Hitler's war against Germany
Hitler's war against Germany
Hitler as monument to a human blindness. Throughout all war he made strategic mistakes. And instead of calling things by their proper names, historians find silly explanations for simple things. For example, in 1942 Hitler put main on the Caucasus. To Baku, an ultimate goal of operation there were 1200 km. Germans were in 120 km from Moscow and in suburbs of Leningrad. Why Hitler refused to take Moscow and Leningrad? It is really so difficult to understand, what it simply imitated operations waiting for defeat of Germany? In 1945 the best divisions SS were in Hungary when the Soviet armies were in 60 km from Berlin. The German armies at the time of capitulation were in Norway, Italy, Latvia, Yugoslavia. Why they there were when battles were conducted in the territory of Germany? Obviously not to give the chance to strengthen defense density.
Main issue. Why Hitler needed defeat of Germany in war. Options different, there can be Austrian Hitler hated Germany and wanted it to destroy. Or he was the supporter of the New World Order.
In life and such it happens. Hitler arranged war to put to Germany the worst that can occur at the state defeat in war.
I wrote it, the majority will apprehend with laughter. As it is ridiculous, Hitler wanted defeat of Germany in war. Such doesn't happen in the nature. Such course of events is excluded by mankind history! ? But after all there was a traitor Arminius. It brought 3 Roman legions to the wood where they were completely destroyed. 2000 years later Hitler too did with the German armies.
Main issue. Why Hitler needed defeat of Germany in war. Options different, there can be Austrian Hitler hated Germany and wanted it to destroy. Or he was the supporter of the New World Order.
In life and such it happens. Hitler arranged war to put to Germany the worst that can occur at the state defeat in war.
I wrote it, the majority will apprehend with laughter. As it is ridiculous, Hitler wanted defeat of Germany in war. Such doesn't happen in the nature. Such course of events is excluded by mankind history! ? But after all there was a traitor Arminius. It brought 3 Roman legions to the wood where they were completely destroyed. 2000 years later Hitler too did with the German armies.
Re: Hitler's war against Germany
As fixed matches are played. In tennis and war.Said British tennis player Andy Murray. Several times to get to a grid, to make a double mistake. And to play all match on the honest. As well Hitler. In 1942 sent Germans to the Caucasus,divided on July 23 offensive to 2 parts, in the Caucasus also divided into 2 parts offensive. For months Russians and Germans were at war as it is necessary to the parties in war. Hitler sometimes corrected a course of operations not in favor of Germans. For example, according to its personal instruction in decisive phases of battles panzer corps on other sectors of the front were thrown.
Re: Hitler's war against Germany
Hitler to Germans these smiles
http://militera.lib.ru/memo/german/guderian/11.html
The device behind the front page of the defense (HKL — "Hauptkampflinie") created in usual fighting conditions also of the second strip of defense ("Grosskampflinie") on which it would be possible to lean in large defensive battles was one of the most important requirements of the front. Front commanders demanded that approximately in 20 km in the back from a first line of the front page of defense the positions strong, carefully disguised and taken by armies were built for conducting large battles. Further, they wished to receive instructions on defense which would grant them the right just before the beginning of artillery training of the opponent, to depart the main forces on the second strip of defense, leaving on the first [517] only small cover. Such maneuver would make artillery preparation it absolutely vain, would nullify all long preparations of the opponent for expansion of the forces, would force it to encounter well prepared boundary of defense and to recede. There is no doubt that this requirement was quite reasonable. I studied it and reported on Hitler. He flew into a rage and absolutely refused to be reconciled with such situation when without fight wanted to leave the territory of 20 km in depth. Hitler ordered to create the main line of resistance in 2 — 4 km from a first line of defense. At return of this senseless order it completely lived on memories of World War I, and no arguments could force it to refuse the decision. This mistake very strongly made itself felt when in January, 1945 Russian it was succeeded to carry out break, and reserves, besides according to Hitler's categorical order and contrary to my council, were tightened close to a front line. First line of defense, the main line of resistance and reserves — everything got at once under blows of Russians and was at the same time overturned. Hitler's anger addressed now on the people building strengthenings and when I began to object it — as well on me. He ordered to bring the shorthand report of the meeting held in the fall of 1944 at which position of the main line of resistance as now he started claiming was discussed that always stood up for distance in 20 km. "What fool can order such nonsense? " I paid its attention that it made it. Brought and became to read to the shorthand report. But after several offers he ordered to stop reading. It was clear self-incrimination. Unfortunately, the advantage in it wasn't as break of the front was the come true fact.
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/s ... clnk&gl=by
The early morning of 12 January 1945 was cold, foggy and overcast. Ice was forming on the roads, and after a short while, snow began to fall in great amounts. The silence of the early morning was broken at about 0130 hours by the earth-shattering reports that marked the opening barrage of the Vistula-Oder Campaign.
Koniev massed some 420 guns per mile of front, concentrating them on the northern 20 miles of the 48th Panzer Corps sector. The initial barrage was short but powerful,raining hundreds of thousands o frounds on the forward German positions.
The effects were devastating. The fires pulverized men,equipment and fighting positions. At about 0500 hours, the artillery shifted the fires to a strip pattern, and Soviet forces began their advance with forward battalion-sized detachments of infantry with some armor support. These forces easily took the forward positions and saw the effects of their own massed artillery offensive.
According to S. Borzenko, a battle-front Pravda correspondent:
"The infantrymen soon reached the enemy's forward positions and broke into the first line of trenches. Here they saw the results of the artillery preparation. Disfigured bodies of Germans, shreds of clothing [and]splinters of smashed logs lay every where. Those German soldiers who remained after the artillery barrage offered very little resistance.They were stunned by the hurricane of fire which had swept over their positions. Blood streamed from their noses and ears. "("Launching the New Offensive," "Information Bulletin,"Embassy of the USSR, Volume V,Number 8; Washington, D.C., 1945)
Once in their initial positions,the forward detachments went to ground in anticipation of German artillery fire. The Soviets then conducted a second longer and more powerful prep. It lasted for an hour and 47 minutes and was, according to Marshal Koniev, "So powerful, judging from a number of captured documents, that it seemed to the enemy to have lasted for at least five hours" (Koniev, Sorok Piatyi,Moscow,1966).
German forces in the second and third lines of defense came under fire and were severely mauled. German Captain Reinhardt Mueller, whose battalion occupied positions in the 3d defensive line, said the Soviet barrage decimated many of the defending units: "I began the operation with an understrength battalion.After the smoke of the Soviet prep cleared, all I had left was a severely depleted company. Many of the survivors were dazed, disoriented and bleeding. I had [only] a platoon of combat effective soldiers left." (Captain Sims interviewed the late Mueller in West Germany in 1984. Mueller was a battalion commander in the 68th Infantry Division at the Sandomierz Bridgehead in January 1945.)
The Fourth Panzer Army forward reserve became demoralized and was temporarily combat ineffective. The Fourth Panzer Army command post suffered heavy damage from Koniev's long-range artillery strikes, reducing German command and control effectiveness. Huge gaps were torn throughout the German defenses. The Germans, caught forward without a chance to withdraw their defending forces out of artillery range, were decimated.
http://militera.lib.ru/memo/german/guderian/11.html
The device behind the front page of the defense (HKL — "Hauptkampflinie") created in usual fighting conditions also of the second strip of defense ("Grosskampflinie") on which it would be possible to lean in large defensive battles was one of the most important requirements of the front. Front commanders demanded that approximately in 20 km in the back from a first line of the front page of defense the positions strong, carefully disguised and taken by armies were built for conducting large battles. Further, they wished to receive instructions on defense which would grant them the right just before the beginning of artillery training of the opponent, to depart the main forces on the second strip of defense, leaving on the first [517] only small cover. Such maneuver would make artillery preparation it absolutely vain, would nullify all long preparations of the opponent for expansion of the forces, would force it to encounter well prepared boundary of defense and to recede. There is no doubt that this requirement was quite reasonable. I studied it and reported on Hitler. He flew into a rage and absolutely refused to be reconciled with such situation when without fight wanted to leave the territory of 20 km in depth. Hitler ordered to create the main line of resistance in 2 — 4 km from a first line of defense. At return of this senseless order it completely lived on memories of World War I, and no arguments could force it to refuse the decision. This mistake very strongly made itself felt when in January, 1945 Russian it was succeeded to carry out break, and reserves, besides according to Hitler's categorical order and contrary to my council, were tightened close to a front line. First line of defense, the main line of resistance and reserves — everything got at once under blows of Russians and was at the same time overturned. Hitler's anger addressed now on the people building strengthenings and when I began to object it — as well on me. He ordered to bring the shorthand report of the meeting held in the fall of 1944 at which position of the main line of resistance as now he started claiming was discussed that always stood up for distance in 20 km. "What fool can order such nonsense? " I paid its attention that it made it. Brought and became to read to the shorthand report. But after several offers he ordered to stop reading. It was clear self-incrimination. Unfortunately, the advantage in it wasn't as break of the front was the come true fact.
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/s ... clnk&gl=by
The early morning of 12 January 1945 was cold, foggy and overcast. Ice was forming on the roads, and after a short while, snow began to fall in great amounts. The silence of the early morning was broken at about 0130 hours by the earth-shattering reports that marked the opening barrage of the Vistula-Oder Campaign.
Koniev massed some 420 guns per mile of front, concentrating them on the northern 20 miles of the 48th Panzer Corps sector. The initial barrage was short but powerful,raining hundreds of thousands o frounds on the forward German positions.
The effects were devastating. The fires pulverized men,equipment and fighting positions. At about 0500 hours, the artillery shifted the fires to a strip pattern, and Soviet forces began their advance with forward battalion-sized detachments of infantry with some armor support. These forces easily took the forward positions and saw the effects of their own massed artillery offensive.
According to S. Borzenko, a battle-front Pravda correspondent:
"The infantrymen soon reached the enemy's forward positions and broke into the first line of trenches. Here they saw the results of the artillery preparation. Disfigured bodies of Germans, shreds of clothing [and]splinters of smashed logs lay every where. Those German soldiers who remained after the artillery barrage offered very little resistance.They were stunned by the hurricane of fire which had swept over their positions. Blood streamed from their noses and ears. "("Launching the New Offensive," "Information Bulletin,"Embassy of the USSR, Volume V,Number 8; Washington, D.C., 1945)
Once in their initial positions,the forward detachments went to ground in anticipation of German artillery fire. The Soviets then conducted a second longer and more powerful prep. It lasted for an hour and 47 minutes and was, according to Marshal Koniev, "So powerful, judging from a number of captured documents, that it seemed to the enemy to have lasted for at least five hours" (Koniev, Sorok Piatyi,Moscow,1966).
German forces in the second and third lines of defense came under fire and were severely mauled. German Captain Reinhardt Mueller, whose battalion occupied positions in the 3d defensive line, said the Soviet barrage decimated many of the defending units: "I began the operation with an understrength battalion.After the smoke of the Soviet prep cleared, all I had left was a severely depleted company. Many of the survivors were dazed, disoriented and bleeding. I had [only] a platoon of combat effective soldiers left." (Captain Sims interviewed the late Mueller in West Germany in 1984. Mueller was a battalion commander in the 68th Infantry Division at the Sandomierz Bridgehead in January 1945.)
The Fourth Panzer Army forward reserve became demoralized and was temporarily combat ineffective. The Fourth Panzer Army command post suffered heavy damage from Koniev's long-range artillery strikes, reducing German command and control effectiveness. Huge gaps were torn throughout the German defenses. The Germans, caught forward without a chance to withdraw their defending forces out of artillery range, were decimated.
Re: Hitler's war against Germany
68,168,304 infantry divisions covered a 60-km sector of the front. 13,52,3G,5G soviet armies attacked by 39 km,including 22 km line of defense 68 id.4 armies against 3 divisions.At the same time in Kurland were 32 divisions, which Hitler forbade to transfer to Germany.
http://www.olaf-kaul.de/jk/id291baranowbrueckenkopf.pdf
32 divisions in this hole
http://www.gutenberg-e.org/esk01/maps/L ... n45_lg.jpg
http://www.olaf-kaul.de/jk/id291baranowbrueckenkopf.pdf
32 divisions in this hole
http://www.gutenberg-e.org/esk01/maps/L ... n45_lg.jpg
Re: Hitler's war against Germany
And how many Soviet forces? They were in Kurland and not on the central sector. If HItler decided simply to transfer Kurland forces to the rest of the Ostfront, these Soviet forces would also be free to atack them. And the gain would be? HItler have at least an strategy on 1944: to retain some sectors of the front and wait for new submarines and planes. The alternative GEnerals offered him was simply retreat, retreat and retreat.At the same time in Kurland were 32 divisions, which Hitler forbade to transfer to Germany.
Re: Hitler's war against Germany
It's true he made but strategic mistakes, but is there any evidence that this was done deliberately? According to this book: http://www.amazon.co.uk/How-Hitler-Coul ... 0609808443 Hitler came to trust his "intuition" after he decided to not listen to his generals on the western campaign in 1940. (the book is not perfect - see the review below for a summary of what else it could have said).
Re: Hitler's war against Germany
In defense the main quantity of machine guns and artillery on front kilometer. Rate of fire of a machine gun 600 shots in a minute. The soldier with a rifle in attack can hope only that the bullet won't get to him or a splinter. In March 1943 after front reduction near Moscow with 530 to 200 km Germans released 22 divisions on other sectors of the front.Boby wrote:And how many Soviet forces? They were in Kurland and not on the central sector. If HItler decided simply to transfer Kurland forces to the rest of the Ostfront, these Soviet forces would also be free to atack them. And the gain would be? HItler have at least an strategy on 1944: to retain some sectors of the front and wait for new submarines and planes. The alternative GEnerals offered him was simply retreat, retreat and retreat.At the same time in Kurland were 32 divisions, which Hitler forbade to transfer to Germany.
Generals in 1944 didn't want to retreat everywhere, they insisted on strengthening density of defense on the central direction. Exactly there the German defense was especially weak.
Planes and submarines it you to Germans attributed such strategy. Only the German divisions could change course of war.
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schlacht_v ... elbewegung
Re: Hitler's war against Germany
Hitler never admitted it and and not his memoirs. It is possible to be mistaken several times but if each decision in favor of the opponent, is an occasion to reflect. Even at the end of war Hitler shocked generals with the decisions. Strategic offensive in March 1945 in Hungary same absurdity. Only not to use a division SS near Berlin.Cerdic wrote:It's true he made but strategic mistakes, but is there any evidence that this was done deliberately? According to this book: http://www.amazon.co.uk/How-Hitler-Coul ... 0609808443 Hitler came to trust his "intuition" after he decided to not listen to his generals on the western campaign in 1940. (the book is not perfect - see the review below for a summary of what else it could have said).
Manstein was the author of idea break through Ardennes. Even if Hitler awarded the success itself, is no reason why he then took the decision that led to disaster at the front.
http://lib.rus.ec/b/283457/read
On February 17 opponent from area Komarno struck sudden blow to the armies of the 7th Guards army defending base on right river bank Gron to the north of Estergom. On February 24 the army was compelled to depart for the left coast, and the general M. S. Shumilov received personal reprimand for carelessness and the bad organization of defense against the Supreme Commander. The Soviet sources claim that the enemy threw into fight about 400 tanks and assault tools that, considering a condition of the German divisions, couldn't be physically. But it isn't important, than generals — bad weather or a mogutnost of the opponent justify the defeat. News about participation in the German counterstroke of the 1st and 12th tank divisions SS became the real sensation. It meant that in the Western Hungary the 6th tank army SS materialized.
Our strategists expected it anywhere — directly on the Berlin direction, on flanks at Konev or Zhukov — but only not here. However, Anglo-Americans similarly thought. So, on February 20 the chief of a staff of the American army George Marshall told to the chief of the General Staff general A. I. Antonov that the opponent prepares for counterattack and creates on East front two groups: one — in Pomerania for blow on Thorn, another — in the area Vienna, Moravska Ostrava for approach in the direction of Lodz. Thus in the southern group inclusion of the 6th tank army SS was supposed. Similar data arrived earlier and from English command. The chief of a staff of the front general S. P. Ivanov tells that when it report to Moscow about concentration of large tank group of the enemy near the Lake Balaton, him considered as the mystifier:"Even the chief of the General Staff general A. I. Antonov, talking on VCh to the Front commander F. I. Tolbukhin, puzzly I asked: "Who can believe you, what Hitler removed the 6th tank army SS from the West and directed against the 3rd Ukrainian front, instead of under Berlin where the last operation on defeat of fascist armies prepares? " It was valid, difficult to believe that the opponent in conditions when the Soviet armies were in 60 km from Berlin, will throw the tank connections to Hungary and to organize there counterattack".
Any of investigations didn't get into Hitler who has ordered in the second half of January to direct esesovsky army of Josef Dietrich's from Ardennes on the most southern site of East front next ingenious plan.
The purpose been born in the head of the Fuhrer of operation with a code name "Spring awakening" was: within 10–12 days into smithereens to crush armies of the marshal of Tolbukhin and to reject them for Danube. Then tank divisions it was planned to throw for the central direction.
Hitler with aplomb claimed that Stalin has a number of outstanding military leaders, but — any strategist, after all, be differently, "the Soviet blow would be struck not to the baranovsky base, and in Hungary". However, own generals too badly understood the Fuhrer. For example, "father" of armies SS, oberstgruppenfyurer Paul Hausser:
"While the Supreme command of ground forces offered operation on a latching of the opponent in "pincers" from Silesia and Pomerania, the Supreme command of Wehrmacht ordered to involve army in Hungary. Not here the war outcome was turned! The military-economic reasons, oil at the Lake Balaton weren't the sufficient basis for such strategy. Thus, at the end of January the order on an army transfer from the Western front was given. Situation on the railroad allowed to transport at the same time only four echelons therefore the staff of army arrived to the region of the Slave (Dyyor) on February 20, the last parts — only at the beginning of March".
Re: Hitler's war against Germany
How Hitler could have won WW2.Very simply.
On May 15, 1942 to attack on the central direction,which was 47% of Soviet rifle divisions. 3 weeks to destroy them, for two months to occupy the territory of European Russia. In May-July on the southern flank Germans captured 1.5 million Soviet soldiers. Could be much greater if the main direction was Moscow.
In 1943, the maximum allowance to send to the eastern front. Destroy the Kursk salient in April, further advance towards Moscow.
In 1942-1943 without Hitler's intervention in the army affairs Germany could win the war in 60 days. The Soviet armies were helpless to reflect the German offensive in the direction of the main blow.
On May 15, 1942 to attack on the central direction,which was 47% of Soviet rifle divisions. 3 weeks to destroy them, for two months to occupy the territory of European Russia. In May-July on the southern flank Germans captured 1.5 million Soviet soldiers. Could be much greater if the main direction was Moscow.
In 1943, the maximum allowance to send to the eastern front. Destroy the Kursk salient in April, further advance towards Moscow.
In 1942-1943 without Hitler's intervention in the army affairs Germany could win the war in 60 days. The Soviet armies were helpless to reflect the German offensive in the direction of the main blow.
Re: Hitler's war against Germany
The Germans did not capture 1.5 million Soviets in may/june 1942.
You are only joking of course.
You are only joking of course.
- Ironmachine
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Re: Hitler's war against Germany
IMHO, winning the war would take them 61 days, not 60.werd wrote:In 1942-1943 without Hitler's intervention in the army affairs Germany could win the war in 60 days.
So nothing changed between 1942 and 1943, the Germans had the option to win the war in just 60 days in either of those two years?
Re: Hitler's war against Germany
According to German documents 5,754,000 prisoners.ljadw wrote:The Germans did not capture 1.5 million Soviets in may/june 1942.
You are only joking of course.
1941 - 3355 thousand, 1942 - 1653, 1943 - 565 , 1944 - 147 , 1945 - 34
250,000 in May-July 1942 in the Crimea, 240t in Kharkov. And 700-800 thousand during operation "Blau".
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_ ... POW_deaths
On July 23 Hitler made a strategic mistake, having divided offensive into 2 parts. The Caucasus and Stalingrad attacked at the same time.And many other mistakes.
Re: Hitler's war against Germany
IMHO - the Russian word. In Spain live many Ukrainians. In 1943 changed nothing. In July Germans attacked the Kursk ledge, the most strengthened place in the world. Conceding defending in number, they sustained losses 5-10 times smaller.Ironmachine wrote:IMHO, winning the war would take them 61 days, not 60.werd wrote:In 1942-1943 without Hitler's intervention in the army affairs Germany could win the war in 60 days.
So nothing changed between 1942 and 1943, the Germans had the option to win the war in just 60 days in either of those two years?
Hitler had to cut off a ledge in April. In May to attack Moscow and Leningrad. Manstein and Model considered delay fatal.
April, May, June Hitler waited and it was a mistake. Formation of 40 new divisions in the West in April-August for defense "the fortress of Europe" also was the wrong decision. It was necessary to achieve a resolute victory in the east.
Re: Hitler's war against Germany
Official Soviet statistics understated casualties, it is confirmed by demographic research.Military casualties about 20 million, 2.5 times higher than the official figures.
мужчин - men ; женщин - women
http://www.soldat.ru/news/937.html
мужчин - men ; женщин - women
http://www.soldat.ru/news/937.html