Strategic Options After Kursk
Re: Strategic Options After Kursk
It almost certainly wouldn't have changed the way the war went in 1945 very much but what would have been the effect of Germany using the 1000 panzers and 250,000 troops on an eastern front offensive in December 1944 instead of in the Ardennes?
I'm thinking probably in terms of it being launched in northern Poland with a duel purpose. To surround and capture or destroy as much Soviet armour as possible in that region and to link up with the cut off units of Army Group North enabling it to withdraw west to the Konigberg area thus reinforcing the German front line there.
I'm thinking probably in terms of it being launched in northern Poland with a duel purpose. To surround and capture or destroy as much Soviet armour as possible in that region and to link up with the cut off units of Army Group North enabling it to withdraw west to the Konigberg area thus reinforcing the German front line there.
Re: Strategic Options After Kursk
Apologies for the late reply, I just returned from two weeks on the road.AJFFM wrote:Out of a simple research I made:
The drive from Paris to the Rhine took 5 months in which the US took something like 50k KIA alone. The drive from the Rhine to the Czech borders took 50 days in which American troops took over all in all of the NWTO (which include combat in Northern Germany too) the total casualties of April and May of 45 (including KIA and backdate reporting) was 53k men which was less than the total for March alone for the whole Atlantic theatre (Adj. Report p.6, summary).
So I think gross numbers speak for themselves.
Too simple I'm afraid.
The drive from Paris (25 August 1944) to the Rhine (7 March 1945) was 6 months and ten days. In the six whole months between those dates - September, October, November, December, January, February - there were 56,597 KIA in the ETO, including the AAF. I.e., 9,432.8333 per month.
The drive from the Rhine (7 March 1945) to the end of the war (7 May 1945) was 61 days. In the two whole months between those dates - March, April - there were 18,477 KIA. I.e., 9,238.5 per "month".
Please explain to me exactly how 9,432.8333 versus 9,238.5 - a change of 2.06018% - indicates a desire by the Germans to surrender rather than fight in the later period?
So yes in fact I also believe the exact numbers speak for themselves...
BTW, what exactly is "backdate reporting"?
Re: OstFront Supremo
You may always try to explain how Manstein could have held the Ukraine in 1943. As the 17 th army was not part of his command he had nothing to do with the Kuban which was not a fiasco either.BDV wrote:ChrisDR68 wrote: "BDV":
No, not Manstein.
The guy should have NEVER been given a command above infantry corps. Never.
Most of what I've read on WWII has Von Manstein as one of the Reich's best strategist. What gives you such a negative view of his abilities?
Well, there is that little remebered campain in Ukraine in 43-44, which basically lost Ukraine and truly broke the OstFront (and the fiasco in Kuban before hand). And his unabashed penchant for extermination and quasipaternal care for his exterminating underlings (so that they are not shortchanged of the loot)..
Re: Strategic Options After Kursk
What he never said, rather the contrary.steverodgers801 wrote:he did some good stuff, especially after Stalingrad, but his claims that he could have singlehandedly won the war belong with Guderians claims that he was never a Nazi.
Re: Strategic Options After Kursk
Their opponents would disagree because they were tough divisions to fight.ljadw wrote:The SS divisions in the west were not better than the army divisions : LSS was useless, DR was not much better,
Re: Strategic Options After Kursk
Which is something irrelevant : the army divisions also were tough .
Re: Strategic Options After Kursk
How should one catalogue some one as Guderian who during the war accepted Adolf's money,and after the war was saying : it is all the fault of Adolf ?steinmetz wrote:What he never said, rather the contrary.steverodgers801 wrote:he did some good stuff, especially after Stalingrad, but his claims that he could have singlehandedly won the war belong with Guderians claims that he was never a Nazi.
Let's see :the word starts with hypo and is ending with crite.
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Re: Strategic Options After Kursk
steinmetz -- We're not interested in repartee exchanges here. Please start including facts and sources in your posts.
Re: Strategic Options After Kursk
Which contradicts the posting in which you stated ss divisions were useless. Now they are suddenly as tough as army divisions.ljadw wrote:Which is something irrelevant : the army divisions also were tough .
The truth is that the best divisions in Normandy were all the mobile divisions, army and SS. The secondrate infantrydivisions were the ones that were the real problem.
Re: Strategic Options After Kursk
You can always try to give a detailed sourced explanation about where he made Hitler responsible for a decision he did not make.ljadw wrote:How should one catalogue some one as Guderian who during the war accepted Adolf's money,and after the war was saying : it is all the fault of Adolf ?steinmetz wrote:What he never said, rather the contrary.steverodgers801 wrote:he did some good stuff, especially after Stalingrad, but his claims that he could have singlehandedly won the war belong with Guderians claims that he was never a Nazi.
Let's see :the word starts with hypo and is ending with crite.
And acepting a wellmerited reward does not mean that Guderian suddenly needed to become uncritical about Hitler, neither during nor after the war. Anyway, Guderian was not the type of personality with an unctrical atitude . All along his career he always spoke his mind, whatever the consequences.
Last edited by steinmetz on 25 Sep 2014, 16:05, edited 2 times in total.
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Re: Strategic Options After Kursk
A repartee post from steinmetz was removed pursuant to the warning at http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 4#p1898644 - DT.
Re: Strategic Options After Kursk
If Marlborough can get a manour for Blenheim 1704 then there is no reason why Guderian should not get a reward also.At least Hitler did not make his commanders dukes.ljadw wrote:How should one catalogue some one as Guderian who during the war accepted Adolf's money,steinmetz wrote:What he never said, rather the contrary.steverodgers801 wrote:he did some good stuff, especially after Stalingrad, but his claims that he could have singlehandedly won the war belong with Guderians claims that he was never a Nazi.
Re: Strategic Options After Kursk
steinmetz wrote:Which contradicts the posting in which you stated ss divisions were useless.ljadw wrote:Which is something irrelevant : the army divisions also were tough .
Now they are suddenly as tough as army divisions.
1)I challenge you to prove that I said that SS divisions were useless
2)I challenge you to prove that I said that the SS divisions were tough : I said,and I said to my point,that they were not better than than the Army divisions .
Re: Strategic Options After Kursk
steinmetz wrote:If Marlborough can get a manour for Blenheim 1704 then there is no reason why Guderian should not get a reward also.At least Hitler did not make his commanders dukes.ljadw wrote:How should one catalogue some one as Guderian who during the war accepted Adolf's money,steinmetz wrote:What he never said, rather the contrary.steverodgers801 wrote:he did some good stuff, especially after Stalingrad, but his claims that he could have singlehandedly won the war belong with Guderians claims that he was never a Nazi.
At least,Marlborough did not steal his manor,as was doing Guderian : he took an estate that belonged to a Polish family .
And here also,you are deliberately misquoting what I said .
Re: Strategic Options After Kursk
I quoted your own statement of 27 juli that LSS was useless and DR not much better.ljadw wrote:steinmetz wrote:Which contradicts the posting in which you stated ss divisions were useless.ljadw wrote:Which is something irrelevant : the army divisions also were tough .
Now they are suddenly as tough as army divisions.
1)I challenge you to prove that I said that SS divisions were useless
2)I challenge you to prove that I said that the SS divisions were tough : I said,and I said to my point,that they were not better than than the Army divisions .
I answered that their opponents rated them as tough and you then replied that armydivisions were also tough which implies you consider SS tough.