Strategic Options After Kursk

[ChrisDR68]

We all know that in the original timeline once the battle of Kursk was over in July 1943 the story on the eastern front was one of almost constant Soviet advances and victories and German defeats and retreat.

With the benefit of hindsight could the German forces in the east have changed the situation with a different command structure and/or strategies and forced the Soviets to at least a standstill before the crushing defeats of Operation Bagration ended all German hopes in 1944?

[ljadw]

Answze : NO

[steverodgers801]

The battle of caused not just tank casualties, the amount is debatable, but the crucial was in infantry losses. The Germans no longer had the men to hold a solid line. Manstein likes to claim that if he had been allowed to do the same defense as he had earlier in 1943 he could have won the war, but that is dependent on the Soviets attacking exactly where expected and taking no steps to control their advance. Bagration in 1944 was the example of the Soviets letting the Germans think they would attack in one area and then hitting another first.

[werd]

The battle of caused not just tank casualties, the amount is debatable, but the crucial was in infantry losses. The Germans no longer had the men to hold a solid line. Manstein likes to claim that if he had been allowed to do the same defense as he had earlier in 1943 he could have won the war, but that is dependent on the Soviets attacking exactly where expected and taking no steps to control their advance. Bagration in 1944 was the example of the Soviets letting the Germans think they would attack in one area and then hitting another first.

on the east/west divisions, number in thousands

1.07.1943 168/75; 3115/1369. In addition to these armies divisions SS and Luftwaffe 18/15

01.02.1944 the number of army in the east 2366t. In 7 months it was reduced by 25%.

1.06.1944 157/128 55/45%

http://94.242.221.125/bookreader.php/13 ... 3-1945.pdf


Manstein insisted on carrying out offensive operations on east front before disembarkation of allies in Normandy. Hitler considered that it is necessary to save up reserves in the West, to crush allies. If distribution of forces depended on Manstein, from 128 divisions which were in the West,60 in the spring 1944 could appear in the east for carrying out large offensive against Russians.

About Bagration following items:

1 . Wehrmacht command from investigation knew that in the summer 1944 Russians in Belarus attack earlier, than in Ukraine.
2 . Command of army group Centre considered impossible to reflect offensive and asked Hitler to take away armies to Berezina, having reduced the front by 240 km. To increase defense density, create reserves. Hitler forbade.
3 . In the first days of offensive there was an opportunity to take away armies to the west, but Hitler resolved only when Russians deeply held in the rear and an exit from a copper became impossible.

[ChrisDR68]

In the D&C book "The Eastern Front" it states that in December 1943 the correlation of forces on the Eastern Front was as follows: 5.6 million troops to 4.9 million and 5600 tanks to 5400 both in favour of the Soviets (page 170).

I'm a little suspicious of these numbers as they seem to be too close to each other but if they are accurate then it seems to me that the German strategic position in the east was far from hopeless at this point in the war.

Had Hitler appointed a commander-in-chief east at this time (possibly either Model or Von Manstein) who had the power to move forces from one army group to another in good time to face potential Soviet offensives then I think it may have been possible to wear down the Red Army to a much greater degree than actually happened in reality.

Of course what the Germans really needed was an armoured strategic reserve to counter punch any Soviet breakthroughs. With most new panzers going west in anticipation of an Allied landing in France creating this reserve was problematic at best.

[BDV]

No, not Manstein.

The guy should have NEVER been given a command above infantry corps. Never.

[ljadw]

With most new panzers going west in anticipation of an Allied landing in France creating this reserve was problematic at best.

Did they ?

[ljadw]

In the D&C book "The Eastern Front" it states that in December 1943 the correlation of forces on the Eastern Front was as follows: 5.6 million troops to 4.9 million and 5600 tanks to 5400 both in favour of the Soviets (page 170).

I'm a little suspicious of these numbers as they seem to be too close to each other

These numbers are prit-prat:

strength of the Ostheer on 1 october 1943 (without WSS and LWField) :2.564.000

On 1 january 1944:Ostheer : 2.528.000 Red Army :5.57 million

The tank numbers also are prit-prat

From the late Ron Klages on Feldgrau :

Panzerstrength on 31 december 1943:

PzII:62

Pz III:196

Pz 38(t):13

PzIV : 841 (different types)

Pz V : 349

Pz VI:232

Flamm panzer III: 21

Befehlpz:135


Total : 1849

As it is obvious that the German allies did not have 3600 tanks in the east,the number of 5400 for the Axis is tittle-tattle.

[BDV]

strength of the Ostheer on 1 october 1943 (without WSS and LWField) :2.564.000

Add a few hundred thousand Romanian/Hungarian/Finnish. WSS should count too, as should all LW personnel.

TOTAL axis forces on the Ostfront are what ~3.5 million?

[ljadw]

Something like this,but,it never could be 4.9 million

[ChrisDR68]

No, not Manstein.

The guy should have NEVER been given a command above infantry corps. Never.

Most of what I've read on WWII has Von Manstein as one of the Reich's best strategist. What gives you such a negative view of his abilities?

[BDV]

"BDV":
No, not Manstein.
The guy should have NEVER been given a command above infantry corps. Never.

Most of what I've read on WWII has Von Manstein as one of the Reich's best strategist. What gives you such a negative view of his abilities?

Well, there is that little remebered campain in Ukraine in 43-44, which basically lost Ukraine and truly broke the OstFront (and the fiasco in Kuban before hand). And his unabashed penchant for extermination and quasipaternal care for his exterminating underlings (so that they are not shortchanged of the loot).

But, his claims (HIM!) that AGN could have just waltzed in Leningrad, that's what showed me that he just pulled stuff out of his ass. In truth, I am not aware of a bigger liar among Adolf's gang of exterminators.

[hauptman]

No one could have salvaged the Ukraine in 43-44. HGS was simply too weak especially in infantry to hold the like anywhere. Rhzev showed that the Wehrmacht needed sizable reserves to hold a line. HGS was the weakest HG compared in the east in context to the length of the front. Also, being the most open and hence vulnerable to mobile attack, HGS would have needed more infantry and mobile units to approach the defensive successes in HGN and HGM.

The Red Army was able to penetrate the defensive lines of HGS almost at will, again due to the lack of reserves. BDV whatever personal grudge you have against v. Manstein obviously has clouded your judgement of him. As for his ability, his record speaks for itself.

[steverodgers801]

he did some good stuff, especially after Stalingrad, but his claims that he could have singlehandedly won the war belong with Guderians claims that he was never a Nazi.

[ljadw]