Germany winning on the Eastern Front

[LKofEnglish]

You would need to define "winning" first but absolutely yes the Germans not only could have knocked Russia out of the War in 1942 but why they didn't is still a very interesting question.

The Russians assumed incorrectly that come Springtime the Wehrmacht would amass all their forces in the Center for a final blow on Moscow...which is interesting since the Russians amassed all their forces in the South thus showing a total willingness to "throw Moscow to the Wolves" as it were. This created massive logistical challenges for the Red Army...something they did not handle well. The Germans meanwhile were not planning their final offensive against Moscow at all yet interestingly they completely failed to take notice that the Russians were planning their first offensive in the South as well. So much like Vietnam the two largest Armies found the!selves squaring off against each other literally by accident.

The Red Army struck first in what is known as the 2nd Battle of Kharkov...and were absolutely annihilated. Talk about bad intelligence! This "opened the door" so to speak for Hitler's Generals as now they knew the planning for Case Blue was sound and a dramatic battle for the City of Vorenzh unfolded...one that cost Field Marshall Beck his job because he was constantly giving reports that were far too optimistic. If not for Paulus' 6th Army Beck would have had a serious crisis in Southern Russia...as it was the 6th saved the day and utterly annihilated the Russian Army while crossing the Don. This resulted in the first order for retreat ever given by Stalin...although Russian historians debate this fact even today.

What we do know is Paulus had no enemy in front of him by July, 1942 and that the Stavka was more than just nervous that the Germans would not just reach the Volga but take and hold it.

Had Paulus succeeded in this that would have cut Russia in two with the Khuban Step to the South being a guarantor of security for Nazi Germany and all her allies. (The Khuban Step is perfect "tank country) and there would be no need to station an Army there to defend it.

Hitler miscalculated by dividing his forces and sending an entire Army South into the Caucuses...something he never needed to do.

The other blunder was wiping Sevastapol off the map. Once the Red Army attacked in 1943 Hitler had no way of defending the Crimea. (I think Putin today has committed an identical blunder actually.) Those were the best defenses in the World...and had Hitler ordered they be seized intact or not at all then World War 2 would have indeed turned out quite differently.

The German Navy was very slow to take advantage of their taking of the Crimea...and Goring simply didn't understand the importance of the Crimea to Germany's allies.

Interestingly the award for the taking of the Crimea was called " the Crimean Shield" though.

Interesting question and good comment stream. Much is still to be learned since the collapse of the USSR has opened up much in the way of previously unknown facts.

[ljadw]

This is not correct at all

One exemple:the Caucasus : the aim of Fall Blau was to capture the oil fields of the Caucasus, not Stalingrad :the fall of Stalingras would not have cut the SU in two .

[Boby]

This is not correct at all

One exemple:the Caucasus : the aim of Fall Blau was to capture the oil fields of the Caucasus, not Stalingrad :the fall of Stalingras would not have cut the SU in two .

Was not a grave mistake to split the offensive?

[randwick]

.
for the 1942 fighting season ,the soviet Stavka was working on the worst possible outcome for them ,
a direct concerted attack on Moscow , that would have forced them to bring all their forces to the area .
to be ready for the worst case was their whole logic .
Moscow was ( is ) the logistic center of Russia , from it forces could be dispatched everywhere , while gathering forces from other directions would have been more difficult , especially if some of the railways had been taken . it also was a great commissary center , freshly raised forces could be equipped there faster and better than in some far off province .

the soviet Stavka wasn't sure Hitler would send his forces South , there was intelligence , but intelligence could be fooled .
the opening of case blue was the crossing of the Volga , taking the Voronezh Bridge by an hair raising crazy armored raid could be the opening of a north swing to draw reserves ,the taking of Rostov was an indication too but the same could be said , was it the real offensive or a local action .
Until the bulk of German armor was committed to a Southern direction , thing were not so clear .
Still , reinforcements were send to Stalingrad quite early , not only was the Volga river traffic a major artery but railroad to the South were few , only two lines connected the region from Astrakhan to the Caucasus .
the soviets needed oil as much as the German .

The second battle of Kharkov was a big mistake , basically a spoiling attack , it grossly overestimated the RKKA offensive power ,underestimated the Wehrmacht recovery from the Winter fighting and exposed the miserable logistics and communication of the red army .
armies got wasted for very little gain .
taking Sebastopol was a necessity . taking it intact was just not going to happen , it would have to be stormed .
there was a thread about axis naval forces in the black sea ,basically no large units could be deployed there and if send there could not get out
it was S-boats and a quite sizable Italian squadron . more could have been done possibly but to claim the Kriegsmarine was slow overstate things

[ljadw]

This is not correct at all

One exemple:the Caucasus : the aim of Fall Blau was to capture the oil fields of the Caucasus, not Stalingrad :the fall of Stalingras would not have cut the SU in two .

Was not a grave mistake to split the offensive?

NO ,because

A ) It was not split : The Caucasus was the principal aim, the Wolga (not Stalingrad ) was secundary, but necessary to protect the flancks of AGA :thus there was no split

B ) More forces for AGA would not have helped AGA ,the same for AGB .

The problem was distance : 1000 km from Rostov to Baku : it was impossible to do this with a big army, but OTOH it was impossible to defeat the opposing Soviet forces with small forces : thus the Germans hoped to defeat the opposing Soviet forces in a few weeks and than to go to the oil fields with small forces (the analogy with Barbarossa is striking),but EVERYTHING would depend on the ability of the Soviets to reinforce their forces ,if they could do it, Blau was doomed, if the Soviets collapsed in the first weeks, Blau was feasible .

But there was nothing the Germans could do about it, only hoping that their dreams would come true.

As for Barbarossa, the outcome of Blau depended on the Soviets . On the Soviets only .

[Boby]

Split = both Stalingrad (or the Volga) and the Caucasus at the SAME time. Was not Blau originally (April directive) to be launched in four phases, the last one being the Caucasus?

Regards

[ljadw]

It had to be at the same time : the Germans were short on time :if they first went for the Wolga,there would be no time to go to Baku,and if they first went to Baku , there was no time to go to the Wolga .

Distance Rostov/Stalingrad :some 400 km,distance Rostov/Baku some 1000 km .

On 3 august, the vanguard of AG A comprised only light mobile forces and most of the tanks lagged behind due to the lack of fuel and supply breakdowns .If AGA had been able to defeat decisively the opposing Soviet forces and if the Soviets had not been able to replace their losses, this (situation on 3 august) would not have been a problem: the light mobile forces could have advanced to Baku .

It was the same for AGB.

[Boby]

But that was decided by Hitler with Directive 45. He felt the soviets were mostly beaten:
http://der-fuehrer.org/reden/deutsch/We ... -07-23.htm

Until now he stick to original plan. But, Gehlen survey of early August warned that RKKA was creating a lot of new units. Deaf ears from the FHQu.

[Boby]

Here are some FHO material pre- and during Blau
http://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/ru/n ... ect/zoom/4

[Boby]

I think this is the document I was referring:
http://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/ru/n ... ect/zoom/4

[ljadw]

But that was decided by Hitler with Directive 45. He felt the soviets were mostly beaten:
http://der-fuehrer.org/reden/deutsch/We ... -07-23.htm

Until now he stick to original plan. But, Gehlen survey of early August warned that RKKA was creating a lot of new units. Deaf ears from the FHQu.

That the RKKA was creating new units was something meaningless until these new units would be committed during Blau .

And a few days before the start of Uranus,FHO was still talking about a big Soviet offensive against AGC .

[Boby]

That the RKKA was creating new units was something meaningless until these new units would be committed during Blau .

Of course they were! Look at the Anlage 1 of the document.

As for Gehlen's predictions of November, this is irrelevant. We are talking of July/August situation.

[Boby]

http://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/ru/n ... ect/zoom/5

[mezsat2]

Reinforcing the northern and southern flanks of heeresgruppe B during Stalingrad could have changed alot and maybe even allowed the wehrmacht to capture stalingrad.

Maybe OKW should have forced the Rumanians and Italians (along with maybe a few fanatical SS battalions as enforcers) into Stalingrad to fight it out in the sewers and let the Wehrmacht defend the flanks. That would seem to have been a more rational use of the available forces.

[ljadw]

And how would they have done this ?