Appleknocker27 wrote:ljadw wrote:Appleknocker27 wrote:ljadw wrote:NO : you said clearly that pre-war forces were better than recruits and reservists called up during the war,that they had more experience which means : war experience .
And you have NO proof that qualitatively the 800000 men lost in 1941 were better than those available in june 1942 for Blau .
"
The spring of 1942, by which time the Russian winter counter-offensive had ended, found the German Army as spent force, incapable of undertaking major military operations. German divisions on the Eastern Front, with several exceptions, consisted of a reinforced regiment of Infantry, usually four or five battalions of Infantry, few if any heavy weapons, a handful of engineers, about 20 light howitzers, and a rather large contingent of support troops. Raw conscripts or recently transferred rear area support troops often replaced the fallen combat veterans in the Infantry companies, and Infantry companies consisted of anywhere from 30-80 men, rather than the authorized 191 men. Russian terrain was unsuitable for western motor vehicles and the German Army had littered the Russian countryside with broken vehicles. The German General Staff as early as November 18, 1941, began the process of taking motor vehicles away from the Infantry's supply, anti-tank, and engineer units. And the German economy could not provide sufficient vehicles to refit all of the army's panzer divisions. The Russian campaign (Barbarossa) had reduced the German Army in quality and quantity."
PG 163 of
http://www.amazon.com/Forgotten-Legions ... 0275902358
What I stated all along in this thread is fact, now you have a quote from a very reliable source. Beyond any doubt, you will not admit error in this thread or any other, so this post is for the few that are following it, just to make sure you lead non astray...
To be clear, the Infantry battalions in the Infantry divisions bore the majority of casualties during Barbarossa. Their losses as a percentage of total strength are disproportionate to the losses suffered by any other branch in the army. The Ersatz army/replacement system was completely overwhelmed and could not provide nearly enough properly trained Infantrymen to refill all German Infantry divisions. Therefore, maximum effort was made to fill the units intended for Blau, while most of the rest of the divisions on the Eastern front took a back seat. The to experienced NCOs, specialists and junior officers was catastrophic and irreplaceable.
Why would Lewis be a very reliable source ? Someone reliable would not use as argument the strength of the Ostheer immediately after the winter campaign ,to pontificate that the WM was very weak in the summer .Only a few divisions were fully operational in march 1942, but much more were operational in the summer,besides the discussion is not if the WM was spent during Barbarossa,but if the Barbarossa losses were influencing the outcome of Blau,implying that less Barbarossa losses would increase the chance of Blau to succeed. And : THIS IS NOT SO .
That the rest of the divisions on the Eastern Front took a set back is totally irrelevant for the outcome of Blau : these divisions were not used for Blau .
What Lewis is saying (a lot of meaningless generalities) can not be used in a discussion for the outcome of Blau . Blau started with 60 divisions and failed,if it started with 70 divisions, it also would fail.
Lol....
Barbarossa had how many army groups on how many different axis of advance vs Blau? Hmmmm, now was Blau a much smaller operation and the other 2 army groups static?
You cannot avoid the effect of barbarossa's losses on the combat capability of the ostheer in 1942. No matter how much you try to reframe and obfuscate...
Red herring : the question is NOT the effect of Barbarossa losses on the combat capability of the Ostheer in 1942, but the effect of Barbarossa losses on the outcome of Blau .Only a part of the 1942 Ostheer participated on Blau and the Ostheer of 1942 was NOT the Ostheer of 1941 .
If the other 2 army groups were not static,is also a red herring.
60 divisions participated in Blau,only these divisions must be involved in the discussion,the composition of these divisions was different from 1941 (the losses were only a minor cause),but the opposing forces were also different,and the mission of the German forces was also different ,thus the linear explanation is wrong and suspicious : you can not transport the Ostheer of 1941 to 1942.
The losses were only a minor cause : only the killed and missing left the East definitively, and they were only a minority of those who left : a big part of the wounded returned, and a very big part of the non wounded also left .
The LSS left the east in the summer of 1942= more non wounded/killed /missing left than casualties .
If there were less casualties there would also be less replacements .
In may/june 1940,the Germans lost 150000 men : it is not so that if they had lost only 100000 men, there would be 50000 men more for the Ostheer in june 1941.
It is the same for weapons and war material :til 5 august 1941 the Ostheer had lost 914 tanks,it is not so that if they had lost only 614 tanks, 300 more tanks would have been available for Blau .
If inmay/june 1940 the LW had lost less aircraft, this would not have resulted in more aircraft for Blau .
