more benefits than a general offensive: And it would have been a classic eastern strategy of the Imperial period: I suppose it hinges on whether a soviet attack could have been provoked?????????

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Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front

#279

Post by ChrisDR68 » 04 Jan 2015, 17:03

I agree with the strategy of launching Barbarossa in 1942 but I don't think Stalin would have attacked Germany even if provoked by Hitler. Yes there was discussion of a pre-emptive strike by the Soviets before June 1941 but I can't see Stalin sanctioning such an offensive after witnessing the poor display of the Red Army against the Fins during the Winter War.

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Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front

#280

Post by doogal » 04 Jan 2015, 17:23

Possibly (to draw Stalin into making an offensive decision) some limited attacks with little scope, to secure better geographical positions in the event ?? I agree its dubious as to whether Stalin would have happily acquiesced in this: But not wholly improbable:

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Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front

#281

Post by ljadw » 04 Jan 2015, 19:57

Zart Arn wrote:
LWD wrote:. Anyway, a scenario, in which there is no German-Soviet war, is rather favorable for Germany, since the mass of resources dedicated in the reality to the war in the East, will be used against Britain.

LWD wrote: Historically, the German mechanized groups were the nemesis of the Red Army. .




These two statements are not correct

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Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front

#282

Post by detaf » 19 Jan 2015, 23:28

The russians had too good tanks T 34 and many men

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Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front

#283

Post by Alixanther » 20 Jan 2015, 16:37

1. Stalin would have not allowed Hitler another year to prepare. His mobilization was underway, at the peak they would have attacked no matter what. Once you get the ball rolling it's hard to stop it. The troops need food, oil, various other supplies. They cannot be maintained at full strength indefinitely. In all times mobilization meant war.

2. I'm in no position to tell which was the time chosen by Stalin to attack (he probably waited for a Sealion Operation to occur to maximize his chances) but I guess that in late Summer / early Autumn he would have attacked anyway.
Remember that Soviet officers had orders given to them as part of an offensive plan and, once Wehrmacht attacked, they tried to implement them.
In the Southern flank, they actually crossed the river Prut into Romania, fighting their way in, establishing bridgeheads. Would such an operation improve the defense of USSR? Of course not. It's obvious that was part of a bigger offensive plan which was thwarted by the German attack.

3. The myth of "unsuspecting Stalin" is similar to the myth of "surrounded Britain". The "unsuspecting Stalin" had given orders for the biggest mobilization in history of mankind, while the "surrounded Britain" stubbornly kept fighting: there was no moment when Germans would not make peace. Anything was good enough. If they did not want to negotiate, they obviously were in a better position than the Germans, which were blockaded on the continent. At no time was Britain cornered into submission. They did whatever they wanted. They wanted war and hell they got it.
Hitler saw the stubborness of the British and the menace of the Soviet mobilization in his rear and decided to attack them by surprise. He did good? He did bad? We cannot possibly know what a Soviet attack would have brought without the preemptive strike of the Wehrmacht. Maybe the whole Europe would have been sovietized, maybe U.S. would not have supported Stalin and instead would force Britain to make peace with Germany so the latter could focus on defending the continent. It's hard to tell.

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Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front

#284

Post by BDV » 20 Jan 2015, 21:01

I agree with Alixanther's posting on the offensive designs of Djugashivilli and his coterie of murderers.

However, IMO a reasonable argument can be made that the first thrust of the Soviet horde would have been into the Balkans and Tzarigrad, an old goal of Russia. Occupying the Romanian oilfields would have been just another handful of Schicklgruber's and Germany's short hairs in Koba's fist.

The conditions and goals of a second thrust are much more difficult to predict, but Stalin was (historically) both an opportunist and a bully, so the details of the developments in Western Europe would be the key to that.
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Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front

#285

Post by Erwinn » 22 Jan 2015, 15:00

Only good thing comes out of a Soviet attack - German counterattack scenario, is propaganda for Germans.

They might have gotten the support of many occupied countries, show Soviets as the real evil. Hell even USA and UK would re-consider their Lend Lease/Ally status with SU.

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