Strategic Options After Kursk

[steinmetz]

he did some good stuff, especially after Stalingrad, but his claims that he could have singlehandedly won the war belong with Guderians claims that he was never a Nazi.

What he never said, rather the contrary.

How should one catalogue some one as Guderian who during the war accepted Adolf's money,

If Marlborough can get a manour for Blenheim 1704 then there is no reason why Guderian should not get a reward also.At least Hitler did not make his commanders dukes.

At least,Marlborough did not steal his manor,as was doing Guderian : he took an estate that belonged to a Polish family .


And here also,you are deliberately misquoting what I said .

Guderian stole notting. He was offered land by Hitler as a dotation.As he got a new job not much later, nothing came of the idea of settling as a farmer.
The concept of giving land to victorious generals was not new and does not imply that a commander should become blind to mistakes made by the donator.

[ljadw]

Guderian selected an estate in Poland,of which the owner had been evicted,that's making him a complice of robbery .

[ljadw]

Which is something irrelevant : the army divisions also were tough .

Which contradicts the posting in which you stated ss divisions were useless.


Now they are suddenly as tough as army divisions.

1)I challenge you to prove that I said that SS divisions were useless


2)I challenge you to prove that I said that the SS divisions were tough : I said,and I said to my point,that they were not better than than the Army divisions .

I quoted your own statement of 27 juli that LSS was useless and DR not much better.
I answered that their opponents rated them as tough and you then replied that armydivisions were also tough which implies you consider SS tough.

Saying that the LSS was useless and that DR was not much better is NOT saying that the SS divisions were useless : if I had said that the LSS, DR, HJ,GvB, Hohenstaufen and Frundsberg were useless, than I would have said that the SS divisions were useless .As I did not say this, your claim is false .

When you said that the SS divisions were rated tough by the pponents, I replied that the army divisions also were tough,that DOES not imply that the SS divisions were tough :here also your interpretation is false .

[David Thompson]

ljadw -- The topic is strategic options after Kursk. Please get back to discussing it.

[steverodgers801]

After The Manstein victory in early 43, the Germans could only hope the Soviets kept making the same mistake of attacking where the Germans wanted and over stretching their lines leaving them vulnerable to counter attack. The Soviets showed they would not make the same mistake again. One of the key factors in the success of Bagration is that the Soviets convinced the Germans the attack was coming in the Ukraine and so the Germans prepared for that attack. It came, but after the destruction of AGC and the withdrawal of most German reserves.

[steinmetz]

Which is something irrelevant : the army divisions also were tough .

Which contradicts the posting in which you stated ss divisions were useless.


Now they are suddenly as tough as army divisions.

1)I challenge you to prove that I said that SS divisions were useless


2)I challenge you to prove that I said that the SS divisions were tough : I said,and I said to my point,that they were not better than than the Army divisions .

I quoted your own statement of 27 juli that LSS was useless and DR not much better.
I answered that their opponents rated them as tough and you then replied that armydivisions were also tough which implies you consider SS tough.

Saying that the LSS was useless and that DR was not much better is NOT saying that the SS divisions were useless : if I had said that the LSS, DR, HJ,GvB, Hohenstaufen and Frundsberg were useless, than I would have said that the SS divisions were useless .As I did not say this, your claim is false .

When you said that the SS divisions were rated tough by the pponents, I replied that the army divisions also were tough,that DOES not imply that the SS divisions were tough :here also your interpretation is false .

Weak answer as I originally only contradicted the statement about LSSAH and DR. In addition, by saying that armydivisions ALSO were tough you accept that the SS divisions mentioned were tough or do you not understabd what "also' means.

[steinmetz]

Guderian selected an estate in Poland,of which the owner had been evicted,that's making him a complice of robbery .

As if you care. And he was told where to choose one. Anyway, it does not matter anyway because he got a new job which occuopied him fully.

[steinmetz]

After The Manstein victory in early 43, the Germans could only hope the Soviets kept making the same mistake of attacking where the Germans wanted and over stretching their lines leaving them vulnerable to counter attack. The Soviets showed they would not make the same mistake again. One of the key factors in the success of Bagration is that the Soviets convinced the Germans the attack was coming in the Ukraine and so the Germans prepared for that attack. It came, but after the destruction of AGC and the withdrawal of most German reserves.

Wrong. Within a more flexible approach where you are prepared to give up terrain, there is still scope for largescale counterattacks.
Also makes you less susceptible to deception if you do not force yourself to react to any enemy attack because of not being obsessed about holding onto everything.

[ChrisDR68]

After The Manstein victory in early 43, the Germans could only hope the Soviets kept making the same mistake of attacking where the Germans wanted and over stretching their lines leaving them vulnerable to counter attack. The Soviets showed they would not make the same mistake again. One of the key factors in the success of Bagration is that the Soviets convinced the Germans the attack was coming in the Ukraine and so the Germans prepared for that attack. It came, but after the destruction of AGC and the withdrawal of most German reserves.

Wrong. Within a more flexible approach where you are prepared to give up terrain, there is still scope for largescale counterattacks.
Also makes you less susceptible to deception if you do not force yourself to react to any enemy attack because of not being obsessed about holding onto everything.

Was a more flexible approach possible though?

I've read about the Ukrainian campaign of late 1943/early 1944 and Von Manstein mentions in Lost Victories the fact that Army Group South which he commanded at the time was at least 200,000 soldiers below compliment with replacements few and far between.

Even with a skilful defensive commander such as he the Germans gave up huge chunks of territory eventually retreating to the west bank of the Dnieper River and beyond. Operation Bagration may have been when the heart was torn out of the Ostheer but this preceding campaign was the one that put Army Group Centre in such a vulnerable strategic position in the first place.

[Hauptmannnenkel]

servus all,

few questions:

1. Why is Kurst viewd as a russian "succes" hailing russian strategistits?
Russian High command new where Germany would attack for months, they could prepare their defense in perfection.
Nevertheless they managed to lose much more material and men than Germany. So where is the so called "perfect russian strategy"? Even in a defense position, even with much more soldiers and mateiral, even with more strategic reserve. The russian losses between july and septembe 43 were horrifying compared to german losses, althoug germany couldnt recovr their losses and russia could


2.
After Kursk i dont think that Germany could do anything. A new front was opend in Italy, Troups had to be transfered from the east to the south. Material and Soldiers losses couldnt be replaced. So no chance at ths point.

BEFORE Kurs, i think a "Pattfrieden/Verständnisfrieden" could be reached if Hitler would give the command completly the OKW/OKH. With the material before Kursk, Wehrmacht could - with skillfull feints and retreats (like manstein feb/march 43) - wear down the red army in hugh defensive combats. But even this wouldnt solve the problem, that the allied would open a front in italy or france. and russia was forcing them to do it. and russia knew: at the point where germany had to fought on multiple fronts, the war is over.

[steinmetz]

After The Manstein victory in early 43, the Germans could only hope the Soviets kept making the same mistake of attacking where the Germans wanted and over stretching their lines leaving them vulnerable to counter attack. The Soviets showed they would not make the same mistake again. One of the key factors in the success of Bagration is that the Soviets convinced the Germans the attack was coming in the Ukraine and so the Germans prepared for that attack. It came, but after the destruction of AGC and the withdrawal of most German reserves.

Wrong. Within a more flexible approach where you are prepared to give up terrain, there is still scope for largescale counterattacks.
Also makes you less susceptible to deception if you do not force yourself to react to any enemy attack because of not being obsessed about holding onto everything.

Was a more flexible approach possible though?

I've read about the Ukrainian campaign of late 1943/early 1944 and Von Manstein mentions in Lost Victories the fact that Army Group South which he commanded at the time was at least 200,000 soldiers below compliment with replacements few and far between.

Even with a skilful defensive commander such as he the Germans gave up huge chunks of territory eventually retreating to the west bank of the Dnieper River and beyond. Operation Bagration may have been when the heart was torn out of the Ostheer but this preceding campaign was the one that put Army Group Centre in such a vulnerable strategic position in the first place.

Manstein would have fought a completely different campaign in which there would have been no attempt at holding an overlong line with Insufficient forces. Losing a lot of terrrain was always inevitable.

[steinmetz]

servus all,

few questions:

1. Why is Kurst viewd as a russian "succes" hailing russian strategistits?
Russian High command new where Germany would attack for months, they could prepare their defense in perfection.
Nevertheless they managed to lose much more material and men than Germany. So where is the so called "perfect russian strategy"? Even in a defense position, even with much more soldiers and mateiral, even with more strategic reserve. The russian losses between july and septembe 43 were horrifying compared to german losses, althoug germany couldnt recovr their losses and russia could


2.
After Kursk i dont think that Germany could do anything. A new front was opend in Italy, Troups had to be transfered from the east to the south. Material and Soldiers losses couldnt be replaced. So no chance at ths point.

BEFORE Kurs, i think a "Pattfrieden/Verständnisfrieden" could be reached if Hitler would give the command completly the OKW/OKH. With the material before Kursk, Wehrmacht could - with skillfull feints and retreats (like manstein feb/march 43) - wear down the red army in hugh defensive combats. But even this wouldnt solve the problem, that the allied would open a front in italy or france. and russia was forcing them to do it. and russia knew: at the point where germany had to fought on multiple fronts, the war is over.

There is a lot of sense in this.

[hauptman]

None.

Nazi Germany had too many powerful enemies which would overwhelm them with men and material. The Wehrmacht had shot its bolt in 1941. Germany was not prepared for a long war, let alone one of attrition. Manpower, arms, and resources to produce those arms were not adequate for the level of fighting needed to fight the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain.

Germany lost in the east when Barbarossa failed. Then of course, Hitler's decision to involve more than one enemy was the real reason for Germany's defeat. Bismarck created the German empire by isolating Germany's enemies one by one. The Kaiser and Hitler lost because they failed to follow Bismarck's ability to isolate enemies. It is simple as that.

[BDV]

Germany lost in the east when Barbarossa failed. Then of course, Hitler's decision to involve more than one enemy was the real reason for Germany's defeat. Bismarck created the German empire by isolating Germany's enemies one by one. The Kaiser and Hitler lost because they failed to follow Bismarck's ability to isolate enemies. It is simple as that.

Failure to properly assist their Allies was another.

[Graeme Sydney]

servus all,

few questions:

1. Why is Kurst viewd as a russian "succes" hailing russian strategistits?
Russian High command new where Germany would attack for months, they could prepare their defense in perfection.
Nevertheless they managed to lose much more material and men than Germany. So where is the so called "perfect russian strategy"? Even in a defense position, even with much more soldiers and mateiral, even with more strategic reserve. The russian losses between july and septembe 43 were horrifying compared to german losses, althoug germany couldnt recovr their losses and russia could


2.
After Kursk i dont think that Germany could do anything. A new front was opend in Italy, Troups had to be transfered from the east to the south. Material and Soldiers losses couldnt be replaced. So no chance at ths point.

BEFORE Kurs, i think a "Pattfrieden/Verständnisfrieden" could be reached if Hitler would give the command completly the OKW/OKH. With the material before Kursk, Wehrmacht could - with skillfull feints and retreats (like manstein feb/march 43) - wear down the red army in hugh defensive combats. But even this wouldnt solve the problem, that the allied would open a front in italy or france. and russia was forcing them to do it. and russia knew: at the point where germany had to fought on multiple fronts, the war is over.

There is a lot of sense in this.

No one say it wasn't possible, it just wasn't probable - and is outside the scope of history and into the land of wishful thinking.